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Abstract 
For a decade, the EU and NATO have both claimed to have a relationship purported 
to be a ‘Strategic Partnership’. However, this relationship is widely understood by 
both academics and practitioners to be problematic. Although not denying that the 
relationship is problematic, it is claimed here that the argument, whereby the EU and 
NATO simply do not cooperate, is very limited in its value. In fact, it is argued that 
the two organisations cooperate far more, albeit less efficiently, outside of the formal 
Agreed Framework for cooperation. According to the formal rules of Berlin 
Plus/Agreed Framework (BP/AF), the EU and NATO should not cooperate at all 
outside of the Bosnia Herzegovina (ALTHEA) context. This is clearly not the case. 
The fundamental aim of this thesis is to investigate how this cooperation - beyond 
the BP/AF – has emerged. Above all, it asks, within a context where formal EU-
NATO cooperation is ruled out, what type of cooperation is emerging? This thesis 
attempts to explain the creation and performance of the informal EU-NATO 
institutional relationship beyond Berlin Plus. 
This thesis, drawing on insights from historical institutionalist theory and by 
investigating EU-NATO cooperation in counter-piracy, Kosovo and Afghanistan, puts 
forward three general arguments. First, in order for informal EU-NATO cooperation 
to take place outside of the BP/AF, cooperation is driven spatially away from the 
central political tools of Brussels, towards the common operational areas and 
hierarchically downwards to the international staffs and, in particular, towards the 
operational personnel. Second, although the key assumptions of historical 
institutionalism (path dependency, punctuated equilibrium and critical junctures) help 
to explain the stasis of the EU-NATO relationship at the broad political and strategic 
level, a more complete understanding of the relationship is warranted. Including 
theoretical assumptions of incremental change helps to explain the informal 
cooperation that is now driving EU-NATO relations beyond Berlin Plus. Finally, this 
thesis makes the fundamental claim that the processes of incremental change 
through informal cooperation reinforce the current static formal political and strategic 
relationship. Events and operational necessity are driving incremental change far 
more than any theoretical debates about where the EU ends and NATO begins. Until 
events force a situation whereby both organisations must revisit the formal structures 
of cooperation, the static relationship will continue to exist, reinforced by sporadically 
releasing the political pressure valve expedited through the processes of informal 
cooperation. If the EU and NATO are to truly achieve a ‘Strategic Partnership’, it will 
stem from an existential security critical juncture and not from internal evolutionary 
processes.  
Key Words: European Union, NATO, Common Security and Defence Policy, Historical 
Institutionalism, Transatlantic Security, International Organisations, European Security. 
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Chapter One 
Introducing the Research Design and Methodology 
 
Introduction 
 
The EU and NATO have had formal institutional relations since 1999.1 However, an 
informal relationship between the two organisations has existed since at least 1996 
and, it could be argued, even earlier. Today, official texts and communiqués speak of 
a relationship whereby the ‘two organizations share common strategic interests and 
cooperate in a spirit of complementarity and partnership’2 or that ‘the EU and NATO 
have built a genuine strategic partnership that is now well established and deep-
rooted’ (NATO Office of Information and Press).3 However, this relationship is widely 
understood by both academics and practitioners to be problematic. In fact, the formal 
relationship has become effectively a straitjacket for EU-NATO cooperation, since 
the EU will not meet formally with NATO to discuss issues that fall outside of the 
formal framework for cooperation (currently, the only operation ALTHEA in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina) without all 284 of its members present. Yet both the EU and NATO 
have conducted various missions in common areas of operation. This suggests that 
there could be cooperation outside of the formal structures. Therefore, the 
fundamental objective of this thesis is to investigate for evidence of EU-NATO 
cooperation beyond the formal structures, often referred to as the Agreed 
Framework, and how that cooperation has evolved despite the political blockage that 
                                            
1
 Please see: European Union Council Cologne, 3-4 June 1999; European Council Helsinki, 10-11 
December; The Washington Declaration, 23-24 April 1999. 
2
 As outlined in NATO-EU: a strategic partnership on the NATO Website. Available at: 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49217.htm. 
3
 As outlined in EU-NATO: The Framework For Permanent Relations on the ESDP website. Available 
at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/03-11-
11%20Berlin%20Plus%20press%20note%20BL.pdf. 
4
 Please note that the EU had a membership of 27 (and not 28) during the majority of the time that the 
research for this thesis was being conducted. 
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prima facie should exclude such cooperation. In order to do this effectively, this 
thesis will elucidate the EU-NATO relationship comprehensively and unpack the 
discrepancies between the rhetoric and reality of this relationship. To be clear, it is 
the EU-NATO relationship beyond the formal agreements that is the focus of the 
thesis and it asks the following: Within a context where formal cooperation is ruled 
out, what kind of cooperation is emerging?  
This thesis, drawing on insights from historical institutionalism, puts forward three 
general arguments to this question. First, in order for informal EU-NATO cooperation 
to take place outside of the Berlin Plus and Agreed Framework (BP/AF), cooperation 
is driven spatially away from the central political tools of Brussels, towards the 
common operational areas and hierarchically downwards to the international staffs 
and, in particular, towards the operational personnel responsible for such operations. 
Second, although the key assumptions of historical institutionalism (path 
dependency, punctuated equilibrium and critical junctures) help to explain the 
creation and the persistence of the BP/AF at the macro level, these analytical tools 
are less useful when it comes to investigating EU-NATO cooperation where formal 
cooperation is ruled out. For this, we need to consider processes of incremental 
change, learning and socialisation. Finally, this thesis makes the fundamental claim 
that these processes of incremental change through informal cooperation, in fact, 
reinforce the stasis of the current formal political/strategic relationship. Events and 
operational necessity are driving incremental change far more than any theoretical 
debates about where the EU ends and NATO begins. Until such events force a 
situation whereby both organisations must revisit the formal structures of 
cooperation, the static relationship will continue to exist, reinforced by sporadically 
releasing the political pressure valve which is expedited through processes of 
informal cooperation. 
This first chapter aims to accomplish the following. First, it will establish the 
significance of the subject matter under investigation, and present the general 
research puzzle and research questions. Second, this chapter will present both the 
analytical and empirical focus. It will then lead on to the methodology and case 
selection criteria before finally outlining the structure of the thesis going forward.  
 
15 
 
The Rationale 
 
Since events at the 1998 St Malo summit helped clear the path for the creation of the 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP),5 the question of how much 
autonomy ESDP should have vis-à-vis NATO has been central to both the 
transatlantic and internal European debates. Since St Malo, ESDP has carried out 
missions within and outside Europe, both autonomously and with recourse to NATO 
assets through the Berlin Plus agreement. 
Research undertaken on the current relationship between the EU and NATO has 
shown that structured cooperation is effectively blocked at the political level in 
Brussels owing mainly, but not exclusively, to an external conflict between Turkey 
and Cyprus. Since the finalisation of the Berlin Plus agreements in 2003, the EU has 
conducted two missions, one completed and one ongoing (Concordia and ALTHEA), 
through that mechanism. Yet, military operations that would seem to be ideally suited 
and closer to the original intentions of Berlin Plus have been conducted without 
recourse to NATO assets (Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
and Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA in Eastern Chad & Central African Republic). 
There are also ongoing crisis management operations where both the EU and NATO 
are deployed in the same space, albeit performing different tasks, but no formal 
institutionalised agreement is in place to facilitate their joint efforts. 
Realist and functionalist analyses have helped to explain the top level barriers to 
cooperation, but what is lacking in the literature is an investigation into the 
cooperation taking place in mission areas where no Berlin Plus agreements have 
been implemented, or where they may be deemed inappropriate, and why Berlin 
Plus has persisted (even though it has been referred to as a ‘straitjacket’). It has 
been a decade since any new EU operation has been agreed and conducted 
through Berlin Plus. Therefore, it is appropriate for the EU, NATO, as well as 
academics, to investigate its relevance. 
Since 1999, the EU and NATO have attempted to cooperate on various issues 
and in a range of different types of operations. Cooperation between the two 
                                            
5
 Please note that the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) changed to the Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) after the signing of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. The acronyms are 
often used interchangeably in this thesis. 
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organisations is seen in both the academic literature and by policy-makers as 
problematic in light of the common challenges which face both institutions. The 
Berlin Plus arrangement, finalised in 2003, is the only structured and institutionalised 
form of cooperation between the EU and NATO. This arrangement has been 
successful in enabling structured cooperation in two EU-led missions to date: the EU 
mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and the EU mission in Macedonia. 
However, further attempts at cooperation have been thwarted due to political 
controversy and operational deficiency. Therefore, cooperation outside Berlin Plus 
should not exist.  
Historical institutionalism: Institutionalist literature has three main variants in 
Political Science, namely rational choice institutionalism (RCI), sociological 
institutionalism (SI) and historical institutionalism (HI). HI is a pluralistic approach 
that combines insights from RCI and SI, while adding a distinctive interpretation that 
relies upon historical interpretation to ask how institutions shape political behaviour 
and outcomes over time. HI posits the idea that policy choices made when an 
institution is being formed, or when a policy is being initiated, will have a continuing 
and largely determinate influence over policy far into the future. This phenomenon is 
termed path dependency. HI defines institutions as rules, both formal rules and 
organisations, as well as informal rules and norms. This distinction is important as it 
determines just which actors are involved in the decision-making process and their 
strategic behaviour. HI stresses agency (i.e. it allows for choice within institutional 
settings) but emphasises that choice is conditioned by that setting (and notably by 
expectations, socialisation and, more formally, rules which endure over time). How 
an actor behaves depends on the individual, the context and the rule. Investigators 
pursuing an HI approach go to the historical record (utilising methods such as 
process tracing) to try and determine whether or not decisions taken were self-
interested (i.e. rational), altruistic/collective, or simply habitual. Finally, HI looks at the 
mechanisms of institutional change and how ideas are influential within the 
institutional setting. 
HI addresses the following: (1) The behaviour of actors at different stages of 
institutional development - for instance, at the pre-institutional, the design and 
persistence stages. Each is relevant to the historical development of not only Berlin 
Plus but the EU-NATO relationship as a whole. (2) What institutions do. By looking at 
all three stages, HI helps to determine how institutional constraints have shaped 
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outcomes. Here, institutions are seen to provide certainty of expectations ('the 
shadow of the future'), as well as moral and cognitive templates to guide behaviour. 
The choice in favour of Berlin Plus is thus explainable as a consequence of previous 
patterns of interaction between NATO and the EU and, therefore, we should expect 
to find that any processes of cooperation beyond the Berlin Plus context could also 
be explainable as a consequence of previous patterns of interaction as set by the 
formation and persistence of that framework. The functional purposes of the 
mechanism might, similarly, be viewed as a functional extension of existing 
prerogatives. That these are problematic, meanwhile, can be viewed as a 
consequence of institutional inefficiencies which have been carried forward. (3) 
Institutional persistence. HI permits a dependency analysis of Berlin Plus. This has 
both a rational dimension ('sunk costs') and sociological one (Berlin Plus obtains the 
character of a social institution). 
It is assumed that a good degree of informal decision shaping and making will be 
discovered between the two organisations. Therefore, this study considers the EU-
NATO relationship as a holistic one and assumes this relationship to be an institution 
in its own right, as well as the individual EU and NATO sub-sets of institutions and 
collections of bureaucracies. As will be outlined in more detail within the chapter that 
lays out the analytical framework, this thesis assumes an institution in the broad 
sense and will operationalise EU-NATO cooperation as a formal institution with 
formal bureaucratic structures, formal rules and operating procedures, while also 
allowing for the informal norms and practices that underline any ad hoc and informal 
EU-NATO cooperation.  
By approaching the EU-NATO relationship holistically, the analysis is not reduced 
or limited. It is assumed that there are many subset relationships contained within 
this holistic context or umbrella EU-NATO framework and these will be actively 
investigated as a means to explain the wider EU-NATO relationship. The EU-NATO 
relationship has often been described by observers as problematic, but this thesis is 
not designed to test or quantify the problematic relationship as a dependent or 
independent variable per se. The thesis is purposefully using this description only as 
a starting point. The base line of this thesis is that there is a formal relationship 
between the EU and NATO but, although it persists as the only formal structure for 
cooperation, both institutionally and operationally, it is very limited in its use. 
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Furthermore, cooperation outside of this context should be ruled out and, therefore, 
this thesis problematises cooperation outside of that formal structure.  
By first establishing that the formal EU-NATO framework of Berlin Plus/Agreed 
Framework (BP/AF) is blocked and therefore problematic for facilitating EU-NATO 
cooperation post 2004, key questions arise: Does EU-NATO cooperation take place 
outside of the BP/AF? If so, why and how does EU-NATO cooperation proceed when 
the formal mechanisms for cooperation are supposedly blocked at the political and 
strategic level? Or, to put it another way, with regard to the formal relationship (the 
Agreed Framework), it would appear that the EU-NATO relationship has remained 
stagnant and unchanged since the Berlin Plus arrangements were finalised in 2003 
(barring the decision to add the EU Cell and NATO Permanent Liaison Team in 
2005). But, is it the case that the EU-NATO relationship has been fixed on a course 
of inertia unchanged in its current format as the academic literature suggests? Given 
the fact that both the EU and NATO have missions in the same operational spaces 
(Kosovo, Afghanistan and Counter-Piracy of the Horn of Africa), but without a 
notable change to the Agreed Framework, this would seem to suggest that the 
formal relationship is not the whole story.  
Therefore, it is appropriate to investigate whether the static Agreed Framework is 
indeed the entire picture, or whether there could be elements of incremental change 
taking place within a broader understanding of EU-NATO relations. In other words, is 
there an adaptive, interactive, and interdependent evolutionary process between 
individuals, micro-level institutions and the organisations as a whole going on below 
the surface of the seemingly stagnant formal and Agreed Framework? If so, how has 
any cooperation outside of the BP/AF evolved? To what extent is the BP/AF the 
normative and institutional reference point for EU and NATO actors attempting to 
cooperate outside the formal structures? What are the conditions for the growth of 
cooperation outside the BP/AF? Finally, if there are micro processes of evolutionary 
change transpiring, then what impact does this have on the EU-NATO at the macro 
static level? This is the lacuna that this thesis aims to address. What this thesis 
claims is that the argument, one so often purported, whereby the EU and NATO just 
do not cooperate, is very limited in its value. In fact, the EU and NATO cooperate a 
great deal; it is just not predominately within the formal mechanisms. As Steinmo 
suggests, evolutionary approaches move beyond equilibrium methodologies 
because ‘any given institutional arrangement is part of an adaptive process in which 
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multiple agents operate within a dynamic context’ (Steinmo, 2010, p. 16). Therefore, 
it is assumed that, by looking at EU-NATO cooperation within an historical context 
and within its specific operational environment, a more accurate picture of this 
relationship will emerge. 
 
Methodology 
 
This thesis utilises historical institutionalism (HI), premised on an assumption that 
institutional settings have a historical quality that influences their conception and 
development. It utilises the notion of path dependency to suggest that institutional 
formation is a consequence of prior choices (such that options are narrowed) and 
that subsequent institutional development proceeds in a manner partly determined 
by the circumstances of an institution’s foundation. This approach has enjoyed 
considerable influence in the study of Comparative Politics to explain cross-national 
variations (Pierson, 2007, 2000; Steinmo, 2010; Steinmo et al., 1992; Thelen, 1999) 
and has had a growing impact in International Relations – being used, for instance, 
to plot over time the development of EU external action (Smith, 2004; Juncos, 2007). 
However, this thesis proposes that, although the key assumptions of historical 
institutionalism (path dependency, punctuated equilibrium and critical junctures) help 
to explain the creation and the persistence of the BP/AF at the macro level, these 
analytical tools are less useful when it comes to investigating EU-NATO cooperation 
where formal cooperation is ruled out, i.e. the type of cooperation that is being 
problematised in this investigation. 
This thesis, therefore, follows a qualitative case study approach and is premised 
on an interpretivist epistemology, which is derived from the general research 
questions outlined above and clearly generated by the analytical framework in the 
next chapter. An interpretivist approach is one whereby observation techniques are 
employed ‘which seek to make sense of actors’ actions and language within their 
natural setting’ (Williams, 2000, p. 210). Furthermore, this epistemology is justified 
as this thesis investigates the EU-NATO relationship and informal cooperation 
between them by directly engaging with those actors who work and socially interact 
within an EU-NATO context. The research questions also determine the process of 
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data collection outlined below. These include: secondary and primary 
documentation, interviewing techniques and process tracing. 
HI involves an inductive method through the collection of qualitative data in order 
to ascertain trends in institutional development. Such data, in turn, permit the use of 
process tracing – a means by which causal processes of institutional development 
might be inferred (George and Bennett, 2005) through the accumulation of materials 
derived from primary documents, interviews and secondary literatures. Process 
tracing can be understood as a ‘detailed narrative or story presented in the form of a 
chronicle that purports to throw light on how an event came about’ (George and 
Bennett, 2005, p. 210). In the context of this thesis, process tracing allows the 
researcher to investigate and interpret the steps and processes that led to EU-NATO 
informal cooperation outside the BP/AF context, as well as the conditions for the 
growth of that cooperation. The process-tracing approach has led, in this 
investigation, to the observation that not only does path dependency help us to 
understand the mechanisms of stasis in the EU-NATO relationship at the macro 
level, but also how learning and socialisation have contributed to processes of 
incremental change in the relationship. Furthermore, a process tracing approach 
helps to understand the relationship between the HI causal mechanism of path 
dependency, which led to stasis, while juxtaposing this with the casual mechanisms 
of incremental change, learning and socialisation that are linked to processes of 
informal cooperation. As a qualitative method, process tracing allows the researcher 
to acquire and interpret data that may have linkages and connections. It has been 
noted that process tracing allows ‘for the study of complex causal relationships such 
as those characterised by multiple causality, feedback loops, path dependencies, 
tipping points, and complex interaction effects’ (Falleti, 2006, p. 13). Ultimately, 
process tracing enables the researcher to unravel the connections between events 
and situations in a methodical manner (Haastrup, 2010). 
 
Table 1.1: List of Primary and Secondary Sources 
Primary Sources: 
EU Treaties 
ESDP/CSDP Presidency Conclusions 
EU Council Decisions 
EU Council Joint Actions 
Political and Security Committee Decisions 
EU Operation Factsheets 
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NATO Summit Declarations 
NATO Strategic Concepts 
NAC Ministerial Decision Sheets 
NATO Terms of Reference Sheets 
NATO and EU Memorandums of Understanding 
Joint EU-NATO Secretary General & High Representative Letters 
Internal SHAPE Decision Sheets 
Internal EU and NATO Permanent Representation Non-Papers 
Internal Political Correspondence 
Internal Reports and Memos 
UNSC Resolutions 
Speeches 
Press Releases 
Internal EU and NATO reports and presentations 
European Union Institute for Security Studies publications 
NATO Review Publications 
Secondary Sources: 
Academic Literature (Books, Journals, Blogs) 
Newspaper Articles 
PhD Theses 
Official Briefing Reports from various think tanks and policy organisations 
As Yin notes, a ‘case study does not imply the use of a particular type of 
evidence. Case studies can be done by using either qualitative or quantitative 
evidence. The evidence may come from fieldwork, archival records, verbal reports, 
observations, or any combination of these’ (Yin, 1981, p. 58). Furthermore, he notes 
that a case study is an ‘empirical inquiry’ and it is an investigation of a ‘contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context’ (Yin, 2003, p. 13). One benefit of employing 
a research framework that utilises the case study approach is that it permits ‘a 
holistic observation of the phenomenon being investigated’ (Andrade, 2009; 
Creswell, 2009; Haastrup, 2010).  
Case selection is always a real challenge for case study research design 
(Creswell, 2007). Clearly, if this thesis is pursuing an investigation of EU-NATO 
cooperation where formal cooperation is ruled out, then case studies have to be 
chosen where the formal relationship or the BP/AF is not present. However, further 
rationale informing the case study selection of counter-piracy, Kosovo and 
Afghanistan is warranted. First, these are all cases where both the EU and NATO 
are operating in common operational areas and, therefore, cooperation is potentially 
possible. It should also be noted that these cases involve areas of operation with 
much different levels of hostility and belligerence on the ground. The selection of 
these three cases also allowed for an investigation of cooperation in a broad 
spectrum of operational types, i.e. military to military cooperation, civilian to military 
22 
 
cooperation and, in the case of Afghanistan, cooperation that existed in a real 
complex mixture of different civilian and military postures.  
The three case studies were also chosen because they represented the best 
possible temporal examples to search for the evolution of cooperation and the 
conditions of informal cooperation due to the length of their respective missions. 
However, there were other possibilities. For example, potential EU-NATO 
cooperation in Darfur, where both organisations supported the African Union’s 
Mission in Sudan (AMIS), was a potential case study. However, owing to the fact that 
both the EU and NATO missions lasted less than two years, this particular case did 
not fit the temporal assumptions of HI as outlined in the chapter devoted to the 
analytical framework. A case study design is also appropriate for an analytical 
approach based on the assumptions of HI because it teases out the appropriate 
observations for analysis in a historical/temporal context to which this approach is 
inclined (Haastrup, 2010). Ultimately, what are being investigated are potential cases 
where new rules have been created whereby agents are creative enough, over time, 
to adapt to the limits of BP/AF (because formal cooperation has been ruled out). 
Finally, these three case studies were the best options allowing for the 
hierarchical and spatial approach this investigation outlines. The assumption here is 
that cooperation will be most prominent away from the political strategic level and 
hierarchically downwards towards the international staffs (and especially the 
operational agents); also, spatially away from the central tools of Brussels towards 
operational HQs and the areas of operation. All three case studies provided 
opportunities to investigate for cooperation between three levels of different actors: 
political/strategic, international staff working in Brussels, and actors working on the 
ground in an operational context. Furthermore, any evidence of the 
institutionalisation of cooperation was also expected to take place most prominently 
hierarchically downwards towards the international staffs and especially the 
operational agents and, again, also spatially away from the central tools of Brussels 
towards operational HQs and the areas of operation. 
The interviews for this thesis were numerous (72). Addressing the research 
questions meant conducting interviews with actors that were attached to, or involved 
in, the negotiation periods leading up to the inception of Berlin Plus and the Agreed 
Framework as a whole. This posed certain challenges, the most obvious being the 
locating of those individuals who may have relocated or changed jobs. A second 
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issue of concern in this regard was the reliability of memories as they pertain to the 
subject; these negotiations took place over 12 years ago in some instances. 
However, the most challenging aspect was to structure a line of questioning that 
adequately adopted the assumptions of historical institutionalism into the collection 
of empirical data. For example, it was necessary to formulate questions that not only 
sought to address exogenous interests, but that also took into account any 
endogenous interests as well as any learning processes that had occurred. For 
example, questions that tried to juxtapose how actors might attempt to cooperate 
beyond the BP/AF due to functional or situational necessity, while simultaneously 
being constrained by the limitations of the BP/AF due to exogenous political 
interests. Furthermore, it was important to design questions that accounted not only 
for the traditional assumptions of HI, such as path dependency, but also for 
assumptions of incremental change, learning and socialisation.  
Addressing the research questions also involved interviewing a variety of actors. 
The selection list of interlocutors was chosen so that they would be representative of 
the totality of the three levels of practitioners within the EU-NATO umbrella (political 
strategic/international staffs, both civilian and military, and operational, civilian and 
military) and in line with the hierarchical and spatial approach. The research involved 
interviews with personnel who work, or have worked, within the political-military 
institutions of both CFSP/ESDP and NATO. Furthermore, it was necessary to 
conduct interviews with actors representing states that had joint membership with 
both the EU and NATO, but also those who are members of one organisation but not 
the other. This was vital in assessing what effect working inside both Berlin Plus 
operations and non-Berlin Plus operations had on those actors not party to the total 
amount of available intelligence, as well as to assess whether the BP/AF was as an 
institutional and/or normative reference point for those actors attempting to 
cooperate where the BP/AF was not present. This raised obvious problems of time 
and logistics. However, numerous research trips were conducted in Brussels and at 
both EU and NATO operational HQs over the research period. 
The total number of interviews with EU interlocutors was 30 and a total of 37 with 
NATO. The remaining four consisted of: two DSACEURs, two DSACEUR aides 
(both double-hatted EU/NATO), UK MOD officials and an interlocutor with the US 
Mission to the EU. With regard to the three levels of analysis, 19 interviews were 
conducted with actors working at the political/strategic level, 30 working at the 
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international staff level (both civilian and military personnel), and 23 interviews were 
conducted with operational level personnel (both civilian and military) working in all 
three case studies devoted to informal and non BP/AF cooperation. In order to 
properly set the baseline chapter of the formal EU-NATO relationship, interviews 
were also conducted with actors who worked within the BP/AF context; specifically 
those actors involved with the CONCORDIA and ALTHEA missions. This was also 
imperative for investigating to what extent these actors and institutional linkages 
overlap between the formal and informal environments.  
Those interviews conducted at the political/strategic level were with staff working 
within the permanent representations to either NATO or the EU. They ranged from 
the ambassador level down to counsellor grade. At the international staff level, 
interviews were conducted with interlocutors working within NATO HQ, SHAPE, 
EUMS, CMPD, the Commission, CPCC, the EU Cell at SHAPE, EU Staff Group at 
SHAPE, and the European Security and Defence College. Interviews were also 
conducted with the permanent liaison teams that work between the two 
organisations. These interviews ranged from NATO Secretary General level, NATO 
Assistant Secretary General level, Political Affairs sections, Political/Military Affairs 
units, Crisis Management, Heads of Section, Defence Policy and Planning, and 
down to Counsellor level. Finally, interviews with operational level interlocutors 
ranged from EU and NATO Operational Political Advisors, Branch Heads, Legal 
Advisors, Military Cooperation Units, Chief of Staff, Political Advisors to Head of 
Missions as well as Operational Commanders.  
Although this list of interviews is a comprehensive sweep of the EU and NATO as 
a whole, as well as the sub-set of institutional arrangements, both in terms of 
hierarchy and spatially representative of all three levels, and from the centre 
(Brussels) to the periphery (in-theatre), financial and time limitations meant that 
interviews with actors from some bodies were not possible. The most important of 
these, in terms of EU-NATO cooperation, would be the European Defence Agency 
(EDA) and Allied Command Transformation – NATO (ACT). Multiple attempts were 
made to secure interviews both with the Chief Executives and POLADS, but to no 
avail. However, as this research was focused primarily on EU-NATO cooperation in 
the field of crisis management, it is hoped that this shortcoming will not impact the 
overall significance of the data. It is worth noting, however, that cooperation in the 
area of defence procurement and the defence markets would make for a further 
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interesting study; this is especially so since ‘smart defence’ and ‘pooling and sharing’ 
have become a central focus for both organisations in lieu of the recent economic 
and austerity constraints impacting member states. 
Some other methodological issues are also worth mentioning. First, securing 
interviews was a difficult challenge. However, added to this problem was the difficulty 
involved in trying to secure actors that were working in the institutions in the early 
creation stages of the EU-NATO relationship. Often, staff had moved on or were 
impossible to locate. However, although this was a limitation, it is believed that 
enough of the interlocutors interviewed were present in the earlier stages of the 
relationship formation. What was particularly helpful was that some of these 
individuals had worked in one IO before being posted to the other. This also helped 
objectively, as they could put the relationship into perspective from the institutional 
and organisational constraint posed by working in such an environment. 
 One aspect of the data collection that was particularly troublesome was getting 
access to classified information. Often, interlocutors would have to summarise 
documents as they were not able to show the actual document due to classified 
restrictions. Interestingly, this applied not only to the Berlin Plus documents, Terms 
of Reference and other Memorandums of Understanding concerning the formal 
Agreed Framework, but also to many of the documents that were ‘worked out’ in the 
field to accommodate for the lack of an official EU-NATO relationship in that specific 
area of operation. This was particularly the case with both the Kosovo and the 
Afghanistan case studies. The sensitivities involved in having commanders in the 
field even to put their signatures on the same document were so delicate that often 
attempts at these agreements were delayed for long periods of time. Furthermore, as 
they dealt with modalities and procedures for issues such as protection and 
evacuation, sensitive information exchanges, intelligence, medical support and even 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs), the ability for the researcher to look at the 
actual document was very limited. 
Finally, interviews were conducted with personnel connected to each case study 
in this thesis. However, due to the particular hostile environment in Afghanistan and 
the Gulf of Aden, as well as budget constraints, the author was not able to visit these 
particular geographical regions. However, it was possible to visit all of the other 
active operational HQs as part of the research, including KFOR and EULEX in 
Kosovo and Northwood with regard to ATALANTA and Ocean Shield.  
26 
 
 
Outline of the Thesis 
 
Chapter One introduced the empirical topic under investigation and the analytical 
focus that will be employed to carry out this investigation. The former is the EU-
NATO relationship and cooperation between the two posts of the BP/AF. The latter is 
a framework of analysis based on the assumptions of historical institutionalism. The 
fundamental objective of this thesis is to investigate for evidence of EU-NATO 
cooperation beyond the formal structures, often referred to as the Agreed 
Framework, and how that cooperation has evolved despite the political blockage that 
prima facie should exclude such cooperation. 
This chapter then outlined the three key arguments put forth in this thesis. First, in 
order for informal EU-NATO cooperation to take place outside of the BP/AF, 
cooperation is driven spatially away from the central political tools of Brussels, out 
towards the common operational areas and hierarchically downwards to the 
international staffs and, in particular, towards the operational personnel responsible 
for such operations. Second, although the key assumptions of historical 
institutionalism (path dependency, punctuated equilibrium and critical junctures) help 
to explain the creation and the persistence of the BP/AF at the macro level, these 
analytical tools are less useful when it comes to investigating EU-NATO cooperation 
where formal cooperation is ruled out. For this, we need to consider processes of 
incremental change, learning and socialisation. Finally, this thesis makes the 
fundamental claim that these processes of incremental change through informal 
cooperation, in fact, reinforce the current static formal political and strategic 
relationship. 
This chapter then further clarified the main rationale, the key research questions 
and the central research puzzles that this thesis will address. To reiterate, by first 
establishing that the formal EU-NATO framework of BP/AF is blocked and, therefore, 
problematic for facilitating EU-NATO cooperation post 2004, the central questions 
arise: Does EU-NATO cooperation take place outside of the BP/AF? If so, why and 
how does EU-NATO cooperation proceed when the formal mechanisms for 
cooperation are supposedly blocked at the political and strategic level? Essentially, 
this thesis investigates three contexts (counter-piracy, Kosovo and Afghanistan), 
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where formal cooperation is ruled out, in order to assess what type of cooperation is 
emerging. Therefore, it is assumed that, by looking at EU-NATO cooperation within 
an historical context and within its specific operational environment, a more accurate 
picture of this relationship will emerge. 
The chapter also outlined the theoretical and methodological approach being 
applied to the topic. This thesis utilises HI and is premised on an assumption that 
institutional settings have a historical quality that influences their conception and 
development. It pursues a qualitative case study approach and is premised on an 
interpretivist epistemology, which is derived from the general research questions 
specifically generated by the analytical framework in Chapter Three. Finally, the 
justification of the case study selection was outlined. 
Chapter Two establishes the key empirical puzzle under investigation: Why are 
the formal mechanisms of EU-NATO cooperation (BP/AF) static, while cooperation is 
continuing outside of that context? To set the baseline of the EU-NATO relationship, 
the chapter first outlines the historical trajectory underpinning the EU-NATO Agreed 
Framework, including Berlin Plus. This is critical, as the EU-NATO Agreed 
Framework must be established so that it is clear what the actual formal terms of 
these agreements are before an investigation of EU-NATO cooperation beyond 
Berlin Plus can be initiated. The chapter outlines the historical narrative behind the 
formalisation of the EU-NATO co-operational agreements and then seeks to 
demonstrate how the formal relationship was put into practice. The chapter then 
details the only two cases of formal Berlin Plus operations (CONCORDIA and 
ALTHEA). It then shows that, although the BP/AF persists as the only formal 
mechanism for EU-NATO cooperation, it has not been utilised in any other 
operations and has, therefore, essentially been static since 2004. This leads to the 
central research puzzle informing this thesis: Why does the BP/AF seem to stop or 
become static but cooperation between the EU and NATO does not?   
The aim of Chapter Three is to clearly outline and argue why new institutionalism 
generally, and historical institutionalism more specifically, provide appropriate 
theoretical tools for investigating and analysing the EU-NATO relationship in both its 
formal and informal manifestations. It addresses the main theoretical arguments of 
new institutionalism based on the current literature and how these theories relate to 
the subject area of this research more specifically. It argues that historical 
institutionalism is an appropriate approach by which to tackle this research, as it is a 
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‘pivotal’ approach with one foot in the rationalist camp and another in the sociological 
one. In this way, HI can be developed to focus on the persistence of the EU-NATO 
relationship at its structured formal level while, at the same time, addressing the 
informal institutional procedures, within an historical context, to assess what 
incremental processes are at work within the specific environment in which the EU-
NATO relationship exists.  
This chapter outlines the key assumptions of what are putatively understood to be 
the traditional and central tenets of HI: path dependency, punctuated equilibrium and 
critical junctures. However, it is argued that, although these assumptions help to 
explain the stasis of the EU-NATO relationship at the broad political and strategic 
level, in order to gain a more complete understanding of the EU-NATO relationship, 
the incorporation of assumptions based on an understanding of incremental change, 
facilitated through learning and socialisation, is needed to further explain these 
processes. Theoretical assumptions based on incremental change, learning and 
socialisation are, therefore, outlined in the chapter. Finally, the chapter offers the 
specific research questions that will be investigated in all the three case studies as 
generated from these theoretical assumptions.  
The central focus of Chapter Four is the case study of counter-piracy. This 
chapter draws from the baseline of the BP/AF that was established in Chapter Two, 
and the analytical framework addressed in Chapter Three, to investigate for 
evidence of cooperation beyond the formal structures in a specific area of 
operations, where both the EU and NATO have military operations deployed. This is 
to ascertain whether there are examples of informal norms and practices that 
support informal cooperation between the two organisations. In order to accomplish 
this task, the chapter seeks to analyse a case where both the EU and NATO are 
concurrently conducting very similar military missions in the same area of operations 
but lacking any formal institutions or mechanisms for cooperation. An in-depth 
analysis of cooperation, both at the macro and micro level, in the area of counter-
piracy is undertaken in order to establish the nature of the EU-NATO relationship in 
an informal but operational setting. It seeks to establish any processes of continued 
institutionalisation with the formal relationship and, once these processes are 
established, to compare them to those processes that drove the formal mechanisms 
for cooperation outlined in Chapter Two. In this way, an overall assessment of any 
path-dependent features to the relationship can be teased out while, at the same 
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time, investigating for evidence of incremental change, facilitated by learning and 
socialisation, in the relationship as well. 
The central focus of Chapters Five and Six is the case studies of Kosovo and 
Afghanistan. In order to understand the relationship more fully, an investigation is 
also needed in areas where the EU and NATO are operating in the same mission 
space (and potentially cooperating) but in different capacities. These two case 
studies seek to build on the counter-piracy case study by investigating the 
relationship in two areas where both the EU and NATO are present but conducting 
different types of operations. Therefore, the case studies of Kosovo and Afghanistan 
are critical. Both NATO and the EU are present on the ground in both cases. In 
Kosovo, NATO is conducting a military operation while the EU is engaged with a civil 
rule of law mission. Both operations are significant in size although they operate in a 
relatively non-hostile environment. Kosovo is a particularly interesting case to 
investigate for EU-NATO cooperation beyond Berlin Plus. Although there is no Berlin 
Plus operation in Kosovo, of the three cases in this thesis, Kosovo (and the KFOR 
mission, in particular) seems the most likely candidate for implementing the Berlin 
Plus arrangements. The EU taking over NATO’s KFOR mission - with recourse to 
NATO assets and capabilities - could conceivably be not that different from the way 
Operation Althea is conducted in Bosnia Herzegovina. In the case of Afghanistan, 
the EU is present with a civil police training mission, while NATO/ISAF is responsible 
not only for creating an environment of overall security in the country but also for 
conducting its own police training through its NATO Training Mission Afghanistan. 
However, the EU Police Mission is dwarfed by NATO’s ISAF mission and both 
operate in an extremely hostile environment.  
Chapter Seven is devoted to illustrating the key findings of the empirical analysis 
and the broader significance of the analytical approach. The key empirical findings 
from the case studies will be extrapolated in order to illuminate a more complete 
picture of EU-NATO cooperation than is currently found in the literature. The 
empirical findings demonstrate that a focus on incremental change through informal 
cooperation, as well as the path dependent nature of the formal Agreed Framework, 
leads to a much more complete understanding of how these two organisations 
operate in the common field of security. The theoretical conclusions also comment 
on the overall utility and drawbacks to the analytical approach applied. 
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Conclusion 
 
The objective of the next chapter is to establish they key empirical puzzle under 
investigation. In order to do this, it must first clearly contextualise the EU-NATO 
relationship by outlining the historical trajectory underpinning the EU-NATO Agreed 
Framework, including Berlin Plus. It reveals how the formal relationship was put into 
practice and then demonstrates that, although the BP/AF persists as the only formal 
mechanism for EU-NATO cooperation, it has not been utilised in any other 
operations and has, therefore, essentially been static since 2004. This leads to the 
central research puzzle informing this thesis: Why does the BP/AF seem to stop or 
become static but cooperation between the EU and NATO does not? It is to this 
discussion that the thesis now turns. 
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Chapter Two  
Establishing the Formal EU-NATO Framework 
 
‘Why are NATO-EU relations still so problematic? Why do both 
institutions find it so hard to make the much-talked-about 
"strategic partnership" a reality? My answer to these questions 
is clear and unambiguous. NATO-EU relations have not really 
arrived in the 21st century yet. They are still stuck in the '90s’ 
(Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO Secretary General 2004-2009). 
 
Context & Background  
 
The next section turns to the historical trajectory underpinning the EU-NATO Agreed 
Framework, including the creation of Berlin Plus and the Agreed Framework. It is 
critical to first establish the why, what and when of the EU-NATO Agreed Framework 
and to be clear what the actual formal terms of these agreements are before an 
investigation of EU-NATO cooperation beyond Berlin Plus can be initiated. This 
section lays out the historical narrative behind the formalisation of the EU-NATO co-
operational agreements underpinning the relationship and then seeks to 
demonstrate how the formal relationship was put into practice. To accomplish the 
latter, this chapter will detail briefly the only two cases of formal Berlin Plus 
operations (CONCORDIA and ALTHEA). This chapter will then go on to illustrate 
that, although the BP/AF persists as the only formal mechanism for EU-NATO 
cooperation, it has not been utilised in any other operations apart from ALTHEA and 
has, therefore, essentially been static since 2004. This leads us to the central 
research puzzle informing this thesis: Why does the BP/AF seem to stop or become 
static but cooperation between the EU and NATO does not? However, let us first 
turn to the historical context in which the BP/AF was created. 
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Characterising the EU-NATO Relationship 
 
To understand the context of EU-NATO relations, it is helpful to look at this 
relationship in the context of three broad periods since 1998. The first period of EU-
NATO cooperation is best captured by the reserved and apprehensive view held by 
many in Europe and America. Although there were those who argued that (1) ESDP 
should not be seen as a rival to NATO, (2) autonomy should be encouraged and (3) 
capability duplication should be discouraged, there were also senior officials in the 
George W. Bush administration and many in Europe who were sceptical over an 
ESDP with full-blown autonomy. When leaders such as George W. Bush and Tony 
Blair expressed their approval of ESDP, it was quickly followed by statements that 
‘NATO will remain the essential foundation of transatlantic security.’6  
Since the 1998 St Malo declaration, four ESDP institutional bodies are of note: 
The Political and Security Committee (PSC), the European Union Military Committee 
(EUMC), the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) and, on the civil side, the Civil 
Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC). It is important to highlight that ESDP, and 
especially the military component, is primarily an EU Council competence, although 
it does have responsibilities to the Commission and the European Parliament. It was 
made clear from the start of ESDP that this would be the only way that some 
member states could agree to the initiative. Moreover, any attempts to move ESDP 
military operations into Commission territory would be seen as crossing the ‘red 
lines’ of many member states. 
The PSC is an ambassador -level body created by a Council decision in 2001. It is 
the most important of the post St Malo ESDP bodies and its chief aim is to: ‘keep 
track of the international situation in the areas falling within the common foreign and 
security policy, help define policies by drawing up “opinions” for the Council, either at 
the request of the Council or on its own initiative, and monitor implementation of 
agreed policies’ (EU Core Documents from 1998-2000, 2001, p. 191). 
The EUMC is the ‘highest military level body’ within the ESDP and Council 
structures. The body is made up of all the military chiefs of EU member states and its 
                                            
6
 This quote is taken from a 23 February 2001 joint statement by President George W. Bush and 
Prime Minister Tony Blair. Accessed at: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/02/20010226.html 
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primary obligation is to advise the PSC. EUMS is composed of military and civilian 
experts seconded to the Council Secretariat by the Member States. The CPCC falls 
within the remit of the Council Secretariat and is the permanent structure responsible 
for an autonomous operational conduct of civilian ESDP operations.7 
However, the period 1999 to 2003 was a tumultuous time for both organisations 
as the negotiations for what would eventually be called the Berlin Plus arrangements 
were worked out. These arrangements, based on earlier agreements worked out at a 
1996 Berlin ministerial, were designed to give ‘assured EU access to NATO planning 
capabilities’ in the event of an EU-led crisis management operation. These 
negotiations were delayed due to what has subsequently been termed the 
‘participation problem’ due to existential differences between certain states that are 
either in the EU but not NATO, or vice-versa (Yost, 2007, p. 92).   
The Berlin Plus arrangements were further settled upon in December 2002 owing 
to an agreement whereby Cyprus and Malta,8 then both soon to join the EU, would 
not take part in EU operations that involved ‘using NATO assets’ (EU Core 
Documents from 2002, 2003, p. 171).9 An EU-NATO Joint Declaration was released 
in December 2002 and, in March 2003, both the EU and NATO stated that they had 
finally worked out Berlin Plus (EU Core Documents from 2002, 2003, p. 178; EU 
Core Documents from 2003, 2003, p. 48).10 With compromises and arrangements in 
place to facilitate the EU’s access to NATO planning and capabilities, plans were 
drawn for two EU-led missions in the Balkans: operation CONCORDIA in the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(BiH). To date, of the nine EU military missions conducted since ESDP’s inception, 
these two remain the only operations to be conducted utilising the Berlin Plus 
arrangements. 
                                            
7
 Further information can be obtained by visiting the ESDP website on ESDP structures and 
instruments. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=279&lang=en&mode=g 
8
 This is no longer the case for Malta, as it signed a bilateral security agreement with NATO and 
rejoined the Partnership for Peace programme in April 2008. However, this circumstance still applies 
to Cyprus. 
9
 See: EU Council Meeting, Copenhagen 12 December 2002; Copenhagen European Council 
meeting, 12 and 13 December 2002; North Atlantic Council decisions, 13 December 2002. Available 
at: http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/chai57e.pdf. 
10
 The EU-NATO Joint Declaration available at: http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/chai57e.pdf. 
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The second period of EU-NATO cooperation was characterised by the strategic 
disagreements concerning the post 9/11 world and the fractious diplomacy leading 
up to the Iraq War. Although cooperation at one level progressed within the 
framework of EU missions in Macedonia and Bosnia - missions that, for the first time, 
utilised EU access to NATO assets through the Berlin Plus arrangements - the 
political atmosphere was clouded by events on the international stage. To reiterate, 
the Berlin Plus arrangements were (and still are) the framework through which the 
EU and NATO communicate institutionally and cooperate. Through these 
arrangements, the EU has ‘assured access’ to NATO planning as well as ‘presumed 
access’ to NATO assets and capabilities. The arrangements were first discussed at a 
WEU-NATO ministerial meeting in Berlin (1996). After the NATO-EU Declaration on 
ESDP was announced, and after drawn-out political process, these arrangements 
were finalised on 17 March 2003 (see Table 2.1). However, the lead up to the Iraq 
War brought the different views on ESDP-NATO relations to a boiling point and they 
were branded in an overwhelmingly caricatured fashion (Cornish, 2004). Any hope 
for a political compromise over a strategic partnership between the EU and NATO 
seemed impossible. The French agenda under Chirac was seen as pursuing ESDP 
as an alternative to NATO as the primary forum for discussing global security issues 
while, at the same time, curtailing US hegemonic ambitions (Valasek, 2008, p. 1). On 
the other side of the fence were those European officials drawing ‘red lines’ in the 
sand when it came to marginalising NATO as the primary organisation responsible 
for European security and defence.  
 
Table 2.1 Berlin Plus 
• Assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities able to contribute to military 
planning for EU-led operations; 
 
• The presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO capabilities and 
common assets for use in EU-led operations; 
 
• Identification of a range of European command options for EU-led missions; 
 
• The further adaptation of NATO’s defence planning system to incorporate more 
comprehensively the availability of forces for EU-led operations; 
 
• A NATO-EU agreement covering the exchange of classified information; 
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• Procedures for the release, monitoring, return and recall of NATO assets and 
capabilities; 
 
• NATO-EU consultation arrangements in the context of an EU-led crisis 
management operation making use of NATO assets and capabilities. 
 
The argument over ESDP autonomy reached its zenith with the so-called 
‘Chocolate Summit’. When four EU and NATO member states (Belgium, France, 
Germany and Luxembourg) met and agreed to establish a separate planning 
headquarters for EU missions - something in itself not prohibited by the Berlin Plus 
arrangements if the EU was declared the lead nation in a crisis - this independent 
decision was seen as an ‘attempt to divorce ESDP operations from the need to rely 
on NATO capabilities’ (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 2008). Although the main 
obstacles to ESDP-NATO cooperation at this time were political and related to 
issues such as Iraq (Zaborowski, 2006) as well as other existential political 
considerations, this is not to say that institutional relations were not also troubled. 
The Berlin Plus arrangements themselves also placed limitations on ESDP-NATO 
cooperation.  
Many saw these arrangements as too limited in scope. They did not guarantee EU 
access to NATO assets as the member states were not identical in both 
organisations and, therefore, a potential veto was crippling. A further limitation is that 
Berlin Plus did not have any mechanisms for combining civil-military capabilities. 
Finally, Berlin Plus did not identify which organisation should lead a mission, and it is 
enacted only when that decision has been made (Burwell et al., 2006). This led to 
what has putatively been understood as a ‘beauty contest’ between two relative 
newcomers to crisis management and resulted in both the EU and NATO vying to 
demonstrate their relative added value in this competency. This scenario became 
most apparent in the lead up to the ESDP and NATO Darfur missions, which saw 
independent and duplicated EU as well as NATO efforts because agreements could 
not be reached in such short notice and institutional competition was rampant 
(Burwell et al., 2006; Michel, 2007; Tardy, 2006). The realisation that these divisive 
issues were causing damage to both the EU and NATO has since urged a more 
pragmatic approach from all sides. Nonetheless, the formal EU-NATO relationship 
has been essentially frozen since the 2004 Cypriot Annan Plan Referendum, which 
allowed Greek Cyrus to join the EU with the Turkish Cypriot question unresolved. 
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Turkey uses its membership of NATO to block Cyprus from joining the Partnership 
for Peace (PfP), while Cyprus uses its membership of the EU to ensure that no 
matters outside of Berlin Plus are discussed at the NAC-PSC level. Both sides of this 
divide have seized on this issue to leverage the other in any future settlement of 
Cyprus. Formal EU-NATO cooperation will stay problematic until the issue is 
resolved. Although Cyprus was not yet a member of the EU, it was widely 
recognised in all the relevant capitals that this would be a reality in 2004. However, 
what was as yet still undecided was how Cyprus would join the Union: with its acquis 
communautaire applying to the whole island or just to the Greek Cypriots in the 
south of the island. Although the Annan Plan for Cyprus was later rejected on 24 
April 2004, the expectations in most of the relevant capitals were mostly positive at 
that time. In the words of one interviewee, ‘the expectation was that the people on 
both sides of the island would find an agreement. So the referendum came as a 
shock, it was a total failure’ (Interview 5, 2010). This unintended consequence will be 
revisited in the next chapter when the analytical framework is addressed. 
A third period in EU-NATO relations can be discerned after the crisis over Iraq 
began to quieten and a new pragmatic approach was adopted towards ESDP-NATO 
relations. In 2005, a Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report 
noted that any debate over this relationship should not be about US power and EU 
weakness, but ‘over how a combination of American and European power can best 
contribute to global order in spite of the weaknesses found on each side of the 
Atlantic’ (Serfaty, 2005, p. 4). With coalition troops engaged in Iraq, NATO forces 
being increasingly challenged in Afghanistan, and EU-NATO cooperation over 
counterterrorism almost nonexistent, the need to focus on what was required to meet 
current security risks became urgent (Cornish, 2006). In 2006, a paper released by 
the Atlantic Council of North America outlined the key principles to the EU-NATO 
relationship. Although it identified NATO as the ‘essential’ and ‘primary’ forum for 
transatlantic security discussions, it also acknowledged the EU as having a ‘vital role’ 
as a security actor. Furthermore, it added that the relationship should not be based 
on a grand bargain that saw a civil-military division of labour (Burwell, 2006, p. 6). 
This more pragmatic approach also incorporated the lesson that, if sequencing 
decisions were not made prior to a crisis, the situation could lead to a ‘beauty 
contest’ scenario as it did in the run-up to the Darfur missions (Burwell et al., 2006, 
p. 14). 
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Other issues were absorbed as well. NATO became even more interested in the 
idea of cooperation in post-conflict reconstruction as this issue was vital for 
stabilising Afghanistan. Dufourcq and Yost noted that both the EU and NATO should 
give much more consideration to the organising of combat operations as target 
selection has a direct impact with regard to the success of post-conflict 
reconstruction (Dufourcq et al., 2006). The lack of communication between the two 
organisations at the NAC-PSC level was further identified as counterproductive. 
Ideas, such as a potential Berlin Plus in reverse, were suggested, whereby NATO 
would have access to EU civil capabilities, an area which NATO lacked and to which 
the EU had shown some added value. However, this suggestion was also 
compromised by the same political issues that limited any further use of Berlin Plus 
beyond ALTHEA. 
The relationship clearly has elements of both grand rhetoric relating to the so-
called ‘strategic partnership’, as well as a common understanding in the public 
record that the relationship was and still is understood to be problematic. Therefore, 
this chapter will briefly look at examples of this contained in both the academic 
literature on the EU-NATO relationship as well as through a few primary source 
examples by relevant policy makers and practitioners. We start with the former.  
Zaborowski is by no means the only academic to characterise the EU-NATO 
relationship as ‘strained’ or to use adjectives of a similar notion. In 2006, Paul 
Cornish came to the conclusion that, ‘while there have been practical achievements 
in NATO-EU co-operation, the realisation of a mature and efficient security 
relationship is hostage to the illusion of a “grand bargain”; agreement at the highest 
political levels on the purposes and character of transatlantic security co-operation’ 
(Cornish, 2006, p. 5). Similarly, Daniel Keohane of the European Union Institute for 
Security Studies (EUISS) noted that ‘there is something rotten in the state of EU-
NATO relations. Both organisations would benefit from working closely together on a 
range of security issues, from counter-terrorism to the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction’ (Keohane, 2006, p. 1). Nicole Gnesotto has also commented that 
‘the political relationship between the two organisations is far from satisfactory’ 
(Biscop et al., 2010, p. 10) and Koops (2010) has called it ‘Unstrategic’. 
Of course, much of this was observed during the negotiation period from 1999 to 
2002. As Mark Webber notes, the development by the EU, from 1999 onwards, of 
ESDP resulted in a three-year diplomatic wrangle over the terms of Turkish 
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participation. Ankara used its position within NATO to block agreement between the 
EU and the Alliance on the grounds that the institutional arrangements for the EU-
NATO link did not provide sufficient weight to the role of non-EU European NATO 
states (Webber, 2007, p. 190). The Security and Defence Agenda (SDA) released 
two papers entitled Revisiting NATO-ESDP Relations - Part I & Part II. In the first of 
these publications, the writer notes ‘as over-lapping organisations, the EU and NATO 
need to find practical ways to cooperate better, especially when dealing with fragile 
and failing states’ (Korski, 2008, p. 10). Furthermore, the UK House of Commons 
Defence Committee published a full report just before the undertaking of this study. 
Contained within this report are a myriad of examples illustrating a problematic 
relationship. Charles Grant suggests in his official testimony that ‘it is extraordinary 
that there is a difficult relationship when the same governments are involved in the 
two organisations’ (Charles Grant in House of Commons Defence Committee, 2008, 
p. 82). Furthermore: 
 
A close relationship between NATO and the EU is essential. 
The lack of it is inexcusable given the importance of NATO to 
EU security. In practice, the relationship between NATO and 
the EU is fraught with difficulties. It is plagued by mistrust and 
unhealthy competition, and characterised by a lack of 
communication and cooperation. Little progress has been 
achieved in recent years in improving a relationship which 
remained stalled and inefficient. (House of Commons Defence 
Committee, 2008, p. 81) 
 
Examples of scholars writing about this problematic relationship can also be found 
by academics working outside of Europe. In one report issued by the Rand 
Corporation, it notes ‘unfortunately, in the pivotal EU-NATO relationship there are a 
range of both implicit and explicit problems’ (Larrabee and Lindley-French, 2008, p. 
43). Finally, David Yost, who devoted a whole chapter of NATO and International 
Organizations to NATO’s relationships with the EU, said of this particular 
relationship, the ‘participation problem’ is shorthand for the conflict of principles that 
has, since the 2004 enlargement of the EU, limited effective cooperation between 
the members of the EU and NATO (Yost, 2007, p. 92). Furthermore, he quoted 
Simon Lunn (the Secretary General of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly) as 
saying:  
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Whenever a fresh crisis arises, there is always a strong sense 
of institutional rivalry and competition. Rivalries were, for 
example, apparent in the “beauty contest” between NATO and 
the EU about assistance to the African Union regarding Darfur 
in the spring and summer of 2005 (Yost, 2007, p. 81). 
 
However, this description of the EU-NATO relationship, or ‘strategic partnership’, 
is not limited to academics writing on the matter. A number of instances can also be 
teased out of the public record with regard to policy makers and practitioners at the 
highest levels. For example, the former NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop 
Scheffer has, on more than one occasion, directly alluded to this problematic 
relationship. A NATO Parliamentary Assembly Committee report quotes him as 
saying, ‘how narrow the bandwidth of co-operation between NATO and the Union 
has remained. Despite many attempts to bring the two institutions closer together, 
there is still a remarkable distance between them’.11 In a Speech in Berlin on 29 
January 2007, he further alluded to the relational problems: 
 
‘How do NATO-EU relations stand? Let me answer that by 
means of a little anecdote. A few weeks ago, one of my staff 
told me he had been invited to a conference on "frozen 
conflicts". And then he added with a smile: "Of course it's about 
the Caucasus, not about NATO-EU relations!". It would 
undoubtedly be going too far to describe NATO-EU relations as 
a "frozen conflict".  
Why are NATO-EU relations still so problematic? Why do both 
institutions find it so hard to make the much-talked-about 
"strategic partnership" a reality? My answer to these questions 
is clear and unambiguous. NATO-EU relations have not really 
arrived in the 21st century yet. They are still stuck in the '90s.’12  
 
The yearly Security Conference in Munich offered further examples of references 
to this problematic relationship. The following are some examples of such 
frustrations. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has commented that 
                                            
11
 For full text see: http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=1168 
12
 Full text of the speech can be found at: http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2007/s070129b.html 
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‘regulars here at the Munich Conference have heard me talk often enough about the 
impediments to better cooperation between the NATO and the EU’ (Scheffer, 
2008).13 David Miliband, the UK Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
affairs, offered this critique: ‘We need to sweep away the obstacles to genuine 
NATO/EU partnership, in strategic dialogue, but also in practical co-operation’.14 
French President Nicholas Sarkozy has noted that, ‘to my mind, things are clear: it’s 
Defence Europe and NATO, not Defence Europe or NATO. Both together... It was a 
major error for people to think that by weakening one they could strengthen the 
other.’15  
 The section above notes the public record. However, as part of an attempt to 
establish that the BP/AF was understood by those working in EU and NATO 
institutions that it was problematic and static outside of the ATHEA context, an EU-
NATO questionnaire/survey was sent, via email, to all of the interview participants 
(and at all three levels of analysis) involved in this thesis. Those who received the 
email were also asked to forward the survey to any personnel working within their 
respective institutions. A total of 18 respondents took part in the online survey.   
There is no attempt to justify or defend this questionnaire/survey as a central 
methodological research tool, or to claim that the responses to these questions 
represent categorical or definite findings. It is only an informal addition with the sole 
purpose of gathering a limited amount of quantitative data to help establish the 
baseline of this thesis; i.e. that the formal EU-NATO relationship (BP/AF) has 
become static outside of ALTHEA. Only then can we ask what evidence is there of 
EU-NATO cooperation outside or beyond the BP/AF.  
The first set of questions tried to quantify the perceived level of sub-optimality16 of 
the EU-NATO relationship, to establish what the perceived primary cause of this 
blockage was, and to determine the secondary causes of the perceived impediments 
to the problematic relationship amongst those working in the EU and NATO 
                                            
13
 This is available at: https://www.securityconference.de/ 
14
 Ibid. 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 It should be noted that the term sub-optimal in this thesis should be equated with ‘problematic’ and 
nothing more. Often, the terms are used interchangeably throughout the thesis and in the 
questionnaire found in the appendix. 
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institutions. In addition, the first set of questions tried to order these perceived 
primary and secondary causes. Overall, the limited amount of answers do seem to 
validate the understanding that the EU-NATO relationship is perceived by personnel 
to be sub-optimal (94.4% agreeing) and the understanding that the Turkey/Cyprus 
question is the primary cause; the vast majority of respondents listed this as their 
perceived primary cause of EU-NATO blockage.17 However, it should be noted that, 
besides the Turkey/Cyprus issue, other primary impediments to the relationship were 
offered. For example, ‘lack of trust between the two organisations’, ‘intra-European 
politics’, ‘imbalance and asymmetry’, ‘different objectives and agendas of each 
organisation’, and ‘lack of coordination on the strategic level’. When asked to list any 
further or secondary causes of a problematic relationship, answers ranged from 
different ‘cultures’ and ‘working procedures’ to ‘competition’ and the ‘US agenda’. 
The purpose of highlighting all of these comments, both in the public record and 
through additional data gathering, is to demonstrate that the relationship has 
elements of both grand rhetoric relating to strategic partnership, a common 
understanding that the relationship is understood to be problematic, and that EU-
NATO cooperation has been limited to the formal rules of the BP/AF since 2004. 
What all of this establishes is an institutional relationship that is based on formal 
structures that are problematic because the stated aims of the partnership have not 
been achieved. Therefore, it is justifiable to ask why such a relationship has 
persisted for so long if the stated ambitions of each organisation have not been 
reached. Furthermore, it is appropriate to pose the question: Is this, in fact, the 
totality of the relationship? Or will investigating both the formal and informal elements 
of this relationship reveal a better understanding of the totality of EU-NATO 
relations? To reiterate, the fundamental objective is to investigate for evidence of 
EU-NATO cooperation beyond BP/AF and how that cooperation has evolved despite 
the political blockage that prima facie should exclude such cooperation. 
Up until now, this thesis has been able to establish the meta narrative surrounding 
the political blockage of EU-NATO relations as reduced to the BP/AF. But what about 
that framework in practice? How does it work in reality? Just because the framework 
is not utilised outside of the ALTHEA context after 2004, it does not necessarily mean 
                                            
17
 See the full questionnaire in the appendix section of this thesis. It will be referred to again later in 
the study. 
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that the framework itself is inefficient. In fact, Berlin Plus worked rather well in 
CONCORDIA and continues to work well in ALTHEA. From this, we can infer that 
formal EU-NATO cooperation is limited outside of ATHEA, not because of some 
inherent flaw to BP/AF, but more to do with existential political obstacles. Therefore, 
we can ask if formal EU-NATO relations have become static due to political reasons 
and not necessarily institutional design; if so, then to what extent is BP/AF the 
institutional and normative reference point for actors attempting to cooperate beyond 
the formal structures? In order to assess this, we must turn to establishing the formal 
rules of the BP/AF and understand how they work in an operational setting. Only then 
is it possible to investigate cooperation beyond the formal relationship. 
 
The specificity of Berlin Plus: Establishing the formal EU-NATO 
institutional relationship 
 
At this point, it is germane to establish the formal EU-NATO institutional relationship 
and outline the different levels of actors working within EU-NATO institutions. The 
first to be acknowledged are the state actors. These actors work in both the EU and 
NATO Brussels institutions as well as in the national capitals, be it in the ministries of 
defence (MODs) or foreign ministries (MOFAs). Within NATO, there are the national 
delegations of all 28 member states headed by an ambassador to the organisation. 
In the EU Council, there are the permanent representatives from the 28 member 
states also headed by an ambassador (or 27, bearing in mind that Cyprus is not 
present at the formal level of EU-NATO discussions).18 The highest level of regular 
EU-NATO institutional discussions involving these actors are the bi-monthly NAC-
PSC meetings, which convene at the level of ambassador.19 The EU and NATO 
foreign ministers have not met since 2003; however, there are the so-called 
                                            
18
 In 2014, there are 28 EU member states and 28 NATO member states. When they meet under 
Berlin Plus (where Cyprus is excluded), it is at EU 27 and NATO 28. However, for the majority of the 
time the research for this thesis was being conducted, the EU only had 27 member states. Therefore, 
formal Berlin Plus EU-NATO meetings were conducted at 26-28.  
19
 Unlike the PSC, which always meets at the ambassador level, the NAC can also convene with the 
same decision-making authority at heads of state, as well as the foreign or defence ministerial level. 
However, when the NAC and PSC meet formally it is at the level of ambassador. 
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‘Transatlantic Events’ through which the relevant foreign ministers engage each 
other on an informal basis, as will be explained in the case studies of this thesis.  
Second, there is the level of the international staff. There are contacts between 
the two organisations at the secretariat level, both civilian and military. The 
international staff at NATO are recruited from member countries, either directly by 
the organisation or seconded by their governments (NATO Handbook NATO 
Handbook, 2006, p. 75).  
 
The International Staff supports the process of consensus-
building and decision-making between member and Partner 
countries and is responsible for the preparation and follow-up of 
the meetings and decisions of NATO committees, as well as 
those of the institutions created to manage the different forms of 
bilateral and multilateral partnership with non-member countries 
established since the end of the Cold War. (NATO Handbook 
NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001, p. 221) 
 
On the EU side, there has been a restructuring of the institutions, particularly post-
Lisbon Treaty. The EU Council Secretariat has rationalised DG 8 (military) and DG 9 
(civilian) into one new directorate called the Crisis Management Planning Directorate 
(CMPD) (Gya, 2009).20 Furthermore, CSDP is now contained within the European 
External Action Service (EEAS) ‘under the authority of the High Representative of 
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European 
Commission (HR/VP)’.21 These actors work with the interests of their respective 
institutions in mind and not the specific interests of their nations. However, they 
operate in more of a support capacity and therefore do not usually retain the clout to 
overcome the impasse brought about by the political deadlock. Finally, there are the 
military actors involved. Crucially, this thesis is concerned with both military and 
civilian staffs, as well as military commanders working within mission areas where 
both the EU and NATO are engaged.  
In NATO, there are of course meetings between the Ministers of Defence. 
However, in order to assist the highest level civilian bodies, there are ‘senior military 
                                            
20
 For a more detailed description of ESDP institutional restructuring see: http://www.isis-
europe.org/pdf/2009_artrel_272_esr44-civmil-integration.pdf.  
21
 For more details on the restructuring of CSDP, see the CSDP website at 
http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/index_en.htm (last accessed 12/12/2013) 
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officers’ who serve as national Military Representatives (MILREPS) and on the 
Military Committee. This body also meets at the level of Chiefs of Defence (CHoDs). 
However, the day-to-day work of the Military Committee is managed by the Military 
Representatives who support their CHoDs. According to the NATO Handbook, the 
MILREPS ‘work in a national capacity, representing the best interests of their nations 
while remaining open to negotiation and discussion so that consensus can be 
reached’ (NATO Handbook NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001, p. 239). 
Within NATO, there is also the International Military Staff (IMS) who are made up 
of both military and civilian personnel. As with the international staff, they are 
supposed to work towards the overall common interest of the Alliance and not on 
behalf of their respective nations (NATO Handbook NATO Office of Information and 
Press, 2001, p. 242). Finally, this section notes the understated (in the literature) 
importance of the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) 
regarding EU-NATO formal cooperation. This post is double-hatted (EU-NATO) and 
is always a European22 commander. In a Berlin Plus operation, DSACEUR is the 
primary candidate to become the Operational Commander for any EU-led operation 
once the EU avails itself of NATO assets and capabilities under the Berlin Plus 
arrangements. According to the NATO MC 403/1 Military Decision sheet dated 5 
March 2003, the responsibilities of the DSACEUR as the EU’s Operational 
Commander are: 
 
(1) Act under the political control and strategic direction of the EU. 
(2) Once appointed by the EU: 
a. Receive guidance and strategic directives from the EU. 
b. Conduct all aspects of operational planning, including 
rules of engagement (ROE). 
c. Direct the activation of the Operational Headquarters. 
d. Form the force (including force generation). 
e. Deploy, sustain, direct and recover the force. 
f. Direct the operation under the political control and 
strategic direction of the EU. 
g. Issue the EU-approved OP/PLAN and ROE to the Force 
HQ. 
h. Manage the EU financial resources allocated to support 
the operation, according to EU procedures. 
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 The position of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) has always gone to an American, 
while the office of DSACEUR is a European. 
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i. Report and assess the operation to the appropriate EU 
bodies. (Interview 13, 2010) 
However, the DSACEUR is also, according to the terms of reference, the Strategic 
Co-ordinator which, in addition to the role of EU Operational Commander, 
additionally tasks the office with European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) 
responsibilities. The DSACEUR is ‘the focal point within the Alliance for ESDI related 
issues’ and is the ‘EU’s primary Alliance military strategic interlocutor’ in relation to 
ESDP (Interview 13, 2010). As the DSACEUR sits at such a pivotal position at the 
nexus of EU-NATO relations, this office will be investigated in all three case studies. 
As such, it is expected that DSACEUR will have a direct impact on facilitating both 
formal (BP/AF) and informal (beyond BP/AF) EU-NATO cooperation.  
On the EU side, the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) is the highest 
military body within the Council. This body, like the NATO equivalent, is made up of 
the CHoDs and is assisted by the permanent military representatives.23 This body is 
the primary advisory body to the PSC. Within the EU framework, there is also the 
European Union Military Staff (EUMS). This body, again like NATO’s equivalent, is 
made up of both civilian and military personnel through secondment to the Council 
Secretariat by the member states. Alongside these bodies is the newly-formed 
CMPD, an integrated Civ/Mil unit as outlined above. Finally, to date, the EU does not 
have a completely autonomous operations headquarters similar to NATO’s Supreme 
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). However, there is an EU cell24 at 
SHAPE as well as a NATO liaison team at EUMS to help facilitate open and 
transparent cooperation. 
Again, the highest point of formal institutional contact between the EU and NATO 
is at the level of nation-states. The institutional gathering that facilitates EU-NATO 
cooperation at this level is the NAC-PSC ambassadorial meetings, the first of which 
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 For a more detailed description of ESDP military bodies see: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence.aspx/ 
24
 Many mistakenly believe that this is an EU-NATO integrated cell. It is more appropriate to see this 
cell as the EU’s own Operational Headquarters (OHQ) facility to operate at the strategic level, 
provided by NATO and within SHAPE as a bolt-on but with access to full NATO capability for a Berlin 
Plus operation. When Javier Solana went to visit this facility for the first time, he was very clear that 
he was going to visit his (the EU’s) OHQ and not SHAPE. There was a lot of emphasis within SHAPE 
to make sure that this was just not cosmetic but a reality. The DSACEUR office was instrumental in 
this process. 
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took place on 5 February 2001 (before 2001, PSC was an interim body). Originally, 
these events took place regularly, with varying frequency of between four and ten 
times per year.25 From 2001 until 2003, these two bodies met with an agenda that 
covered the full spectrum of common issues. For example, the NAC-PSC discussed 
geographical issues such as Afghanistan, Moldova and Kosovo as well as issues of 
proliferation, energy security, and trans-national terrorism (Interview 5, 2010). 
However, the enlargement of the EU in 2004 changed the political situation, causing 
a drastic contraction of the issues allowed on the formal agenda. This contraction 
was caused by what has commonly been referred to as the ‘participation problem’. 
The ‘participation problem’ refers to various political obstacles that have, since 
2004, drastically reduced the scope of effective cooperation between the EU and 
NATO. The Presidency conclusions from the 2002 EU Copenhagen Council state 
that:  
 
“the Berlin Plus” arrangements and the implementation thereof 
will apply only to those EU Member States which are also either 
NATO members or parties to the “Partnership for Peace”, and 
which have consequently concluded bilateral security 
arrangements with NATO (EU Core Documents EU Core 
Documents from 2002, 2003, p. 170). 
 
Once again, this agreement has resulted in Berlin Plus becoming effectively a 
straitjacket for EU-NATO cooperation; this is because the EU will not meet formally 
with NATO to discuss issues that fall outside of the Berlin Plus format (currently only 
operation ALTHEA) without all 28 of its members present. NATO will not meet with 
the EU in a formal setting with nations that are not at least members of the PfP. 
Therefore, the broad scope of issues that were once on the formal agenda has since 
disappeared. The ‘participation problem’ is directly related to the existential dispute 
existing between Turkey (member of NATO, but not the EU) and Cyprus (member of 
the EU, but not NATO). Turkey uses its membership of NATO to block Cyprus’ 
attempts at joining the PfP, while Cyprus uses its membership of the EU to ensure 
that no matters outside of Berlin Plus are discussed at the NAC-PSC level. Both 
sides of this divide have seized on this issue to leverage the other in any future 
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 Original agreements between the EU and NATO called for NAC-PSC meetings no less than three 
times a semester (one Presidency). 
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settlement of Cyprus. Formal EU-NATO cooperation will stay dysfunctional until the 
issue is resolved; in this way, it has become ‘collateral damage’ (Interview 5, 2010) 
of the 2004 Cypriot Annan Plan Referendum.26 
The ‘participation problem’ and its resulting ‘scope problem’ should not be 
underestimated. Regarding the latter, still another casualty of this political blockage 
was the bi-annual EU-NATO foreign ministers’ meetings, as called for in the 2001 
exchange of letters between the EU Presidency and the NATO Sec/Gen. From 2001 
to 2003, these meetings took place in line with this request and all common issues of 
concern were on the agenda. The last of these official foreign ministers’ meetings 
took place on 4 December 2003. However, since September 2005, these meetings 
have continued in an informal setting known as the ‘Transatlantic Events’ (Interview 
5, 2010), an attempt to overcome blockages at the formal and political level which 
was initiated by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in 2005. We shall return to 
these events in the case study chapters.  
It is also important to outline just how these ‘red lines’ affect actors’ ability to 
execute work on a day-to-day basis which, of course, has had a direct impact on EU-
NATO cooperation post 2004. The most notable ‘red line’ caused by the 
‘participation problem’ relates to the exchanging of documents between the 
organisations. A NATO-restricted document (classified) can only be sent to EU 
member states that have signed security agreements with NATO. The Berlin Plus 
agreement itself was made classified at the time of its initiation for exactly this 
reason. Therefore, when a confidential document is to be sent to the EU, NATO has 
two options. First, if the material is covered by the Agreed Framework (Berlin Plus 
and some capability issues), then NATO staff send it to the EU knowing that it will 
only be disseminated to 27 member states (Cyprus is excluded). Second, if the 
material is classified but is not covered in the Berlin Plus framework - for example, 
Kosovo, Afghanistan, terrorism, or energy security - then NATO staff recognise that 
these issues are dealt with by the 28 EU member states and, therefore, they will not 
pass on the document to their EU staff counterpart. This issue is further complicated 
because documents that are under the control of the originator, for example NATO 
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 This referendum refers to a joint Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot vote aimed at settling the 
Cyprus dispute. The referendum was rejected by the Greek-Cypriot side in 2004. The failure of this 
referendum came as a shock to many and has had major implications for EU-NATO relations as the 
Island joined the EU with this dispute unresolved. 
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non-classified documents, are also held back as these, too, would be released to all 
28 EU member states. The result is that, post-2004, only documents related to 
Operation ALTHEA and certain capability issues could be officially passed between 
the organisations. Investigating intelligence cooperation is a central component of 
this thesis. If intelligence sharing is formally limited to ALTHEA but cooperation is 
indeed going on outside of that context, then how actors attempt to manage this 
obstacle becomes highly important. In other words, in what way will agents be 
creative enough to adapt to the limitations of the BP/AF if attempting cooperation 
beyond the BP/AF? If cooperation is proceeding, then we should expect to find some 
evidence of these creative solutions. 
Some observers may find the level of interaction between NATO and the EU 
Commission surprising as ESDP/CSDP is a second pillar EU competence. Certainly, 
the relationship is adolescent and a history of ‘zero security culture’ prevented any 
relationship in the 1990s (Interview 11, 2010). After the inception of Berlin Plus, 
however, this former ‘house of glass’ was heavily securitised in some departments, 
thus allowing for a relationship to develop. Before 2004, seminars that included 
issues such as terrorism began to take place between NATO, the Council, and the 
Commission. Between 2004 and 2009, only Berlin Plus classified materials that were 
passed to the EU Council were then shared with the Commission; for example, 
through the DG for External Relations. Since the signing of the Lisbon Treaty, this 
has changed as the Commission now serves as head of the EEAS.  
The Commission is also part of the NAC-PSC relationship through representation 
when these institutions meet. However, if the Council and the Commission do not 
agree, then they ‘cannot speak for each other’ (Yost, 2007, p. 91). The Commission 
has a further role through joint Commission Council bodies. Through these bodies, 
information feeds through to the Commission as an ‘unintended consequence but a 
welcomed one’ (Interview 11, 2010). This is a very important formal link, as are the 
informal get-togethers on the margins of these meetings. This is the only real link the 
Commission has with NATO or EU-NATO cooperation and, as such, they are ‘all 
very much attached to it’. Of course, since 2004, this relationship was also affected 
due to the reduction in volume and scope of information filtering through. There was 
an appetite by the Commission as well as NATO to develop relationships. However, 
these moves of rapprochement were blocked ‘harshly’ by Turkey, Cyprus and, to 
some extent, Greece (Interview 11, 2010). It would seem that the Commission was 
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the victim of the same political developments in this issue area since enlargement, 
though somewhat mitigated by the Lisbon Treaty restructuring and establishment of 
the EEAS. 
There is also a link between the NATO Sec/Gen and the EU SG/HR.27 At the 
formal level, the NAC-PSC meetings are co-chaired by both of these posts. The 
SG/HR has also been invited to all meetings of the NAC at the level of foreign and 
defence ministers. However, the NATO Sec/Gen is usually only invited to EU 
defence ministerial meetings (Yost, 2007, p. 91). Moreover, a series of meetings 
between Solana and de Hoop Scheffer led to calls for more robust EU-NATO 
cooperation and to comments such as: ‘it is astounding how narrow the bandwidth of 
cooperation between NATO and the Union has remained’ and that ‘NATO-EU 
relations have not really arrived in the 21st century yet. They are still stuck in the 
'90s’ (Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, 2007). Therefore, it is expected that these two posts 
would be crucial for cooperation and synergy between the two organisations; the 
relationship is, therefore, investigated for evidence of cooperation beyond the 
context of the BP/AF in all three case studies. As such, the personal relationship that 
develops between them, and how they prioritise each other’s organisation, has real 
implications for this study.  
Lt Gen David Leakey (former Director General of the EUMS) was keen to draw 
attention to the fact that ‘the cause of the problem in the EU-NATO relationship lies 
at the very highest level, in the fixed positions of certain states rather than within the 
machinery of the Organizations themselves’ (Leakey, 2008). However, when it 
comes to formal cooperation between the military bodies in Brussels, these were 
also the victim of the political blockage as described above. The EUMC is the 
highest military body in the EU (Howorth, 2007, p. 74). This body is highly co-
operational in one respect, as 21 of the CHoDs are double-hatted as military 
representatives to the NATO military committee as well. They meet as a body twice 
a year in their EU capacity and at least three times a year at NATO. More often, the 
EUMC is convened at the level of MILREPS, who are also double-hatted to assist 
                                            
27
 Note this position has changed to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP) post-Lisbon Treaty December 
2009. Therefore, SG/HR refers to Dr Javier Solana and HR/VP to Baroness Catherine Ashton. 
Throughout the study, the reference to only the HR could refer to either of these actors depending on 
the timeframe in question.  
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their NATO representatives (Howorth, 2007, p. 74). Furthermore, the Chairman of 
the EUMC attends meetings of the NAC-PSC, the Council, and the NATO Military 
Committee. 
Within the EU Council Secretariat, the DGE 8 (military) and DGE 9 (civilian) 
bodies played a fundamental role in the conception and development of ESDP 
(these two institutions have now migrated into the newly-formed CMPD since the 
signing of the Lisbon Treaty). It was DGE 8 that navigated the ‘sensitive dossier’ of 
ESDP-NATO relations as well as ‘the application of the Berlin Plus agreements and 
the negotiation of the technical arrangements necessary to streamline EU-NATO 
cooperation in the theatre’ (Grevi et al., 2009, p. 37). Finally, within the Council 
Secretariat, the EUMS is directly attached to the SG/HR and works under the 
direction of the EUMC (Grevi et al., 2009, p. 40). Clearly, under Berlin Plus 
operations, there are EU-NATO contacts (representing 27 EU and 28 NATO member 
states) between all these bodies and they are ‘formal and agreed’ (Interview 5, 
2010). Of course, on the EU side it is not fully agreeable as they would prefer to 
operate at 28. Yet, as with their civilian counterparts in DGE 9, this is the situation in 
which they find themselves.  
At the level of the MODs, for political directors of MODs and MILREPS, the 
situation is, once again, only formal at the 28-27 format. There were some attempts 
to overcome the political impasse in the military arena but it was met with mixed 
results. There was an attempt to meet informally at 28-2728 with the Political 
Directors in late 2009, but this attempt failed due to the Turkish representative 
declining to participate (Interview 5, 2010). At the level of MILREPS, there was also 
no success at bringing them together. These actors are also investigated in the case 
studies. For example, to what extent does the formal rules of the BP/AF dictate 
cooperation between them? Is there any evidence of these actors attempting to 
bypass the formal rules and cooperate outside the BP/AF context? 
Under the Berlin Plus agreements, when the EU makes a request to NATO for a 
‘NATO European command option’ for an EU-led operation, it is the DSACEUR who 
is the primary candidate for the EU operational commander (European Union 
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 This was before Croatia joined the EU, so the number 27 does represent the full EU membership, 
including Cyprus. 
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External Action Service, 2011a).29 This mechanism is supposed to allow the 
DSACEUR to assume his European responsibilities ‘fully and effectively’. For a 
Berlin Plus operation, this is coherent and efficient. The overall mission is under the 
responsibility of the Council, but the operational chain of command (CoC) runs 
directly through the DSACEUR’s office at SHAPE, through Allied Joint Force 
Command Naples, and to the ground force commander. The role of the DSACEUR 
will also be investigated in all three case studies. It would be expected, given his 
positions at the nexus of EU-NATO strategic and operational relations, that the office 
of the DSACEUR would be vital for any informal cooperation beyond the BP/AF. 
This section has outlined the EU-NATO institutional linkages for cooperation 
created through the Berlin Plus and the Agreed Framework negotiation process (see 
Table 2.2 for summation). This chapter will now turn to formal EU-NATO cooperation 
within the context of two operations (CONCORDIA & ALTHEA), both of which were 
(and in the case of ALTHEA, still is) facilitated through these linkages. However, 
before doing so, it is important to make one point: it is not technically possible to 
properly evaluate Berlin Plus because, in the strictest sense, it has never really been 
deployed. Berlin Plus was created so the EU could request from NATO assets and 
capabilities to engage with new operations. In the case of both CONCORDIA and 
ALTHEA, the EU merely took over missions that NATO had already been running, 
albeit they did then utilise NATO assets and capabilities. Therefore, since Berlin Plus 
has never really been used in the way it was intended, it cannot be properly 
evaluated as such. This thesis, therefore, must investigate actual EU-NATO 
cooperation as it exists. So what is the actual formal EU-NATO framework? This 
chapter now turns to illustrating the EU-NATO relationship in two formal operational 
contexts. 
 
Table 2.2: Establishing Formal Cooperation (Agreed Framework) 
03/06/1996 NAC Final Communiqué 
The initial commitment from NATO to WEU that the 
NAC will approve the release of NATO assets and 
capabilities for WEU-led operations 
3-4/12/1998  ST MALO Declaration 
The establishment of a progressive framing of a 
common defence policy (CESDP/ESDP/CSDP) in the 
EU 
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 As noted in section 7 of the EU-NATO: The Framework for Permanent Cooperation and Berlin Plus. 
Available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/03-11-
11%20Berlin%20Plus%20press%20note%20BL.pdf. 
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23/04/1999 
NATO Washington 
Declaration 
Welcomes the strengthening of European Defence 
capabilities 
3-4/06/1999 
European Council 
Cologne 
Establishes effective mutual consultations, 
cooperation and transparency between EU and 
NATO, and starts the process of arrangements for 
non-EU partners in NATO 
10-11/12/1999 
European Council 
Helsinki 
Further outlines the modalities for consultation, 
cooperation and transparency/sets up the political 
and military structures for ESDP 
7-9/12/2000 European Council Nice 
Describes a genuine strategic partnership between 
the EU and NATO 
29-30/12/2001 NAC Meeting 
Further talks of a genuine strategic partnership and 
mentions the first FORMAL meetings of EU and 
NATO Foreign Ministers 
12-13/12/2002 
European Council 
Copenhagen  
Sets the parameters for Berlin Plus: NATO members 
or those with Security agreements with NATO/PfP 
13/12/2002 
Classified NAC Decision 
Sheet 
Confirms assured access for EU to NATO planning 
capabilities and provides the basis for a 'permanent 
framework for joint action' 
16/12/2002 
EU-NATO Joint 
Declaration  Outlines the 'principles' of the 'strategic partnership' 
24/02/2003 GAERC 
Notes that the three main elements of Berlin Plus had 
been concluded 
05/03/2003 
NATO restricted 
Document 
The Terms of Reference for DSACEUR (1) EU-NATO 
Strategic Coordinator and (2) EU's Operations 
Commander 
17/03/2003 
Statement by NATO 
Sec/Gen Berlin Plus finally Implemented  
31/03/2003 CONCORDIA Launching of first Berlin Plus Mission 
02/12/2004 ALTHEA Launching of second Berlin Plus Mission 
19-25/11/2003 
Agreed by both the NAC 
and PSC 
First joint EU-NATO crisis management exercise 
based on Berlin Plus 
03/10/2005 
Confirmed EU Council 
15-16/12/2005 
Establishing military permanent arrangements NATO 
Liaison Team at EUMS and EU Cell at SHAPE 
 
Operation CONCORDIA30 
 
Background and Context 
 
The military operation CONCORDIA, which was mandated to contribute to a stable 
and secure environment in the Former Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), lasted from 
31 March 2003 until 10 December 2003. It operated on a budget of 6.2 million Euros 
and had a modest troop strength of just above 350. In total, 13 EU Member States 
and 14 non-EU States contributed. CONCORDIA operated in a theatre where the 
UN, EU, NATO and the OSCE had various instruments deployed as part of a wider 
political and regional context (Gustav Lindstrom ‘On the Ground: ESDP Operations 
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 CONCORDIA is named after the Greek/Latin term for ‘harmony’.  
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2004, pp. 111-130; Eva Gross, Operation Concordia FYROM in ESDP 10 years 
2009: pp. 174-176). 
The EU first announced to the world, through the 2002 Barcelona European 
Council Presidency Conclusions, their ‘availability to take responsibility, following the 
elections in FYROM and at the request of its Government, for an operation to follow 
that [was] currently [being] undertaken by NATO’ at the time (European Council 
Barcelona 15-16 March 2002 in, EU Core Documents from 2002, 2003, p. 48). With 
this announcement, the initiative was taken to put ESDP into operational practice as 
well as formal EU-NATO cooperation for the first time in history. That next May, a 
joint press statement following an EU-NATO Ministerial further took note of this 
declaration (Joint Press Statement at EU-NATO Ministerial 14-15 May 2001 in EU 
Core Documents from 2002, 2003, p. 60). The seemingly common goal of having an 
EU operation replace the three NATO operations that had preceded in FYROM was 
further endorsed by the 2001 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1371, 
which stated the welcoming of: 
 
international efforts, including those of the Organization for 
Security in Europe, the European Union, and the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, in cooperation with the Government of the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and other states, to 
prevent the escalation of ethnic tensions in the area and to 
facilitate the full implementation of the Framework Agreement, 
thus contributing to peace and stability in the region (UNSCR 
1371, 2001). 
 
Given the negative Balkan experiences of the Yugoslav civil wars in the 1990s, 
both the EU and NATO began to develop a ‘concerted approach to the Western 
Balkans’ (NATO Website, 2003). Crisis management operations in FYROM were 
very much a part of that concerted approach. After violence broke out between 
ethnic Albanian extremists and the FYROM Government over the extent to which the 
Albanian population were receiving equal rights in that country, President Boris 
Tajkovski requested the then NATO Secretary General George Robertson to send 
troops in order to maintain peace and security within the Macedonian Republic 
(NATO Website, 2011). The necessary agreement for any such deployment of 
NATO troops was the Ohrid Framework political agreement, created for ‘securing the 
future of Macedonian’s democracy and permitting the development of closer and 
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more integrated relations between the Republic of Macedonia and the Euro-Atlantic 
community (Framework Agreement 13/02/2001).31  
Operation Essential Harvest was agreed by the North Atlantic Council two days 
after the signing of the framework document. This NATO mission consisted of 3,500 
troops, which were tasked to implement the Ohrid Agreement by collecting and 
destroying weapons and ammunition belonging to the ethnic Albanian groups; at the 
same time, two subsequent NATO missions, operation Amber Fox and operation 
Allied Harmony, were launched to protect OSCE and EU monitors and to help assist 
the local government in assuming control of security functions (Eva Gross in Grevi et 
al., 2009, pp. 174–175). As Eva Gross points out (2009:174-175), a few existential 
factors were critical to the success of these missions and allowing for the 
subsequent handover of peace and security responsibilities to the EU. Most notably, 
the return to large-scale violence was ‘unlikely’, but the FYROM government had 
also decided upon a policy of integrating into the two key trans-Atlantic structures, 
namely the EU and NATO. Finally, and just as important, was the decision by the 
ethnic Albanian population to work ‘within rather than against the government’ 
(Gross 2009:174-175). By the time the EU launched operation CONCORDIA, a force 
of just 350 was needed to maintain the already stable environment. 
Council Joint Action (2003/92/CFSP) (EU Core Documents from 2003, p. 29) is 
the primary document that outlines the overall mission mandate and details of 
operation Concordia. Of primary importance for establishing the baseline of formal 
(BP/AF) EU-NATO cooperation is Article 1 section 3, which stipulates that 
CONCORDIA ‘shall be carried out with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, on 
the basis agreed with NATO’. Although this document does not refer to Berlin Plus 
directly, as it was not finalised until March of that same year, it does in essence 
frame the entire operation along the lines of the Berlin Plus as envisioned and 
agreed in principle in December 2002 EU Council Copenhagen 12-13 December 
2002 and NAC decision sheet 13 December 2002 (EU Core Documents from 2002, 
2003, pp. 170 & 178–179). Although the section below will outline in full the 
specificity of the formal institutional relations between the EU and NATO regarding 
CONCORDIA, it is clear from this Council Joint Action that, in line with Berlin Plus 
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 The full text of the Agreement can be found here: 
http://www.ucd.ie/ibis/filestore/Ohrid%20Framework%20Agreement.pdf (last accessed October 2013). 
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arrangements, the DSACEUR would be offered the position of EU Operational 
Commander and that SHAPE would be designated for the EU Operational 
Headquarters (Council Joint Action 2003/92/CFSP Article 2, sections 1-3). In other 
words, a formal institutional link for crisis management cooperation would be set in 
place according to the BP/AF established earlier in this chapter. 
 
Establishing Berlin Plus for CONCORDIA 
 
As noted above, the political initiative and the joint EU-NATO planning measures 
which were needed to make CONCORDIA a reality started to take shape with the 
EU Barcelona Council Conclusions and the joint EU-NATO press announcement of 
March and May 2002. However, the Seville EU Council Conclusions (21-22 June 
2002) not only reaffirmed the EU’s willingness to take over control of the FYROM 
peace-keeping operations from NATO, but the European Council also instructed the 
Secretary General/High Representative and the competent bodies of the European 
Union to: 
 
make the necessary contacts with the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia authorities and NATO chiefs and to 
continue and intensify the planning measures underway in 
order to be in a position to take over the NATO operation at the 
end of NATO’s current mandate, provided that the permanent 
arrangements between the European Union and NATO 
(Berlin+) are then in place (EU Core Documents from 2002, 
2003, pp. 73–74).  
 
Without re-visiting the political challenges that underpinned the three-year struggle 
to finalise the Berlin Plus arrangements already outlined above, it is worth 
mentioning that the months between the 2002 Seville European Council and the 
2002 EU Council at Copenhagen saw negotiations intensify in order to finalise these 
arrangements. It should also be noted that these arrangements were to be worked 
out in time to facilitate the operational handover from NATO to the EU in early 2003. 
The Brussels European Council Conclusions demonstrated the EU’s 
‘determination to reach agreement with Turkey’ in order for the Union to have the 
capacity to act in Macedonia (EU Core Documents from 2002, 2003, p. 135). 
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Furthermore, it mandated the SG/HR, Javier Solana, ‘to act accordingly’ in order to 
reach an agreement between Turkey and Greece, one that was needed to facilitate 
cooperation between the EU and NATO (EU Core Documents from 2002, 2003, pp. 
136–137). The Copenhagen European Council finally saw the deadlock breached. 
To reiterate, an agreement was reached whereby the ‘Berlin Plus arrangements and 
the implementation thereof will apply only to those EU Member States which are also 
either NATO members or parties to the partnership for Peace’. This effectively 
removed Cyprus and Malta from taking part in any ESDP operations with recourse to 
NATO assets when they did eventually join the EU in 2004 (EU Core Documents 
from 2002, 2003, p. 170). 
Although the intersections of formal institutional EU-NATO dialogue and 
cooperation have already been addressed, it is now prudent to summarise the 
institutional relationship between the EU and NATO as specifically set out for 
operation CONCORDIA in order to better understand how the BP/AF works in 
practice. Bearing in mind that any EU military operation in Macedonia was at the 
request of the FYROM government, that it would be a ‘follow-on’ mission to Allied 
Harmony and with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities (Article 1: mission), 
Council Joint Action 2003/92/CFSP clearly outlined the terms of formal cooperation 
between the EU and NATO. First, the EU invited NATO to agree the DSACEUR, 
Admiral R Feist, to assume the position of EU Operational Commander and for 
SHAPE to act as the Operational Headquarters for CONCORDIA (Article 2 
Appointment of the Operational Commander). Second, the Council decided to launch 
the operation once EU crisis management procedures were in place. These would 
include decisions on the Operational Commander, the operations plan, the rules of 
engagement, decisions on the Operational Headquarters and assigning the post of 
EU Force Commander (Article 3: planning and launching the operation). Next, this 
document clearly gives the necessary ‘political control’ and ‘strategic direction’ to the 
Political and Security Committee while under the ‘responsibility of the Council’ and 
‘assisted’ by the SG/HR (Article 4: Political Control and Strategic Direction). The 
remit of this political control and strategic direction would encompass decisions 
made regarding the necessary changes to the planning and launching of the 
operation as outlined above. 
Article 5 attributes the EUMC the remit to ‘monitor the proper execution of the 
military operation conducted under the responsibility of the Operation Commander’ 
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and to act as the primary ‘point of contact’ with the Operational Commander (Article 
5: Military Direction). Thus, the DSACEUR is an integral institutional link between the 
EU and NATO. Article 10 and 11 go on to further outline the EU’s relations with 
NATO. They stipulate that (Article 10: Relations with NATO & 11 Release of 
Classified information to NATO and third states): 
 
Article 10 
1. Contacts and meetings between EU and NATO should be 
stepped up during the preparation and conduct of the operation, 
in the interests of transparency, consultation, and cooperation 
between the two organisations. This should include meetings at 
the PSC/NAC and Military Committee level and regular contacts 
between the EU and NATO commanders in the region. 
Throughout the operation NATO shall be kept informed on the 
use of NATO assets and capabilities.32 The PSC shall inform 
the NAC before proposing to the Council the termination of the 
operation. 
2. The entire chain of command33 will remain under the political 
control and strategic direction of the EU throughout the 
operation, after consultations between the two organisations. In 
that framework the Operational Commander will report on the 
conduct of the operation to EU bodies only. NATO will be 
informed of developments in the situation by the appropriate 
bodies, in particular the PSC and the Chairman of the Military 
Committee. 
Article 11 
The Secretary-General/High Representative is authorised to 
release to NATO and third parties associated with this Joint 
Action EU classified information and documents generated for 
the purposes of the operation in accordance with the Council 
Security Regulations.  
 
On 7 February 2003, the EU released a press briefing announcing that, with the 
agreement of NATO (NAC decision dated 6 February 2003), Admiral Rainer Feist 
(Germany) was to be appointed EU Operational Commander for operation 
CONCORDIA. This document also announced the appointment of Brigadier-General 
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 The exact list of the NATO assets and capabilities requested by the EU for this mission is a 
classified document. 
33
 See the Chain of Command flow chart for Berlin Plus missions below. 
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P Maral (France) as EU Force Commander and SHAPE as the EU Operational HQ 
under EU-NATO permanent arrangements (CSDP Website, 2003). A few days later, 
on 18 February 2003, a PSC decision sheet was released setting up the Committee 
of Contributors (CoC)34 for the EU-led operation in FYROM, whereby the CoC ‘will 
play a key role in the day-to-day management of the operation’ and ‘the Committee 
will be the main forum where contributing States collectively address questions 
relating to the employment of their forces in the operation’ (EU Political and Security 
Committee Decision, 2003). Representatives of all EU Member States, 
Representatives of the third States contributing to the operation, the Director General 
of the EUMS (DGEUMS) and the Operational Commander were all entitled to attend 
CoC meetings under this decision (EU Political and Security Committee Decision, 
2003). 
 
Figure 2.1: Operational Chain of Command in Berlin Plus Operations 
The EU Council (political control and strategic direction) 
 
DSACEUR (NATO & EU OP-COM), SHAPE-EUSG 
   
NATO Allied Joint Force Command Naples 
    
EU Operational Commander (in-theatre) 
 
For the launching of CONCORDIA - a Berlin Plus and EU -led operation that had 
DSACEUR as the Operational Commander and where a headquarters was 
established at SHAPE - there was also a body made up of personnel from EU 
Member State contributions to support DSACEUR. This headquarters group was 
known as the ‘EU Staff Group and should not be confused with (and often is) the EU 
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 Note that the resolution to the contentious negotiations of how ESDP operations would affect non-
EU European Allies is addressed later in this thesis. 
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Cell at SHAPE’ (Interview 16, 2010). ‘Concordia was launched in 31 Mar 2003 but 
Staff Group was established here on 04 Feb 2003 in SHAPE to manage the 
operation with/for DSACEUR’ (ibid). However, as agreed when the EU and NATO 
‘devised the chain of command’, NATO’s regional command in Naples, Allied Forces 
South Europe (AFSOUTH) would be an additional link situated between the office of 
the ‘DSACEUR and the force commander in Skopje’. The responsibility of AFSOUTH 
was tasked with the responsibility of ‘ensuring coherence with ongoing NATO 
operations in the region and also for providing extraction forces in case of a 
deterioration of the situation’ (Monaco, 2003, p. 2).  
 
Figure 2.2: EU Staff Group Diagram  
 
(Taken from the EU Website www.consilium.europa.eu) 
 
Finally, it should be acknowledged that NATO retained its own autonomous 
personnel in FYROM to help it to become ‘fully integrated in Euro-Atlantic structures, 
and will continue to work for peace and stability in the Balkans’ (EU Core Documents 
from 2003, 2003, p. 48). In order to achieve this, NATO retained a ‘Senior Civilian 
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Representative and a Senior Military Representative in Skopje’ to assist FYROM ‘in 
the development of security sector reform and adaption to NATO standards’ (EU 
Core Documents from 2003, 2003, p. 48). These representatives worked not only 
with CONCORDIA operating in the theatre, but also the European Union Special 
Representative (EUSR), a Commission delegation, the European Agency for 
Reconstruction (EAR), the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM), and the EU Presidency 
(Eva Gross Grevi et al., 2009, p. 176). This is not to say that the thickness of all the 
EU institutional coordination was directly connected to formal EU-NATO cooperation. 
However, it is relevant with regard to the overall performance, in terms of the 
effectiveness and the coordination of CONCORDIA as the first ever EU and EU-
NATO Berlin Plus operation. 
This chapter now turns to the BP/AF in the context of Operation ALTHEA. 
CONCORDIA was an important milestone in its creation; however, the BP/AF was 
not fully established until the EU took over the NATO Mission in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH). In order to fully establish the baseline of formal EU-NATO 
cooperation, against which the case studies in this thesis will be considered, further 
developments in the BP/AF need to be discussed. 
 
Operation ALTHEA35 
 
Background and Context 
 
ALTHEA, the on-going executive military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
was/is mandated to facilitate three main objectives: First, like the NATO/SFOR 
mission in BiH before it, ALTHEA has the responsibility to maintain a ‘safe and 
secure environment’ in compliance with the 1995 Dayton-Paris peace agreement. 
Second, the operation is tasked with supporting the work of the EU’s Special 
Representative/High Representative of the international community to Bosnia. 
Finally, ALTHEA supports the local authorities in tasks such as countermines 
activities, control of weapons and ammunition movement, and the overseeing of 
weapons and ammunition storage sites (European Union External Action Service, 
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 Named after ALTHEA, the Greek god of healing. 
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2011b). ALTHEA was launched on 2 December 2004 with an initial troop strength of 
approximately 7,000, but is on-going with currently around 600 (last updated in 
February 2013)36 personnel. Currently, there are 18 EU Member States and five non-
EU Member States contributing forces. There is a common budget cost of 15 million 
Euros (Council of the European Union, 2004a).  
As with CONCORDIA, ALTHEA was launched as part of a wider political and 
strategic context vis-à-vis the Western Balkans. Furthermore, ALTHEA is also a 
mission that was launched with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities under the 
Berlin Plus arrangements. In fact, CONCORDIA in many ways set the tone and was 
a necessary pre-set operation for ALTHEA, the largest EU/ESDP military operation 
to date. Finally, like CONCORDIA, ALTHEA was a take-over operation from NATO’s 
Implementation Force (IFOR), a 60,000-strong deployment, and later the 
Stabilisation Force (SFOR) made up of around 30,000 troops. At the EU Council in 
Copenhagen (12-13 December 2002), there was the first public mention of ‘the 
Unions willingness to lead a military operation in Bosnia following SFOR’ (EU Core 
Documents from 2002, 2003, p. 170).  
This was closely followed by the European Union and NATO Declaration stating 
that ‘[T]ogether, we are going to analyse the possibilities for an EU military role in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (EU Core Documents from 2002, 2003, p. 180). However, 
it was not until the NATO Istanbul Summit of 2004 that NATO welcomed ‘the 
decision of the European Union to mount a new operation in Bosnia’ (The North 
Atlantic Council, 2004a). Of course, in between these two announcements was the 
decision to launch the Iraq War (without a UNSC resolution) and the transatlantic rift 
that stemmed from this decision. There was recognition in just about every notable 
transatlantic security ‘core document’ of 2003 (EU Core Documents from 2003) 
giving political momentum to the idea of the EU’s replacement of SFOR, with the 
possible launching of that operation in early 2004. However, Iraq played a large part 
in delaying the final decision. The General Affairs and External Relations Council 
(GAERC) document of February 2003 is especially noteworthy as it also attempted 
to lay out the significance of an EU-led operation in BiH. Consideration should also 
be given to the ‘integrated EU approach’ towards Bosnia, where Lord Paddy 
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 For the latest ALTHEA Fact Sheet, visit http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-
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Ashdown had been appointed EUSR to Bosnia37 since 2002, and ESDP had already 
launched a police mission on 1 January 2003 (EU Core Documents from 2003, 
2003, p. 46). The EU had, of course, played ‘a key supporting role’ in BiH since the 
signing of the Dayton-Paris Peace accords in 1995. 
Significantly, EU and NATO integration, over time, has become a deeper part of 
the equation for BiH. However, this goal was signalled from as early on as 2003, 
when both organisations stated publicly their ‘common objectives’ to ‘assist the 
countries concerned towards further integration into EU and NATO structures’ (EU 
Core Documents from 2003, 2003, pp. 97–98). This overall strategic objective and 
organisation/instrument-rich environment, supported by UNSC resolutions 1551 and 
1575, gave ALTHEA the impetus to see through the Iraq troubles and eventually 
launch in December 2004. 
EU Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP, the primary document outlining the 
overall mission mandate, details the operational structure of ALTHEA. Once again, 
with regard to establishing the baseline of EU-NATO cooperation and the BP/AF, 
Article 1 section 3 stipulates that ALTHEA ‘shall be carried out with recourse to 
NATO assets and capabilities, on the basis agreed with NATO’ (Council of the 
European Union, 2004a). Although the term Berlin Plus is not specifically referred to 
in the document, it does give ALTHEA ‘recourse to NATO common assets and 
capabilities, on the basis agreed with NATO’ (Article 1.3), appoints the DSACEUR as 
Operational Commander (Article 2) and designates SHAPE as the OHQ for ALTHEA 
(Article 3), all the key attributes of a Berlin Plus operation. The next section will 
outline, in full, the specificity of the formal EU-NATO relationship regarding ALTHEA. 
 
Establishing Berlin Plus for ALTHEA 
 
As noted above, EU Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP is the primary document 
outlining the mandate and structure of EU ALTHEA. Articles 1.1-1.3 note that 
ALTHEA is conducted to ‘provide deterrence, continued compliance with the 
responsibility to fulfil the role… of the General Framework Agreement (GFAP) in BiH, 
and to contribute to a safe and secure environment’. In order to do this, the forces 
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deployed will ‘operate in accordance with the general concept approved by the 
Council’ and with ‘recourse to NATO common assets and capabilities’. Clearly, this 
means that, like CONCORDIA, ALTHEA is a formal Berlin Plus mission. Admiral 
Rainer Feist (DSACEUR)38 was appointed as ALTHEA’s first Operational 
Commander and SHAPE was delegated the role of EU Operational Headquarters 
(Article 2 & 3). This document also appointed Major General A. Leakey as the first 
EU Force Commander39 (Article 4). Furthermore, like CONCORDIA, after the 
Council has decided on the launching of the operation, approved the operational 
plan as well as the ROEs (Article 5), the PSC ‘shall exercise the overall political 
control and strategic direction’ with responsibility to the EU Council regarding ‘the 
powers to amend’ all of the above (Article 6.1). 
In light of these duties, the PSC will need to ‘report to the council at regular 
intervals’ and ‘receive reports from the Chairman of the European Union Military 
Committee (CEUMC) regarding the conduct of the EU military operation’ and they 
may invite both the DSACEUR/OP-COM and the FOR-COM to meetings ‘as 
appropriate’ (Article 6.2-3). This document further gives ‘military direction’ to the 
EUMC by designating them the power to ‘monitor the proper execution’ of the 
operation ‘conducted under the ‘responsibility of the EU Operational Commander’ 
(Article 8.1-2). The CEUMC shall also ‘act as the primary point of contact with the EU 
operational Commander’ (Article 8.3). 
With regard to the direct ‘relations with NATO’ (Article 13.1), Joint Action 
2004/570/CFSP states that all ‘relations with NATO shall be conducted in 
accordance with the relevant provisions laid down in the 17 March 2003 Exchange of 
Letters between the Secretary-General/High Representative and the NATO 
Secretary General’. This ‘Exchange of Letters’ document is the actual classified 
Berlin Plus document and is the closest direct mention of it to be found in this Joint 
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 Although Admiral Feist (Germany) was appointed OP/COM in July 2004, he was no longer NATO 
DSACEUR by the time ALTHEA was launched in December 2004. The first ALTHEA OP/COM when 
the operation was launched was DSACEUR General Sir John Reith (UK: 2004-2007), followed by 
DSACEUR General Sir John McColl (UK: 2007-to date). 
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 ALTHEA EU Force Commanders are as follows: Major General A. Leakey (UK: December 2004-
December 2005); Major General G.M. Chiarini (Italy: December 2005-December 2006); Rear Admiral 
H. J. Witthauer (Germany: December 2006-December 2007); Major General I.M. Villalaín (Spain: 
December 2007-December 2008); Major General S. Castagnotto (Italy: December 2008-December 
2009); Major General Bernhard Bair (Austria: December 2009-December 2010). 
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Action. Article 13.2 also reaffirms the chain of command for ALTHEA as a Berlin Plus 
Operation; most importantly, the Operational Commander (OP/COM) shall report on 
the conduct of the operation ‘only to EU bodies’ and that NATO shall be informed of 
‘developments in the situation by the appropriate bodies, in particular the PSC and 
CEUMC’. Here, it is important to remember that ‘Berlin Plus arrangements and the 
implementation thereof will apply only to those EU Member States which are also 
either NATO members or parties to the partnership for Peace’. Therefore, unlike 
CONCORDIA, this caveat removed Cyprus and Malta from actually (and not just in 
theory) taking part in ALTHEA with recourse to NATO assets, as they joined the EU 
in May of 2004 before ALTHEA was launched (EU Core Documents from 2002, 
2003, p. 170). 
This, of course, had a real impact on the release of information to third states as 
outlined in Article 14 of Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP, due to the fact that certain 
member states of the EU and NATO decided to keep EU-NATO relations strictly to 
the letter of Berlin Plus agreements on EU-NATO modalities of cooperation. The 
PSC-NAC meetings would only meet to discuss BiH in a format without Cyprus and 
Malta.40 Furthermore, from May 2004 onward, the formal passing of sensitive 
information between the organisations would only be carried out as conditioned by 
the strict ‘red line’ practices outlined above. 
On 21 September 2004, a PSC decision was released which reaffirmed that the 
participation of third states would ‘apply only to those EU Member States which are 
also either NATO members or parties to the “Partnership for Peace”, and which have 
consequently concluded bilateral security arrangements with NATO’ (EU Political 
and Security Committee Decision, 2004a). Only by meeting these conditions could 
the contributions from third states be accepted. In the days following, PSC decision 
sheet BiH/2/2004 appointed DSACEUR Gen J. Reith as Op/Com (EU Political and 
Security Committee Decision, 2004b) and BiH/3/2004 set up the Committee of 
Contributors (EU Political and Security Committee Decision, 2004c). For reasons of 
brevity, it should be noted that this document is much the same as that used to set 
up the CoC for CONCORDIA. However, one interesting difference is the mention of 
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 Malta reinstated its PfP agreements with NATO in April 2008 and, as such, regained their right to 
receive information through Berlin Plus agreements.  
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Berlin Plus and the use of any opportunity to restate the rules of this agreement as 
they relate to third states, i.e. Cyprus and Malta.  
Finally, there is the EU Staff Group (EUSG) at SHAPE to support the DSACEUR 
‘in his role as Operational Commander, who is to plan and direct the operation at the 
military strategic level of command’ made up of fourteen military and five civilian 
personnel (currently). The Chief of EUSG is responsible to the OP/COM for the ‘day-
to-day’ running of ALTHEA and the EUSG liaises with all divisions and offices within 
SHAPE. Due to the fact that the CoC has the added command element of 
AFSOUTH in Naples, in October 2004 the PSC decision BiH/4/2004 appointed as 
Head of the EU Command Element at Naples the NATO Chief of Staff at AFSOUTH, 
General Ciro Cocozza. Once again, this was a ‘double-hatted’ position as with 
CONCORDIA (EU Political and Security Committee Decision, 2004d). 
We can now see that the baseline of formal (BP/AF) EU-NATO relations has been 
established politically, institutionally and operationally. But what about cooperation 
beyond the BP/AF? After all, the EU and NATO have been operating in close 
geographical proximity and with closely-aligned goals since, and apart from, 
operation ALTHEA. If we investigate a sample of these areas and operations, will 
there be evidence of EU-NATO cooperation? Furthermore, if cooperation is 
established, to what extent is the BP/AF the normative, political, institutional and 
operational reference point or framework for such cooperation? In what way will 
agents be creative enough to adapt to the limitations of the BP/AF if attempting 
cooperation beyond the BP/AF? 
 
Summarising the Agreed Framework 
 
So far, this chapter has shown that Berlin Plus was deemed to be the appropriate 
form of cooperation for CONCORDIA and ALTHEA. The literature also seems to 
demonstrate that Berlin Plus, as an instrument of EU-NATO cooperation, was a 
success in both operations; and still is with regard to ALTHEA, albeit with some 
pronounced friction points. 
This chapter has also demonstrated the process that established Berlin Plus and 
what has developed into the Agreed Framework for cooperation between the EU and 
NATO. This BP/AF is the formal institution with formal bureaucratic structures, rules 
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and operating procedures for cooperation. Therefore, the BP/AF can now be used as 
a formal rule criterion but also as a normative, political, institutional and operational 
baseline to further investigate for any cooperation beyond the formal framework of 
EU-NATO relations. If formal EU-NATO cooperation is ruled out, then what type of 
cooperation is emerging, if any? What are the conditions for any growth or 
institutionalisation of informal EU-NATO cooperation beyond the BP/AF? Finally, is 
there any evidence of actors linked to the EU and NATO institutions creating new 
rules, or employing creative solutions to adapt the limits of the BP/AF in the informal 
cases of cooperation, as analysed later in the thesis? It is, therefore, necessary to 
summarise this framework.  
First, Berlin Plus was directly modelled on the Berlin NAC decisions of 1994 and, 
most obviously, 1996 which called for ‘the use of separable but not separate military 
capabilities in operations led by the WEU’ (The North Atlantic Council, 1996). 
Therefore, it is clear that Berlin Plus, as an institution, is clearly a template of an 
earlier attempt to create a similar institution albeit with a different organisation. 
Furthermore, Berlin Plus has only ever been implemented for operations, whereby a 
‘hand-over’ to EU-led military responsibility was the framework and not a scenario in 
which the EU independently takes the lead and initiates an operation but with 
recourse to the ‘collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance; for operations in 
which the Alliance as a whole is not [or was ever] engaged militarily as an Alliance’ 
(Yost, 2007, p. 74). Therefore, since Berlin Plus has never really been used in the 
way it was intended, it cannot be properly evaluated as such. This thesis, therefore, 
must investigate actual EU-NATO cooperation as it exists, but utilising the baseline 
as created in this chapter. 
Second, it is important to summarise the formal institutions that constitute EU-
NATO cooperation as laid out by the Agreed Framework. Most significant to note, in 
terms of sequencing, is that these institutional arrangements were worked out before 
Cyprus (still as a divided island) joined the EU after the Greek Cypriots rejected the 
referendum concerning the northern Turkish part of the Island. At the nation state 
level, these are: EU-NATO Foreign Minister meetings and the NAC-PSC 
Ambassador level meetings. As this chapter has demonstrated, since the EU 
enlargement of 2004, and specifically due to Cyprus joining the Union, the first 
meetings have been discontinued in their official capacity. With regard to the NAC-
PSC, from 2001 until 2003, these two bodies met with an agenda that covered the 
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full spectrum of common issues. For example, the NAC-PSC formally discussed 
geographical issues such as Afghanistan, Moldova, and Kosovo as well as issues of 
proliferation, energy security, and trans-national terrorism (Interview 5, 2010). Since 
2004, however, ALTHEA has been the only agreed agenda subject that can be 
discussed at a formal NAC-PSC level without the presence of Cyprus (Yost, 2007, p. 
93). These meetings have been drastically reduced given their limited agenda and 
(at the time of writing) the last of these meetings took place in March 2012. 
As mentioned, the relationship between the NATO Sec/Gen and the EU SG/HR41 
has also been crucial in regards to cooperation and synergy between the two 
organisations. At a purely formal level, the NAC-PSC meetings are co-chaired by 
both of these posts. The SG/HR has also been invited to all meetings of the NAC at 
the level of foreign and defence ministers. However, the NATO Sec/Gen is usually 
only invited to EU defence ministerial meetings (Yost, 2007, p. 91). At MOD level, for 
political directors of MODs and MILREPS, the situation is only formal at the 28-26 
format, now 28-27 but still excluding Cyprus. There was an attempt to meet 
informally at 28-27 with the Political Directors, but this attempt failed due to the 
Turkish representative declining to participate (Interview 5, 2010). At the level of 
MILREPS, there has also been no success at bringing them together. What has also 
developed since 2003 is a series of central tools that are supposed to facilitate EU-
NATO cooperation. These are: the EU Staff Group in SHAPE (created for 
CONCORDIA but is still present and operational for ALTHEA), the ‘Military 
Permanent Arrangements’, which established the NATO Liaison Team at EUMS and 
the EU Cell at SHAPE, and the DSACEUR with the dual function of Operations 
Commander for Berlin Plus operations - CONCORDIA (completed) and ALTHEA 
(on-going) - as well as the ‘strategic coordinator’ with the ‘terms of reference’ that 
include ‘[enhancing] transparency’. What is necessary to consider in the case studies 
that follow is the degree to which these central tools are relevant in regards to 
cooperation when Berlin Plus has not been agreed for a particular operation, but the 
EU and NATO may still desire to communicate and cooperate out of functional or 
situational imperatives. 
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 Note this position has changed to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy post-Lisbon Treaty December 2009. 
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When it comes to the formal institution with formal bureaucratic structures, rules 
and operating procedures for cooperation, what has to be remembered is the EU-
NATO security of information agreement. A NATO-restricted document (classified) 
can only be sent to those EU member states that have signed security agreements 
with NATO. This has, of course, resulted in the participation and scope problems 
outlined above. If intelligence sharing is formally limited to ALTHEA, but cooperation 
is indeed going on outside of that context, then how actors attempt to manage this 
obstacle becomes highly important. In what way will agents be creative enough to 
adapt to the limitations of the BP/AF if attempting cooperation beyond the BP/AF? If 
cooperation is proceeding, then we should expect to find some evidence of these 
creative solutions. 
Although both CONCORDIA and ALTHEA have been generally deemed success 
stories, there have been frictions regarding the Agreed Framework and the 
implementation of Berlin Plus. First, these frictions were evident with regard to the 
sharing of sensitive information between the EU and NATO, even in the context of 
Berlin Plus, for example the presence of non-NATO members of the EU inside the 
EU cell at SHAPE. There were also political sensitivities, established in 
CONCORDIA and ALTHEA, regarding the use of NATO’s AFSOUTH in Naples as 
part of the chain of command structure. In the case of ALTHEA, obtaining the full list 
of assets and capabilities at the strategic level was ‘drawn out and protracted’ 
(Simón, 2010, p. 29); what could not be resolved was the delineation of tasks, which 
could not be solved in Brussels, so they asked the field commanders to do it for them 
and on the ground (Interview 11, 2010). This last theme introduces an important 
spatial element to the EU-NATO relationship that will be picked up in much more 
detail in the three subsequent case studies. What will be shown in the case studies 
is that this precedent has been utilised in cases of EU-NATO cooperation outside the 
BP/AF as well, and a hierarchical and spatial dimension to EU-NATO cooperation is 
clearly evident, not only in formal BP/AF cooperation but especially with regard to 
informal cooperation beyond the BP/AF operations.  
What this has demonstrated is that (1) there is established rhetoric for positive 
EU-NATO cooperation (both for these missions and as a strategic alliance), (2) that 
institutions were created to formally operationalise and facilitate cooperation, and (3) 
Berlin Plus, specifically, is the mechanism that uses these institutions together with 
the offer of EU access to NATO’s assets and capabilities to establish what is 
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commonly known as the Agreed Framework (with the caveats built into the security 
of information agreement). These comprise the formal structures, rules and 
operating procedures that practitioners at all three levels of cooperation should 
comply with. Finally, this chapter has demonstrated that Berlin Plus is now only a 
framework of last resort, yet it retains a deeply symbolic value internalised by actors 
at all three levels of EU-NATO cooperation. However, the combination of the 
established rhetoric and the Agreed Framework means that all of the above should 
only be used to discuss and conduct ALTHEA and no more. The following chapters 
will investigate whether this is, in fact, the case.  
 
Conclusion 
 
‘Relations are only getting worse and the PSC-NAC is meeting once a year to talk 
only about Bosnia’ (Interview 21, 2010). There have only been five formal meetings 
between EU-NATO Foreign Ministers, all of which took place before 2004. According 
to Yost, there are those member states that ‘prefer autonomy’ and see Berlin Plus as 
a ‘last resort’ for those operations in which NATO assets and capabilities are, 
regrettably, necessary (Yost, 2007, p. 89). This argument is bound up in the desire of 
some member states to obtain an independent OHQ for ESDP operations and the 
institutional blockage that the Cyprus-Turkey situation has meant for EU-NATO 
cooperation. But the more salient fact here is that some member states, with 
ALTHEA in mind, ‘were determined that Berlin Plus should be the exception rather 
than the rule’ (Interview 3, 2010), and are ‘very keen to see it go’ (Interview 1, 
2009a). ALTHEA has left a ‘sour feeling’ in the mouths of some Member States and 
they have indicated that, after ALTHEA, there would be no more Berlin Plus 
operations (Interview 12, 2010a). Over time, this has resulted in a formal EU-NATO 
relationship, whereby the EU avails itself of SHAPE for ALTHEA, but at the political 
level ‘you have nothing’ (Interview 12, 2010a). So we arrive at the key empirical 
puzzle under investigation: Why are the formal mechanisms of EU-NATO 
cooperation (BP/AF) becoming static, yet cooperation is continuing? As one senior 
NATO official put it: 
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There is nothing wrong with Berlin Plus, except that it excludes 
one of the EU nations and therefore we can’t move forward 
because the EU won’t allow it to without all 27 Member States. 
There is not much wrong with Berlin Plus at all really. However, 
I think that wrapping other missions into Berlin plus, for example 
if KFOR (Kosovo) was to become an EU operation, and I don’t 
think that will happen anytime soon, but let’s say that it was 
they could make it into a Berlin Plus operation, but that wouldn’t 
work because we have gone passed that now because it would 
create difficulties with Cyprus and they would not agree to it. 
So basically Berlin Plus is frozen. But that is not to say that 
there is anything particularly wrong with it, in fact with the way 
we run Bosnia at the moment is a model of how efficient it can 
be in terms of running an operation (Interview 13, 2010). 
 
This chapter has set the baseline of EU-NATO cooperation. It has also 
established exactly what the BP/AF is in terms of the EU-NATO relationship, but also 
specifically when cooperation is formally operationalised on the ground in military 
operations. The chapter established that the AF generally, and Berlin Plus 
specifically, was modelled on past institutional templates and designs. Quite 
significantly, we can begin to see that sequencing, path dependency and unintended 
consequences have all, to a degree, shaped the specific nature and limits of the EU-
NATO relationship. Therefore, these concepts will be specifically addressed in the 
next chapter   
It is now possible to take this BP/AF and ask, in a context where formal 
cooperation is ruled out, what type of cooperation can we see emerging and to 
investigate for informal norms and practices that support informal cooperation 
between the EU and NATO. Furthermore, if these practices and informal structures 
do exist, can the assumptions of historical institutionalism help to explain the stasis 
of the BP/AF as outlined in this chapter, while also accounting for any evolutionary 
changes to the relationship as well? Do the theoretical assumptions of HI help to 
explain the creation and evolutionary paths of the relationship beyond BP/AF? The 
next chapter seeks to establish the analytical framework that will inform that 
investigation. 
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Chapter Three 
Historical Institutionalism:  
the framework of analysis 
 
From the same trunk, there are many different branches and 
smaller branches. Although it is possible to turn around or 
clamber from one to another – and essential if the chosen 
branch dies – the branch on which a climber begins is the one 
she tends to follow (Levi 1997, p. 28 in Pierson, 2004, p. 20). 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter will establish historical institutionalism (HI) as the framework of analysis 
for this thesis. As will be demonstrated, HI offers much that can help us to 
understand the current stasis of BP/AF. However, it is also anticipated that the 
traditional or central assumptions of HI will prove less useful in explaining any 
evidence of EU-NATO cooperation beyond BP/AF, or how that cooperation has 
evolved despite the political blockage that prima facie should exclude such 
cooperation. In other words, although the central assumptions of HI are helpful in 
explaining stasis at the grand political level (of the kind outlined in the previous 
chapter), they are less helpful in explaining what is effectively being problematised in 
this thesis. However, this chapter will also demonstrate that the literature on HI has 
advanced considerably in recent years to incorporate incremental change, learning 
and socialisation. Therefore, the framework of analysis will be developed in this 
chapter to account for these assumptions. 
 Theory in International Relations (IR), as well as in Political Science more 
generally, has long been contested owing, in essence, to the problem of applying 
‘hard’ scientific approaches to a field in which the objects of study are social beings. 
Hedley Bull (1966b: 2), for one, has commented that ‘international politics [are] not 
susceptible to scientific enquiry’, while Chomsky (1994: 120) has suggested that, in 
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IR, ‘historical conditions are too varied and complex for anything that might plausibly 
be called “a theory” to apply uniformly’. 
Things have developed since then. For example, see Patrick Thaddeus Jackson’s 
The Conduct of Enquiry in International Relations (Jackson, 2010). That said, the 
central aim of this chapter is to present clear theoretical assumptions and a 
framework that can be applied to the investigation of informal cooperation in the case 
studies that follow. There is no expectation that theory will apply ‘uniformly’ to the 
totality of EU-NATO cooperation, but there is an assumption that ‘institutions matter’, 
as does history. Therefore, this chapter will establish the applicability of HI, not only 
for explaining why the BP/AF is stuck in its current institutional equilibrium, but also 
for investigating incremental changes to the EU-NATO relationship beyond the 
BP/AF stasis and in cases where cooperation is not formally agreed.  
On this basis, the present chapter will proceed as follows. First, HI falls within a 
wider IR and institutionalist literature. This literature will be identified and its relevant 
claims extrapolated. This section of the chapter will highlight the importance of ‘new 
institutionalism’ (March & Olsen, 1989). It will pay particular attention to rational 
choice and sociological institutionalisms and where these two approaches stand in 
relation to HI. It will conclude by providing a clear working definition of institutions for 
this study. The second section will first be devoted to establishing the central 
assumptions and logics of HI: history, path dependence, and unintended 
consequences. Then, there will be a discussion of how the literature on HI has 
advanced in recent years to incorporate a notion of incremental change. This 
understanding of change moves past the more traditional (and limiting) adherence to 
change that is solely based on unintended consequences. The chapter will then turn 
to a discussion of learning and socialisation, two additional assumptions that are also 
based on more recent developments in the HI literature. Finally, there will be a 
detailed discussion of how these assumptions led to the generation of the specific 
research questions that will then be applied to the case studies that follow. 
 
Institutionalism within IR Literature 
 
This thesis takes as its starting point the central focus of institutions. Within IR, there 
is no agreement, either on what constitutes an institution, or on the degree to which 
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institutions play a role in shaping international politics. However, within one area of 
Political Science, coined institutionalism, there is at least agreement that institutions 
do ‘matter’. The various strands of this literature, however, agree on little else. 
Institutionalism as a scholarly tradition fell out of favour towards the third quarter 
of the twentieth century (March and Olsen, 1989; Peters, 2005, 1999; Steinmo in 
Porta and Keating, 2008; Steinmo et al., 1992). However, it has made a vibrant 
resurgence in the last two decades. Two influential works by March and Olsen 
(March and Olsen, 1998, 1989) have been central to this rediscovery of institutions 
and, consequently, ‘institutional perspectives have reappeared in political science’ 
(March and Olsen, 1989, p. 1). On the other hand, it is fair to say that institutionalism 
has never been too far removed from the discipline: ‘the roots of political science are 
in the study of institutions’ according to Peters (Peters, 2005, p. 1). Sven Steinmo 
takes this a step further by claiming that ‘institutional theory is as old as the study of 
politics’ (Steinmo in Porta and Keating, 2008, p. 118). Before a full discussion of 
these key assumptions of HI can be dealt with, it is necessary to situate this 
approach within the scholarship of what is termed ‘new institutionalism’. This is 
essential in order to gain a full comprehension of the dual-track approach which HI 
accommodates.  
In 1996, Hall & Taylor noted that the term ‘new institutionalism’ was appearing 
‘with growing frequency in political science’ and give at least three different 
‘analytical approaches’ within the relevant literature (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 5). 
There are, in fact, several more strands of new institutionalism to be accounted for; 
however, there is not sufficient room here to begin a lengthy discussion regarding 
the totality of these approaches. Therefore, the three variants of institutionalism 
identified by Hall and Taylor will be addressed here: rational choice institutionalism 
(RCI), sociological institutionalism (SI) and HI. The reason for this parsimonious 
reading of new institutionalism is that HI can be thought of as a synthetic approach, 
or middle-range theory that combines historical factors with insights from both 
rational choice and sociological institutionalism. It is fundamentally aimed at 
analysing ‘real world outcomes’ (Steinmo in Della Porta and Keating, 2008). Hall and 
Taylor have thus termed HI as having a ‘pivotal position’ between the two other 
variants mentioned above (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 6). 
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 Rational Choice Institutionalism 
 
Scholars working within RCI are concerned, as are all institutionalists, with how 
institutions structure behaviour (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992; Hall and Taylor, 1996; 
Peters, 2005; Steinmo in Della Porta, 2008). Yet, the ways in which these scholars 
see the influence of institutions are distinct from those utilising other variants of 
institutionalism. As a starting point, for RCI scholars institutions are salient as 
‘features of strategic context, imposing constraints on self-interested behaviour’. 
Furthermore, ‘institutions define (or at least constrain) the strategies that political 
actors adopt in pursuit of their interests’ (Steinmo et al., 1992, p. 7). Hall and Taylor 
(1996: p. 12) have characterised this conceptualisation of self-interested actors as 
having ‘a fixed set of preferences or tastes’ and then, when acting within institutions, 
these actors’ behaviour is ‘entirely instrumental’ with the sole purpose of ‘maximising 
the attainment of these preferences’.  
The study of politics may be the study of institutions; however, it is also the study 
of human beings. Therefore, when RCI scholars posit that institutions have different 
structuring effects on behaviour, what is implicit in this viewpoint, as is so often the 
case with disagreements in political science, is how these scholars view and 
conceptualise human behaviour. As Sven Steinmo (Steinmo in Porta and Keating, 
2008, p. 126) has put it, where there is grave disagreement between RCI and the 
other variants of institutionalism is with ‘their understanding of the nature of the 
beings whose actions or behaviour is being structured’. For the rational 
institutionalist, institutions primarily matter because they ‘frame’ strategic behaviour. 
Viewed in this way, actors define themselves in institutions as ‘rule followers’ and, 
when considering their interests from the standpoint of institutions, they are most 
likely going to ask themselves if this institution will help them achieve ‘goals at an 
acceptable cost’ (Smith, 2004, p. 33). Therefore, society is replete with and 
structured by actors (individuals and states) who are seen to be in pursuit of 
individual ends - or, what March and Olsen (1998: pp. 949-951) have termed, the 
‘logic of expected consequences’. In sum, RCI scholars see interests as 
exogenously (from the institution) determined and, therefore, institutions are the 
mere arenas where interests are negotiated and fought over. 
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RCI also postulates the way in which institutions, as arenas, structure interaction 
between political actors. This approach often defines institutions as ‘features of a 
strategic context, imposing constraints on self-interested behaviour’ (Thelen and 
Steinmo, 1992, p. 7). As stated above, contained within the RCI approach is the 
belief that actors’ interests are exogenously given. Therefore, one critical role 
institutions play is in reducing uncertainty or ‘the shadow of the future’. When actors 
believe that joint benefits can be gained, institutions will be created and maintained 
to facilitate that process. Institutions are created to ‘provide information’ about other 
actors’ preferences and to ‘reduce transactions’ between them (Keohane and Martin, 
1995, p. 42). Yet, according to Peters (2005, p. 59), ‘the various rational choice 
perspectives tend to be better at defining institutions than they are in describing and 
explaining the processes by which institutions are created’. In other words, RCI is 
much better at explaining ‘behaviour within existing sets of rules’ than it is at 
illuminating ‘the process through which those rules are created’ (ibid, p. 59). 
However, RCI is not silent on institutional creation. This approach tends to posit 
institutional genesis based on a deductive model and in response to a specific 
function that is valued by the actors concerned. The creation of an institution is a 
direct reaction to the value and function it will provide for the actors involved; most 
notably, gains to exogenously given interests through cooperation (Hall and Taylor 
1996, p. 13). Implicit in this rationale is the idea that the creation of a given institution 
is determined by the fact that any alternative form would be less proficient at meeting 
actors’ needs and interests and, therefore, inferior.  
Although one should not confuse the explanations of institutional creation with 
those of institutional persistence, for reasons of brevity a short summation of the 
weaknesses to RCI’s ability to account for these separate issues is given here. As 
mentioned above, RCI rests its logic on a functionalist approach to institutional 
creation. However, this has meant that the approach tends to play down the 
numerous inefficiencies that can be found in institutions of all kinds. Moreover, since 
RCI assumes that the basis of institutional creation is functional, it also tends to be 
rather ‘intentionalist’. Consequently, the approach sees institutional creation and 
persistence as ‘highly purposeful’ and ‘under the control’ of those actors involved 
(Hall and Taylor 1996, p. 19). A rationalist understanding of IR would posit that a 
problematic institutional arrangement, such as the one in this study, would adapt or 
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disappear. That it persists suggests that an RCI reading alone is insufficient for the 
empirical subject matter dealt with in this thesis. 
Due to RCI’s intent on seeing institutions, analytically, with the primary function of 
determining effects on behaviour and policy, but not on interests, it is not altogether 
surprising that this approach does not give much attention to institutional change or 
persistence. As Peters (2005, p. 61) puts it, ‘institutional change is simply exogenous 
to a model in which the purpose is to explain outcomes that result from the particular 
institutional arrangement in place’. This reasoning has implications for this work. If 
RCI attributes change to imperfections or to the sub-optimal achieving of the 
requirements the institution was designed for, it then follows that institutional 
persistence can be credited to the opposite effect; that is, the institution meeting the 
requirements and goals for which it was formed. The second chapter clearly 
demonstrated that this has not been the case. Therefore, further institutional 
concepts must be drawn upon. 
 
Sociological Institutionalism 
 
Developing independently but contemporaneously to other variants of the new 
institutionalism, scholars working with SI began to posit that institutional processes 
were not necessarily manifest, nor created simply due to rationality or efficiency, but 
could be attributable to ‘culturally specific practices’ (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 14). 
Within this tradition, interests are seen altogether differently from the RCI variant of 
institutionalism. Once again, this conceptually different understanding of interests 
and how they are defined and structured is a direct reaction to an alternative view of 
human social behaviour. Whereas RCI envisions human beings as calculating and 
self-interested actors, sociological institutionalists see a world where humans are 
essentially social beings (Steinmo in Della Porta 2008, p. 126).  
This view fundamentally depends on a particular understanding, or logic, of how 
human behaviour is construed. March and Olsen (1998, p. 949) describe how this 
understanding of human behaviour differs from a rationalist perspective: 
 
On the one side are those who see action as driven by a logic 
of anticipated consequences and prior preferences. On the 
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other side are those who see action as driven by a logic of 
appropriateness and sense of identity. 
 
This distinction has ramifications on how institutions are conceptualised. For 
sociological institutionalists, institutions are not mere arenas that structure interaction 
between political actors as a set of rules, but actually ‘frame’ (Steinmo in Della Porta 
2008, p. 126) how those actors working inside them envision the world in which they 
operate. Therefore, interests can be seen as endogenously given to those 
institutions, and actors are not merely pursuing self-interests as rule followers but act 
out of what March and Olsen (1998, p. 951) have termed a ‘logic of appropriateness’. 
This logic of appropriateness has ramifications for behaviour as actors may ask 
themselves: ‘to what extent does this institution fit with existing institutions and 
goals?’ (Smith, 2004, p. 33). Within the sociological approach, institutions are 
defined to a much broader extent than is usually found within most Political Science 
analyses. Formal rules, procedures or norms, symbol systems, cognitive scripts, and 
moral templates which can frame meaning and guide human action are all 
subsumed within the sociological variant of institutionalism (Hall and Taylor 1996, p. 
14). This conception can even define culture itself as institutions (CF. Lynne Zucker 
in Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). 
Given this description of sociological approaches, Scott’s (1995a: 33 quoted in 
Peters, 2005, p. 116) definition of institutions as ‘cognitive, normative and regulative 
structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behaviour’ 
seems to be clearly connected to how the sociological strand of institutionalism will 
be linked to the framework of analysis and the working definition of institutions that 
are operationalised in this study.  
Sociological institutionalism also offers a different reading of the way institutions 
are both created and persist. As a starting point, this approach assumes that 
institutional creation is done within a world abounding with prior existing institutions 
(Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 20). SI sees new institutions being formed based on 
‘templates’ which are borrowed from other prior existing institutions. This is an 
important feature of the approach and will have direct ramifications, not only for the 
assumptions of HI described below, but also the empirical case studies dealt with in 
this research. As will be demonstrated, the BP/AF often provides a normative 
background for informal cooperation and actors will often act as if the BP/AF is in 
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operation institutionally, even when it is not. However, unlike RCI, which sees these 
creational processes based on the efficiency and functionality of the institution, SI 
allows for new institutional practices based on ‘the social legitimacy of the 
organisation or its participants’. These organisations assume specific institutional 
forms or practices because these practices are ‘widely valued within a broader 
cultural environment’ (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 16). 
However, SI may stray too far in the other direction. SI can often be ‘curiously 
bloodless’ (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 21). In other words, it is seen as neglecting the 
impact of power clashes fought over interests and has been accused of ‘writing 
actors out of the script’ and thus limiting actors to mere ‘cultural dupes’ (Tonra, 2003, 
p. 735). The point here is that the approach could benefit, as could RCI, from a more 
complex blending of the logics that both variants advance regarding institutions and 
human behaviour. This could be done by an understanding that frames of meaning, 
scripts and symbols are not only produced by ‘interpretation’ but from a ‘process of 
contention as well’ (Hall & Taylor 1996, p. 21). 
SI usually sees change as occurring through the process of institutionalisation or 
deinstitutionalisation (see Smith, 2004; Peters, 2005; Juncos Garcia, 2007). 
‘Institutions must, and will, find means of adapting to changes in their environment’ 
by ‘recognizing changes in the environment and then finding ways to make the 
institution conform to those external forces’ (Peters 2005, p. 119). This type of 
change directly relates to the more incremental processes of institutional change, 
which are further addressed below. After defining the working definition of institutions 
to be utilised in this study, we then turn to establishing the overall framework of 
analysis for this thesis; it is one that incorporates the traditional assumptions of HI 
based on history, path dependency and unintended consequences, but also 
accounts for processes of change that are more incremental in nature. What will be 
demonstrated is that HI is a fusion of both the logics conceptualised above.  
 
Defining and Operationalising Institutions  
 
Although the sections above provide contrasting descriptions of how two institutional 
approaches conceptualise both human political behaviour and how institutions affect 
that behaviour, this chapter has yet to address the particular working definition of 
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institutions that will be utilised in this study. This section aims to accomplish that 
goal. It will start by defining the HI approach to structuring human political behaviour. 
This will then be followed by an outline of various working definitions of relevance, 
before clearly stating the precise definition deemed the most appropriate for 
addressing EU-NATO cooperation beyond the solely BP/AF context. There is a 
fundamental issue at hand here; the working definition of institutions must be able to 
account for both formal and informal structures and both processes of stasis and 
incremental change. 
As opposed to RCI, HI does not see institutions as providing a context in which 
political actors define their strategies and pursue their interests as problematic. In 
fact, according to Thelen and Steinmo (1992, p. 7), HI argues that institutions ‘play a 
role’ in shaping politics and its history. This approach sees actors as following both 
the logic of consequence and the logic of appropriateness. In this way, HI is not 
confined by the narrow definitions of either RCI or SI. As Steinmo (in Della Porta, 
2008, p. 126) argues; ‘historical institutionalism stands between these two views: 
human beings are both norm-abiding rule followers and self-interested rational 
actors’. This is a critical point, as HI can therefore allow institutions to shape actors’ 
strategies as well as their goals. Critically, what HI is primarily concerned with is why 
a certain choice was made and/or why a certain outcome occurred (Steinmo, 2008, 
p. 126).  
Some definitions see institutions as ‘the rules of the game in a society’ (North, 
1990, p. 3), or as consisting of ‘cognitive, normative and regulative structures and 
activities that provide stability and meaning to social behaviour’ (Scott in Peters, 
2005, p. 116). However, such definitions may be too broad to utilise in this study as 
they leave almost nothing out of the conceptual picture and, as such, are difficult to 
operationalise. On the other hand, rational choice definitions of institutions, seen as 
mere ‘features of a strategic context imposing constraints on self-interested 
behaviour’ (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, p. 7), are far too simplistic for an approach 
that is seeking to discover if institutions have had a structuring effect on actors’ 
preferences from both an exogenous and/or endogenous standpoint. 
Thelen and Steinmo (1992, p. 2) argue that institutions are ‘both formal 
organizations and informal rules and procedures that structure conduct’. Building on 
this definition is Peter Hall’s concept of institutions as ‘the formal or informal 
procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational 
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structure of the polity or political economy’ (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 6). This 
research will progress by incorporating a combination of these two definitions and 
seek to operationalise EU-NATO cooperation as a formal institution with formal 
bureaucratic structures, rules and operating procedures through the BP/AF, while 
also allowing for the informal norms and practices that underline much of the ad hoc 
and informal nature of EU-NATO cooperation beyond the BP/AF context. 
 
Historical Institutionalism: Understanding Stasis 
 
In the words of Steinmo; ‘[h]istorical institutionalism is neither a particular theory nor 
a specific method’, but ‘best understood as an approach to studying politics and 
social change’ (Steinmo in Della Porta 2008, p. 118).42 This thesis will proceed on 
this assumption. Moreover, it is argued that the validity in applying HI propositions, 
with regard to the case studies chosen for this research, is defended by the fact that 
HI is a middle-range theory and, therefore, can be adequately applied as such. 
However, as has been pointed out, there are certain challenges with building middle-
range theory (Immergut and Anderson, 2008, p. 361): 
 
Theoretical concepts are difficult to apply consistently to 
empirical cases, contradictory hypotheses generated by the 
same theory, theoretical over-determination, and the biases of 
case choice, the problem of measuring both independent and 
dependent variables. 
 
Before beginning a more in-depth narrative of HI, this section will give a brief 
background to the approach and how it is placed in the literature. The chapter will 
then discuss in detail both the more traditional and central assumptions of HI 
(History, PD, and unintended consequences) before moving on to a discussion of 
how the literature has progressed in recent years to account for incremental change, 
learning and socialisation. Once this is completed, the chapter will finally turn to 
                                            
42
 It should be noted that, from now on, this conceptualisation of HI is built into the study and often the 
terms theory or approach are used interchangeably.  
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establishing the research questions generated from this comprehensive account of 
the HI literature. 
 
Background 
 
HI has a considerable and detailed position in the new institutionalist literature. That 
is not to say that this variant is identical in all its forms throughout the literature. In 
fact, it has been rather ‘diverse’ and has ‘provided for understanding policy 
continuities over time within countries and policy variation across countries’ (Thelen 
and Steinmo, 1992, p. 10). Furthermore, as Thelen and Steinmo (1992, pp. 12-13) 
have pointed out, ‘institutions constrain and refract politics, but they are never the 
only cause of outcomes’. The focus HI gives to institutions does not mean that this 
approach neglects or replaces attention to other variables – ‘the players, their 
interests and strategies, and the distribution of power among them. On the contrary, 
it puts these factors in context, showing how they relate to one another by drawing 
attention to the way political situations are structured’ (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, p. 
13). HI is not an elegant theory, but its effectiveness can be found in the way it 
demonstrates how different variables can be linked over time.  
The central assumption of HI is that initial factors in the creation of an institution, 
such as policy choices or the templates borrowed for the design of an institution, will 
have a constraining and determining hold over the institution and/or the actors 
associated with it for the duration of its existence (King, 1995; Skocpol, 1992; 
Pierson, 1994/2004; Peters, 2005). This notion is commonly referred to in the 
literature as path dependency. The following section will outline this concept.  
 
History Matters 
 
As outlined above, HI assumes that political outcomes are a mixture of both rule 
following and interest maximising and will, to varying degrees, be the result of both 
the logics of consequence and appropriateness. However, this poses a dilemma for 
the researcher, namely which logic is more pronounced in any given scenario? Sven 
Steinmo’s (Steinmo in Della Porta, 2008, p. 126) answer is that ‘the historical 
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institutionalist would go to the historical record (also known as evidence) to try and 
find out’. 
Similar to Pierson’s (Pierson, 1994, p. 4) work on EU integration, HI can be 
understood as both historical and institutional. This may sound obvious, but 
important consequences follow from this statement. The first relates to the notion 
that, ‘political development must be understood as a process that unfolds over time’. 
The second, to the notion that ‘many of the contemporary implications of these 
temporal processes are embedded in institutions’ (Pierson, 1994, p. 4). Furthermore, 
HI defines the relationship, if seen merely as a ‘snapshot’ in time, as insufficient. It 
intends to move past this limiting analysis to one of ‘genuine historical research’ 
(Pierson in Immergut and Anderson, 2008, p. 354). 
The rest of this section will attempt to further elucidate why history matters as 
understood through the chosen framework for analysis. It is mainly built on 
propositions laid out by Steinmo (Steinmo in Della Porta, 2008). It will then be 
possible to outline path dependency as a key assumption of HI and to illustrate more 
generally why history is important in terms of the empirical research under 
investigation. 
Steinmo lays out three clear reasons why history does matter. First, he proposes 
‘political events happen within a historical context’, which has direct consequences 
for those decisions and events. This implies that the form an institution takes - its 
initial design - is a direct consequence of the moment in time in which it was 
designed. Of course, this implies that cooperation in the area of security between 
any other organisations in the world, or even in Europe for that matter, would not be 
identical in character due to those particular differences in history relevant to those 
organisations and their member states.  
Second, history does matter because ‘actors’ or ‘agents’ learn from those 
experiences garnered over time. Steinmo relates this back to the discussion of 
human behaviour addressed above. In other words, scholars working within the HI 
approach recognise that ‘behaviour, attitudes and strategic choices take place inside 
particular social, political, economic and even cultural contexts’. In doing so, HI 
places working assumptions and even variables within the ‘appropriate context’ 
(Steinmo in Della Porta, 2008, p. 127). This concept relates back to Pierson’s idea 
that snapshot views of political outcomes are limited. There is an understanding here 
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that, by deepening the understanding of the historical context, HI scholars can offer a 
richer and more accurate explanation of those events being analysed. 
Steinmo (in Della Porta, 2008, p. 128), building on Pierson, suggests that 
‘expectations’ are also seen as shaped by prior events. Therefore, it is essential for 
the HI scholar to look for patterns in history, or why the historical record in a certain 
case has produced patterns that would make a particular ‘snapshot’ view, or 
outcome, more predictable when viewed from a temporal dimension. According to 
Steinmo (in Della Porta, 2008, p. 128): 
 
The historical institutionalist is something like the environmental 
biologist who believes that in order to understand the specific 
fate of a particular organism or behaviour, she must explicitly 
examine that organism in the ecology or context in which it 
lives. 
 
This does, of course, relate back to the practicality of applying hard scientific 
approaches touched upon in the introduction of this chapter. In other words, HI 
assumes that it is not enough to apply approaches that are only concerned with 
variables studied in episodic and fixed time frames. 
Finally, before turning to path dependency, it is appropriate to understand what 
March and Olsen (1998, pp. 954-955) have termed ‘efficient’ and ‘inefficient’ 
histories. Once again, two opposing views, this time of how history unfolds are 
described: 
 
On the one side are those who see history as following a 
course that leads inexorably and relatively quickly to a unique 
equilibrium dedicated by exogenously determined interests and 
resources. On the other side are those who see history as 
inefficient, as following a meandering path affected by multiple 
equilibria and endogenous transformations of interests and 
resources.  
 
According to the first approach, efficient history is ‘determined’ and even ‘predictable’ 
based on conditions that are pre-set by the environment in which those conditions 
reside. The key attribute of this approach, with regard to this study, would see 
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institutions as having only a minor role independently and are mere ‘products’ of a 
history that is the creation of exogenously determined interests. 
 
Path Dependency 
 
This section aims to address one of the leading explanatory concepts of HI. The aim 
is to expand HI while giving explanatory clarity through the propositions attributed to 
it through the concept of path dependency. 
The most basic understanding of path dependency is that ‘what happened at an 
earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events 
occurring at a later point in time’ (Sewell in Pierson, 2004, p. 20). However, as 
Pierson (2004, p. 20) points out, this very broad understanding of the concept may 
be helpful only in its assumption that ‘history matters’. For this concept to be useful 
to the social scientist and to avoid ‘concept stretching’, what is needed is a narrower 
definition of path dependency in order to provide for analytical clarity (Satori, 1970, p. 
1034). Therefore, one must look at the basic conditions of path dependence: 
sequencing, positive feedback/increasing returns, punctuated equilibrium, and critical 
junctures. 
Embedded in this concept of path dependency is the critical notion that the most 
important effects of an event will be ‘temporally lagged’. In other words, the 
consequences of initial choices and even seemingly inconsequential or random 
occurrences will not be understood or felt until some later stage (Mahoney and 
Schensul in Goodin and Tilly, 2006, p. 457). Furthermore, initial choices can lead to 
processes that may engender ‘multiple possible outcomes’, which depend on the 
particular sequence of events and how these events unfold over time (Pierson, 2004, 
p. 21). 
The ‘Polya urn process’ has been given as an example of how sequencing 
matters and it can be described as follows: ‘There is a very large urn containing two 
balls, one black one red. You remove one ball, and then return it to the urn along 
with an additional ball of the same colour. You repeat this process until the urn fills 
up’ (Pierson 2004, p. 17). According to Pierson, from this experiment three things 
can be extrapolated that demonstrate how sequencing (history) matters and how this 
process demonstrates positive feedback. First, there is no way of knowing what the 
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‘eventual ratio’ between red and black balls will be in any given trial. Second, in any 
given trial, the ‘ratio will eventually reach an equilibrium’. Finally, ‘sequence is thus 
crucial’ because the draws that take place in the early stages of the process will 
have ‘a powerful effect on which of the possible equilibria will actually emerge’. 
Path dependency is also viewed as containing ‘self-reinforcing’ processes. In 
other words, once a particular path is in train, it can be extremely difficult to change 
that path. Steps along a particular path produce ‘consequences that increase the 
relative attractiveness of that path for the next round’ (Pierson, 2004, p. 18). 
Analysing the ‘stickiness’ of institutional development may lead to a clearer 
understanding of the continuing consequences that stem from initial institutional 
arrangements and agreements. This can be done by looking at the notions of 
positive feedback and increasing returns. 
The concept of positive feedback (or self-reinforcement) appears when each step 
in a ‘particular path’ results in outcomes and consequences that amplify the 
‘attractiveness’ of the path going forward (Pierson, 2004, p. 18). In doing so, positive 
feedback processes capture two key elements that are relevant to path dependence. 
First, the cost of switching paths, or from one approach to another, will increase over 
time as ‘each step in a particular direction makes it more difficult to reverse course’ 
(Pierson, 2004, p. 21). Second, this underscores the issue of ‘timing and sequencing’ 
and distinguishes ‘formative moments or conjectures’ from the periods that 
strengthen divergent paths (Pierson, 2004, p. 19). Brian Arthur (1994) has noted 
certain traits that can be found within positive feedback processes: unpredictability, 
inflexibility, nonergodicity, and potential path inefficiency (Arthur, 1994). Pierson 
adds to these characteristics a further point: that ‘sequencing is critical’ and events 
that occur earlier on have much more magnitude than those that appear later on 
(Pierson, 2004, p. 18).  
First, unpredictability is understood by the notion that initial events are often 
random and have more determining effects and, therefore, many outcomes are 
possible. Second, inflexibility appears when difficulty in switching paths is prominent. 
Usually, the further along in the process, the more inflexible it becomes. 
Nonergodicity is the understanding that even small events can play a role in shaping 
future outcomes and, therefore, cannot as such be ruled out of the equation. Finally, 
those patterns and outcomes that become the established paths are not necessarily 
the optimal paths yielding the highest ‘payoffs’, thus resulting in ‘path inefficiency’. 
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Yet, over time, those paths not initially chosen will become increasingly distant and 
unreachable alternatives while the path chosen becomes even more self-reinforcing 
(Pierson, 2004, pp. 74–75). 
These characteristics are vital in allowing for history to be remembered when 
analysing the empirical data. It allows the researcher to investigate, not only 
variables at the moment of interest, but also the sequence in which they occurred. 
Furthermore, particular attention can be paid to minor perturbations in the early 
stages of institutional design; these may well have larger than expected effects, 
which drive institutional development onto distinct paths that can persist even when 
rigid in nature. 
The notion of increasing returns demonstrates how positive feedback processes 
result in path dependence. Taken from his work on technology, Arthur (1994) has 
outlined four such conditions that help in hypothesising when these path dependent 
processes occur. These are: large set-up of fixed costs, learning effects, 
coordination effects and adaptive expectations (Arthur in Pierson, 2004, p. 24). 
Although these conditions were initially expressed to shed light on technological 
change, recent work has also demonstrated their usefulness in describing social 
behaviour (North, 1990; Pierson, 2004, 2000, 1994). As mentioned above, ‘initial 
institutional or policy decisions, even sub-optimal ones can become self-reinforcing 
over time’ creating ‘lock-in’ effects (Pierson, 1994, p. 17). The creation of new 
institutions, involving complex social interdependence, will often entail high ‘fixed 
costs’. By encouraging individuals to gain new skills, make investments, purchase 
goods and generally devote time and money, these new institutions generate ‘sunk 
costs’ (Pierson, 1994, p. 17). Crucially, concerning the discussion of human 
behaviour above, these sunk costs can entail both material and cultural components. 
There is considerable debate in the literature as to how ‘locked-in’ these paths can 
become and to what extent the ‘trajectories of development’ are set However, a 
temporal analysis should not necessarily rule-out ‘shifts away from the path’, even if 
it is argued that these shifts are more difficult to achieve as time passes (Mahoney 
and Schensul in Goodin and Tilly, 2006, p. 464). This deterministic caveat of path 
dependency processes, as well as more general critiques of how HI accounts for 
institutional change, should be addressed in order to develop a more analytically 
acute model of HI that is conducive for the empirical puzzle being addressed. 
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‘Punctuated equilibrium’ has been the most ‘dominant’ explanation of institutional 
change in the literature thus far (but by no means the only one). This concept, 
Steinmo explains (in Della Porta, 2008, p. 129), sees institutions as remaining 
‘essentially stable (at equilibrium) until they are faced with external (exogenous) 
shock’. These ‘shocks’ are the facilitators of the ‘breakdown’ of prior institutions and 
they further precipitate ‘intense political conflict’ regarding the design of new 
institutional arrangements (Steinmo et al., 1992, p. 15). This ‘political contestation’ 
allows policies to be set on particular paths, but these paths are ‘continuously 
renegotiated in an ongoing political process’ (Immergut and Anderson, 2008, p. 357). 
These punctures to the equilibrium result in new ‘branching point[s]’ or, as is more 
commonly termed, ‘critical junctures’ (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 10). 
The hallmarks of path dependent processes are these critical junctures. Path 
dependent models, although viewing later institutional sequences as closed and 
rigid, conceptualise early sequences as open or permissive. In other words, multiple 
outcomes or paths are possible depending on choices and events in the early stages 
of an institution’s life. The term critical juncture refers to the period during which 
‘important causal processes are launched’ (Mahoney and Schensul in Goodin and 
Tilly, 2006, p. 460). This is the time when particular paths are formed due to a 
particular selection of one option from a range of other alternatives. These decisions 
then have a knock-on effect and reduce future possibilities. A critical juncture is 
when a ‘new sequence’ begins and the range of future outcomes is ‘narrowed’ 
(Mahoney and Schensul in Goodin and Tilly, 2006, p. 460). 
Essentially, the HI analytical framework should guide the investigation to look for 
critical junctures, while at the same time paying due attention to the initial conditions 
leading up to the ‘branching’ periods these junctures create and where ‘historical 
development moves onto a new path’ (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 10). 
 
Unintended Consequences 
 
The concept of ‘unintended consequences’ is a further central assumption of the HI 
approach. The utility of this concept is heavily premised on the hypothesis that actors 
are not constantly functioning with the full amount of information (relevant to their 
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given issue area) that is potentially available to them. They are, in other words, 
acting from the standpoint of ‘bounded’ rationality (March and Simon, 1958).  
Unintended consequences have four basic assumptions (Huczynski and 
Buchanan, 2009, pp. 737–738). One, the defining of any particular situation by 
actors working in an issue area is likely to be ‘incomplete’. Two, all the alternatives to 
a problem will not be generated or considered. Three, it is not possible for actors to 
predict or foresee all the consequences of each solution. Lastly, final solutions are 
usually selected primarily on personal and political factors. Furthermore, theories of 
‘bounded rationality’ assume, for the most part, ‘logic of consequences’ (March and 
Olsen, 1989, p. 950), but that the ‘process of choosing institutions has generally 
been far from far-sightedly rational’ (Immergut and Anderson, 2008, p. 359). The 
effect of these limitations is that decisions are made that can be thought of as ‘good 
enough’ rather than ‘ideal’, or they ‘satisfice’ rather than ‘maximise’. As Huczynski 
and Buchanan (2009, p. 738) explain: 
 
When maximising, decision-makers review the range of 
alternatives available, all at the same time, and attempt to 
select the very best one. However, when satisficing, they 
evaluate one option at a time in sequence until they alight on 
the first one that is acceptable. That chosen option will meet all 
the minimum requirements for the solution, but may not be the 
very best (optimal) choice in the situation. Once an option is 
found, decision makers will look no further. 
 
Pierson (1994, p. 13) has demonstrated that, ‘even if policymakers do focus on long 
term effects’, the eventuality of unintended consequences having an effect on the 
evolution of an institution or policy is likely to be ‘widespread’. This approach 
assumes that decision makers often have to be content with less than ideal solutions 
to institutional problems. The HI assumptions of history, path dependency and 
unintended consequences outlined above help to explain the creation, the frozen 
nature and the persistence of the BP/AF at the macro level. However, although these 
assumptions of HI are useful in explaining these factors, they are less useful when it 
comes to investigating EU-NATO cooperation where formal cooperation is ruled out. 
For this, we need to consider processes of incremental change, learning and 
socialisation. Clearly, the overwhelming stasis in the formal EU-NATO relationships 
can be attributed to the unintended consequence of the failure of Cyprus to accede 
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to the EU as a non-divided island. As noted in Chapter Two, although Cyprus was 
not yet a member of the EU, it was widely recognised in all the relevant capitals that 
this would be a reality in 2004. However, what was as yet still undecided was how 
Cyprus would join the Union: whether its acquis communautaire would apply to the 
whole island or just to the Greek Cypriots in the south. Although the Annan Plan for 
Cyprus was later rejected on 24 April 2004, the expectations in most of the relevant 
capitals were mostly positive at that time. In the words of one interviewee, ‘the 
expectation was that the people on both sides of the island would find an agreement. 
So the referendum came as a shock, it was a total failure’ (Interview 5, 2010). 
Let us now apply these assumptions to the formal EU-NATO Framework outlined 
in Chapter Two. One of the factors that persuade certain states to use Berlin Plus is, 
of course, the great reduction in cost that this framework provides. Although the EU-
centric member states do not always want to draw attention to this, it is something 
that is accepted behind closed doors. One insider described it in the following way: 
‘as much as the EU would hate to admit it, it is a very low cost option, they tap into 
the whole of the NATO structure and it cost them virtually nothing in terms of people, 
they have all the expertise of NATO at their beckon call reporting to the EU and 
running their own operation. So it is a very cost effective operation. They win on all 
sides except the political side’ (Interview 8, 2010).  
There can be no doubt that Berlin Plus is, however, still utilised in BiH today. This 
has been going on for so long that it is ‘not necessarily negotiated’. However, there is 
a great deal of interaction and the EU still uses NATO assets that, without, it ‘could 
not do its job day-to-day’ (Interview 1 & 2, 2009a & 2009b). 
When it comes to the overall lessons learned (LL) from ALTHEA and the second 
attempt to use Berlin Plus as the fundamental formal link between the two 
organisations, some important disparities can be extrapolated. First and foremost, 
although ALTHEA has generally been thought of as a success, both in terms of the 
operation itself and in terms of EU-NATO cooperation, there have been some 
lingering effects that make any future Berlin Plus mission less likely. As one senior 
US diplomat put it, ‘I do not think things have been terrific in Bosnia, but Bosnia is 
definitely the exception, and in terms of using that mechanism going forward, it just 
won’t happen’ (Interview 17, 2010). However, there are, perhaps, two ways in which 
to better conceptualise this reality in order to give us a more nuanced understanding 
of what ALTHEA has meant for EU-NATO cooperation at the political-strategic level. 
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These paradoxical concepts are what I call the Berlin Plus of last resort and the 
symbolic Berlin Plus. They are contradictory phenomena while, at the same time, 
they both exist concurrently. Taken together, they demonstrate the path dependence 
of Berlin Plus and EU-NATO cooperation writ-large. 
The Berlin Plus of last resort refers to both the lingering difficulties and frictions 
that stem from the EU’s reliance on NATO for its assets and capabilities, many 
originating in ALTHEA, but also to its determination to be seen as an independent 
and unique actor in crisis management. According to Yost, there are those member 
states that ‘prefer autonomy’ and they see Berlin Plus as an option of ‘last resort’ for 
those operations in which NATO assets and capabilities are, regrettably, necessary 
(Yost, 2007, p. 89). This argument is bound up in the desire of some member states 
to obtain an independent OHQ for ESDP operations and the institutional blockage 
that the Cyprus-Turkey situation has meant for EU-NATO cooperation. But the more 
salient fact here is that some member states, with ALTHEA in mind, ‘were 
determined that Berlin Plus should be the exception rather than the rule’ (Interview 3, 
2010), and are ‘very keen to see it go’ (Interview 1, 2009a). ALTHEA has left a ‘sour 
feeling’ in the mouths of some Member States and they have indicated that, after 
ALTHEA, there would be no more Berlin Plus operations (Interview 12, 2010a). Over 
time, this has resulted in a formal EU-NATO relationship, whereby the EU avails 
itself of SHAPE for ALTHEA, but at the political level ‘you have nothing’ (Interview 
12, 2010a). 
In direct contrast to this, and existing simultaneously, is the notion of a symbolic 
Berlin Plus that must be retained for fear that the last formal link between the two 
organisations should vanish. The thorny negotiations that finally saw Berlin Plus 
agreed in 2003 are not forgotten in this light and the probability of re-constructing 
them, should they be lost, is at the centre of this attitude and is discernible at the 
political level. At this level:  
 
there is a fear that considering all the problems of getting it 
(Berlin Plus) negotiated in the first place, that if it were to be let 
go, then they may not get it back. By establishing structural 
cooperation between the EU and NATO there is a symbolic 
value, whether with substance or not. There is a feeling that this 
is important, the NAC-PSC meetings are important. People are 
so afraid of letting go of Berlin Plus because so many things are 
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not working between the EU and NATO; at least this is 
something they can point to. (Interview 1 & 2, 2009a & 2009b) 
 
This concept has manifested itself in attempts to turn ALTHEA into a non-
executive mission.43 According to another interview, ‘several States are keen to keep 
at least one Berlin Plus operation going, even if it is a non-executive mission. This is 
because of the symbolism of having one EU-NATO mission running and the visibility 
that it provides’ (Interview 21, 2010). Furthermore, this is even with the knowledge 
that ‘SHAPE is not needed to run a non-executive mission’ (Interview 21, 2010). 
Although no decision has been taken to turn ALTHEA into a non-executive mission 
at the time of writing, the interviewees have acknowledged that Cyprus has, in fact, 
agreed to do this in principle. The result of such a decision is that Cyprus would 
effectively vote itself out of operating in such a change to ALTHEA. Besides posing 
the obvious question of whether Berlin Plus or SHAPE is appropriate for a non-
executive operation, one for which it was neither developed or agreed, questions 
arise as to whether EU-NATO institutions played a role in shaping Cyprus’s decision 
in this way. 
One official at the Swedish Representation to ESDP commented that, as far as 
ALTHEA is concerned, ‘there is still a lot of interaction and the EU still uses NATO 
assets that without them, the EU could not do its job’. They also noted that ‘everyone 
is scared of closing down Berlin Plus and a lot of people are asking if this framework 
could be used in Kosovo’ (Interview 1 & 2, 2009a & 2009b). Furthermore, a senior 
NATO official also noted that: 
 
The problem of course is that the only thing running through 
Berlin Plus is BiH. But for how much longer? Because last year 
the EU was having a major debate about the closing down of 
the office of the High Representative in BiH, terminating the 
EUFOR mission there, so this would become a civil mission and 
Berlin Plus is only for military missions (Interview 3, 2010).  
 
Yet another NATO staff official, when asked ‘why does Berlin Plus persist in this 
way’, commented: 
 
                                            
43
 This was first noted in the Council Conclusions on ESDP (Brussels, 17 November 2009). 
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Because I can’t imagine an alternative at the time that would 
have been any better, and as much as the EU would hate to 
admit it, it’s a very low cost option, they tap into the whole of 
NATO structure and it cost them virtually nothing in terms of 
people, they have all the expertise of NATO at their beckon call 
reporting to them running their operation, so it’s very cost 
effective operation. They win on all sides except for the political 
side. As long as it is dressed up in a way that does not upset 
too many people then you don’t have that problem either. I 
mean B+ works, but it has its limitations, so there is no point in 
killing it, it could possibly be used in the future (possibly) 
(Interview 8, 2010). 
 
Historical Institutionalism: Understanding Incremental Change 
 
The section above has outlined the central and more traditional assumptions that are 
found in the cannon of HI literature. However, these are insufficient to explain the 
persistence of the problematic and stymied (outside of Operation ALTHEA) BP/AF 
for formal EU-NATO cooperation, as well as any observance of informal EU-NATO 
cooperation beyond the BP/AF, despite the political blockage that prima facie should 
exclude such cooperation, i.e. the particular form and processes that informal 
cooperation has taken since 2004. Therefore, additional assumptions, ones that 
have been more recently proposed in the HI literature, are now offered in order to 
allow for a more complete explanation of the EU-NATO relationship. Based on the 
proposition that incremental change can occur within the larger context of 
institutional persistence, these additional assumptions of learning and socialisation 
are introduced as part of the framework of analysis.  
Peters, Pierre and King (Peters et al., 2005, p. 1277) have pointed out that ‘the 
primary attention to structural variables prevents historical institutionalism from 
providing a clear conceptualization of policy change and, indeed limits the 
possibilities for a theoretical explanation of change’. Furthermore, any credible 
theory, even a middle-range theory, must be capable of coping with change as well 
as status quo phenomena. However, this research sees this dual-track approach as 
an opportunity to investigate the cooperation beyond the BP/AF framework that is 
being problematised in this research. 
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Incremental Change 
 
This section builds on the work of Sven Steinmo (2008) as well as Peters, Pierre and 
King (2005) to help develop a more robust version of HI and the framework of 
analysis. It describes a model of HI that not only employs path dependency and the 
self-reinforcing processes of positive feedback in its analytical ‘tool-box’, but also 
includes the concepts of agency and ideas. Of crucial importance here is an 
understanding of change seen as the product of major shifts or ‘punctuated 
equilibria’ as well as incremental adjustment. By utilising this approach, one that 
accounts for processes of both persistence and change - while, at the same time, 
understanding institutions as mechanisms subject to path dependency and as 
arenas where ideas and learning can be housed – the thesis can account for both 
the stasis of the EU-NATO institutional relationship as well incremental changes 
within that larger macro-level stasis. It will also permit the researcher to investigate 
the relationship between these two processes. In fact, what will be demonstrated is 
that both processes reinforce each other to a certain degree. What the case studies 
will show is that these processes of incremental change, through informal 
cooperation, reinforce the current static formal political and strategic relationship.  
Steinmo (in Della Porta, 2008, p. 129) has stated that, until recently, institutionalist 
literature has lacked a ‘fully theorized explanation of change’. To address this 
lacuna, he presents a number of reasons as to why institutions are resistant to 
change. First, all institutions (formal or norm) are ‘embedded’ within a larger 
framework of institutions. This means that changing the rules of one institution will 
invariably have repercussions for others. Second, actors working within an institution 
can ‘form expectations’ regarding both the rules and the institutions. Changing these 
rules or institutions can have long-term unpredictable consequences. This means 
actors change the rules they are familiar with, even when this is ‘not necessarily 
optimal’. Third, institutions can become ‘locked in’ as a great deal of time and 
material cost can be invested in learning the rules and change may bear unwanted 
costs. Finally, over time, institutions have an effect on behaviour which can also 
influence preferences. In other words, institutional persistence can be favoured 
merely out of routine and habit as it comes to represent what those inside ‘are used 
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to’ (in Della Porta, 2008, p. 129). With all these sources of institutional persistence, 
change has been under-explained in the institutionalist literature.  
An analytical privileging of institutional persistence gives rise to two problems 
(Peters et al., 2005, p. 1277): an ‘inability to incorporate adequately political change 
in the analytical framework’ and ‘a failure to identify the political conflict and 
dissensus within what at the surface might appear to be stable, path-dependent time 
periods’ (Peters et al., 2005, p. 1277). However, Peters et al. would seem to agree 
that the traditional HI explanation for institutional change, punctuated equilibrium, is 
useful while, at the same time, limiting. Therefore, a more adequate approach is 
found by analysing both the exogenously given shock of punctuated equilibrium 
while paying attention to widespread incremental change. As this thesis is 
problematising any cooperation outside of the BP/AF and any evolution of such 
cooperation, this conceptualisation is especially valuable.  
By not always viewing change as exogenously given punctuated equilibrium, the 
approach allows room for institutions, ideas, and the environment to exist as a ‘co-
evolutionary process’. Change and history can be seen as an incremental process 
and not just a process that is ‘lurching from one equilibrium to another’. This 
understanding helps to alleviate the notion that actors are mere ‘dupes’ and can 
include agency in the analysis. In other words, actors can be seen as more than just 
‘prisoners’ of the institutions in which they work (Steinmo in Della Porta, 2008, p. 
133). It is argued that, by bringing a ‘stronger sense’ of agency into the analyses, 
most of the critiques concerning the HI approach could be alleviated (Peters et al., 
2005, p. 1284). Therefore, this thesis will be investigating for evidence of 
institutionalisation that facilitates informal EU-NATO cooperation, particularly at the 
micro level of the relationship. In other words, it will be investigating for processes by 
which ‘norms, or shared standards of behaviour, are created and developed’ (Smith, 
2004, p. 26). Furthermore, it is not sufficient for any institutional model based on path 
dependency to solely argue that patterns persist; ‘to be effective a theory should be 
able to link outcomes with actors and with the processes that produced the 
outcomes’ (ibid, p.1284). This is relevant because, as we will see, often actors 
working at the political level overlook EU-NATO cooperation outside of the BP/AF 
context in general and by actors working at the international staff and operational 
levels specifically. Actors look for creative ways to bypass or get around the BP/AF 
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in order to achieve cooperative goals. Therefore, we can investigate to what extent 
these have been systematised or institutionalised.  
 
Learning 
 
‘To better explain institutional change, one needs to bring ideas into institutional 
analysis’ in conjunction with the notion of ‘punctuated equilibrium’ mentioned above 
(Steinmo in Della Porta, 2008, p. 130). If the sole explanation of institutional change 
is dependent on external and exogenous shocks, then agency is written out of the 
analysis altogether. This section aims to demonstrate how ideas and learning can 
contribute to the incremental processes of institutional change and how this change 
is not merely seen as a process ‘lurching from one equilibrium to another’ (Steinmo 
in Della Porta, 2008, p. 133). 
As Steinmo (2008, p. 130) has noted, historical institutionalists are not ‘wedded’ to 
any one grand theory or methodology and, as a consequence, ‘ideas have come to 
take a central place in their analyses’. Institutional change, he adds, is ‘the product of 
changes in ideas; defined here as “creative solutions to collective action problems” 
held by actors’ (Steinmo in Della Porta, 2008, p. 131). This evolutionary dynamic to 
institutional change allows the researcher to explore ‘power relations’ and to see 
actors not just as ‘prisoners of the institutions they inhabit’ (Steinmo in Della Porta, 
2008, p. 133). It further allows the researcher to identify institutional change when 
‘powerful actors have the will and ability to change institutions in favour of new 
ideas’: 
 
A group or collective may agree that a particular idea is a good 
idea if they agree that there is a problem that needs solving, 
and they agree that this idea may actually solve the problem. 
Seen in this way, ideas are not ‘irrational’, but instead are best 
understood as creative adaptations that can be evaluated both 
on rational and emotive grounds (Steinmo in Della Porta, 2008, 
p. 131). 
 
Peters, Pierre and King (Peters et al., 2005, pp. 1282-3) also note that some 
scholars utilising HI argue ‘ideas play a crucial role in the selection of policies’. 
However, they are critical of HI’s ability to explain ‘how these ideas manifest 
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themselves’. They argue that any such explanation ‘must rely on the values of the 
leadership of the institution rather than the values that are more widely shared within 
the institution’ (ibid, p. 1283).  
Ideas and learning are understood as reactions to or reflections on unintended 
consequences as defined above. Paul Pierson (1994, p. 16) has argued, albeit in the 
context of European integration, that learning arguments depend ‘on the freedom of 
member states to fold new understandings back into the organisational design’. The 
crucial element to be investigated is whether learning processes are sufficient for the 
principal actors involved to regain control in response to the outcomes of unintended 
consequences. In other words, if unintended consequences have an unmanageable 
impact, and if learning does not provide a sufficient impetus for correction, then 
actors will be constrained in their action. Therefore, it is essential to examine the role 
institutions play in facilitating learning by providing new information, changing belief 
systems, creating focal points, and coordinating expectations (Levy, 1994, p. 281). 
Of great interest here is to what extent the same institutions that are constrained by 
formal rules, rules that should prohibit cooperation between the EU and NATO, also 
facilitate ‘creative solutions’ or ‘creative adaptations’, i.e. they facilitate, through 
learning, the conditions for the growth of informal cooperation outside the BP/AF. 
Learning (for the individual) can be understood as ‘a change in beliefs (or the 
degree of confidence in one’s beliefs) or the development of new beliefs, skills, or 
procedures as a result of the observation and interpretation of experience’ (Levy, 
1994, p. 283). However, here a distinction must be drawn between ‘simple’ and 
‘complex’ learning (Checkel, 2001; Levy, 1994; Stein, 1994). ‘In simple learning new 
information leads to a change in means but not in ends, and in complex learning a 
recognition of conflicts among values leads to a modification of goals as well as 
means’ (Deutsch quoted in Levy, 1994, p. 286). Furthermore, as Stein (1994, p. 171) 
suggests, ‘complex learning, at its highest level, may lead to a reordering or 
redefinition of goals’. The ability to identify, first, whether an institutional environment 
is conducive to learning and, second, to determine whether simple or complex 
learning is transpiring, is key to the HI approach and its key claim that temporal and 
institutional factors elucidate political processes and outcomes. 
The above obviously raises the issue of under what conditions learning is likely to 
take place and under what conditions it is likely to be strengthened or more 
significant, i.e. complex. It is important, in light of the rational/sociological debate 
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above, to ask what does it mean for an agent to learn? Who is the agent that is 
learning? Is it the human occupants of institutions or the aggregate of these 
institutions, i.e. the institution itself? Checkel (2001, pp. 560-61) notes that these two 
approaches answer this question differently. The rationalists tend to represent 
learning in strictly ‘individualistic terms’. They employ a notion of game-theoretic 
terms and explain the gathering of new information through ‘strategic interaction 
where the players observe other agents’ behaviour and then, at some later point, use 
their newly-acquired information to update beliefs about the other agents’ (Checkel 
2001, p. 561). In other words, the rationalist approach emphasises simple learning 
over complex, as this information is utilised to alter strategies but not preferences.  
The sociological approach presumes that not only rational processes of learning 
are at work. This approach attempts to account for ‘complex social learning’, a 
process whereby agent interests and identities are shaped through a process of 
‘interaction’ and over time (Checkel, 2001, p. 561). Although HI attempts to identify 
both simple and complex learning, it is assumed that simple learning is much more 
pervasive within institutional settings that involve actors working in the international 
environment. This argument is only strengthened when investigating actors are 
working in an international environment, where security is the primary policy issue. 
This section has addressed the processes of learning at the individual level. 
However, when analysing the institutional territory of international organisations, one 
must also consider state and organisational learning. Levy (1994, p. 287) argues 
that: 
 
The reification of learning to the collective level – and the 
assumption that organisations or governments (in this case 
states as international actors) can be treated as organisms that 
have goals, beliefs, and memories – is not analytically viable’. 
Organisations do not literally learn in the same sense that 
individuals do. They learn only through individuals who serve in 
those organizations, by encoding individually learned inferences 
from experience into organisational routines. 
 
Furthermore, all organisational change cannot be attributed to learning. 
Organisational change only involves learning when ‘individual cognitive change’ can 
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be said to exist, and only if the ‘individuals’ inferences from experience become 
embedded in organisational memory and procedure’. Thus: 
 
Organisational learning involves a multistage process in which 
environmental feedback leads to individual learning, which 
leads to a change in organisational behaviour, which leads to 
further feedback (ibid, p. 288). 
 
Therefore, individual learning is ‘necessary but not sufficient’ for organisational 
learning (Levy, 1994, p. 289). The process of transferring individual learning to 
organisational learning can be stymied at any point. Individuals may learn, but be 
‘deterred’ from institutionalising their new ideas; they may attempt to institutionalise 
these changes, but be blocked at the political level. Or (much less frequently) these 
changes may be institutionalised but still fail to change organisation behaviour (Levy, 
1994, p. 288). Finally, governmental learning is even more complex than 
organisational learning as it involves ‘the aggregation of learning by multiple 
organisations and by multiple individuals working both in the organisations or outside 
and independently of them’ (Levy, 1994, p. 289). 
The empirical research undertaken for the case studies that follow attempts to 
distinguish whether learning has facilitated EU-NATO cooperation beyond the BP/AF 
context. It will investigate for evidence of strategies to circumvent or replace the 
BP/AF by both EU and NATO actors in missions where cooperation is not formally 
agreed. The research will also attempt to discern if learning has been primarily 
aimed at either developing strategies to merely circumvent or incrementally change 
the BP/AF at the micro level in order to facilitate informal cooperation (simple 
learning), or towards fundamentally renegotiating or replacing the BP/AF as the 
formal framework for EU-NATO cooperation (complex learning). It will also attempt to 
investigate for any evidence of individual and/or organisational learning where 
possible. 
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Socialisation 
 
Finally, a further benefit of an institutional approach to IR is that it allows for an 
investigation into the impact that institutions have on the socialisation of actors 
working within their domain. This assumption is based on a premise that ‘actors who 
enter into a social interaction rarely emerge the same’ - a premise which, according 
to Johnston (Johnston, 2001, p. 488), is both ‘uncontroversial’ and ‘radical’, 
depending on the theoretical lenses you apply. The literature generally depicts 
socialisation as ‘the comprehensive and consistent induction of an individual into the 
objective world of a society or sector of it’ (Berger and Luckmann, 1990, p. 130), or 
the ‘process by which the newcomer – the infant, rookie, or trainee, for example – 
becomes incorporated into organised patterns of interaction’ (Stryker and Stratham, 
1985, p. 325). Common in the relevant literature is the view that socialisation leads 
to ‘expected ways of thinking, feeling and acting’ (Johnston 2001, p. 494). 
Once again, the view or understanding of socialisation in the IR literature is 
fundamentally conceptualised along the rationalist and sociological/constructivist 
divide and, therefore, has different answers to whether ‘international institutions have 
the ability to socialise agents’ (Checkel, 2005, p. 804). For example, rationalist 
approaches do not deny the possibility of socialisation, but tend to perceive it in a 
limited way. Neo-realists, for example, have conceptualised social interaction in the 
international environment merely as a process of ‘selection and competition’ 
(Johnston, 2001, p. 489), whereas contractual institutionalists accept that social 
interaction within institutions can ‘change behaviour (strategies)’ through ‘cost-
benefit analyses’. However, seeing as these processes impact on preferences and 
interests, it is not ‘a central concern’ of the approach (Johnston, 2001, p. 490). For 
social constructivists, however, socialisation is a central concept that views social 
interaction and the ‘diffusion of international norms’, focused through the logic of 
appropriateness (described above), to allow for the internalisation of norms. For 
social constructivists, there is an inference that institutions ultimately impact on 
whether or not actor/agents ‘switch’ from a logic of consequence to a logic of 
appropriateness over time and through social interaction. 
The special issue of International Organization (2005, issue 4) expands on this 
concept by distinguishing between socialisation and the internalisation of norms. It 
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considers three ‘mechanisms’ of social interaction that also underpin this study: 
strategic calculation, role playing, and normative suasion. The mechanism of 
strategic calculation does not involve the internalisation of norms and a switch from 
the logic of consequence to the logic of appropriateness does not occur. In other 
words, behaviour does change, but only in response to ‘material incentives’ and 
actors are only viewed as ‘instrumentally rational’ (Checkel, 2005, pp. 808-809). The 
second mechanism, role playing, allows for the internalisation of norms and ‘the shift 
from the logic of consequence towards a logic of appropriateness has begun’. 
However, a process of ‘reflective internalisation’ on the ‘intrinsic value’ of these 
norms has not yet occurred (ibid: pp. 809-10). Finally, normative suasion sees the 
switch ‘as complete’. The agent has transformed from solely a cost calculator to one 
that has internalised norms through the acts of ‘argument’ and ‘persuasion’ (within 
the institutions) and would be inclined to view these norms as ‘the right thing to do’ 
(ibid, p. 812). 
As with learning, the empirical research undertaken in the case studies attempts 
to determine whether socialisation has facilitated EU-NATO cooperation beyond 
BP/AF. It will investigate for evidence of how repeated interaction between EU and 
NATO actors may lead to any strategies to circumvent or replace the BP/AF where 
cooperation is not formally agreed. The research will also attempt to investigate to 
what extent the actors have internalised the need to cooperate, despite the 
limitations of the BP/AF. It will also investigate to what extent cooperation beyond or 
outside of the BP/AF is taken for granted by actors and facilitated by interacting with 
other EU and NATO actors. 
 
Applying the Framework of Analysis to EU-NATO Cooperation 
 
HI has elevated path dependency, in particular as a central assumption that helps to 
explain institutional persistence. Yet, as the HI literature has developed, a realisation 
has set in that path dependence is insufficient in its explanations regarding specific 
cases. It may provide us with an understanding of why institutional persistence 
occurs; however, to tease out the particular circumstances and form of persistence, 
we need to look at the additional assumptions of incremental change, learning and 
socialisation as outlined above.  
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Before moving on to the case studies of this thesis, research questions must be 
generated based on the assumptions of HI as detailed above. This is in order to 
establish a clear framework of analysis to inform the investigation of informal EU-
NATO cooperation outside the BP/AF context. These research questions are now 
listed.  
 
General Guiding Research Questions: 
 
1. Is there any evidence of EU-NATO cooperation outside the BP/AF context 
despite the political blockage that prima facie should exclude such 
cooperation? 
2. If such cooperation can be established, how has cooperation evolved since 
the BP/AF macro level stasis was established in 2004? 
3. To what extent is BP/AF the normative and institutional context for any 
cooperation since stasis was established?  
 
With this list of guiding research questions, this thesis can now proceed to 
investigate contexts where formal cooperation is ruled out and ask what kind of 
cooperation is emerging. Have any new formal institutions with formal bureaucratic 
structures, formal rules and operating procedures, or any informal norms and 
practices been established allowing actors to circumvent the BP/AF where a formal 
agreement was not established? If they have been established, then how have they 
determined the conditions for the growth of informal cooperation outside the BP/AF 
context?  
As well as the guiding research questions listed above, the thesis as a whole will 
also seek to substantiate the following set of assumptions based on the framework of 
analysis outlined in this chapter:  
 
Assumption 1: Institutions 
EU and NATO institutions (both formal and informal) have facilitated the 
establishment of EU-NATO informal cooperation and they have been the normative 
reference points for that informal cooperation outside the BP/AF context. They have 
also facilitated the conditions for the growth, as well as the increased 
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institutionalisation, of informal EU-NATO cooperation outside the formal BP/AF 
context. 
Assumption 2: Path Dependency 
Although theories of a more realist persuasion help to account for the political 
blockage of formal EU-NATO cooperation, the HI assumptions of history, path 
dependency and unintended consequences help to explain the creation, the frozen 
nature and persistence of the BP/AF at the macro level. However, although these 
assumptions of HI are useful in explaining these factors, they are less useful when it 
comes to investigating EU-NATO cooperation, where formal cooperation is ruled out. 
For this, we need to consider processes of incremental change, learning and 
socialisation.  
Assumption 3: Incremental Change 
Incremental change regarding the EU-NATO relationship will not completely replace 
the BP/AF. In fact, in many ways the BP/AF is the normative reference point for EU 
and NATO actors working outside its official context. However, it does involve the 
creation and increased institutionalisation of new rules and norms to circumvent the 
BP/AF when a formal relationship has been ruled out. 
Assumption 4: Learning 
Learning is an important facilitator of informal EU-NATO cooperation outside the 
context of the BP/AF. Learning, facilitated by formal institutions both within the EU 
and NATO respectively and by informal EU-NATO institutions and norms, are a key 
determining factor setting the conditions for the growth of informal EU-NATO 
cooperation. However, simple learning will be more pervasive as information is 
utilised to alter strategies (circumventing the BP/AF at the micro level) but not 
preferences (retaining the BP/AF at the macro level). 
Assumption 5: Socialisation 
Social interaction between EU and NATO actors at all three levels of analysis 
(political/strategic, international staff and operational) will have an impact on 
common attitudes towards cooperation outside the BP/AF context. However, it is 
expected that behaviour will be more associated with ‘strategic calculation’ rather 
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than ‘role playing’ or normative suasion. In other words behaviour will be aimed at 
altering strategies (circumventing the BP/AF at the micro level) but not preferences 
(retaining the BP/AF at the macro level). 
 
Conclusion 
 
By combining a temporal/historical approach (as assumed by the HI framework 
outlined in this chapter) with the hierarchical/spatial approach involving three levels 
of analysis in all three case studies investigating cooperation outside the BP/AF, it is 
hoped that a deeper understanding of the EU-NATO relationship is uncovered from 
an empirical point of view than currently exists in the literature. By a 
hierarchical/spatial approach, it is assumed that cooperation will be most prominent 
away from the political strategic level and hierarchically downwards towards the 
international staffs (and especially the operational agents) and also spatially away 
from the central tools of Brussels towards operational HQs and the areas of 
operation. As noted in Chapter Two, this precedent was already set as political 
sensitivities were established in CONCORDIA and ALTHEA. In the case of ALTHEA, 
obtaining the full list of assets and capabilities at the strategic level was ‘drawn out 
and protracted’ (Simón, 2010, p. 29). So what could not be resolved in Brussels was 
the delineation of tasks and, therefore, the field commanders were tasked to do this 
on the ground in-theatre (Interview 11, 2010). All the case studies will be 
investigated by analysing these three levels of EU-NATO cooperation.  
In order to do this, the thesis now turns to the case studies. These case studies 
seek to determine how rigid the compliance to that AF is in reality. Within three 
different contexts, where formal cooperation is ruled out, this thesis asks: what kind 
of cooperation can we see emerging? The case studies selected, specifically 
investigate for the growth of informal cooperation over time. This approach will 
account for both the persistence of the EU-NATO relationship at the macro level as 
well as any incremental changes that have occurred within that relationship. This 
thesis now turns to the three cases studies of informal cooperation outside of the 
BP/AF context. 
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Chapter Four  
Beyond Berlin Plus  
Informal Military Cooperation in Counter-Piracy 
 
We are striving to achieve unity of effort, we will never achieve 
unity of command (Interview 29, 2010). 
I know a lot of people often say that we are either competing or 
cooperating in counter-piracy, actually we are working 
alongside one another, we are more deconflicting than we are 
cooperating, we certainly are not integrating (Interview 13, 
2010). 
 
Introduction 
 
It is now possible to look beyond the stasis of the BP/AF for EU-NATO cooperation 
and attempt to ascertain if there is evidence of informal cooperation between the two 
organisations outside or beyond this framework. In order to accomplish this task, this 
chapter seeks to analyse a case where both the EU and NATO are concurrently 
conducting very similar military missions in the same operating space but do not 
formally engage through the established institutions or mechanisms for cooperation. 
An in-depth analysis of cooperation in the area of CP, at both the macro and micro 
level, is undertaken to establish that there is indeed an informal EU-NATO 
relationship in an operational setting. This chapter then investigates these processes 
of continued institutionalisation beyond the formal relationship. In this way, an overall 
assessment of any path-dependent features to the relationship can be teased out 
while, at the same time, accommodating for incremental changes in the relationship 
as well.  
Although the EU-NATO relationship and cooperation towards countering piracy is 
not a formal relationship, or one operationalised through Berlin Plus, this chapter will 
demonstrate that rhetoric for a positive relationship does exist. Importantly, and as 
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Javier Solana stated in 2009, it has to be a more ‘flexible framework’ without the 
formal structures to support it. Both organisations have publicly stated their intention 
to work as closely as possible ‘with all actors involved’, and with specific reference to 
‘exchange of information’. The contradictory developments of failing to agree a 
formal relationship combined with the rhetoric to promote a ‘strategic partnership’ 
has resulted in increased informality of relations and a pushing of cooperation 
spatially towards the two sets of international staffs working in Brussels and 
operationally, both in Northwood and at sea. 
Interestingly, this case study also shows that, although Berlin Plus is not the 
formal structure for EU-NATO cooperation in counter-piracy (in terms of formal 
institutional structures and the EU officially having access to NATO assets and 
capabilities), what is observable is what I term the essence of Berlin Plus. What will 
be demonstrated is that the EU borrowed NATO assets and capabilities (unofficially) 
when the EU was initially trying to stand up ATALANTA and thus BP/AF remains, to 
a degree, a normative and institutional context for cooperation, albeit in an informal 
capacity. The EU did not possess a Standing Naval Maritime Group and, therefore, 
essentially borrowed NATO’s until such time as it was ready to launch ATALANTA. It 
could also be argued that, without NATO’s Ocean Shield mission operating 
concurrently to ATALANTA, the EU would have much less intelligence capability and 
the rate of piracy would be much higher in the region. The following table helps to 
illustrate this point. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
106 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.1: Chronology of EU and NATO Presence off the Somali Coast 
Operation Period Mandate 
NATO ‘Allied Provider’  
SNMG2 
October-December 2008 Provide deterrent presence and 
escorting transiting UN World 
Food Programme vessels, and 
AU vessels providing logistical 
support to AMISOM 
EU NAVFOR Atalanta Since December 2008- Protection of merchant vessels 
vulnerable to piracy threat, in 
particular those chartered by the 
World Food Programme (but not 
exclusively); deterrence, 
prevention and repression of 
acts of piracy and armed 
robbery;
44
 
NATO ‘Allied Protector’, 
SNMG2 
SNMG1 
March-June 2008 
June-August 2008 
Protection of vulnerable vessels 
against acts of piracy 
NATO ‘Ocean Shield’ Since August 2009 
(extended so far until 
December 2012) 
Continuation of previous 
mandate; additional element of 
providing support to states in the 
region in developing their own 
capacities to tackle the piracy 
problem (e.g. local coast guard); 
training of local and regional 
authorities. 
- detour and disrupt pirate acts 
- protect commercial shipping 
 
Furthermore, it is clear that Berlin Plus was never really even considered as an 
option for conducting an EU-led operation with formal recourse to NATO assets and 
capabilities due to the political deadlock surrounding the BP/AF. However, no 
enhanced mechanism to replace Berlin Plus has been negotiated, much less 
adopted. This leads to the suggestion that using Berlin Plus is no longer deemed a 
possibility for conducting new operations and that this reality has been internalised 
by actors working at all three levels of analysis. This has further increased informality 
of relations and pushed cooperation spatially away from the political/strategic level, 
                                            
44 When the operation was launched, some MEPs expressed concerns about how the activities of 
ATALANTA could be clearly distinguished from the tasks performed by some EU member states 
within the framework of Operation Enduring Freedom-Horn of Africa, which aims at countering 
terrorist activities. 
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but towards increasingly institutionalised relationships between the two sets of 
international staffs working in Brussels (and SHAPE), as well as at the operational 
level, both in Northwood and at sea. The most striking example of ‘flexibility’ towards 
informality, as we will see, was the decision to establish both the NATO Ocean 
Shield and EU ATALANTA OHQs within the UK’s Northwood Permanent Joint 
Headquarters. 
It is, therefore, necessary to summarise this flexible and informal relationship. 
What this chapter will show is that the informal relationship is based on distinct 
processes of incremental change in the EU-NATO relationship, facilitated by forms of 
learning and socialisation. First, it is obvious that the more cooperation is hidden or 
subsumed within an international effort, the easier it is for the more obstructionist 
political actors to allow informal cooperation at the two other lower levels of analysis. 
Second, this chapter will show the unique role the Permanent Joint Headquarters at 
Northwood UK has to play as a ‘fusion centre’ for the informal cooperation of EU and 
NATO staff, giving a tremendous advantage in the face of political obstruction. This 
case study will also demonstrate that there have been very deliberate attempts to 
institutionalise cooperation at Northwood and in the Area of Operations (AO). Third, 
and directly related to the previous point, there has been an obvious drive for 
operational staff to test the bounds of the political ‘red lines’ when it comes to the 
sharing of sensitive information. Although this has not led to the systemisation of 
intelligence sharing, a ‘unity of effort’ is discernible in order to supplement for the 
obvious lack of a formal ‘unity of command’ (as would be the case in a formal Berlin 
Plus operation, for example Operation ALTHEA). Finally, none of this would have 
even been possible if the actors involved were not working within common military 
and operating cultures; this is even more evident in this case study due to a long 
history of maritime cooperation at sea between the 21 coinciding members of the EU 
and NATO as well as those who are only members of one of the organisations. Not 
only is this a case of different organisations using the same set of forces due to a 
high degree of membership overlap, but this case shows that Operational 
Commanders have even been rotated from NATO into ATALANTA and back to 
NATO. 
It is clear, therefore, that many of the institutions and established links of 
operational contact established for the formal cooperation dealt within Chapter Two, 
are used, albeit informally, for EU-NATO cooperation with regard to counter-piracy. 
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There have been informal attempts at the NAC and PSC levels (although with much 
less success) to discuss on-going counter-piracy operations. However, with regard to 
the increasing institutionalisation of informal cooperation at the two lower levels of 
analysis, the usual obstructionist political actors have used a ‘blind eye’ approach to 
overlooking much of this informal relationship. This chapter will also establish the 
existence of contact at the S/G and H/R levels (regardless of the personality in the 
post), as well as other senior level international staff (at both the EU and at NATO), 
having informal meetings to discuss operations in this area. It will demonstrate that 
the office of the DSACEUR as the EU-NATO ‘strategic coordinator’, developed under 
Berlin Plus, has also led to an informal relationship between that office and various 
institutions within the EU; one where the ‘real business’ is being done, for both 
formal Berlin Plus and informal non-Berlin Plus operations. Once again, this 
demonstrates that BP/AF remains a normative and institutional context for 
cooperation. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section frames the chapter as an 
investigation of EU-NATO cooperation beyond the BP/AF and establishes the 
specific research questions for this case study. Second, the chapter will 
contextualise both NATO’s and the EU’s different operations in the area of counter-
piracy. This initial section begins with some background to the current trends in 
piracy and the political processes that led up to the creation of both the EU and 
NATO missions. The section then goes on to outline in more detail the exact 
sequencing to the launching of the individual missions as well as the specific nature 
and mandate of both NATO’s operation Ocean Shield and the EU’s ATALANTA. The 
main section of the chapter is an in-depth empirical analysis of the EU-NATO 
relationship with regard to their respective missions in counter-piracy. It investigates 
cooperation at three levels of analysis: the political/strategic level, the international 
staff level, and the operational level. This approach is used to maintain uniformity 
from one case study to the next and for methodological consistency. The chapter 
ends by offering a set of conclusions that are based on the research questions 
established in the introduction. This chapter will ultimately demonstrate that static 
path-dependent features to the relationship are present, while evidence of 
incremental processes of change are also simultaneously present within the EU-
NATO relationship. 
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Framing Propositions: 
 
The primary objective of the case studies is to investigate for evidence of EU-NATO 
cooperation, despite the political blockage that prima facie should exclude such 
cooperation. Second, they investigate how such cooperation has evolved since 
BP/AF stasis (2004), as well as the nature and form of this cooperation. Finally, to 
investigate to what extent the BP/AF remains the normative and institutional context 
for cooperation since 2004. However, some assumptions are first required for the 
EU-NATO relationship as it pertains to CP specifically, especially those related to 
incremental change, learning and socialisation before the specific research 
questions can be set for this case study. 
Due to the limitations of BP/AF - in particular, the participation and scope 
problems outlined in detail above - it would be expected that NO formal EU-NATO 
strategic dialogue, joint EU-NATO planning, official EU-NATO task-sharing or any 
kind of EU-NATO formal functional or strategic action will be evident in relation to 
military cooperation vis-à-vis counter-piracy. Furthermore, the NAC and the PSC 
would not be permitted to formally discuss CP or have it as part of any official NAC-
PSC agenda. In other words, there will be no formal political/strategic institutional 
framework for cooperation concerning CP. 
However, if it is taken as a given that there will be certain functional and 
operational requirements for cooperation, conditioned by the fact that both the EU 
and NATO are operating in the same geographical space and conducting similar 
military missions in pursuit of their respective mandates, then agents at all three 
levels (political/strategic, international staffs and operational) will seek alternative 
avenues for cooperation in the face of these restrictions as created by the limitations 
of BP/AF. Furthermore, agents will adapt the rules and institutions created by the 
BP/AF arrangements as a normative and institutional reference point, not only for 
limiting formal cooperation, but also for facilitating informal cooperation. 
Therefore, the long-established assumptions of HI, as outlined in Chapter Three, 
remain appropriate for explaining the limitations of BP/AF as a formal vehicle of EU-
NATO cooperation in CP (while still persisting as the only formal EU-NATO 
institutional framework in general). But these assumptions are much less useful in 
explaining any other forms of EU-NATO cooperation beyond the strict interpretation 
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of BP/AF. This case study, therefore, problematises how EU-NATO cooperation in 
CP proceeds, despite the formal existence of the BP/AF and the political blockage 
that should prohibit any cooperation between the two organisations. Consequently, 
this case study is an investigation of how EU-NATO cooperation takes place despite 
this political blockage. It will investigate for evidence of socialisation and learning that 
has helped to facilitate any incremental changes in the EU-NATO relationship. 
Ultimately, this chapter will show that, although formal institutions with formal 
bureaucratic structures, formal rules and operating procedures are much less utilised 
for EU-NATO cooperation in CP (although often they are the normative reference 
point), informal norms and practices are much more significant and, therefore, 
intuitions do matter.  
Finally, given the political sensitivities of BP/AF, there is an expectation that some 
degree of institutionalisation of cooperation (i.e. the development of norms or shared 
standards of behaviour) will take place, but it will be most prominent hierarchically 
downwards towards the international staffs and especially the operational agents, 
and also spatially away from the central tools of Brussels towards operational HQs 
and the areas of operation. As well as the general guiding research questions and 
assumptions established in Chapter Three, the following research questions are also 
generated to investigate the EU-NATO relationship in the context of CP: 
 
(1) Is there any observable evidence of learning facilitating informal EU-NATO 
cooperation in the case of counter-piracy? 
(2) Is there any observable evidence of socialisation with regard to informal EU-
NATO cooperation in the case of counter-piracy? 
(3) Is there any observable evidence of institutionalisation impacting on changes in 
behaviour, or at least facilitating changes in behaviour (be they rational or 
sociological), in the case of counter-piracy? 
 
The chapter will now attempt to contextualise both NATO’s and the EU’s different 
operations in the area of counter piracy before turning to an in-depth empirical 
analysis of the EU-NATO relationship with regard to their respective missions in 
counter-piracy.  
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Comparing mission responsibilities between the EU and NATO 
 
Counter Piracy in the Gulf of Aden 
 
Piracy is by no means a new phenomenon and the rate of piracy has increased 
dramatically since the early 1990s. However, the year 2007 saw just under half of all 
reported pirate attacks situated in African waters and the numbers of attacks, 
particularly in the waters of Somalia, doubled in 2008 ‘accounting for an estimated 
40% of the 293 attacks’ reported that year worldwide (Ploch et al., 2011, p. 4).45 As 
from 2008, the Horn of Africa has seen a drastic surge in pirate attacks with numbers 
rising from eight attacks in 2007 to 61 in 2008, 76 in 2009, 124 in 2010 to 176 in 
2011 (ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2012). Additionally, ransom demands for 
the release of both vessels and hostages have been steadily increasing since 2007. 
In 2010, the ICC International Maritime Bureau reported that 219 of the 445 pirate 
attacks worldwide were attributable to Somali Pirates (ICC International Maritime 
Bureau, 2011, pp. 5–6).  
 
                                            
45
 See the ICC Commercial Crimes Services. 
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Figure 4.1: Chart of Attacks Attributable to Somali Pirates 
 
 
*Figures taken from the ICC International Maritime Bureau Website 
 
Although it is widely recognised that any attempt to resolve this growing threat 
must be land-based and rooted in the rule-of-law, the current political environment 
and general stability in Somalia is not adequate to facilitate such processes, 
although this has been improving over time. Most of the pirates in the region are 
based in Somalia, using beaches along its extensive coastline to launch attacks from 
small crafts and various larger ‘mother ships’. These attacks are aimed at pirating 
what ships they can from the estimated 25,000 to 35,000 ships that pass through the 
Horn of Africa per year. Increasingly, the pirates are becoming more emboldened 
and the huge amounts of ransoms being paid have driven them as far as 1,000 
nautical miles offshore to seek unsuspecting and vulnerable vessels. 
In 2008, the United Nations became ‘increasingly concerned’ with regard to this 
growing threat. In particular, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) requested 
that the international community begin to tackle this problem after several of its 
World Food Programme vessels were pirated that year (The House of Lords, 2010, 
p. 7). In 2008, the combination of these attacks and the growing concern of maritime 
companies with regard to the safety of their vessels and crew prompted the UNSC to 
pass resolution 1814 in order ‘to take action to protect shipping involved with the 
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transportation and delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia and United Nations-
authorised activities’. That year, it further passed resolution 1816, to ‘[U]se, within 
the territorial waters of Somalia, in a manner consistent with action permitted on the 
high seas with respect to piracy under relevant international law, all necessary 
means to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery’.46 
The mandate was widened with resolution 185147 and at the request of the Somali 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG), whereby the Secretary-General (Ban Ki-
moon) ‘may undertake all necessary measures that are appropriate in Somalia, for 
the purpose of suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea’. There was also 
a Contact Group for Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) set up in response to 
the growing concern on behalf of the international community. At its first meeting in 
January 2009, the CGPCS released the following statement: 
 
Pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1851, 
the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) 
was established on January 14, 2009, to facilitate discussion 
and coordination of actions among states and organizations to 
suppress piracy off the coast of Somalia. The CGPCS will 
report its progress periodically to the UN Security Council. 
Participating in the meeting were representatives from... the 
European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), the UN Secretariat, and the International Maritime 
Organization (Contact Group on Piracy, 2009). 
 
The CGPCS also created four working groups in order to fulfil its six objectives of: 1) 
improving operational and informational support to counter-piracy operations, 2) 
establishing a counter-piracy coordination mechanism, 3) strengthening judicial 
frameworks for arrest, prosecution, and detention of pirates, 4) strengthening 
commercial shipping self-awareness and other capabilities, 5) pursuing improved 
diplomatic and public information efforts, 6) tracking financial flows related to piracy 
(Ploch et al., 2011, p. 19). 
                                            
46
 Full access to UNSC resolution 1816 can be access at: http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/361/77/PDF/N0836177.pdf?OpenElement (last accessed 13-12-
2013). 
47
Full access to UNSC resolution 1851 can be access at: http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/655/01/PDF/N0865501.pdf?OpenElement (last accessed 13-12-
2013). 
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All of the above led to various missions being launched to tackle the problem 
under the legal framework of the UNSC. However, standing up of specific NATO and 
EU missions took time and was hampered by political posturing, slow decision-
making, and capability procurement. Initially, and as what was putatively seen as a 
short-term solution, naval assets were sent from individual nations acting unilaterally, 
including NATO and EU member states, to support maritime vessels originating from 
individual nations (Germond and Smith, 2009, p. 582). Although a more rigorous 
discussion will be explored later in the chapter regarding the various processes that 
were undertaken to launch both the NATO and EU missions, it should be noted that 
this chapter specifically looks at NATO’s operation Ocean Shield and the EU’s 
mission NAVFOR ATALANTA and, specifically, cooperation between them. That 
said, it should be noted that EU-NATO cooperation with regard to counter-piracy is 
subsumed in the greater international milieu that comprises the efforts to combat 
piracy in the Gulf of Aden, off the coast of Somalia, and in the Indian Ocean. These 
include US-led coalition Combined Task Force (CTF), CTF-151 or CTF-150 
depending on which is currently deployed under the Combined Maritime Forces 
(CMF) – the EU’s NAVFOR ATALANTA, NATO’s Ocean Shield (formerly Allied 
Provider and Allied Protector), and various independent deployers such as China, 
India, Japan, and Russia. 
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Figure 4.2: Contributing Nations to CMF/EU/NATO (Note: independent deployers 
excluded) 
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This international coordination has led some to call the waters off Somalia a 
‘laboratory for international military naval coordination’ (Helly in Grevi et al., 2009, p. 
399). 
 
NATO: Operation Ocean Shield 
 
Context: 
In the struggle to launch an initial response to piracy, one added value that NATO 
brought to the table was its ability to deploy one of its two Standing Naval Maritime 
Groups (SNMGs) to the region. The SNMGs are a ‘multinational, integrated maritime 
force - made up of vessels from various allied nations, training and operating 
together as a single team - that is permanently available to NATO to perform a wide 
range of tasks, from participating in exercises to crisis response and real world 
operational missions’ (NATO Website).48 From October to December 2008, utilising 
                                            
48
 See: http://www.manw.nato.int/page_snmg1_new_default.aspx (last accessed December 2013). 
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SNMG-2, NATO conducted Operation Allied Provider to ‘temporarily’ assist the UN 
and, in particular, her World Food Programme (WFP) vessels on route with 
humanitarian aid to Somalia. However, it was not limited in mandate to escorting 
WFP vessels and the Allied Provider did engage in ‘providing a deterrent presence 
and… also provided a maritime security presence and escorted African Union-
chartered vessels carrying logistical supplies for the African Union Mission in 
Somalia (AMISOM)’ (The North Atlantic Council, 2008). In December 2008, NATO 
transferred its WFP responsibilities to the EU. 
However, this did not prove to be the end of NATO involvement with counter-
piracy. From March until August 2009, utilising SNMG-1, NATO conducted Operation 
Allied Protector with the responsibility to ‘deter, defend against, and disrupt pirate 
activities’ (Ploch et al., 2011, p. 20). However, this mission can also be seen as a 
temporary mission, one whereby NATO decided to engage the assets it had 
travelling through the area in order to help mitigate the rising numbers in piracy. 
Finally, on 17 August 2009, the NAC approved the current NATO counter-piracy 
Operation Ocean Shield and, due to the length of the mission, has utilised both 
SNMG-1 and SNMG-2. This operation was extended by the NAC until the end of 
2014 and it is this operation, as well as the two that predated Ocean Shield, that this 
case study will use to asses EU-NATO cooperation in counter-piracy.  
 
Mandate: 
 
The mandate of Operation Ocean Shield is broader than that of NATO’s two 
previous missions. Although its primary objective is still to ‘deter and disrupt piracy 
off the coast of Somalia’, it has, since the NAC approval of 17 August 2009, tried to 
broaden its approach by ‘offering, to regional states that request it, assistance in 
developing their own capacity (e.g. local coast guard) to combat piracy activities in 
full complementarity with existing international efforts as coordinated with the 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia’ (NATO Website).49 SNMG-2 
assumed operations under the command of Commodore Michiel Hijmans (Royal 
Netherlands Navy) with the following vessels deployed: De Ruyter (Flagship - 
                                            
49
 See: http://www.aco.nato.int/page208433730.aspx (last accessed December 2013). 
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Netherlands), Eastern Snare (Denmark), TCG Gaziantep (Turkey), and USS Laboon 
(United States). The Primary objectives of these vessels are: piracy detoured and 
disrupted, the protecting of commercial shipping, and enduring and effective counter-
piracy operations (Interview 26, 2010). 
 
Chain of Command: 
 
It is salient to outline the chain of command (CoC) for NATO in Operation Ocean 
Shield as it plays a critical role, not only in its own organisational and institutional 
processes, but it also affects NATO’s cooperation with other organisations and 
institutions. However, at the risk of repetition, it is prudent at this point to only outline 
the NATO CoC structure parsimoniously. At the political level and sitting atop the 
NATO command structure is the North Atlantic Council (NAC). This body has 
‘effective political authority and powers of decision, and consists of Permanent 
Representatives of all member countries’ (NATO Office of Information and Press, 
2001, p. 149). Below this at the strategic level is the Military Committee charged with 
the responsibility to ‘assist and advise the NAC’. However, the MC can meet at any 
level between Chiefs of Defence to senior military officers serving as Military 
Representatives (MILREPS). This body is ‘the highest military authority in NATO, 
working under the overall political authority of the Council’ (NATO Office of 
Information and Press, 2001, p. 239). The strategic level also moves onto the office 
of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). This office is ‘responsible to 
the Military Committee for the overall direction and conduct of all Alliance military 
matters within their areas of command’ (NATO Office of Information and Press, 
2001, p. 241). It must also be mentioned that the office of the Deputy Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe (DSACEUR) does play an invaluable facilitating role when it 
comes to EU-NATO cooperation in counter-piracy.  
Moving from the strategic level to the operational level, the NATO CoC moves to 
Joint Force Command (Lisbon) and then down to the tactical level consisting of the 
Operation Headquarters (OHQ) situated in Northwood, UK, and the Force 
Headquarters (FHQ), Combined Task Force 508 at sea. All of these levels will be 
analysed, but particular attention will be paid to NATO member state representations 
at the political level and Allied Strategic Commander offices at SHAPE regarding the 
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strategic level. At the tactical level, Northwood OHQ, in particular, is salient to this 
case study. 
 
EUFOR ATALANTA 
 
Context: 
 
There is no doubt that piracy off the coast of Somalia was a direct threat to the 
national interests of EU member states. However, the fact that the EU had no history 
of maritime ESDP/CSDP missions, or in fact a standing capacity to deal with such 
threats, meant that an EU option was not necessarily a foregone conclusion. 
Germond and Smith have demonstrated elsewhere some of the political nuances 
behind the decision to send counter-piracy down the ESDP/CSDP route. This is not 
the place to go into a lengthy discussion on this topic, but suffice it to say, their 
research underlines the necessity for cooperation between the big three EU military 
players (France, Germany, and the UK) for any such endeavour to become reality. In 
their words, ‘[T]he gradual development of comprehensive maritime dimension of 
European security, including a recognition of the importance of the EU’s maritime 
frontiers, the unprecedented rise in piracy off Somalia, and a mixture of EU member 
states’ domestic and foreign interests, helps explain the EU’s first ESDP naval 
operation’ (Germond and Smith, 2009, p. 587). 
As noted above, there was no naval capacity for ESDP in 2008 and, as such, new 
territory was breached. One of the first creations was the EU Naval Coordination Cell 
(EU NAVCO) in September 2008. EU Council Joint Action 2008/749/CFSP in 
support of UN Security Council resolution 1816 created NAVCO by stating: 
 
the aim of the EU military coordination action shall be to support 
the activities of Member States deploying military assets in-
theatre, with a view to facilitating the availability and operational 
action of those assets, in particular by setting up a coordination 
cell in Brussels, hereinafter referred to as the ‘EU Coordination 
Cell’ (Council of the European Union, 2008a). 
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As Helly points out, this was the first real attempt by the EU to coordinate between 
its member state’s navies and with the maritime industry at large (Helly in Grevi et 
al., 2009, p. 395).  
On 10 November 2008, EU Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP announced the 
EU’s intention to provide for (Council of the European Union, 2008b): 
 
- the protection of vessels of the WFP delivering food aid to 
displaced persons in Somalia, in accordance with the mandate 
laid down in UNSC Resolution 1814 (2008) 
- the protection of vulnerable vessels cruising off the Somali 
coast, and the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of 
piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast, in accordance 
with the mandate laid down in UNSC Resolution 1816 (2008). 
 
Ultimately, on 8 December 2008, EUFOR Operation ATALANTA (EUFOR 
ATALANTA) was ‘approved’ by EU Council Decision 2008/918/CFSP (Council of the 
European Union, 2008c).  
 
Mandate: 
 
When it comes to the mandate of ATALANTA, although the operation is enhanced 
by the wider connection it has to the EU, specifically the Commission and its political 
and financial capabilities that bring added value in terms of capacity building, rule of 
law, and other comprehensive instruments, ATALANTA’s actual mandate is, in fact, 
more limited in scope than that of NATO. The CSDP Fact Sheet defines the 
ATALANTA mandate as such (European Union External Action Service, 2011c): 
 
Table 4.2: Operation ATALANTA’s Mandate 
Mandate  
Operation ATALANTA's mission is to: 
Provide protection for vessels chartered by the WFP;  
Provide protection for merchant vessels; 
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Employ the necessary measures, including the use of force, to deter, prevent and intervene 
in order to bring to an end acts of piracy and armed robbery which may be committed in the 
areas where they are present. 
 Taken from EU naval operation against piracy (EUNAVFOR Somalia - Operation ATALANTA) 18/01/2011
50
 
 
However, the comprehensive approach is also seen as part and parcel of the EU’s 
modus operandi in this issue area. The EU has launched missions such as EUTM 
Somalia, which are intended to directly contribute to ‘the training of Somali security 
forces’, but it must be stressed that this particular case study is limited to the actions 
and cooperation through ATALANTA specifically. On 7 December 2010, EU Council 
Decision 2010/766/CFSP extended ATALANTA’s mandate until 12 December 2012 
(Council of the European Union, 2010) and then, on 23 March 2012, ‘the Council of 
the EU extended the Mandate of Operation Atalanta until December 2014. At the 
same time, the Council also extended the Area of Operation to include Somali 
coastal territory and internal waters’ (EUNAVFOR Somalia Website).  
 
Contributors: 
 
ATALANTA has more than twenty vessels and aircraft attached to its operation and 
over 1,800 military personnel (European Union External Action Service, 2011c). 
Most of the EU member states contribute to the operation and there are consistent 
attempts to find ‘innovative ways to help those member states with no maritime 
borders to contribute’ (Interview 32, 2010a). At the time of writing, Major-General 
Buster Howes (UK) is the Operational Commander stationed at the EU’s OHQ in 
Northwood, UK. Rear Admiral Juan Rodriguez (ES) is Commander of the FHQ part 
of CTF-465 at sea. 
 
                                            
50
 On 23 March 2012, the Council of the EU extended the Mandate of Operation Atalanta until 
December 2014. At the same time, the Council also extended the Area of Operation to include Somali 
coastal territory and internal waters (EUNAVFOR Somalia Website). 
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Chain of Command: 
 
In contrast to NATO’s more detailed chain of command outlined above, the CoC for 
ATALANTA, by comparison, is much leaner. At the political level, the PSC, as laid 
out in EU Council Joint Action 2008/749/CFSP, exercises the ‘political control and 
the strategic direction’ for operation ATALANTA (Council of the European Union, 
2008a). However, the PSC is also obligated to report to the Council ‘at regular 
intervals’. The EU Military Committee (EUMC) supports the PSC and monitors the 
‘proper coordination of EU military action’. The EUNAVFOR OHQ at Northwood is 
crosses both the strategic and operational levels. As with NATO, the EU’s OHQ is 
contained within the UK’s MOD Northwood base, which is home to three command 
and control functions of the British armed forces and North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO), Permanent Joint Headquarters, Commander in Chief Fleet 
and the NATO Regional Command, and Allied Maritime Component Command 
Northwood. The proximity of these two OHQs is a crucial element to EU-NATO 
cooperation in counter-piracy and will be addressed extensively below. At the tactical 
level, and as mentioned above, the FHQ is part of CTF-465 at sea. The disparity 
between both the NATO and EU CoC has led to variances in their operating 
frameworks and poses both advantages and disadvantages for each operation. This 
subject is also a key factor with regard to the EU-NATO informal relationship and, as 
such, will also be addressed in detail below. 
 
122 
 
Figure 4.3: EU and NATO Chains of Command 
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Discovering an Informal EU-NATO Relationship 
 
The Political/Strategic Level 
 
Before engaging with the relevant empirical data with regard to informal EU-NATO 
cooperation at the political level, it is worth spending some time putting the 
relationship into context with regard to counter-piracy. In order to do this, a few 
issues should be highlighted. These can be compartmentalised into general terms 
that relate to piracy/maritime operations per se and specific terms that relate to the 
dynamics of EU-NATO institutional relations specifically. 
Starting with the generalities, it is important to note that EU-NATO cooperation in 
counter-piracy is ‘somewhat hidden’ by a broader international framework for tackling 
this phenomenon (Interview 5, 2010). The reality is that, when sensitive information 
is transferred (see below), it is not always problematic at the political level as it is not 
always regarded as direct EU-NATO cooperation; rather, it is considered as just a 
fraction of a more international effort. In fact, Bahrain is seen as a central hub of 
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cooperation where there exists a very large US presence, CMF, EU and NATO 
officers, as well as assets belonging to various independent deployers. Furthermore, 
London is home not only to Northwood (where both EU and NATO have their 
independent but co-located OHQs), but also home to the international maritime 
community. In this way, the London-based maritime community is very much an 
added value when it comes to mitigating competition and cooperation problems 
between both the EU and NATO, as well as with other actors and organisations. 
A second backdrop to this is the different focus and level of commitment that the 
two organisations have when it comes to the counter-piracy operations. There can 
be no doubt that ‘for NATO the operational priority is Afghanistan’ and counter-piracy 
is very much lower down the chain in order of priority (Interview 3, 2010). One official 
at NATO even went as far as to say that ‘the US was not interested in the piracy 
mission, not in sending ships or getting involved in a serious way because they are 
too focused on Afghanistan’ (Interview 7, 2010b). In other words, the US is happy to 
have the EU take the lead on this operation because it is convenient for their efforts 
elsewhere. Indeed, when this issue was put to US officials, one response was that 
‘obviously Afghanistan is a much bigger focus for NATO at the moment’ (Interview 
17, 2010). 
Another factor that puts EU-NATO cooperation into context is the 21 coinciding 
member states. This obviously has a very big impact on relations. Not only does it 
mean that personnel are transferring between organisations, but there also exists a 
common understanding and culture, both at the political and operational levels, 
especially compared to, for example, relations with the various independent 
deployers. Furthermore, at an operational level, when we talk about EU and NATO 
missions, we can refer to independent non-integrated chains of command, but we 
cannot talk about different sets of navies. In this way, both organisations are 
competing for limited resources to be sure, but at an operational level this goes a 
long way to mitigating obstructions to cooperation.  
Finally, it should be noted that attempting to tackling the problem of piracy at sea 
is not, ultimately, the solution that is going to be successful. It is agreed by all at the 
political level that this particular issue needs to be solved on land and through rule of 
law instruments, for example using coastguards and not deep blue-water navies. 
That being said, as long as the problem persists and conditions in Somalia are not 
conducive to on-land attempts at resolving the issue, there is a shared EU-NATO 
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understanding that both missions are necessary to address the vast area in which 
these pirates operate. One NATO Commander put it as follows, ‘the magnitude of 
the problem is so large, if one of us were to leave, I think there would be a massive 
rise in piracy because we are just holding with one or two ships getting pirated every 
other month. If any one of us were to leave it would significantly impact the whole 
operation that we are doing’ (Interview 26, 2010). 
Turning to the specifics of EU-NATO relations, it has become more and more 
apparent that the EU does not necessarily have to take a back seat to NATO when it 
comes to performance in operations. What counter-piracy has demonstrated is that 
gone is the notion that ‘NATO will always be the Rolls-Royce and the EU will be the 
clapped-out Mini’ (Interview 3, 2010). In many respects, operation ATALANTA is 
seen as the premier operation by the member states. The EU has more ships in 
ATALANTA, it has maritime patrol aircraft and it has the legal arrangements with the 
neighbouring countries, particularly Kenya, to dump the pirates. Many of the 
European NATO-Allies have already decided that, if they were to put a ship in either 
of the operations, they would choose ATALANTA because it is a much better 
resourced mission than the NATO mission, which does not have the same legal 
connection or the maritime patrol aircraft (Interview 3, 2010).  
There is one caveat to this, however. For those NATO nations that are not also 
member states of the EU, it is much more politically and functionally challenging for 
them to contribute to the EU operation. This is due to the much stricter command and 
control policies that the EU retains. Unlike that which NATO offers in 
Afghanistan/ISAF - which is more or less full participation rights vis-à-vis decision-
shaping to non-NATO contributors - the EU does not offer the reciprocal to the non-
EU contributors to its military operations. This makes it very difficult for nations like 
Canada, and even more so for Turkey, to contribute to ATALANTA, even if they 
would otherwise want to do so. 
This brings us to the perennial debate regarding EU-NATO competition and 
duplication. For many, the case of counter-piracy is the beginning of the end to the 
argument over the division of labour. Some EU officials have stressed that the 
argument no longer makes sense and that ‘competition is overblown’ and what is key 
now is ‘which organisation is best for specific operations’ (Interview 4, 2010). 
Whereas NATO may be the more appropriate organisation for Afghanistan, most at 
the political level now see the EU as the more suitable organisation for counter-
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piracy given the political instruments and competencies it possesses (and which 
NATO does not). The research demonstrates that this attitude is held on both sides 
of the EU-NATO divide. Some at SHAPE have even gone as far as calling for a 
‘unified OHQ, whereby NATO plays a secondary role to the EU and contributes at 
the tactical/operational level but leaves the political/strategic competence to the EU’ 
(Interview 13, 2010). 
However, the idea of competition between the two organisations has not vanished 
completely. There is a general feeling among many European Allies and EU member 
state officials that there is no need for NATO to be doing this at all. In their view, the 
EU is the best (or only) organisation for the job and NATO is just trying to duplicate. 
There is also the opposing view, one mainly put forward on the US side, that the EU 
is playing a ‘double game’ and it is somewhat hypocritical given its dependency on 
NATO (and its SNMG capability) and the benefit that it provided in the early stages of 
trying to stand up an EU mission. One US official summed up this argument as 
follows: 
 
The EU was competitive to the point of blocking a NATO 
mission in AUG/Sept 2008, a mission by EU-centric Allies who 
then realised that they were not going to be physically capable 
of standing up an EU mission until December. There was a gap 
there that had to be filled, and then all of a sudden the lights 
changed and it was suddenly ok for NATO to put ships in the 
water. That was fine until December and suddenly they wanted 
NATO to pull back out because the EU was standing up 
ATALANTA. So I don’t know if I can call that competitive, its 
obstructive its duplicative it’s an agenda placing EU interests 
and standing up its own capability ahead of any other 
consideration (Interview 17, 2010). 
 
What is clear is that these two views are very much situated in a political context. The 
reality is that both operations are needed as long as deep blue-water navies are the 
core instrument being deployed to address counter-piracy. However, this does raise 
a point with regard to Berlin Plus. Although this mechanism is not officially used as 
the means of formal cooperation between the EU and NATO for counter-piracy, it is 
difficult to see how the EU’s dependency on NATO capabilities in the deliberation 
and early stages of the operational phase of ATALANTA is different from the initial 
concept and value of Berlin Plus. For example, what the EU essentially did was 
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borrow NATO assets, not only until it was capable of making the difficult political 
decisions to launch its own mission, but also in terms of asset and capability 
procurement. One NATO official was quite cynical in this regard: ‘watching them 
trying to stand up ATALANTA would have been funny if it were not so painfully 
obvious that they did not know what they were doing. Then several months later, 
once they finally did manage to figure out how to remove various ships from various 
parts of NATO’s command structure and rig something together to what is now an EU 
capability, then again it was time for complementarity to kick back in and for NATO to 
go back to the sidelines and observe why the EU carried on its mission’ (Interview 17, 
2010). 
Yet, given all this, the case of counter-piracy has become the laboratory for EU 
NATO informal cooperation in its attempts to push the barriers in terms of what 
personnel at the operational level can get away with given the limitations of the 
BP/AF. Agents have adapted the rules and institutions created by the BP/AF 
arrangements as a normative and institutional reference point, i.e. not only for 
referencing the rules that limit formal cooperation but, also as a means of facilitating 
informal cooperation. This suggests that ‘two faces’ of EU-NATO cooperation are 
unfolding: problematic cooperation at the politico-strategic level is countered by what 
seems to be established and relatively successful patterns of informal coordination 
and cooperation within the operational and tactical arena (Gebhard and Smith, 
2011). 
One must also distinguish between the cooperative relationship with the 
independent deployers operating in counter-piracy and those between the EU and 
NATO specifically. From an ATALANTA perspective, there has been a ‘challenge to 
the institutional norms’ (Interview 31, 2010b), not necessarily in regards to NATO, 
but more in terms of how they can share with Russia, China, Japan and the other 
independent deployers. Due to historical reasons, both political and in the absence 
of cooperation to date, they have had to find ways around that. The PSC has agreed 
ten ‘cooperative frameworks’ that set out how the EU works with these countries 
operating in the region. It should also be stressed that this ‘challenge’ has been 
driven by personnel working at the operational level and not at the political level per 
se (Interview 31, 2010b). 
However, there is an existing ‘sharing of information agreement’ that is external to 
the rules and provisions for cooperation as set out through Berlin Plus. This 
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document was devised unilaterally within ATALANTA but, importantly, given PSC 
consent. In real terms, this means that the level of classification, or what is deemed 
intelligence, has changed. For example, the PSC has consented to the passing of 
photographs from the EU to NATO, but not the analysis of those pictures. This 
decision was taken because the PSC realised that, if it was not, they would be 
‘binding what ATALANTA could and could not do’ (Interview 31, 2010b). This does 
seem to suggest that a degree of simple learning has transpired, facilitated by 
individuals working in-theatre, but also consented to through the organisational level 
by an incremental change to the rules. In other words, this was not an attempt to 
replace the BP/AF, but it was a clear change in strategy to allow for closer 
cooperation at the operational level. 
The difference in the relative thickness in the CoCs between the EU and NATO 
does mean that the sharing of intelligence is much easier for NATO. The added 
distance from the political level, as demonstrated above, gives them more insulation 
from their political minders and lends itself towards more room to manoeuvre in this 
regard. However, these extra layers also hamper NATO when it comes to issues 
such as asset procurement and any other issue that necessitates NAC approval. As 
one NATO official commented, ‘NATO has much more insulation between the 
tactical level and the political level and that has the one advantage that perhaps 
there is a little more leeway in what we can do tactically. But it also means that it is a 
much more cumbersome beast when its wants to do things that do require political 
input or approval’ (Interview 28, 2010). 
Essentially, what does exist is a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ between the two 
organisations with regard to cooperation at both the political and the tactical levels 
(multiple interviews with both EU and NATO officials). However, Operation OCEAN 
SHIELD and ATALANTA (and CMF), despite efforts to avoid it, compete for scarce 
resources. Whilst the two operations de-conflict in space and time - primarily through 
the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE)51 meetings (discussed later in the 
chapter) - no formal arrangement to co-ordinate activity exists. Practical measures 
such as common communication and information systems (CIS) infrastructure 
                                            
51
 For more information regarding SHADE, see: 
http://combinedmaritimeforces.com/2012/06/17/combined-maritime-forces-host-24th-shade-meeting/ 
(last accessed December 2013). 
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cannot be shared between the two operations and nations are forced to enter into 
bilateral arrangements. Forces mandated to support one operation and not the other 
have difficulty sharing intelligence between operations; even nations involved in 
both, but ‘favouring’ one over the other, inevitably give tasking priority to that 
operation. A senior representative from the office of the DSACEUR put it as such: ‘I 
know a lot of people often say that we are either competing or cooperating in 
counter-piracy, actually we are working alongside one another, we are more 
deconflicting than we are cooperating, we certainly are not integrating’ (Interview 13, 
2010). Yet this also seems to suggest that an incremental change to the EU-NATO 
relationship - facilitated by learning and socialisation over time - has transpired and 
both the EU and NATO have learned to alter their strategies in order to cooperate 
beyond the BP/AF context. 
Finally, the US plays an integral part with regard to the passing of sensitive 
information. There are two features to this that are worth noting. First, it is EU-NATO 
institutions and bilaterally (US to EU) that they choose to convey this intelligence. 
Second, it is the proximity of the two OHQs situated in Northwood that facilitates and 
enhances this process. A maritime culture of ‘ship to ship’ cooperation, built on an 
extensive history of this type of cooperation, both generally and within historical 
NATO practices, also enhances cooperation. According to one interlocutor, ‘we have 
a joint cell situated up in Northwood, separate buildings but situated very close 
together. So that is a kind of fusion centre where we collect intelligence and sort of 
pass it on, but it is not generated from inside NATO, its more or less passed to 
NATO by the Americans and then we push it over to the European Union because 
we don’t have the resources to generate our own Intel’ (Interview 3, 2010). 
Ultimately, what makes the cooperation work in spite of the political blockage in 
Brussels is that, for non-Berlin Plus operations, the further cooperation gets from the 
centre (Brussels) and the political implications that it entails, the more likely 
cooperation will be transparent but purely at the informal level. As the next two 
sections will demonstrate, the fact that the political blockage has become 
normatively institutionalised means that informal EU-NATO cooperation is really an 
innovative field, whereby those working at the operational level really must push the 
envelope in order to carry out their missions successfully. Importantly, it is argued 
that this cooperation will be most prominent hierarchically downwards towards the 
international staffs (and especially the operational agents) and also spatially away 
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from the central tools of Brussels towards operational HQs and the areas of 
operation. 
 
International Staff Level 
 
When analysing cooperation at the level of the international staff, the substance and 
thickness of cooperation ranges from ‘banalities’ to a ‘we just have to find a way’ 
type mentality and approach (Interview 7, 2010b). That said, there are three distinct 
areas that are investigated at this level of analysis: the NATO Sec/Gen and EU/HR 
relationship, the international staffs working at both institutions and, critically, the 
office of the DSACEUR. For methodological simplicity, the international staff 
investigated in this section, as with the latter case studies, refer only to the civilian 
and military personnel working within the Brussels-based bureaucracies of both the 
EU and NATO. These are the staff that work for the organisations themselves within 
Brussels (for example, NATO HQ/SHAPE, CMPD, Commission) and are distinct 
from the political representations to the organisations and from the operational staff 
that work in the distinct mission theatres. 
Remembering that the relationship between the EU and NATO concerning 
counter-piracy is an informal one, the relationship between NATO Sec/Gens and the 
EU/HRs does go some way towards enhancing cooperation. However, it is limited 
and sparse in terms of the robustness of effectiveness and the quantity of these 
meetings. While Javier Solana was still acting EU/HR, he demonstrated sentiments 
for overcoming EU-NATO obstructions through statements such as, ‘the “either/or” 
EU-NATO debate is outdated. The EU is not a military alliance and the added value 
of the broader EU/ESDP approach to security has been demonstrated. The key 
issue now is to develop a more flexible framework for working together’ (Solana, 
2009, p. 13). 
In the lead up to the launching of operation ATALANTA, Solana was clear about 
the importance of CSDP standing up its first maritime operation, but he too was 
always careful to mention cooperation with other partners (NATO/CMF etc) in this 
area, mentioning that ‘we will cooperate closely with all actors involved in the region’ 
(EU Core Documents From 2008, 2009, p. 375). However, the document released 
after a meeting of the EU Foreign and Defence ministers on 10 November 2008, 
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under the section ‘Speaking Points for Javier Solana’, revealed a better 
understanding of the substance to this informal relationship. It states, ‘we intend to 
cooperate as closely as possible with all actors involved in the region, notably for the 
exchange of information, including NATO’ (EU Core Documents from 2008, 2009, p. 
395). 
With regard to both Rasmussen and Ashton, they co-chaired a meeting of the 
NAC-PSC on 25 May 2010; however, as described above, these meetings could not 
officially discuss non-Berlin Plus operations, of which counter-piracy was included. 
However, the opportunity was taken for a ‘bilateral’ meeting to exchange words on 
the enhancement of EU-NATO cooperation in general and a specific statement 
noting that cooperation off the coast of Somalia (amongst other areas) needed to be 
‘stepped up’ and they were ‘working on how best to do that’ (NATO Website, 2010). 
The office of the DSACEUR and its relationship with CMPD, however, is an 
interesting, unique and non-linear form of EU-NATO informal cooperation. According 
to one international staff official at NATO, ‘through the DSACEUR is where the real 
business is being done, for both formal Berlin Plus and, importantly, non-Berlin Plus 
operations. DSACEUR keeps the dual hat to discuss even non-Berlin Plus issues’ 
(Interview 7, 2010). However, the interlocutor was also quite adamant that this was 
not the proper docking mechanism for a robust and appropriate relationship, even for 
informal EU-NATO cooperation: 
 
there should be meetings with my boss (the Assistant Secretary 
General for Operations and the Head of CMPD), but these 
meetings are stale and the Head of CMPD will only meet with 
the DSACEUR to discuss real business. These meetings take 
place at SHAPE but also at the Conrad Hotel in Brussels. 
These are referred to as the Conrad meetings. These meetings 
are not at NATO HQ and this is a bit of a scandal. This means 
that the NATO Sec/Gen becomes secondary. Ashton also 
meets with the Sec/Gen and the support staff but there were 
too many problems so now only with the NATO Sec/Gen on a 
one-to-one basis. This is not the right place or level for these 
meetings. They should be between CMPD and Assistant 
Secretary General for Operations and not at SHAPE (Interview 
19, 2010). 
 
However, this relationship does exist and, therefore, warrants discussion. 
Interviews conducted within the office of the DSACEUR revealed that meetings 
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between this office and that of the CMPD did occur. The personnel working in this 
office are very keen to help facilitate EU-NATO cooperation in all areas where the 
two organisations are deployed in the same mission area. One interviewee illustrated 
this by commenting that ‘I think I always have this fundamental belief that anything I 
can do to facilitate EU-NATO cooperation I will do’ (Interview 14, 2010). 
Furthermore, there is also an attitude in the office of the DSACEUR that this 
relationship with CMPD and other EU/CSDP institutions is vital to overcoming the 
problematic and awkward EU-NATO relationship, as well as the political 
impediments to cooperation in missions that do not fall under the BP/AF: 
 
On the other operations, and the areas of major cooperation 
outside of Berlin Plus, counter-piracy for example, what one 
does there is try to facilitate, the passage of sensitive 
information. It is quite difficult because one cannot be seen to 
be doing it too formally. We have informal lunches here, or 
alternatively, up there (Brussels) and at those informal lunches 
we will cover common ground. And we will talk about counter-
Piracy. We will bring in the team leader for that mission for that 
discussion. There will probably be an advisor present, and on 
the other side we will have CMPD, chairman of EUMC, head of 
CPCC, DG EUMS, so they are all there. We will brief them on 
the mission and the areas where we need to cooperate better. 
We have a substance to our meetings here because we 
structure them. But on the policy side and the capability side, up 
in Brussels, of course they are much closer to the political 
problem and therefore they have meetings and they have 
discussions but quite frankly they are pretty bland. (Interview 
13, 2010) 
 
 
Operational Level  
 
As noted above, EU-NATO cooperation in CP, albeit informal, is further hidden or 
shielded by the fact that it is seen as part of a wider and more international effort to 
engage with counter-piracy. This is most apparent at the operational level and 
acknowledged and even taken advantage of in order to facilitate closer cooperation 
by the operational personnel in both organisations. This section will detail informal 
EU-NATO cooperation from five distinct vantage points. These include: the 
international framework for engaging counter-piracy in general, the specific role that 
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the Northwood OHQs play, cooperation with specific regard to sharing of 
intelligence, specific cooperation in the area of operations (AO), and the culture and 
added-value of the maritime component.  
In the AO, the EU has (on average at any given time) ten warships, NATO can 
have five, CMF about six (usually as part of CTF-151), as well as the dedicated 
assets of the independent deployers such as Russia, India, Japan, Malaysia, and 
China. However, as we will see, when you compare EU-NATO cooperation, even 
without a formal agreement, to that of cooperation by either the EU or NATO with 
these independent deployers, it is obvious that the former is much more advanced 
and institutionalised. 
The fact that both ATALANTA and Ocean Shield OHQs are situated at the UK 
facility at Northwood has given informal EU-NATO cooperation a tremendous 
advantage in the face of political obstruction. One senior official at the ATALANTA 
OHQ stated, ‘if NATO had not been here or the EU OHQ had not have been placed 
here, I have no doubt that we would still have a relationship, but would it be as close 
as it is now. And I think that ability to walk across the road has made a huge 
difference’ (Interview 31, 2010b). Northwood has become, as referred to above, a 
‘fusion centre’ for sensitive information. There have also been deliberate attempts to 
institutionalise cooperation at Northwood. A NATO officer described the process 
whereby ‘through the week there is a set of meetings where we meet and we 
coordinate. We have liaison officers and we sit in all the various briefings. You have 
a joint collection management board which is to agree on intelligence and what 
should be the focus area and the assets that we need’ (Interview 29, 2010). A senior 
member of ATALANTA further described the increasing institutionalisation of 
informal cooperation as: 
 
We must keep it at the tactical and operational level. On a day-
to-day basis here at Northwood, with one of the institutionalised 
meetings that we have, each tend to send (I’ll call them a liaison 
officer) but one of their operations people to each other’s brief 
each day, so that we know we are reporting the same things 
and our analysis is similar. A lot comes down to personalities 
and I think we have a good relationship between the two that 
liaise, because without that I think it would be more difficult. 
Now, obviously that is then caught by the institutional issues of 
classified information and that kind of thing (Interview 31, 
2010b). 
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The issue of cooperation is something that both EU and NATO personnel take 
seriously and are constantly trying to ‘push’ and expand as much as possible, despite 
political blockage. Just where the boundaries lie is something that is constantly being 
‘quantified’ at the operational level, even going as far as ‘putting pressure on 
Brussels’ to try and clarify the limits of military cooperation (Interview 31, 2010b). EU-
NATO cooperation with counter-piracy can be seen as a dual approach. It is both top-
down development as well as bottom-up development. However, it is the operational 
level that is ‘the laboratory and very much a part of the bottom-up development’ 
process (Interview 35, 2010). A very senior officer at the NATO OHQ summed up the 
attitude at Northwood as follows, ‘counter-piracy is a mission that is not under 
discussion and everybody agrees that CP has to be countered. Of course, there are 
different visions of what is needed. But for those who are doing it, especially the EU 
and NATO, we know each other very well, we speak the same language, we have 
the same procedures, we explain together, and it comes naturally for us to work 
together on this operation’ (Interview 35, 2010). 
Therefore, the cooperation that stems from this bottom-up approach ‘can be 
explained to a large degree by the operational necessity’ (Interview 35, 2010). 
Therefore, the argument that cooperation is more robust ‘the further it is removed 
from Brussels’ is central to the discussion (Smith, 2011, p. 246). This is something 
that is true for the ships at sea, for the commanders of the task forces working 
together; it is true for the level of cooperation in SHADE, where there are discussions 
of technical matters with the aim of coordinating with all the actors involved, and it is 
true for the OHQs at Northwood. It becomes more difficult the closer you get to 
Brussels; there, it is not only about military necessities or practicalities, but it 
becomes political, and quite often these are not directly related to counter-piracy but 
connected to something completely different. As a result of this dynamic, you have 
what comes close to ‘unity of effort’, which has replaced the formal link or the ‘unity of 
command’ that a Berlin Plus operation would provide. One NATO senior official 
commented that, ‘from a political perspective, we are of course not always pleased 
with that because you would prefer unity of command. But that is something they 
have to accept and having accepting that, we go for unity of effort’ (Interview 35, 
2010). 
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Therefore, socialisation and learning processes are also a factor in this 
relationship. As mentioned above, the proximity of the two OHQs has helped to 
facilitate this process. However, a deep level of socialisation and learning, seemingly 
built upon 60 years of multinational military cooperation through NATO, has also 
been a direct factor supporting EU-NATO cooperation with regard to this particular 
form of informal collaboration. Although more realist assumptions can explain the 
political blockage, and the central tenets of HI help to explain the path dependency of 
the problematic EU-NATO relationship, these additional assumptions are needed to 
explain the granular details of informal cooperation, which clearly exists despite the 
blocking of any formal framework for cooperation. As one CP official stated, ‘even 
more important than the close proximity of the OHQs, is the fact that we already 
knew each other very well before we started. I see real complementarity, even 
interdependencies’ (Interview 35, 2010). 
The most challenging problem - one that both the EU and NATO have to 
surmount when cooperating in a non-Berlin Plus mission - is the passing of sensitive 
information and relevant intelligence. At a more basic level, what could there 
possibly be that two international organisations (with 21 coinciding members), 
operating in a common mission area and combating a common threat which, ‘is not 
under discussion’, would not want to share with regard to intelligence? One 
ATALANTA interlocutor summed this up by stating, ‘in many ways there is nothing 
that we would not want to share. But our hands are bound by documents that have 
been written 5, 10, 15 years ago. People don’t want to take the discussions of 
changing these documents into the political environment’ (Interview 31, 2010b). 
For the ATALANTA operation, the document that sets out the security agreements 
and the regulations for the ‘exchange of classified information’ is the ‘standalone 
security regulation’ (not Berlin Plus) European Union Classified Information (EUCI).52 
Again, at the tactical level, the restrictions these type of rules impose are somewhat 
eased by the fact that there are 21 coinciding member states and they are able to 
access their respective, though exclusive, NATO and EU information/computer 
systems. However, as one EU official said with regard to the EUCI document, ‘it 
would be interesting to see if that document was revised in light of Berlin Plus. But, it 
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may be that they are completely separate and actually we have ended up with the 
same problem’: 
 
This delineation between information and intelligence is an 
interesting one in that its raw data that come into this HQ, and 
we take a very pragmatic approach to that. As soon as some 
analysis has gone into that and therefore it carries an EU 
caveat, that puts us very much on the tightrope. And this is 
what has to be looked at in getting a recognised situation 
awareness that would benefit everybody. Information is shared 
as much as possible, but intelligence -analysed stuff- sits in the 
realms of the rules in which we sit (Interview 34, 2010).  
 
The fact that the OHQs are in close proximity again aids this process even further. 
However, it is not without its difficulties. It is fortunate that the operation is run at 
Northwood, which means they can have briefings which they (EU & NATO) can both 
sit in on. However, their information/computer systems are completely separate, 
while the passage of intelligence that is classified has to be de-classified before it 
can be passed across. This is simply an IT solution; however, ‘it’s only mandrolic and 
it does cause real frictions and real difficulties’ (Interview 13, 2010). Therefore, it 
helps that a number of the nations in the EU are also NATO nations. For example, ‘a 
lot of EU staff will see assets on our NATO systems on our WAN wide-area-network, 
and we will see them. They are just monitoring what is going on, so we will see them 
on our system. But they are a trusted partner, even though they are working for the 
EU, they are still a trusted partner in NATO and we can share information that way 
as well’ (Interview 26, 2010). 
To look at this in another way, the question arises as to why there is a need to go 
to the political level at all if cooperation in the field seems to work, even if it were 
solely explained by operational necessity. Furthermore, it is important to understand 
where this distinction is drawn. The chain of command is crucial in this respect. 
Nonetheless, EU staff are ‘continuously trying to challenge Brussels and to find 
ways, I don’t want to say around the system, but ways of refreshing the current 
system so we can better share’ (Interview 31, 2010b). The existing agreement for the 
passing of intelligence between the EU and NATO limits such transactions to 
pictures and not the intelligence that may or may not stem from them. This is a 
constant source of frustration at the operational level. The EU and NATO may share 
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pictures with each other, but they actually want to be able to share the analysis with 
each other as well: 
 
I think at the moment we are making things work but there 
might be an implication (as seen from the political side) that 
everything we do may not be in the rules and regulations that 
currently exist. We stretch them. If somebody wanted to come 
and do an audit of either the EU or NATO, we are stretching 
things beyond what those agreements are and how they are 
literally read, because we know we have to be able to share, 
otherwise NATO won’t talk to us and we won’t talk to them. This 
goes back to the photo analogy that I used before, so the photo 
is great, we can share photos with each other. But I can’t tell 
you what I think about that picture after I look at it (Interview 31, 
2010b). 
 
Another example of pragmatism and ingenuity, at the operational level, is the use 
of two distinct and new information and communication systems. The first is known 
as The Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa (MSC-HOA). This system, 
established by EU NAVFOR, with ‘close cooperation from industry’, allows for the ‘24 
hour manned monitoring of vessels transiting through the Gulf of Aden whilst the 
provision of an interactive website enables the Centre to communicate the latest anti-
piracy guidance to industry and for Shipping Companies and operators to register 
their movements through the region’ (Maritime Security Centre - Horn of Africa.).53 
However, it is a second system, MERCURY, that is even more germane to analysing 
cooperation by all the forces working in the area of counter-piracy. This secure, 
Internet-based communication system, initiated by the British, works as a ‘neutral 
communications channel’ and ‘allows all SHADE participants to coordinate together 
in real time’ (EU NAVFOR Somalia, 2009). Both the EU and NATO obviously have 
their own communication systems, but MERCURY is ‘an unclassified but secure 
banking protocol system that allows all our forces engaged in CP to talk to one 
another’ (Interview 31, 2010b). 
The sharing of intelligence has ramifications beyond merely coordinating and 
deconflicting in areas of operations. Many personnel at the operational level made it 
clear that cooperation and the sharing of intelligence is needed for other areas as 
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well, most notably when it comes to engaging in a ‘comprehensive approach’, to 
crisis management. The term ‘comprehensive approach’ is here defined as ‘a stress 
on preventative action using a full range of tools directed towards a single 
target/problem’ (Smith, 2011, p. 18).54 As one interviewee noted, ‘everyone focuses 
on intelligence, but it is not just intelligence. What we want to do is get suspects in a 
court and in front of a judge and the only way to do that is by sharing information. To 
build a case for the prosecution you need all this evidence and the pieces to the 
puzzle and some of those pieces are coming from the two different organisations’ 
(Interview 31, 2010b). 
However, even this, seemingly obvious, level of cooperation appears to cause 
problems at the political level, as demonstrated by the comment ‘that everything we 
do may not be in the rules and regulations that currently exist’ (Interview 31, 2010b). 
At the time of these interviews at Northwood, ATALANTA had just undergone a 
seven-month review of the operation. This review was shared with Brussels (PSC) 
as well as the EUMC. Personnel at the operational level ‘highlighted the issue and 
demonstrated a need to clarify the situation on the sharing of information’. However, 
the response from Brussels was mixed and ‘nervous’: ‘why do you need to share 
that?’ A feeling of frustration was apparent amongst those operating at the 
operational level; ‘we don’t want to get around the problem anymore; because we 
want the problem to go away and there should be ways of talking or sharing 
information with each other’ (Interview 31, 2010b). 
Turning to EU-NATO cooperation in the AO, this section looks specifically at 
cooperation and deconfliction through four broad areas. These include: SHADE 
meetings, the Internationally Recognised Transit Corridor (IRTC), deconfliction in the 
Somali Basin, and the Maritime Patrol Aircraft element. 
As noted in detail above, there is a keen awareness and resolve to keep as much 
of EU-NATO cooperation in counter-piracy as possible at the tactical level. The 
institutionalisation of the PSC-NAC blockage (as putatively understood by agents at 
all three levels) has been a fundamental driver for the bottom-up processes of 
cooperation. One example of this was recounted with EU NAVFOR staff and 
specifically illuminates how cooperation is both spatially and hierarchically driven 
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towards the operational level, and that informal EU-NATO institutions have facilitated 
that process through learning and socialisation: 
 
NATO was asked to do an operation but there was mixed views on 
whether NATO should do the operation. However, it was decided 
that they would, although they did not have the assets. So they 
asked EUNAVFOR for the assets, we considered it and sought to 
assist where we could. That shows the level of cooperation. I 
personally don’t think there are any negatives. That was a case of 
us supporting NATO and not just working alongside them. And we 
actually did take that case to Brussels to see if they were in 
agreement to our way of thinking and they said it was an 
Operations/Command decision (Interview 31 & 34, 2010a & 2010b).  
 
This type of informal cooperation has also been institutionalised through the SHADE 
meetings. The EUNAVFOR website refers to SHADE as ‘established in December 
2008 as a means of sharing “best practice”, conduct informal discussions and 
deconflict the activities of those nations and organisations involved in military 
counter-piracy operations in the region’ (EU NAVFOR Somalia, 2009).  
 
Table 4.3: SHADE Achievements  
 Establishment of an Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor 
(IRTC) in the Gulf of Aden, which was endorsed by IMO in July 
2009  
 Development of the IRTC Coordination Guide  
 Agreement on the utility of a common geographical reference 
system  
 Support for the innovative military communications system 
MERCURY, which allows all SHADE participants to coordinate 
together in real time  
 Emergence of coordinated focused operations off the coast of 
Somalia  
 Improving coordination with industry  
 Command opportunities and assets being shared across SHADE 
participants, e.g. Singaporean and Turkish commanders operating 
from US warships  
   
NATO documentation also refers to SHADE as: ‘Monthly meetings of the SHADE 
(Shared Awareness and Deconfliction) group, held in Bahrain, provide a platform for 
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coordination of activities between the maritime industry and NATO (Operation Ocean 
Shield - TF 508), EU (Operation ATALANTA – TF 465), the US-led Coalition 
Maritime Force (CMF - TF-151), and individual nations with maritime assets in the 
region, which have included Australia, Bahrain, China, Egypt, India, Jordan, 
Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Singapore, South Korea, Ukraine and 
Yemen’ (NATO Website). 
Interviewees at Northwood described SHADE as meetings that take place every 
eight weeks and have had (at the last count) over 60 attendees. SHADE is co-
chaired by a permanent CMF chair and a rotational EU or NATO chair. There have 
been attempts to induce various independent deployers to hold the SHADE chair; 
however, the EU-NATO condition whereby you must have ‘enduring assets in the 
IRTC’ has meant that this has not transpired as yet (Interview 24, 2010a). 
Interestingly, the SHADE chair is deliberately kept to the level of Colonel or 
Commander and ‘is very much a military-tactical meeting’ and they proactively try to 
keep ‘politics out’ (Interview 25, 2010).  
SHADE has become ‘quite a productive group’ and has been taking place for well 
over a year (from the time of interview: October 2010). Much of what is achieved is 
effective deconfliction and effective coordination. SHADE is something that the EU 
and NATO ‘try to work hard on’ and is very much geared towards a common 
understanding to the coordination of ‘planning’ and ‘operations’ between the two 
organisations, with CMF and the other independent deployers involved. According to 
one NATO member of staff, ‘it is not secretive information or confidential information. 
But certainly there is information being shared in that group that we don’t want the 
wider population to know about. It’s kept at that level, which allows us to share stuff 
that we may not otherwise want to share with anybody’ (Interview 26, 2010). 
One of SHADE’s most important results was the establishment of the IRTC. 
According to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, ‘The establishment of the 
Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) in the Gulf of Aden is another 
remarkable example of co-operation. Group transits through the corridor are 
protected by ships from EUNAVFOR, NATO and CTF 151.25. A position of IRTC 
coordinator, which rotates among the three multinational deployments, has been 
created to ensure proper tactical coordination. However, not all ships passing 
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through the area join group transits and several navies regularly escort their national 
ships (NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2009).55 
The AO is so massive that the IRTC has been designed to protect shipping lanes 
through the Gulf of Aiden. There is still the wider Indian Ocean as well as the Somali 
Basin, but this corridor has been quite effective in limiting piracy within the Gulf itself. 
The IRTC ‘coordination guide’ is what the EU, NATO, and the CMF ‘hang their hats 
on’ and is essentially a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ to have the minimum ships per area 
within the IRTC; this means eight to ten vessels should be in the IRTC in order to 
have good coverage. To make this work, ‘there is a lot of coordination between the 
three CTFs at sea’; the IRTC coordinator revolves among the three CTFs and, 
according to one ATALANTA interlocutor, they ‘have not had a ship taken out of the 
convoy yet’ (Interview 26, 2010).  
According to this ‘gentlemen’s agreement’, they all still provide two ships into the 
IRTC, despite the individual mandates of each organisation: NATO to detour and 
disrupt piracy, CMF doing the same (plus other national objectives and counter-
terrorism), and the EU’s commitment to the WFP. ‘The IRTC is the highest priority 
amongst everybody’, but this does not mean that coordination is always easy or 
achieved. However, the magnitude of the problem is so large that, if one of the 
organisations were to leave, or if NATO decided to focus its attention elsewhere and 
carry on with other business and the nations would simply put ships into the EU, the 
feeling at the operational level is that ‘there would be a massive rise in piracy’. They 
are just holding, with one or two ships getting pirated every other month with the five 
ships and the submarine that NATO has there now, and the ten to twelve ships that 
the EU has and the three or four operated through CMF. As one commentator 
suggested, ‘we are talking 25+ warships out there patrolling the east and the IRTC; if 
anyone of us were to leave it would significantly impact the whole operation that we 
are doing there right now’ (Interview 26, 2010). 
Besides EU-NATO coordination and deconfliction in the IRTC, there have also 
been attempts to achieve this in the Somali Basin, although cooperation in this 
respect has not been institutionalised for as long as that of the IRTC. In response to 
some unsuccessful attempts at cooperating, resulting in ‘quite a few pirated ships in 
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141 
 
the Somali Basin’, both organisations held meetings starting in Spring 2010 to 
‘hammer out what was needed to make it work’. Now there is ‘excellent coordination 
between the EU and NATO in order to resolve the issue of pirates getting off the 
shore of Somalia and into the wider Basin’ (Interview 26, 2010). Like coordination for 
the IRTC, it is dependent on a gentlemen’s agreement to facilitate progress. 
Coordination is based on a six-month rotation and both organisations agreed to put 
forces into the Somali Basin. Before 2010, the analogy of toddlers playing football is 
useful to describe or visualise cooperation between the actors engaged in CP. When 
a commercial ship spotted or radioed in a warning about a potential pirate ship, all of 
the committed assets in the region would scramble after the same target. Due to 
increased institutionalisation at the operational level between the EU and NATO, this 
is no longer the case. 
The Somalis are able to launch their small craft off the beach and then go to sea 
in boats called ‘whalers’. They are able to carry about 18 barrels of fuel and can 
reach 900-1000 miles off the coast and return. They are also able to tow a couple of 
ships and use them when they attack vessels. This is what drives the force load that 
EU and NATO try to maintain and share among the assets dedicated to both 
missions (and CMF). ‘They should have 17 frigates and 10 MPAs (Maritime Patrol 
Aircraft) really doing the business of enduring IRTC missions and patrolling the 
Somali basin’. However, it is interesting to note that, at the purely military/operation 
level, the EU’s commitment to the WFP is, as one NATO Commander stated it, ‘to 
deliver food to Somalia but to use a billion dollar warship to do it is really not a great 
mission for the military, it is drawing the short straw and a massive waste of an asset 
’ (Interview 26, 2010).  
The final area of cooperation and deconfliction occurs with the maritime patrol 
aircraft (MPAs) element of operations. Working out of Bahrain, this too is set up on a 
rotational basis. Although NATO often has no MPAs in operation, they do still take 
part in the coordination, which is handled in rotation amongst the three 
organisations. The exact number of ATALANTA MPAs is unclear, but the patrolling 
activity of aircraft in the ATALANTA Operation provides crucial added value to the 
Operation. ‘The area of operations is enormous and MPAs are key assets to the fight 
against piracy. On many occasions, acts of piracy have been disrupted as a direct 
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result of the exchange of information and coordination between Maritime Patrolling 
Area (MPA) and EUNAVFOR Warships’ (EU NAVFOR Somalia).56 
In essence, they will fly through the IRTC and look for any small craft that are 
fishing, migrant smuggling from Somalia to Yemen, or pirating crafts. The aircraft 
also go into certain areas on the Somali coast in an attempt to detour and disrupt 
them from leaving the coast. If they do get out, the pilots use the MPAs to do a ‘see-
and-avoid kind of tactic’ and inform the merchant traffic (Interview 26, 2010). The 
MPA cell in Bahrain also contains the EU and NATO liaison officers, ‘who sit in on all 
the various briefings’ that drive much of the MPA deployments. According to one 
interlocutor, ‘we try to fuse the intelligence needs where we should be patrolling and 
everything is coordinated very loosely, but it is achieving what we want it to achieve 
and that is done at a cell in Bahrain where the three organisations have their 
coordinators and those that are deploying aircraft’ (Interview 29, 2010). 
One other area that gives an insightful into the true nature of EU-NATO 
cooperation is that of common culture. This will be looked at from three angles: 
maritime culture in general, EU-NATO common military culture and, finally, a brief 
comparison to the independent deployers with regard to the disparity that exists 
between the EU and NATO culture and the culture of these forces. Although the aim 
of this thesis is not to investigate cooperation between the EU or NATO and any 
independent deployers, some observations do help to quantify the thickness of EU-
NATO informal cooperation as compared to cooperation with these other entities. 
This comparison also helps to show just how dependent any incremental change to 
the EU-NATO relationship is on institutionalisation, learning and socialisation in-the 
theatre. 
On a very general level, EU-NATO cooperation in combating piracy benefits from 
the fact that it is a maritime mission. There is a long tradition of maritime cooperation 
‘that goes far back in history’ and ‘they are used to working with other nations and 
doing things together’ (Interview 35, 2010). This advantage seems to be 
strengthened further by the fact that the two OHQs are situated at Northwood, which 
is a UK Royal Navy compound. Again, it is important to remember that there is only 
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one set of forces for each nation state, regardless of whether they are attached to 
NATO or the EU. It would be extremely unpractical if there was an attempt to 
separate this one set of military forces into two separate military organisations. 
Furthermore, as Frédéric Mérand has stated, ‘[by] the end of the twentieth century, 
the multinational military had become a reality in Western Europe. Armed forces 
exercised with each other regularly and operated abroad using shared assets with 
increasing frequency. Thousands of staff officers interacted in a number of 
multilateral organisations, primarily NATO’ (Mérand, 2008, p. 68). The turnover rate 
within the EU and NATO supports this common culture. Many officers and assets 
within either ATALANTA or Ocean Shield have at one time been attached to the 
other parent organisation. For example, ‘people have been in and out of both OHQs, 
or have been out on one of the member state’s ships. I would say for the operators, it 
is the same mission. They are continuing to do the same job’ (Interview 32, 2010a). 
Finally, it is noteworthy to compare EU-NATO cooperation to that of cooperation 
involving either the EU or NATO with the independent deployers. The reason this 
type of comparison is useful is because it helps to situate where EU-NATO 
cooperation really stands in a broader sense and to juxtapose it against the thickness 
and levels of cooperation with other actors.  
With regard to cooperation in the AO, there is cooperation with independent 
deployers at SHADE, in the IRTC, within the Somali Basin, and with the MPAs 
involved. Most of the independent deployers are mindful of the fact that they want to 
be seen as contributing to counter-piracy; however their top priority is to protect the 
vessels emanating from their respective nations. Some of the difficulties of 
cooperating with the independent deployers are described above with regard to 
SHADE. But these relationships are useful in benchmarking the cooperation between 
EU and NATO as well. According to one NATO interlocutor, ‘it comes easier to us 
(NATO) because we have always done it. It is interesting to see that it works 
between NATO and the EU because if you examine the relationship between us 
together and then with say, for example, China, it is very clear that this relationship is 
very new and it needs a lot of time to develop a level of trust required to get into 
more close cooperation’ (Interview 35, 2010). 
The concept of trust is interesting in terms of counter-piracy cooperation. Just as it 
is appropriate to ask what, in terms of combating piracy, would the EU and NATO not 
want to share, so too is it fair to ask how trust comes into play with this type of 
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operation. For example, if we look at the specific example of China, for them it is 
about participating in an operation where there is a fear of ‘loss of face’ and a fear 
something could go wrong ‘on their watch’. Therefore, they would prefer to continue 
their national initiatives for which they are solely responsible, rather than participating 
in an international scheme where they would have to trust that the partner in the next 
area is doing a good job. That, however, takes time to develop. Of course, in the 
case of China (as well as Russia and India), there are also ‘political considerations 
as well’ (Interview 35, 2010). 
Furthermore, it is not just about levels of trust in terms cooperation in the AO, but 
many problems arise due to the political and historical identities attached to the two 
organisations, especially with NATO. ‘There are still some old ideas which remain in 
their mind, such as we don’t want to work with NATO because we don’t share the 
same ambition of the world. We are doing the same mission, detouring and 
disrupting piracy at sea. But sometimes for some countries or organisations they say, 
well this organisation was doing something different in the past’ (Interview 36, 
2010b). 
The same can be said of Russia. However, NATO does have a history of 
cooperation with this nation. But with regard to Russia and NATO, for example, there 
is no integration of Russian ships and NATO forces; it is just a matter of cooperation. 
It is something that NATO started a few years ago, so it is less difficult than it is with 
China, or even India, who are still discovering this geopolitical environment and how 
international actors are working in this field. The value of military cooperation in 
NATO is often not acknowledged and is taken for granted.  
 
We do it on a daily basis and it works really well, but it has 
taken all these years to develop. If you now enter a new nation 
into the equation - one that has not been part of that, and also 
maybe from a slightly different culture which looks differently at 
things - then it is not easy to integrate. Maybe our expectations 
from the beginning have been a little bit naive in that respect. 
We have a good setup, everybody can join, and everyone can 
see that we have the best way of doing things (Interview 35, 
2010). 
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After comprehensively outlining the EU-NATO relationship within the context of 
informal cooperation towards counter-piracy, the discussion can now summarise the 
key empirical findings. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The EU and NATO have found themselves sharing a common area of operations in 
an attempt to fulfil their individual but similar mandates. The result of this has meant 
that CP has become somewhat of a Petri dish for informal cooperation since both the 
EU and NATO stood up their respective operations. What has developed since 2008 
is not a ‘unity of command’ but clearly a ‘unity of effort’. This has clearly been, first 
and foremost, a bottom-up process, whereby those actors working at the staff level 
and especially the operational level have found creative solutions, over time, to 
adapt to the limits of BP/AF. These creative solutions have been occasionally 
endorsed by EU and NATO political actors; for example, by changing the rules at the 
PSC or NAC level. However, this has been achieved more often by turning a blind 
eye to these alternative strategies aimed at cooperation beyond the BP/AF. The 
result has been the persistence of a static EU-NATO relationship, one still primarily 
structured on the rules and norms of the BP/AF at the macro level (i.e. it has not 
been replaced in order to formally cooperate in a CP context). At the same time, 
informal cooperation has developed facilitated by processes of learning and the 
constant interaction of EU and NATO actors at the staff level and especially at the 
operational level. This, in turn, has led to processes of incremental change at the 
micro level of the relationship. 
Clear patterns of the institutionalisation of informal cooperation are also present 
with regard to EU-NATO cooperation in CP (see Table 4.4 below). Although this was 
less evident at the political level, clear patterns of systematising cooperation at the 
staff and operational levels were revealed. The most obvious examples of this are 
the regular interactions and meetings of EU and NATO personnel both at Northwood 
and within the context of SHADE. These processes in norm development, or ‘shared 
standards in behaviour’ (Smith, 2004, p. 26), have also clearly been more prolific and 
fertile the more they are practised further away spatially from Brussels, and the more 
hierarchically downwards and away from the political level actors. 
146 
 
Clearly, cooperation in the area of CP does not fall within the formal BP/AF 
context. This has, therefore, resulted in the lack of regular or institutionalised formal 
EU-NATO strategic dialogue regarding CP. Yet, what this case study has 
demonstrated is that many of the EU and NATO institutions that would formally 
enable a BP operation are still used as docking mechanisms for informal EU-NATO 
cooperation beyond the BP/AF. In other words, the same actors are discussing CP 
and interacting in similar ways to Berlin Plus mandated operations, they just refuse 
to use the term Berlin Plus. Clear examples of this are the DSACEUR as ‘Strategic 
Coordinator’ and interactions between DSACEUR and CMPD/Chairman of the 
EUMC/Head of CPCC/DG-EUMS. Furthermore, the EU was clearly dependent on 
NATO assets and capabilities in the run-up to the launching of its own operation. 
Furthermore, learning and socialisation have facilitated cooperation in the case of 
CP owing, not least of all, to the two HQs being co-located at Northwood and where 
efforts are made both formally and informally to enhance cooperation. The most 
obvious examples of this are the monthly co-ordination boards and SHADE. There 
are limitations, however, as both the EU and NATO operations work to the national 
and/or organisational parameters set by the BP/AF. Yet, as the Contact Group on 
Piracy off the Coast of Somalia CGPCS57 demonstrates, where there is a will there is 
usually a way. Even so, for each force, the lessons process is a constant one, and 
lessons have to be identified before they can be learned. 
While learning to cooperate outside the BP/AF context is clearly developing, it is 
overwhelmingly simple in nature. In other words, it is not learning that is aimed at 
renegotiating the EU-NATO relationship at the macro level, or replacing the BP/AF 
as the formal framework of the EU-NATO relationship. Furthermore, much of these 
learning processes are only experienced by individuals. This is most obvious when 
individuals attempt to ‘push the envelope’ or to find creative solutions to cooperate 
despite the limitation of the formal framework. However, occasionally there has also 
been evidence of simple organisational learning; for example, when the political 
actors collectively overlook some of these transgressions or even agreeing minor 
changes to the rules, as was the case when the PSC decided to slightly change the 
sharing of information agreement. 
 
                                            
57
 Please see the website for the CGPCS: www.thecgpcs.org. 
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Table 4.4: 
Observed Institutionalisation for Counter Piracy (Systematised or Informal) 
Bi-lateral Sec/Gen & HR Meetings Semi-systematised 
DSACEUR-CMPD/CPCC/EUMS/DG-EUMS Meetings Semi-Systematised 
Northwood  
- ‘Fusion Centre’ 
- Intelligence and information collection centre 
- Joint mess hall 
- Liaison Officers meetings 
Systematised 
Systematised 
Informal (but daily) 
Systematised 
SHADE 
IRTC Coordination Guide 
Systematised 
Systematised 
Somali Basin Coordination Systematised 
MPA Cell at Bahrain Systematised 
  
 
Table 4.5: 
Key Findings for Counter Piracy  
EU depending on NATO assets and capabilities 
initially 
 
IT options for sharing intelligence  
Very high levels of deconfliction   
OHQs in same compound at Northwood  
More flexible and changed rules for sharing 
information 
 
PSC and NAC boundary testing at the operational 
level 
 
Northwood used as a ‘fusion centre’  
DSACEUR as Strategic Coordinator  
Increased institutionalisation of informal cooperation  
Common military cultures and levels of 
professionalism  
 
 
This chapter has attempted to investigate the EU-NATO relationship, both at the 
macro and micro level, in the specific case of cooperation in the area of counter-
piracy and beyond the BP/AF. In order to do this, it looked at cooperation through 
three distinct levels of analysis, namely the political/strategic, international staff and 
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operational levels. This allowed for a rigorous analysis of the relationship in an area 
that has not really been attempted in-depth before now.  
What this chapter has demonstrated is that the rhetoric for a ‘strategic partnership’ 
is present with informal cooperation, just as it is when formal arrangements are 
utilised for active cooperation through Berlin Plus. However, due to the fact that 
neither Berlin Plus nor any other formal mechanism for cooperation was agreed at 
the political/strategic level in this case, increased informality and a dependency on 
the efforts of international staff, as well as operational personnel to circumvent 
political deadlock, was highly necessary in order to achieve any cooperation at all. 
This, itself, was heavily reliant on socialisation and learning. Although the 
relationship continues to be path-dependent due to the initial processes and 
sequencing of events that shaped the BP/AF before 2004, incremental processes 
were also discernible. The most obvious of these is the increased institutionalisation 
of informal cooperation at all three levels, but most concrete at the international staff 
and especially spatially towards the operational level. What this has meant in terms 
of the EU-NATO relationship in the area of CP is a consistent and evolving informal, 
but increasingly institutionalised, relationship driven towards a ‘unity of effort’ due to 
the fact it has not achieved a ‘unity of command’.  
Finally, this chapter has demonstrated that, in order for this increased 
institutionalised relationship to exist and for cooperation on the ground to be 
effective, it is highly dependent on the presence of 21 common member states, as 
well as a long history of both military and especially maritime cooperation that has 
existed between the common EU and NATO member states. Furthermore, when we 
compare cooperation between EU and NATO member states and the various 
independent deployers engaged with combating piracy, a clear difference in 
standards is detectable. 
Therefore, it can be said that most of the formal mechanisms and institutions 
created for the formal EU-NATO relationship to work in a strictly BP context are also 
used with informal cooperation, albeit in a much less systematised way, particularly 
at the political/strategic level. This case study has demonstrated this by looking at 
both organisations operating concurrently in very similar military operations. 
However, an investigation is also needed in areas where the EU and NATO are 
operating (and potentially cooperating) in different capacities in order to more fully 
understand the relationship. This thesis now turns to the case of Kosovo in order to 
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gain a better understanding of the relationship in a case where both organisations 
have concurrent operations running side by side, but without any formal agreements 
to underpin any potential cooperation in the field. 
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Chapter Five  
Beyond Berlin Plus  
Informal Civilian-Military Cooperation in Kosovo 
When it comes to cooperation in the theatre, when we have EU 
lives at risk, we are flexible. We kind of somehow turn a blind 
eye because we don’t want to keep causing problems. So we 
have our baseline, when it comes to staff contacts we know 
what is going on through many means and we know that they 
go beyond what they are supposed to discuss and sometimes 
we don’t say anything. So there is this understanding (Interview 
42, 2011). 
 
Introduction 
 
Chapter Four investigated the EU-NATO relationship, both at the macro and the 
micro level, in the specific case of counter-piracy. This case study aims to do the 
same but within the context of civilian (EU) to military (EU) operations in Kosovo. A 
robust analysis of the EU-NATO relationship in terms of civilian and military 
cooperation is very sparse in the literature and, therefore, this particular case study 
could be justified for these reasons alone. Kosovo is a particularly interesting case to 
investigate for EU-NATO cooperation beyond Berlin Plus. Although there is no Berlin 
Plus operation in Kosovo, of the three cases in this thesis, Kosovo (and the KFOR 
mission in particular) seems the most likely candidate for implementing the Berlin 
Plus arrangements. The EU taking over NATO’s KFOR mission - with recourse to 
NATO assets and capabilities - could be, conceivably, not that different from the way 
Operation Althea was originally transferred from a NATO operation and how it is 
currently conducted in BiH. Similar to Chapter Four, the primary aim of this chapter is 
to investigate for evidence of EU-NATO cooperation, despite the political blockage 
that should exclude any cooperation. Second, it will investigate how such 
cooperation has evolved since BP/AF stasis (2004), as well as the nature and the 
form of any such cooperation. It will also investigate to what extent the BP/AF 
remains the normative and institutional context for cooperation since 2004.  
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This chapter will demonstrate that there is rhetoric for EU-NATO cooperation 
regarding operations in Kosovo. This rhetoric is present in the legal/strategic 
documents that underpin both KFOR and EULEX; it is also present in other primary 
source documentation, as well as from the interviews conducted for this case study. 
These documents speak of ‘close coordination’, ‘close’ working relationships and 
even the release of ‘classified information and documents up to the level of 
confidential’. However, due to the political impasse and the resulting deadlock that 
has been institutionalised and internalised at all three levels of cooperation, the only 
way to achieve any structured cooperation was to have ‘local technical 
arrangements’ drawn up in the field as no formal institutional links were achieved in 
Brussels, or anywhere at the political/strategic level for that matter. However, having 
Kosovo (and now Serbia at least with regard to the EU) as part of a common 
‘Concerted Approach for the Western Balkans’, as well as prior experience of EU-
NATO formal cooperation in the region (CONCORDIA/ALTHEA), this has meant that 
a modest degree of informal strategic institutional links were also established, 
however briefly. This is demonstrated mostly by the holding of an informal NAC-PSC 
meeting in February 2007, which had all 27-28 EU and NATO (Turkey and Cyprus 
included) members discussing the topic of Kosovo informally. Again, the thickness of 
EU and NATO relations over the last (almost) two decades vis-à-vis the Balkans 
makes this case - where formal cooperation is ruled out - a particularly interesting 
case.  
This chapter will also demonstrate that this rhetoric is again present at the 
international staff level. Most discernible is the increased reference by both the 
offices of the EU’s HR and the NATO Sec/Gen to the lack of cooperation, and 
through quotes emanating from these offices, such as the two organisations need to 
‘talk more together’, ‘do more together’ and that coordination concerning Kosovo 
‘needs to be stepped up’. This is also demonstrated by the increased 
institutionalisation of staff-to-staff meetings concerning Kosovo, which will be 
demonstrated in this case study. However, it should be noted that some practitioners 
feel that, since the Lisbon Treaty, there have been some reversals to these 
processes. 
Finally, it cannot be denied that the different operational priorities of both the EU 
and NATO effect the relationship in Kosovo. As it happens, Kosovo and the EULEX 
mission is the EU’s first priority CSDP mission currently on-going (although 
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ATALANTA is also highly prioritised as well), whereas for NATO it is Afghanistan. 
Furthermore, the fact that Kosovo is relatively less hostile, as compared to 
Afghanistan, for example, has meant that a real tipping point for EU-NATO 
cooperation, one that would demand a formal agreement, has not really been 
necessary in order to cooperate and/or deconflict (to a degree) in-theatre. In other 
words, what will be evident is that informal cooperation works well enough spatially 
away from the strategic linkages so as not to force a dramatic change in the Agreed 
Framework at this level. Plus, the status quo remains, albeit with major incremental 
changes in the day-to-day workings of the relationship at the meso and micro levels. 
Once again, this case study is not a formal Berlin Plus operation, nor was 
cooperation formally structured through some re-writing of the Berlin Plus 
mechanism to fit civilian/military cooperation. This, in turn, has led to limitations in 
the EU-NATO relationship concerning cooperation in Kosovo. First and foremost, 
formal institutional settings were not clearly established to facilitate discussions on 
cooperation or strategy between the two organisations. This was somewhat 
mitigated by one informal NAC-PSC meeting in February 2007 set up to discuss 
matters in Kosovo. However, this was far from institutionalised, as it was a one-off 
event (at least to discuss Kosovo). In this way, formal NAC-PSC meetings to discuss 
any matters outside of ALTHEA are rare and path-dependent/locked-in to the Agreed 
Framework, as previously discussed. However, moves to have at least a modest 
amount of informal cooperation through these formal NAC-PSC institutions, however 
‘below the radar’ and ‘off the record’, do establish a degree of evolutionary change 
within the confines of the path-dependent and post-2004 static/locked-in EU-NATO 
relationship.  
Besides the limitations to cooperation concerning the formal channels of strategic 
planning and decision-making at all three levels of analysis, the other major limitation 
concerns the passing of intelligence and sensitive information. Again, the 
relationship is path-dependent and locked into the Agreed Framework due to the 
limited interpretation of Berlin Plus that some nations have taken. The research in 
this case study will show that the increased institutionalisation of informal 
cooperation at the international staff level and the operational level has allowed 
cooperation to transpire in the field. As with counter-piracy, this has been especially 
facilitated through the office of the DSACEUR based on this post’s TOR as the 
‘Strategic Coordinator’ between the EU and NATO.  
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This case study also demonstrates what I called the essence of Berlin Plus issue 
in the previous chapter. The argument could be made, and indeed is by some NATO 
member states, that in Kosovo (and, as we will see, in Afghanistan) NATO lends 
assets and capabilities as well as provides security to the EU in order for it to 
function and carry out its mission in-theatre. The BP/AF channels are not formally or 
officially utilised with CONCORDIA or ALTHEA (NAC-PSC & SHAPE, etc); nor is this 
a case whereby the EU assumes or replaces the military functions of NATO. 
However, in ‘simple terms’, Berlin Plus is by definition ‘an EU-led operation making 
use of NATO assets and capabilities’ (European Union External Action Service, 
2011a). What this chapter will demonstrate is that this is clearly the case in Kosovo, 
as NATO is the 3rd responder and provides the general security and stability in-
theatre. Furthermore, these functions and provisions are clearly written into the 
MOUs and JOPs concerning this case study. These were agreed as the local 
technical arrangements ‘drawn up in the field’.  
It should also be reiterated that, when informal mechanisms were used to carry 
out strategic discussions and planning, it was the NAC-PSC format that was adopted 
in the case of Kosovo and, therefore, utilised the Berlin Plus template/processes for 
cooperation through the Agreed Framework. However, regarding informal 
cooperation and remembering the limitations of the BP/AF as demonstrated in 
Chapter Two, the term 'Within the Agreed Framework' is often quoted as a standard 
operating procedure to Turkey and/or Greece to show that everyone recognises and 
abides by the Berlin Plus arrangement. Because of this, the talks can only be 
informal. There is no provision for formal talks in the BP/AF beyond those on an 
operation that is being conducted under Berlin Plus. Every time a nation proposes to 
go beyond that, it is vetoed by either Turkey or Greece. Therefore, with regard to 
informal meetings, no formal decisions can be taken. It is an exchange of ideas that 
brings no commitment to either side. 
Formal cooperation between the EU and NATO is path-dependent on the 
sequencing of events and the initial institutional creation that was determined in the 
early years of cooperation. Although the Agreed Framework seems locked in and 
limiting in terms of the ability of the EU and NATO to carry out the broader functions 
of cooperation in other mission areas besides ALTHEA, there have clearly been 
evolutionary processes of change built on these initial templates and which operate 
through the same channels. However, undoubtedly there has not been enough 
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political will or an event that has forced a change at the macro level of the 
relationship. In other words, Berlin Plus has not been re-established to account for 
these areas of cooperation or for civilian-military scenarios. The empirical evidence 
suggests that, in the case of Kosovo, this is because the local situation is not 
bellicose enough to force greater levels of formal cooperation whereby the states 
that have a vested interest in the status quo would need to rethink their position. As 
long as lower-level agreements and technical arrangements can be agreed spatially 
away from the politically sensitive centre (Brussels) to the local level (in-theatre), the 
Agreed Framework will not be renegotiated at the macro level.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section frames the chapter as a further 
investigation of EU-NATO cooperation beyond the BP/AF and establishes the 
specific research questions for this case study. Second, it will contextualise and 
detail the posture of both NATO’s and the EU’s different operations in Kosovo. The 
main section is an in-depth empirical analysis of the EU-NATO relationship with 
regard to their respective missions in Kosovo and it investigates cooperation at three 
levels of analysis: the political/strategic level, the international staff level, and the 
operational level. The chapter ends by offering a set of conclusions that are based 
on the research questions established in the next section. It ultimately demonstrates 
that both static and path-dependent features to the macro relationship (BP/AF) are 
present, while simultaneously evidence of incremental processes of change are also 
present at the micro level of the EU-NATO relationship.  
 
Framing Propositions: 
 
Before turning to the empirics of this case study, some assumptions are first required 
for the EU-NATO relationship as it pertains to operations in Kosovo specifically and 
in line with the general research framework, especially those related to incremental 
change, learning and socialisation. The specific research questions can then be set 
for this case study.  
Due to the limitations of BP/AF, it is expected that NO formal EU-NATO strategic 
dialogue, joint EU-NATO planning, official EU-NATO task-sharing or any kind of EU-
NATO formal functional or strategic action will be evident in relation to military-
civilian cooperation vis-à-vis operations in Kosovo. Furthermore, the NAC and the 
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PSC will not be permitted to formally discuss Kosovo or have it as part of any official 
NAC-PSC agenda. In other words, there will be no formal political/strategic 
institutional framework for cooperation concerning Kosovo. 
However, if it is taken as a given that there will be certain functional and 
operational requirements conditioned on the fact that both the EU and NATO are 
operating in the same geographical space, although conducting different missions 
(Civilian versus Military) in pursuit of their respective mandates, agents at all three 
levels (political/strategic, international staffs and operational) will seek alternative 
avenues for cooperation in the face of these limits mentioned above. Furthermore, 
agents will adapt the rules and institutions created by the BP/AF arrangements as a 
normative and institutional reference point, not only for limiting formal cooperation, 
but also for facilitating informal cooperation. 
As with the case of CP, the core assumptions of HI explain the limitations of 
BP/AF as a formal vehicle of EU-NATO cooperation in Kosovo (while still persisting 
as the only formal EU-NATO institutional framework in general). However, these 
core assumptions are much less useful in explaining other forms of EU-NATO 
cooperation beyond the strict interpretation of BP/AF. This case study once again 
problematises why cooperation exists, despite the political blockage that should limit 
its use, and how EU-NATO cooperation in Kosovo proceeds despite a formal 
framework for cooperation. Consequently, this case study is an investigation of how 
EU-NATO cooperation takes place despite this political blockage and investigates 
how much incremental change, socialisation and learning play a role in an agent’s 
ability to find alternatives to, or the adaption of, BP/AF for cooperation. 
Finally, given the political sensitivities of BP/AF, there is an expectation that some 
degree of institutionalisation of cooperation will take place; however, it will be most 
prominent hierarchically downwards towards the international, and especially 
operational, agents. This institutionalisation will also be more prominent spatially 
away from the central tools of Brussels towards operational HQs and the areas of 
operation. As well as the general guiding research questions and assumptions 
established in Chapter Three, the following research questions are also generated to 
investigate the EU-NATO relationship in the context of Kosovo:  
 
(1) Is there any observable evidence of learning facilitating informal EU-NATO 
cooperation in the case of Kosovo?  
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(2) Is there any observable evidence of socialisation facilitating informal EU-
NATO cooperation in the case of Kosovo?  
(3) Is there any observable evidence of institutionalisation impacting on changes 
in behaviour, or at least facilitating changes in behaviour (be they rational or 
sociological in nature), in the case of Kosovo? 
The chapter will now attempt to contextualise both NATO’s and the EU’s different 
operations in Kosovo, before turning to an in-depth empirical analysis of the EU-
NATO relationship with regard to their respective missions.  
 
Kosovo 
 
Background and Context 
 
This case study is not intended to assess the overall effectiveness or success of 
either organisation in Kosovo, but to narrowly focus on cooperation between the two 
organisations; for example, to investigate for patterns and instances of cooperation 
beyond the BP/AF stasis. It is necessary to first contextualise the Kosovo crisis in 
order to properly situate any cooperation between the EU and NATO in this 
operational setting. A brief outline of the Kosovo crisis and how the two organisations 
became involved now follows. 
 As journalist Tim Judah wrote in the spring of 1999, Kosovo was ‘a catastrophe 
waiting to happen’ (Judah, 1999, p. 5; Webber, 2009, p. 449). War in Kosovo initially 
began with low-level violence between the ‘Serbian security forces and the ethnic 
Albanian Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)’ in February 1998 (Judah, 1999, p. 6). This 
commencement of violence would eventually culminate with Operation Allied Force 
(OAF), a 78-day bombing campaign carried out by NATO in the spring of 1999 after 
‘the collapse of the Rambouillet process’,58 a process which endeavoured to find a 
                                            
58
 The Rambouillet Agreement is the name of a proposed peace agreement between then-Yugoslavia 
and a delegation representing the ethnic-Albanian majority population of Kosovo. It was drafted by the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation(NATO) and named for Chateau Rambouillet, where it was initially 
proposed. The significance of the agreement lies in the fact that Yugoslavia refused to accept it, 
which NATO used as justification to start the Kosovo War. Belgrade's rejection was based on the 
argument that the agreement contained provisions for Kosovo's autonomy that went further than the 
Serbian/Yugoslav government saw as reasonable. Taken from: 
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peaceful solution to the conflict (Webber, 2009, p. 450). The air campaign was 
devised to further prevent large-scale atrocities on the Albanian population of 
Kosovo by the Serbian forces that were politically led by the Slobodan Milosevic 
regime. Ultimately, the bombing campaign ended in June 1999 after Milosevic and 
the Serbian Parliament accepted the demands of the international community. These 
demands included, ‘the withdrawal of Yugoslav/Serb forces; the introduction of an 
international civil and security presence under the UN but with “substantial NATO 
participation” and under NATO unified command and control; the establishment of an 
interim administration; the safe return of refugees, the demilitarization of the KLA; 
and the initiation of a political process providing for “substantial self-government”’ 
(Webber, 2009, p. 452). 
This eventually paved the way for UNSCR 1244 (10 June 1999) which ‘authorizes 
Member States and relevant international organizations to establish the international 
security presence in Kosovo’ (UNSC1244). UNSCR 1244 further ‘authorizes’: ‘the 
Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant international organizations, to 
establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim 
administration for Kosovo...’ With specific regard to the European Union and NATO 
as actors involved post-UNSCR 1244, the document gives reference to both in turn. 
First, it ‘welcomes the work in hand in the European Union and other international 
organizations to develop a comprehensive approach to the economic development 
and stabilization of the region affected by the Kosovo crisis...’ (Item number 17). 
Furthermore, ‘the international security presence with substantial North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization participation must be deployed under unified command and 
control and authorized to establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo’ 
(Annex 2: 4). 
It should be noted that, with regard to NATO, a subsequent agreement was also 
negotiated between NATO and Serbia that ‘in effect, gave allied forces carte blanche 
within Kosovo (but stopped short of NATO’s demand for unrestricted access 
throughout the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)’ (Webber, 2009, p. 452). In 
order to assume the military and security task within Kosovo, NATO initially deployed 
KFOR, consisting of 60,000 troops. This figure was cut back substantially to 6,300 
                                                                                                                                       
http://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/Rambouillet_Agreement.html (last accessed 
December 2013). 
158 
 
troops in 2011 and, as of October 2013, was down to a total strength of 4,936 (NATO 
Website: accessed 08/10/2013). As for the EU, while it was not a participant in OAF, 
the Kosovo crisis was a driving force behind the transformation of the EU as an actor 
in international conflict management. As Alistair Shepherd points out, OAF 
‘persuaded many in the EU finally to face up to the expectations and responsibilities 
set out in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)’, including one 
justification for the then newly-created European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP) (Shepherd, 2009, p. 513). Kosovo not only provided a driver for ESDP, but 
also for what would later become ‘the civilian aspects of the EU’s putative conflict 
management role’, culminating with the launch of the European Rule of Law Mission 
(EULEX) within Kosovo in February 2008 (Shepherd, 2009, p.518).  
 
Kosovo Force (KFOR) 
 
According to its website, ‘NATO has been leading a peace support operation in 
Kosovo since June 1999 in support of wider international efforts to build peace and 
stability in the area’ (NATO Website: accessed 24-05-11). As previously mentioned, 
there are about 4,936 troops deployed in Kosovo consisting of 23 NATO countries 
and eight non-NATO ‘Partner Countries’.59 KFOR’s ‘initial’ objectives, mandated 
under UNSCR 1244 and the Military-Technical Agreement (MTA) between NATO 
and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia, include the following: 
 
 Deter renewed hostility and threats against Kosovo by Yugoslav 
and Serb forces;  
 Establish a secure environment and ensure public safety and 
order;  
 Demilitarise the Kosovo Liberation Army;  
 Support the international humanitarian effort; and  
 Coordinate with and support the international civil presence.  
 
Furthermore, since 12 June 2008, KFOR also began the new tasks of assisting in 
the ‘standing down of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) and in the establishment of 
the Kosovo Security Force (KSF)’. There is also included in this task a ‘civilian 
                                            
59
 See http://www.nato.int/kfor/: (last accessed 08-10-13). 
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structure’ to oversee this objective. Crucially for this investigation, NATO claims to 
implement these tasks ‘in close coordination and consultation with the relevant local 
and international authorities’; one of the latter, of course, being the EU. 
The command structure that NATO operates under has taken two forms since 
2006. The command structure prior to 2006 is not of direct concern, as it relates to a 
period before EULEX was operational. From June 2006 until February 2010, NATO 
operated ‘five Multinational Task Forces’: MNTF-Centre (Lipljan); MTNF-North (Novo 
Selo); MNTF-South (Prizren); MNTF-West (Pec); MNTF-East (Urosevac). From 2010 
onwards, this system was reconstructed into ‘mission-tailored Multinational Battle 
Groups’ (MNBGs). According to the NATO website, an MNBG is ‘a military 
organization at the level of a battalion, consisting of numerous companies. These 
companies are highly mobile, flexible and rapidly deployable to potential trouble 
spots all over Kosovo. There are five MNBGs, which constitute KFOR and are ready 
to react to any threatening situation’.60 
These are: MNBG North, MNBG South, MNNG East, MNBG West, and MNBG 
Centre, which also covers the KFOR Headquarters in Pristina. The chain of 
command runs from the Commander of KFOR (COMKFOR) in Kosovo, up to the 
Commander of Joint Force Command Naples (COMJFCN). 
 
The European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) 
 
According to the European Union External Action website, EULEX ‘is the largest civil 
mission ever launched under the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)’. 
This website further states that the ‘central aim’ of EULEX is to ‘assist and support 
the Kosovo authorities on all rule of law matters, particularly in the areas of police, 
judiciary and customs’ (EULEX fact sheet, which was last updated in October 
2012).61 EULEX was launched in February 2008, reaching an ‘initial operating 
capability in December 2008’, and reaching its ‘full operating capability’ in April 2009. 
                                            
60
 Please see the NATO website http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-284AB372-
339D38DF/natolive/topics_48818.htm?selectedLocale=ar (last accessed 08-10-2013). 
61
 For a copy of the Fact Sheet, please see: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-
operations/eulex-kosovo/pdf/12102012_factsheet_eulex-kosovo_en.pdf (last accessed in December 
2013). 
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EULEX works under the general framework of United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1244 and has a unified chain of command to Brussels. The EULEX legal 
basis is to be found in the following documents: Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP 
(4 February 2008), Council Joint Action 2009/445/CFSP (9 June 2009), and Council 
Decision 2010/322/CFSP (8 June 2010). The contributing actors are ‘most EU 
member states as well as Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, Croatia, the US and 
Canada’.62 According to the latest figures, EULEX consists of a ‘final staff target’ at 
around 2,250 (1,200 international, 938 local). The EULEX current mandate is fixed 
until 14 June 2014 and retains its OHQ in Pristina. 
 
Discovering EU-NATO Informal Institutionalisation in Kosovo 
 
The Political/Strategic Level 
 
It is important to remember that this is not just a case of whether or not operations in 
Kosovo should fall under the umbrella of Berlin Plus in terms of the EU replacing 
NATO, while retaining assured access to NATO assets and capabilities. Although 
implementing Berlin Plus was discussed, it was categorically ruled out in relation to 
Kosovo. Therefore, this is a case whereby both the EU and NATO are working 
towards different (yet converging) mandates in the same operational space; yet, 
despite 21 coinciding member states, formal strategic dialogue has been ruled out. 
The question, then, is why does so much of it take place despite this obstruction? 
Undoubtedly, the broad and supporting institutional architecture of EU-NATO 
cooperation regarding Kosovo is based on informal arrangements because no 
agreement for a framework could be agreed at the political level. A statement sent 
from the office of the DSACEUR to various relevant personnel operating at the 
political/strategic level helps to illustrate this point: 
 
There are no formal agreements between EULEX and KFOR. 
There is therefore no arrangement for 1st, 2nd and 3rd 
responders (KP/EULEX/KFOR) in a crowd and riot control 
incident to cooperate formally. They do cooperate informally but 
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 Please see http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/en/info/whatisEulex.php (last accessed December 2013). 
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this is subject to the goodwill of personalities on the ground and 
subject to their nationality. When a civil disorder situation 
deteriorates, control and responsibility is handed from 1st to 2nd 
to 3rd responder. This occurred on Mar 17 2008 when a 
Ukrainian member of UNMIK ‘P’ lost his life. There is a time for 
informality; in the middle of a deteriorating crowd control 
situation is not the appropriate time. Cooperation/liaison 
between the KFOR and EULEX remains informal, ad hoc and 
therefore prone to friction (Interview 13, 2010) . 
 
Before outlining the modalities and procedures of these ‘informal’ and ‘ad hoc’ 
arrangements, it is first necessary to describe the arrangements for both EULEX and 
KFOR individually. 
As mentioned above, the primary legitimising document for both the EU’s and 
NATO’s presence in Kosovo is UNSCR 1244. There is no need to repeat the relevant 
sections of this document as it pertains to both Organisations; however, it is clear 
that both missions understand UNSCR 1244 to be the legal document legitimising 
the military presence (in the case of NATO) and the executive policing presence (in 
the case of the EU) operating within Kosovo. 
In terms of the EU, the legal documents generated from within the Council that 
establish, structure, and outline coordination procedures are primarily (but not limited 
to) Council Joint Action 2006/304/CFSP, Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP, and 
Council Decision ‘amending and extending’ joint action 2008/124/CFSP. CJA 
2006/304/CFSP is a document that predates EULEX, but can be seen as the initial 
EU document that paved the way for what would eventually become EULEX. This 
document clearly defines the ‘tasks’ EUPT Kosovo should carry out in order to fulfil 
this ‘objective’. Under the section entitled ‘structure’, this CJA depicts the following 
competencies: ‘an office of the Head of EUPT Kosovo, a police team, a justice team, 
and an administration team’. Furthermore, EUPT shall establish ‘an office in Pristina’ 
and a ‘coordinating office in Brussels’ (section Article 3). As for the chain of 
command, it runs as follows: 
 
1. The structure of EUPT Kosovo shall have a unified chain of 
command. 
2. The PSC shall provide the political control and strategic 
direction to EUPT Kosovo.  
3. The SG/HR shall give guidance to the Head of EUPT 
Kosovo.  
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4. The Head of EUPT Kosovo shall lead EUPT Kosovo and 
assume its day-to-day management.  
5. The Head of EUPT Kosovo shall report to the SG/HR. 
 
It is also important to note that the ‘PSC shall exercise, under the responsibility of the 
Council, the political control and strategic direction of EUPT Kosovo’ (article 6). 
Article 13 further establishes the relationship with NATO/KFOR regarding the sharing 
of sensitive information. Critically, this document sets the precedent of how EU-
NATO cooperation would play out from the creation of EULEX in 2008: 
 
1. The SG/HR shall be authorised to release to NATO/KFOR 
EU classified information and documents up to the level 
‘CONFIDENTIEL UE’ generated for the purposes of the action, 
in accordance with the Council's security regulations. 
2. The SG/HR shall be authorised to release to the UN/UNMIK 
and the OSCE, in accordance with the operational needs of the 
EUPT Kosovo, EU classified information and documents up to 
the level ‘RESTREINT UE’ generated for the purposes of the 
action, in accordance with the Council's security regulations. 
Local arrangements shall be drawn up for this purpose. 
 
3. The SG/HR shall be authorised to release to third parties 
associated with this Joint Action EU non-classified documents 
related to the deliberations of the Council with regard to the 
action covered by the obligation of professional secrecy 
pursuant to Article 6(1) of Council Decision 2004/338/EC, 
Euratom of 22 March 2004 adopting the Council's Rules of 
Procedure (1). 
 
CJA 2008/124/CFSP is the founding document of ‘EULEX Kosovo’ dated 4 
February 2008. There is no need to go into the greater details of this document as it 
pertains mainly to the structure of EULEX. However, what are relevant are the 
sections that relate to coordination with other actors and to the release of classified 
information. Under the former, it is significant to note that the general wording is still 
rather vague. However, this section is moved into Article 8 of CJA 2008/124/CFSP, 
under the responsibilities of the ‘Head of Mission’. This section reads as follows: 
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The Head of Mission shall ensure that EULEX KOSOVO works 
closely and coordinates with the competent Kosovo authorities 
and with relevant international actors, as appropriate, including 
NATO/KFOR, UNMIK, OSCE, and third States involved in the 
rule of law in Kosovo and an International Civilian Office. 
 
Article 18 entitled ‘Release of classified information’ does offer some noteworthy 
changes that will be addressed in depth below. The line, ‘Local technical 
arrangements shall be drawn up to facilitate this’ particularly demonstrates the true 
nature of informal EU-NATO cooperation in Kosovo. Furthermore, it is rather 
apparent, as was the case with CP as described in the last chapter, that EU-NATO 
cooperation is generally embedded (and therefore enhanced) in a wider international 
milieu operating in Kosovo: 
 
1. The SG/HR shall be authorised to release to the United 
Nations, NATO/KFOR and to other third parties, associated with 
this Joint Action, EU classified information and documents 
generated for the purposes of EULEX KOSOVO up to the level 
of the relevant classification respectively for each of them, in 
accordance with Decision 2001/264/EC. [Local technical 
arrangements shall be drawn up to facilitate this] (Author’s 
emphasis). 
 
2. In the event of a specific and immediate operational need, 
the SG/HR shall also be authorised to release to the competent 
local authorities EU classified information and documents up to 
the level ‘RESTREINT UE’ generated for the purposes of 
EULEX KOSOVO, in accordance with Decision 2001/264/EC. In 
all other cases, such information and documents shall be 
released to the competent local authorities in accordance with 
the procedures appropriate to those authorities' level of 
cooperation with the EU. 
 
3. The SG/HR shall be authorised to release to the United 
Nations, NATO/KFOR, to other third parties associated with this 
Joint Action and to the relevant local authorities, EU non-
classified documents related to the deliberations of the Council 
with regard to EULEX KOSOVO covered by the obligation of 
professional secrecy pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Council's 
Rules of Procedure (1). 
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As for the NATO arrangements specifying potential cooperation, it is much more 
difficult to establish the MOUs and Terms of Reference (TOR) as these documents 
are classified. Therefore, the only alternative is to use what official documents there 
are in the public record. A short detailing of those documents and how they pertain to 
EU-NATO cooperation in Kosovo follows.  
Subsequent to the initial deployment of KFOR troops into Kosovo on 12 June 
1999, just two days after the establishment of UNSCR 1244, a meeting was 
conducted on 18 June 1999 by NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers of the NAC. 
This ‘extraordinary’ meeting produced a document entitled ‘The situation in and 
around Kosovo’. Section five notes that ‘[T]he Alliance welcomes the commitments 
made by its Partners and other interested nations to participate in KFOR’ and section 
seven establishes that ‘NATO welcomes the early establishment of the UN Interim 
Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) and intends to cooperate closely with it together 
with the OSCE and the EU’. As with the other NATO missions in the Balkans, these 
operations are clearly a part of the larger processes of regional integration into the 
transatlantic structures. For example, section nine of this document clearly 
establishes that ‘Allies are cooperating through NATO's initiative for South Eastern 
Europe to support the nations of this region in forging a better future based on 
democracy, justice, security cooperation, economic development and integration’.63 
A period of almost a decade passed between the establishment of KFOR and that 
of EULEX. However, other references to cooperation are present in this interim 
period. To reduce the amount of repetition, NATO documents produced in temporal 
proximity to the EU documents outlined above have been prioritised. A NATO ‘Final 
Communiqué’ from a NAC meeting of Defence Ministers in relatively close proximity 
to CJA 2006/304/CFSP (establishing EUPT-Kosovo) stated that ‘NATO will continue 
to monitor and assist in the development of a safe and secure environment, working 
with other international organisations, especially with the UN and the EU, in the 
process of building a stable, democratic, multi-ethnic and peaceful society in 
Kosovo’.64 
 At the NATO Summit in Bucharest shortly after CJA 2008/124/CFSP establishes 
EULEX, the Summit Declaration notes that ‘[I]n Kosovo, NATO and KFOR will 
                                            
63
 See http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27427.htm (last accessed December 2013). 
64
 See http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_22441.htm (last accessed December 2013). 
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continue to work with the authorities and, bearing in mind its operational mandate, 
KFOR will cooperate with and assist the United Nations, the European Union and 
other international actors, as appropriate, to support the development of a stable, 
democratic, multi-ethnic and peaceful Kosovo’.65 The NAC Final communiqué dated 
3 December 2008 (released in close proximity to the reaching of the initial operating 
capacity of EULEX, though in much less technical jargon than that produced in the 
legal documents of the EU) outlines the NATO understanding of EU-NATO 
cooperation in Kosovo (section 6): 
 
The robust, UN-mandated NATO-led KFOR presence will 
remain in Kosovo on the basis of United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1244. Throughout Kosovo, NATO and 
KFOR will continue to work with the authorities and, bearing in 
mind its operational mandate, KFOR will cooperate with and 
assist the UN, the EU and other international actors, as 
appropriate, to support the development of a stable, 
democratic, multi-ethnic and peaceful Kosovo. The prompt 
deployment of the European Union’s Rule of Law Mission 
(EULEX) throughout all of Kosovo is an urgent priority, and in 
this context we note the adoption by the United Nations 
Security Council of a statement by its Presidency in support of 
the reconfiguration of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK).  
 
Clearly, there was some confusion on just how cooperation would transpire as 
EULEX replaced UNMIK in this civil rule of law field. Although NATO had an MOU 
with UNMIK, it was not altogether clear how NATO would be able to replace these 
technical arrangements for cooperation with EULEX. A press conference conducted 
by the then NATO Secretary General De Hoop Scheffer on 12 June 2008 clearly 
demonstrates this. In response to a question posed to the Secretary General 
regarding the reconfiguration of UNMIK, which would allow for an EULEX presence 
in Kosovo and, therefore, the potential need for a revamped Op/Plan between NATO 
and the EU, he answered ‘we have, of course, to relook into these arrangements and 
what exactly they will look like’.66  
                                            
65
 See http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm?selectedLocale=en (last accessed 
December 2013). 
66
 Full interview can be found at the NATO website: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/index.htm (last 
accessed January 2014). 
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Indeed, the time whereby the EU and NATO had to work out some form of an 
arrangement for cooperation did come. But the result of certain existential political 
barriers to EU-NATO cooperation meant that, in the end, the technical arrangements 
were not agreed in Brussels through the obvious institutional linkages, but were 
arranged by the commanders in the field. Thus, the need for the line ‘[L]ocal 
technical arrangements shall be drawn up to facilitate this’ exists in CJA 2008/124, 
once again demonstrating the spatial and hierarchical dimension to EU-NATO 
informal cooperation.  
Before going into more depth, a few relevant documents are useful to 
demonstrate the lack of official cooperation, while simultaneously underpinned by 
rhetoric alluding to the necessity of cooperation between the two organisations. The 
Strasbourg/Kehl NATO Summit Declaration (4 April 2009) speaks of Alliance 
members ‘welcoming the deployment of the European Union Rule of Law Mission in 
Kosovo, EULEX, and encourage all actors to continue their efforts to facilitate the 
deployment and full operation of EULEX throughout Kosovo’.67 Finally, the Lisbon 
Summit Declaration (20 November 2010), declares NATO’s ‘steadfast’ commitment 
to ‘support a stable, peaceful and multi-ethnic environment, cooperating with all 
relevant actors, in particular the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo 
(EULEX), and the Kosovo Police, in accordance with NATO agreed decisions and 
procedures’.68 The section above documented the strategic vision and rhetorical 
proclamations of EU-NATO cooperation in Kosovo through a compilation of official 
primary source documentation in the public record. However, as the EU-NATO 
relationship in Kosovo is clearly built on informal linkages, it is also germane to 
elucidate the particulars of this relationship as played out at the political/strategic 
level outside this (public) primary source record. It is to this discussion, based on 
extensive and in-depth interviews, that this chapter now turns.  
The following sections investigate EU-NATO cooperation in Kosovo through four 
broad areas. These are (1) generalities at the political/strategic level, (2) informal 
technical agreements for cooperation, (3) the implications of informal cooperation, 
and (4) future implications for EU and NATO cooperation in Kosovo. 
                                            
67
 Please see http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52837.htm (last accessed December 2013). 
68
 Please see http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm (last accessed December 
2013). 
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When it comes to the political/strategic understanding by EU and NATO member 
states, some generalities can be extrapolated. First of all, the cooperation in Kosovo 
is between military (KFOR) and civilian (EULEX) operations. This is relevant to all 
three levels of analysis in this study. However, from a strategic point of view, it is 
clear that ‘both civilian and military operations are widening’ and in this new strategic 
EU-NATO paradigm, the proper framework for cooperation did not exist previously. 
‘We find some sort of substitute for not being able to discuss those engagements 
officially, but we don’t have the proper tools to work, I mean officially’ (Interview 5, 
2010). In other words, no formal framework for civilian-military cooperation exists; 
and this is even before entering into a discussion on the political hurdles, which 
would prevent it from being implemented in the form of operational cooperation (e.g. 
Berlin Plus). Although there is ‘frustration’ resulting from the political impasse that 
prevents these tools from developing properly, clearly ‘there is not enough frustration 
or not enough problems to overcome the deadlock or impasse’ (Interview 5, 2010). 
In part, this is down to the different operational priorities that both organisations give 
to their respective missions. For NATO, the number one operational focus is 
Afghanistan. For the EU, EULEX is the flagship civilian mission and a number one 
priority. One senior NATO official clearly demonstrates this thinking: ‘the challenge 
that we have also faced, at the more strategic level, is that despite having 21 
common members, the priorities of the two organisations and the different 
commitments are not the same. If you were to come to NATO HQ and ask what your 
top priority is, they would say Afghanistan without any shadow of a doubt. You would 
not get the same answer if you went to EU HQ’ (Interview 54, 2011). However, it is 
also clear that, as important as EULEX is for the EU, they still need KFOR as a 
guarantor of security in Kosovo in general and as a 3rd responder in particular. 
As for any formal technical agreements between the EU and NATO that would 
allow cooperation to take place in Kosovo, these could not be established at the 
political level owing to the complications resulting from the ‘participation’ problem 
generated by the Turkish/Cyprus impasse. Instead of formal cooperation agreed at 
the political/strategic level, what exists are four ‘technical agreements’ (Interview 7, 
2010). They should have been signed by the EU and NATO, but this was ‘blocked by 
Turkey’ and, therefore, not signed at the political level but only ‘in-theatre’. However, 
only ‘two sets of identical documents were created and they came down the chain, 
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one in the EU and one in NATO but were signed independently; they were not 
signed on the same paper by a party from each organisation’ (Interview 7, 2010).  
Other interviews confirmed this. One example states: ‘there are no EU-NATO 
formal agreements on the ground. There were attempts to have agreements but the 
same documents came down the chain of command separately in each organisation 
and signed on the ground but not on the same paper. This was an attempt at 
coordination without having to sign these documents at the political level’. (Interview 
11, 2010). This approach is also understood differently in terms of codes of practice 
and norms within the operating procedures and outlooks of both organisations. As 
one NATO official described the above arrangements, ‘NATO can be pretty 
pragmatic and say let’s leave it to the commanders to sort out arrangements. The 
EU seems to feel that it needs more formal agreements that need to be ratified in 
Brussels. That is a kind of a cultural thing which is sometimes difficult to get over’ 
(Interview 54, 2011). It is clear that all of this has implications for informal 
cooperation, for the international staffs, for those working on the ground and for the 
political/strategic level personnel working within these conditions. Some of these 
implications are now further investigated. 
There are also some further general observations that can be noted. First, the two 
operations are autonomous, with one geared towards military instruments while the 
other is rule of law based. This means that cooperation in Kosovo is ‘much more 
organised around intelligence and not strictly military assets’ (Interview 1, 2009). 
This has obvious implications for how sensitive information is passed between the 
two organisations and disseminated afterwards. It is, therefore, also highly restricted 
around the terms of reference regarding such matters as laid out by the BP/AF. In 
other words, any material deemed classified cannot be shared at the 27-28 (now 28-
28) level as operations in Kosovo are not official Berlin Plus operations. There is a 
very bureaucratic process to be respected and one that requires Military Committee 
approval of requests for the release of classified information. 
As demonstrated above, the BP/AF has been static since 2004 and this stasis has 
been path-dependent based on those decisions taken previously. Therefore, there is 
‘no framework to build cooperation’ and this, in turn, means that ‘it really is affecting 
the work there, even to the extent of putting people’s lives at risk, an agreement 
would make the work a lot easier if it were institutionalised’ (Interview 1, 2009). 
Clearly, you need a framework to build cooperation. The major actors do have close 
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cooperation in Kosovo (NATO-EU-OSCE-UN) and there are always forums to meet 
for discussion, but not formal arrangements to build upon. Still another high level 
Danish official described this situation whereby, ‘we have come to a level where in 
Kosovo between EULEX and KFOR there is an agreement with two parallel sets of 
agreements. So, on the ground, it can work but clearly you hit the wall very quickly 
for what can and cannot be achieved. It is difficult to see how we can go any further’ 
(Interview 38, 2011). Again, demonstrating the continued stasis at the macro level of 
the relationship. 
The lack of formal cooperation agreements at the political level does not mean 
that commanders in the field cannot talk (Interview 5, 2010). As a NATO official 
described it, ‘at the political dimension we are in a heavy deadlock or an impasse, 
but on the ground nations are able to find the means to cooperate’. Moreover, ‘from 
a capital point of view, it is interesting that in Kosovo there is a civilian mission led by 
the EU, and of course there is KFOR. If there are some problems between NATO 
HQ and EU HQ, then we deal with it in a smooth manner, a smooth manner on the 
ground, under the radar screen, without political high visibility’ (Interview 5, 2010). In 
keeping with the general argument of this thesis, clearly this cooperation is much 
more robust if it is removed from the political level of Brussels and kept in-theatre 
and at the operational level.  
As the central research framework suggests, the obvious question arises: if 
cooperation does take place in-theatre, then why and how do those member states 
who block cooperation at the political level allow cooperation to take place on the 
ground? All the empirical evidence gathered suggests that all nations – including 
Turkey and Cyprus - ‘turn a blind eye’ to that cooperation as long as it exists below 
the political radar screens. One very senior NATO official commented that ‘they 
[Turkey] are happy to make the point here (NATO HQ) at the strategic level, 
diplomatically, but then turn a blind eye in Kosovo’ (Interview 3, 2010). Still another 
high level EU official confirmed this and even suggested that ‘in Kosovo, Turkey turn 
a blind eye on the ground and they signed a separate agreement to ensure 
cooperation on the ground’ (Interview 4, 2010).  
So what this means, of course, is that Turkey and Cyprus are ‘fully aware that 
both commanders EULEX/KFOR are working together’ (Interview 5, 2010 & 2012). 
One official pointed out that there are even ‘Turkish experts in EULEX as well as 
Cypriot experts in EULEX’. Officially, they cannot work together, but they are in the 
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same mission in the EU. ‘They are showing good will and they realise that they need 
to be a bit flexible’ (Interview 5, 2010 & 2012). Cypriot interlocutors further 
corroborated this ‘blind eye’ approach by stating, ‘when it comes to cooperation in 
the theatre, when we have EU lives at risk, we are flexible. We kind of turn a blind 
eye because we don’t want to keep causing problems. There are certain things I can 
accept, I know they are there, but if you make them bigger than I cannot pretend that 
I am ignoring them. So there is this understanding’ (Interview 42, 2011). All of this 
suggests that interaction within institutions has at least some impact on incremental 
change and strategies when working beyond the BP/AF. Yet, while processes in 
norm development or shared standards in behaviour seem to be evident, they are 
not aimed towards replacing the formal framework at the macro level, but merely 
finding workarounds to that framework.  
Turkish interlocutors not only point out that they know practical cooperation exists 
on the ground in Kosovo. However, they also raise the issue that, if NATO is lending 
assets and capabilities and providing the protection for EU personnel, then this is, in 
essence, the spirit of Berlin Plus, formal agreement or not: 
 
There is not an official agreement because of the simple 
difficulty that the EU said that they cannot go for another Berlin 
Plus agreement in Kosovo, and on the NATO side we argued 
that is the only framework for the time being, so unless it was a 
Berlin Plus operation we will not agree that NATO do a deal 
with the EU. Why? Because a Berlin Plus operation in very 
simple terms means that NATO lends its assets and capabilities 
to the EU and provides security. The EU says this is only valid if 
the EU takes over a military operation and asks NATO for these 
assets. Then they say, oh no we don’t have a military operation 
in Kosovo, but do lend us some assets and capabilities militarily 
and do provide us with security. So we say, by definition this is 
Berlin Plus. So we argued this and it is why we do not have an 
official agreement between the EU and NATO in Kosovo, but 
the practical cooperation in the field goes well (Interview 20, 
2010). 
 
Besides the ‘blind eye’ approach to cooperation in the field taken by the political 
level, there have also been various attempts at informal cooperation taken directly at 
the political/strategic level with the objective of attaining a modest amount of 
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strategic dialogue with regard to Kosovo. Two such vehicles are the so-called 
‘transatlantic events’ and the informal NAC-PSC meetings.  
As discussed in Chapter Two, one casualty of the political blockage was the bi-
annual EU-NATO foreign ministers’ meetings as called for in the 2001 exchange of 
letters between the EU Presidency and the NATO Sec/Gen. From 2001 to 2003, 
these meetings took place in line with this request and all common issues of concern 
were on the agenda. The last of these official foreign ministers’ meetings took place 
on 4 December 2003. However, since September 2005, these meetings have 
continued in an informal setting known as the ‘Transatlantic Events’ (Interview 5, 
2010). This attempt to overcome blockage at the formal and political level was 
initiated by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in 2005. She used the excuse 
of a United Nations General Assembly meeting to invite all of the EU and NATO 
Foreign Affairs Ministers (including Cyprus and Turkey) to informally discuss and 
hopefully overcome the EU-NATO deadlock. These meetings have since been 
conducted on average twice a year, either in New York or in a European capital. 
 
Table 5.1: NATO-EU Official Meetings at Ministers of Foreign Affairs’ Level & 
Informal Transatlantic Events 
Official meetings (2001-2003) 
30 May 2001 Budapest (HU) 
6 December 2001 Brussels – EU Justus Lipsius Bldg 
14 May 2002 Reykjavik (IC) 
3 April 2003 Brussels – NATO HQ (informal NATO-EU working lunch) 
3 June 2003 Madrid (SP) 
4 December 2003 Brussels – NATO HQ  
 
Informal Transatlantic Events (2005-) 
20 September 2005 New York (lunch) 
7 December 2005 Brussels (dinner) 
27 April 2006 Sofia (BU) (dinner) 
22 September 2006 New York – in the margins of UNGA (dinner) 
26 January 2007 Brussels (dinner) 
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26 April 2007 Oslo (dinner) 
26 September 2007 New York – in the margins of UNGA (dinner) 
7 December 2007 Brussels (dinner) 
24 September 2008 New York (dinner) 
2 December 2008 Brussels (dinner) 
4 March 2009 Brussels (dinner) 
22 September 2009 New York – in the margins of UNGA (dinner) 
3 December 2009 Brussels (dinner) 
 
The ‘transatlantic events’ are occasions where the informal agenda can be quite 
broad. A senior NATO official described them in the following way: 
 
In the few days prior to the meeting, people are consulting with 
the host nation. They are consulting between the host nation, 
the US, and with the Sec/Gen & EU HR to see what will be on 
the agenda, and most of the time they are focusing on issues 
such as: Kosovo, Iran, proliferation, terrorism. So they are 
happy to meet together, happy to meet without ambassadors 
and experts, but they just have chats discussing the issues of 
the day resolving bilateral problems and they are free from any 
pressure from the press from their advisors from domestic 
issues and their Prime Ministers or heads of government. So 
the use of these events by FMs is rather opportunistic 
(Interview 5, 2010).  
 
Yet another attempt at cooperation was the informal NAC-PSC meeting held in 
February 2007. This informal meeting comprised the full membership (then 26-25) of 
EU-NATO, including Turkey and Cyprus (see Table 5.2 and 5.3). It should be 
understood that these informal NAC-PSC meetings were not geared towards solving 
the Turkish/Cyprus issue per se, but rather to allow for discussions on Kosovo 
specifically. They are not on the formal agenda due to political deadlock. One very 
senior NATO official described them: 
 
In the first half of my mandate, it did produce a formula, so 
when we had the NAC-PSC, we then had a coffee break 
followed by what one would call an informal meeting without 
name shields. A meeting with the EU, including Cyprus, and 
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where the Turks tacitly agreed. That worked, it was extremely 
informal, sitting around the table without name shields, until the 
moment that the Turks thought that it was enough and, to my 
great and negative surprise, the Turks then found themselves 
supported by the Americans. The formula was not invented in 
order to achieve anything, it was invented in order to discuss 
subjects like Kosovo between the EU and NATO which is 
impossible to discuss when we are limited to the Berlin Plus 
Framework (Interview 40, 2011). 
 
These meetings have now been stopped altogether. There were attempts at re-
starting them after Kosovo declared independence on 17 February 2008, but ‘Turkey 
opposed’ (Interview 41, 2011). Of course, the Turks do see their agreeing to these 
meetings as showing very high levels of flexibility on their part. A Turkish interlocutor 
noted that ‘due to our flexibility we were able to bring in this notion of informal NAC-
PSC meetings. We don’t really like the idea because you are tarnishing the official 
relationship and the existing framework between NATO and the EU. But with these 
informal NAC-PSC meetings, we sit around the table as 27-28 and we discuss things 
that are urgent, for example in Kosovo (Interview 20, 2010). With this issue of 
informal political structures, both the Turks and Cypriots come close to agreement, 
as neither is very keen on any arrangement or institution whereby they have to, in 
essence, ‘accept that these practical arrangements become formalised’ (Interview 
42, 2011). Again, this only reinforces the idea that there are both path-dependent 
and incremental change dimensions to the relationship. Yet, institutional pressure 
does seem to be impacting on the political actors (at least, to some degree) when 
they decide to permit informal cooperation and, thus, the resulting incremental 
changes in the relationship. 
 
Table 5.2: A List of both Formal and Informal NAC-PSC Meetings 
Date Meeting Agenda Presidency 
2001 8 Formal NAC-PSC 
Meetings 
Diverse 
Agenda 
  
2002 6 Formal NAC-PSC 
Meetings 
Diverse 
Agenda 
  
2003 8 Formal NAC-PSC 
Meetings 
Diverse 
Agenda 
  
Cyprus joins the EU 1 
May 2004 
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2004 (second semester) 4 Formal Meetings (26-
23) No Cyprus or Malta 
ALTHEA Dutch Presidency 
2005 (first semester) 2 Formal Meetings (26-
23) no Cyprus or Malta 
ALTHEA Luxembourg 
Presidency 
  1 Informal Meeting (26-
25) both Turkey and 
Cyprus at the table: 
Historical event. June 
2005 
Darfur   
2005 (second semester) 2 Formal Meetings (26-
23) no Cyprus or Malta 
ALTHEA UK Presidency 
2006 (first semester) 2 Formal meetings (26-
23) no Cyprus or Malta 
ALTHEA Austrian 
Presidency 
  2 Informal Meetings 
(26-25) Both Turkey and 
Cyprus at the table: April 
and May 2006 
Darfur   
2006 (second semester) 2 Formal Meetings (26-
23) no Cyprus or Malta 
ALTHEA Finish Presidency 
2007 (first semester) 2 Formal Meetings (26-
23) no Cyprus or Malta 
ALTHEA German 
Presidency 
  1 Informal Meeting (26-
25) both Turkey and 
Cyprus at the table: 
February 2007 
Kosovo   
2007 (second semester) 1 Formal Meeting (26-
25) no Cyprus or Malta 
ALTHEA Portuguese 
Presidency  
2008 (first semester) 1 Formal Meeting (28-
26) no Cyprus. Malta 
Joins PfP in April 2008 
ALTHEA Spanish 
Presidency 
2008 (second semester) 1 Formal Meeting (28-
26) no Cyprus.  
ALTHEA French Presidency 
2009 (first semester) 2 Formal Meeting (28-
26) no Cyprus.  
ALTHEA Czech Presidency 
2009 (second semester) No Formal Meetings: 2 
planned both cancelled 
ALTHEA Swedish 
Presidency 
2010 (first semester) 1 Formal Meeting (28-
26) no Cyprus 
ALTHEA Start of EEAS 
Perm Chair of PSC 
2010 (second semester) No Formal Meetings:  ALTHEA EEAS Perm Chair 
of PSC 
2011 (first semester 1 Informal Meeting: 
(28-27) Both Cyprus and 
Turkey at the Table. 
May 2011 
Libya EEAS Perm Chair 
of PSC 
2011 (second semester) No Formal Meetings: 
meeting planned for 14 
Dec. cancelled 
ALTHEA EEAS Perm Chair 
of PSC 
2012 (first semester)  1 Formal Meeting (28-
26) no Cyprus 
ALTHEA EEAS Perm Chair 
of PSC 
 
Table 5.3: A List of Informal NAC-PSC Meetings Only 
Total of 5 Informal 
NAC-PSC Meetings in 
Total 
 Agenda 
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Jun-05 Darfur 
Apr-06 Darfur 
May-06 Darfur 
Feb-07 Kosovo 
May-11 Libya 
NOTE: When Formal meetings were cancelled, this was usually due to logistical, timing or availability 
reasons and not a desire to not hold them. 
 
Table 5.4: The Effects of Informal NAC-PSC Meetings 
Positives from these 
INFORMAL meetings: 
 Negatives from these 
Informal Meetings: 
Send a political message 
of cooperation for that 
particular issue on the 
agenda 
Not a decision making 
body 
Very dense and 
substantial meetings on 
the agenda topic to work 
out coordination 
Informal agreements 
only 
Everybody is onboard 
and capitals cannot claim 
they are not aware 
Not continuous or fixed 
events 
 It took two months to 
agree informal meeting 
on Libya 
 Although staff-to-staff 
meetings are productive, 
they cannot replace 
cooperation at this level 
 
Finally, it is of value to discuss the future of Kosovo vis-à-vis EU-NATO 
cooperation as seen by those officials working at the political/strategic level and any 
potential for a formal relationship to develop. Based on all of the interviews 
conducted at this level (as well as those at the staff and operational level), the 
overwhelming response was that of pessimism towards the suggestion that Berlin 
Plus would ever be used in Kosovo. The Cypriot interlocutors even went as far as to 
say that Cyprus could never allow this to happen because ‘we have agreed to Berlin 
Plus once and actually our Parliament has a bill that we will never accept Berlin Plus 
again’ (Interview 42, 2011). 
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However, this is not to say that using Berlin Plus if the EU were to take over the 
military duties currently performed by KFOR has not been discussed or suggested. 
As one interlocutor mentioned, ‘everybody is so scared of closing down Berlin Plus. 
Therefore, a lot of people are saying can Berlin Plus be used in Kosovo? But, as yet, 
there are no real serious discussions about using Berlin Plus (Interview 1, 2009). 
Interlocutors from the office of the DSACEUR, foreseeing the political problems that 
would arise if this framework were used in Kosovo, stated that ‘wrapping other 
missions into Berlin Plus wouldn’t work because we have gone past that now. It 
would create difficulties with Cyprus and they would not agree to it’ (Interview 13, 
2010). 
Other interlocutors, although maintaining the pessimistic tone towards this 
framework actually being initiated, did speak of the possible strength of the EU taking 
over KFOR’s mandate, but without Berlin Plus as the agreed framework. The 
argument is that ‘if Kosovo is handed over to the EU, but without Berlin Plus, this 
could kick-start a whole new EU-NATO relationship and reframe this notion of a 
division of labour in an appropriate way’ (Interview 19, 2010). Finally, a senior Danish 
EU diplomat foresaw the future of EU-NATO relations in Kosovo as maybe ‘a CSDP 
training mission, some way down the line, but it would not be with any NATO 
involvement. It would be some kind of successor operation to EULEX, which is a 
civilian operation’ (Interview 38, 2011).  
 
International Staff Level 
 
There are three distinct areas that need to be investigated at this level of analysis: 
the NATO Sec/Gen and EU/HR relationship, the international staffs working at both 
institutions, and the office of the DSACEUR. This section investigates all three of 
these relationships in turn.  
First, when referring to the political impasse already described in great detail 
above, ‘this problem cannot be solved by the High Rep or the Sec/Gen’. As one 
senior NATO official describes it, this is ‘well above the pay grade and it can only be 
solved at the highest political levels’ (Interview 40, 2011). I have written in another 
publication that the relationship between Scheffer and Solana (based on interviews, 
but not with either of them personally) was understood to be varied from ‘not very 
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nice’ to ‘inefficient’ (Smith, 2011: p. 17). However, since the publication of that article, 
further interviews have enhanced the understanding of this relationship: ‘the 
personal relationship with Solana was excellent but, in the Council Secretariat and 
Solana’s staff, there were from time to time people who were not extremely fond of 
NATO’ (Interview 40, 2011). For obvious reasons, it is quite difficult to get access to 
the bilateral meetings held between the NATO Sec/Gen and the EU/HR. However, 
there are some indications of cooperation from the various press interviews that 
have taken place, not only between Solana and Scheffer, but between Rasmussen 
and Baroness Ashton as well. 
On 25 February 2008, a press conference took place between Solana and De 
Hoop Scheffer, whereby the former announced a meeting where they ‘had a very 
good and long meeting, fundamentally about Kosovo’. He added that ‘the 
cooperation between international actors on the ground can be constructive and 
positive to the stability of the region’. The last point is noteworthy as it ties into the 
greater goal of Kosovo (and Serbian) integration into transatlantic structures. De 
Hoop Scheffer reaffirmed this position by stating: ‘travelling beasts as Javier Solana 
and I are, forced by our responsibilities, it is good to have the opportunity from time 
to time, apart from frequent telephone calls, to have a fundamental and serious 
bilateral meeting’. He further added: ‘it was good that we had the opportunity to go in 
some depth and some length, Dr Solana and I, to discuss Kosovo because, by 
definition, NATO-EU cooperation in Kosovo is of great importance, although the two 
organisations each have their own responsibilities’.69 
In a document entitled ‘Summary of Intervention’70 released in conjunction with a 
meeting of international organisations active on the ground in Kosovo (EU, NATO, 
UN, OSCE), Solana further espoused his understanding of EU-NATO cooperation as 
it pertains to Kosovo: ‘NATO complementarity is a defining feature in the Kosovo 
theatre: while KFOR will remain responsible for providing a safe and secure 
environment in Kosovo, the EU has a key role to play by contributing to the 
reinforcement of the Rule of Law’. There is also a continuation of this approach 
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 The full text of the press conference can be found here: 
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2008/s080225a.html (last accessed December 2013). 
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  Find this document here: http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_8030_en.htm (last 
accessed December 2013). 
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under the tenure of Baroness Ashton and Rasmussen. At a bilateral NAC-PSC 
meeting on 25 May 2010, both the Sec/Gen and the EUHR took the opportunity to 
strengthen contacts. The actual NAC-PSC was only mandated to discuss BiH (and 
not Kosovo), but they took advantage of this meeting to express their views on 
cooperation. For example, on EU-NATO cooperation, the Secretary General said 
High Representative Ashton and he shared the view that the two organisations ‘need 
to talk more together, and do more together, from planning to procurement to 
operations’. Cooperation such as in Afghanistan, in Kosovo, in BiH and off the coast 
of Somalia ‘needs to be stepped up’ and we are ‘working on how best to do that’. 
They also both commented on their new relationship and how they envisioned EU-
NATO cooperation at the organisation-to-organisation level. Rasmussen noted that, 
‘Ashton and I, we got off to a strong start in our cooperation. We both share the 
same view that EU-NATO must talk more together. We understand the political 
complications and these won’t be cleared up overnight. We can still do a lot together 
as we are in Kosovo’.  
Interviews conducted at the international staff level also revealed that the key 
instrumental role played by the Sec/Gen and the EUHR is the tasks they have been 
assigned from their respective organisations, ‘to come up with additional proposals 
for how the relationship can be developed and improved’ (Interview 38, 2011). For 
the most part, this is ‘small stuff’: ‘more Transatlantic dinners, more PSC+ 771 
meetings with an expanded agenda, more staff-to-staff meetings, more joint troop 
contributor meetings’ (Interview 38, 2011). 
As noted above, apart from the Sec/Gen/EUHR relationship, there is also a lot of 
synergy when it comes to the staff-to-staff level contacts (Interview 4, 2010). 
However, this must be understood with the caveat whereby staffs have the desire to 
cooperate, but ‘do not have the proper tools to work’ (Interview 5, 2010). This can be 
conceptualised in two ways. First, the Agreed Framework for EU-NATO cooperation 
(even if it is not formally agreed for Kosovo) is based on outdated parameters that 
focus on military to military cooperation. As cooperation in Kosovo is based on 
military to civilian operating procedures, the current framework falls short of what is 
needed for this type of environment. Second, staff-to-staff cooperation in Brussels 
and between the two HQs must be conducted discreetly and with the understanding 
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that cooperation can only go so far before being blocked at the political level. Once 
again, and as noted in the last chapter, it is the staff level contacts that are most 
susceptible to ‘institutional fatigue’ because it is their actions that go unrewarded and 
often seem fruitless (Smith, 2011, p. 33). 
The interviews conducted have supported this notion of ‘institutional fatigue’ at the 
staff-to-staff level. Furthermore, it has been the case since 2004 and the resulting 
political deadlock that ensued from the EU ‘big bang’ enlargement. Moreover, a new 
dimension to this can be added since the incorporation of the Lisbon Treaty into the 
EU Acquis communautaire. The reshaping of the EU institutions has not only caused 
‘turf wars’ and confusion internally for the relevant EU institutions, but there has also 
been a knock-on effect whereby EU-NATO staff-to-staff contacts are but one area 
where things have been negatively affected by this confusion, even where ‘things 
have gone backwards’ (Interview 54, 2011): 
 
I mean, for my first two years here, we were able to meet up 
every six weeks or so at the staff-to-staff level with the EU and 
talk through how things are going in Kosovo. I mean we were 
not able to do sort of formal strategic planning or reach 
decisions. But as a means of making sure, at least at the HQ 
level, that we knew what each other were doing, it was really 
helpful. I have to say that in the aftermath of the Lisbon Treaty 
we have definitely gone backwards, and I think that what I 
perceive is continuing turmoil inside the EU as to who is doing 
what. I mean it is very difficult for me to say now, who is it that I 
should talk to? Who is my opposite number, or who is the 
Assistant Sec/Gen for Operations inside the European Union? 
(Interview 54, 2011). 
 
Yet, some interlocutors feel that most of the cooperation at the staff-to-staff level, as 
well as between commanders in the field, has been driven by personal relationships 
and much of it ‘to be perfectly blunt is personality and event driven’. There has been 
a certain amount of ‘systemisation’ in Kosovo as the mission has gone on, but in 
general it is personality and event-driven (Interview 54, 2011). 
As with counter-piracy (and as we will see with Afghanistan), the research for this 
case study has produced an overwhelming amount of evidence to show that the 
office of the DSACEUR has been vital in its capacity of ensuring cooperation is 
worked out in spite of the political blockage. This is true not only for cooperation in 
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the field, but also to ensure that EU and NATO officials at the staff level in Brussels 
are communicating and cooperating in some fashion. Under Military Decision MC 
403/1 (5 March 2003), the DSACEUR as ‘Strategic Co-ordinator’ has, in his ‘Terms 
of Reference’, responsibilities including ‘the principle point of contact with the EU on 
military strategic issues and maintains a dialogue with the EU on behalf of NATO on 
military matters in relation to ESDP’. This is not to suggest that the DSACEUR can 
provide the same level of effectiveness, or has the same room to manoeuvre as he 
would with a Berlin Plus operation. In that case, he has the Agreed Framework to 
support his actions, the agreed institutions; he is the operational commander, and it 
is all run out of SHAPE. Yet, as one staff official at SHAPE stated, ‘it would be 
remiss of me, indeed anyone, not to give due praise to the role of the DSACEURs in 
all of this, with their contacts and with their push to make progress where they can. 
All of them! They have all been very keen to make progress’ (Interview 8, 2010). 
What the DSACEUR does in this informal area of cooperation is ‘try to facilitate the 
passage of sensitive information’. However, due to the political obstacles, this must 
all be done in such a way that he cannot be seen to be doing it too formally (Interview 
13, 2010). This position is also quite unique because the DSACEUR and his Military 
Assistant are probably the only two people in the world that ‘take off the NATO badge 
when [they] leave Kosovo and put on the EU badge when [they] get to Bosnia’ 
(Interview 14, 2010). The office of the DSACEUR is also very eager to see EU-NATO 
cooperation develop overall. On the day of my interviews at SHAPE, one official 
noted, ‘I think I always have this fundamental belief that anything I can do to facilitate 
EU-NATO cooperation I will do it and is probably a fundamental reason why you are 
here today’ (Interview 14, 2010). As with CP, the office of the DSACEUR has 
‘informal lunches’ to cover common ground on Kosovo and the areas where they 
need to cooperate better. Present at these meetings are a ‘legal advisor’ as well as a 
‘representative from CMPD, chairman of EUMC, head of CPCC, and DG EUMS’ 
(Interview 13, 2010). 
 
Operational Level  
 
At the operational level, it is best to begin with a short overview of the context and 
environment within which both KFOR and the EULEX missions co-exist. Before an 
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in-depth investigation and the specifics of EU-NATO cooperation can be illustrated, it 
is important to describe and define the commonalities and the unique histories, 
objectives, and strategic goals of each mission. This helps to situate the actors 
attempting to coordinate in a common space while performing different functions in 
order to contextualise the mission at the operational level.  
First, ‘KFOR is the granddame of missions now’ (Interview 56, 2011). KFOR has 
had a presence within Kosovo since 12 June 1999 with the primary objective of 
maintaining a ‘safe and secure environment which has been largely achieved’ 
(Interview 55, 2011). However, the environment is still volatile and there is the very 
real risk that insurrection can quickly re-emerge at any time, ‘probably more so than 
any other place in Europe’ (Interview 55, 2011). Riots in the northern and mainly 
Serb region of Kosovo (as recent as November 2013) can attest to this reality.72 
However, what cannot be denied is the overall popularity KFOR/NATO has with the 
majority ethnic Albanian-Kosovar community that extends from the initial NATO 
intervention in the crisis in 1999 (Interview 58, 2011). Therefore, for KFOR, the task 
and the framework are somewhat ‘simpler’ than that of EULEX. Their primary 
mandate can be seen as a 3rd responder and protector of the overall peace in a 
relatively benign environment (Interview 58, 2011). Finally, and as was also 
demonstrated within the context of counter-piracy, the overall importance of the 
KFOR mission in terms of the broader set of NATO priorities would have to be seen 
as existing on a second-tier level to that of its obligations and commitments in 
Afghanistan. For EULEX, the mission is putatively regarded as one of the EU’s 
signature missions. 
This gives each mission a proportionately different level of room to manoeuvre at 
the operational level in order to coordinate without the formal agreements. In other 
words, one of the crucial differences between KFOR and EULEX is that the former is 
manoeuvring further below the ‘political radar screen’ (Interview 56, 2011) and, 
therefore, further detached from political/strategic scrutiny. On the other hand, 
EULEX has to perform its job under a ‘closed and strict mandate’ (Interview 56, 
2011). 
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 For just one example of this, please see the BBC report at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-
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Currently, there are just under 4,936 KFOR troops detailed to NATO’s mission in 
Kosovo in order to maintain a ‘safe and secure environment’ (KFOR, 2012). The 
EULEX rule-of-law mission has 2,250 staff (1,250 international and 938 local) under 
its own authority to assist the reform of the local civil and police institutions (EULEX, 
2013). Although the environment is not as dangerous as it has been in years past, 
the potential for trouble that could demand a kinetic military response is very real. 
The EU’s civil mission is, therefore, ultimately dependent on NATO for its protection. 
So how does cooperation on the ground work beyond or despite the BP/AF 
limitations? Initially, there were two basic documents or technical agreements that 
were signed on the ground in order to facilitate coordination/cooperation (Interview 
11, 2010, Interview 7, 2010b). However, they were not one set of documents signed 
by representatives of both organisations. Two separate, but identical, documents 
worked their way down the CoC to be signed separately in the field at the level of 
KFOR Commander (COMKFOR) and EULEX Head of Mission (HoM) respectively 
(Interview 55, 2011, Interview 56, 2011, Interview 57, 2011, Interview 58, 2011). As 
previously noted, member states like Turkey (and Cyprus) turn a blind eye to these 
agreements and allow cooperation to transpire under the radar screen. They are fully 
aware that the EULEX and KFOR commanders are working together. They are also 
aware that, if there were EU casualties due to some EU-NATO disconnect, then a 
major scandal would ensue. However, some have stated that these agreements are 
weak and time-consuming, to the extent that they potentially put people’s lives at risk 
(Interview 13, 2010, Interview 7, 2010b). 
A document shown to the researcher by one EULEX staff member outlines the 
basic structure of these technical agreements, or Memorandums of Understanding 
(MOUs), as well as the five supporting Joint Operating Procedures (JOPs) that 
accompany them: 
 
Table 5.5: EULEX-KFOR MOUs and Joint Operating Procedures 
MOUs: 
KFOR Directive 049 - mirrored by - EULEX Head of Mission Executive Decision 
(not co-signed on same document but individually)  
-KFOR support to EULEX needs to be requested formally (except in emergencies, 
when the request can be put forward afterwards) 
183 
 
-KFOR supports EULEX within KFOR’s means and capabilities 
-Close cooperation between KFOR and EULEX police forces 
Five Joint Operating Procedures: 
Border boundary management 
-Local authorities have authority over borders and boundaries 
-EULEX will mentor, monitor and advise (MMA) Kosovo authorities 
-KFOR will assist within its own means and capabilities 
Exchange of information including in the field of intelligence 
Military support to police operations 
Procedures to respond in case of civil disturbance situations 
-Principle of 1st (Kosovo Police), 2nd (EULEX) and 3rd (KFOR) responder is 
detailed 
-KFOR may assume security primacy in a designated area 
-KFOR may request support to Kosovo Police or EULEX 
-KFOR may act as 1st responder in urgent civil disturbance situation 
Protection and evacuation support 
KFOR and EULEX 
-to exchange security plans 
-to provide emergency  
-to increase information exchange 
-to define safe locations and evacuation routes 
-to coordinate with international community and local institutions 
 
These MOUs should be seen as a general framework, or the ‘principal’ 
documents, of how EULEX and KFOR coordinate in-theatre. They outline 
coordination in basic terms and how ‘KFOR will support/protect EULEX’. Everything 
else has to be ‘specified through JOPs’ and these will change as the troop numbers 
and tasks themselves change; these JOPs are ‘very specific arrangements for 
carrying out the more general MOU’ (Interview 55, 2011). However, interlocutors 
also pointed out that, in hostile environments, for example potentially in the north of 
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Kosovo, rules of engagement should necessitate a formal relationship (Interview 56, 
2011). This sentiment was also confirmed at the DSACEUR level. However, due to a 
lack of formal arrangements, other mechanisms for coordination must be worked out 
on the ground ‘on a day-to-day basis at the tactical level’ (Interview 56, 2011) 
confirming, once again, the hierarchical/spatial dimension to informal EU-NATO 
cooperation. One example of this is that, whenever exercises are performed in-
theatre, both KFOR and EULEX carry these out together because ‘if a riot breaks 
out, they would be doing it together’ (Interview 56, 2011). Furthermore, it is in 
KFOR’s best interest that EULEX are successful in meeting their mandate because, 
from a strategic point of view, NATO is keen to pull out of Kosovo in the not too 
distant future (Interview 56, 2011, Interview 57, 2011, Interview 58, 2011). 
Yet another example of incremental change was the decision by both KFOR and 
EULEX to develop a Joint Security Concept (JSC) to further complement the two 
MOUs outlined above. The intention of this document was to outline a more ‘holistic 
and comprehensive approach’ and to outline areas where the ‘two mandates 
overlap’: public safety, rule of law, accountable police forces, and unexploded 
ordnance. Furthermore, this document (unlike those mentioned above) was signed 
by both COMKFOR and the EULEX HoM, on the same document, and is proof of 
further institutionalisation in the field (Interview 56, 2011, Interview 58, 2011). As one 
interlocutor commented, ‘I drafted a combined planning document (even if it was not 
about planning at all) and we have the 30-page version that was signed at the 
operational level by both organisations on the same paper. Then we had the short 
version of the strategic planning that will be signed by HoM EULEX and COMKFOR 
on the same paper’ (Interview 58, 2011). 
One issue that is particularly interesting, given the restrictions the Agreed 
Framework place on the exchange of sensitive information, is the second JOP, which 
states that there will be an exchange of information ‘including intelligence’ (Interview 
56, 2011, Interview 58, 2011). When asked to comment on this particular sensitivity, 
one EULEX staff official commented, ‘our people [EULEX] do not seem to be too 
concerned. I mean, there is the issue that they cannot declassify information that they 
receive so they are limited in the way they can distribute information, so they are 
trying to address this and trying to do it together. But neither EULEX nor KFOR seem 
to think that this is something too sensitive where they cannot actually disclose’, 
further demonstrating how the political level actors have learned, over time, what 
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incremental changes in the relationship they will and will not permit (Interview 58, 
2011). 
Given this increasingly routine and institutionalised coordination/cooperation at the 
operational level, it is also appropriate to outline the various levels of contact 
between the missions which facilitate this coordination/cooperation. Three general 
points are worth noting. First, it was made clear by all those interviewed at the 
operational level that cooperation really started to work well ‘from 2010 onwards’; 
before that point, all coordination/cooperation was ‘much more ad hoc’ (Interview 55, 
2011; Interview 56, 2011; Interview 57, 2011; Interview 58, 2011). Second, it was 
also noted that, for the key member states that are responsible for much of the 
blockage at the Brussels level, when it comes to in-theatre cooperation a ‘blind eye’ 
is turned and there is ‘a separation between politics and the military cooperating on 
the ground’; for example, ‘the Turks and the Greeks work well in KFOR on the 
ground’ (Interview 55, 2011).  
Finally, KFOR has been able to assist EULEX by ‘securitising the north of Kosovo’ 
(something UNMIK was unable to do) allowing EULEX to become an actor within this 
more volatile region of Kosovo. KFOR also informs EULEX, by way of intelligence, 
the various individuals that EULEX may want to arrest (Interview 56, 2011). An 
underlying factor that leads to enhanced cooperation is that it is in KFOR/NATO’s 
best self-interest for EULEX to accomplish its mission in the short term. This would 
allow KFOR to ‘un-fix’ from more of their obligations inside Kosovo and, ultimately, to 
continue to downsize and eventually close down the mission. As one EULEX official 
stated, ‘the Kosovo police have managed to assume a number of tasks from KFOR 
and that is one of the main points of contacts between us and KFOR. I mean, KFOR 
has an interest to leave the place and to unfix from tasks. For example, they have 
these fixed tasks, which are mainly the borders and regional cultural heritage sites. 
So for unfixing, downsizing and handing over, they need to hand all of this to the 
Kosovo Police’ (Interview 58, 2011). 
Turning to the EU-NATO points of contact, the highest level of in-theatre 
coordination/cooperation between KFOR and EULEX is between COMKFOR and 
HoM EULEX. Interestingly, two of the most recent EULEX HoMs were previously in 
the role of COMKFOR and both were also French nationals (Interview 55, 2011, 
Interview 56, 2011, Interview 58, 2011). This was ‘no coincidence’ (Interview 58, 
2011). According to all the interviews, these personal relationships are ‘key’ to good 
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cooperation. They led to the ‘exchange of strategic aspects and goals’ and they 
enhance the possibilities of ‘feedback’ and the ‘assessment’ of each other and their 
work (Interview 56, 2011). Some officials even went as far as saying that 
coordination/cooperation ‘depends’ on characters and personalities; if both 
understand each other, then ‘it works’ (Interview 55, 2011). In other words, there is 
evidence that interaction leads to learning, which ultimately facilitates informal 
cooperation and incremental changes. 
By and large, these meetings are very ‘informal and this helps a lot because they 
can even discuss tactical issues’, but they have also become ‘increasingly routine 
over time’. According to KFOR and EULEX officials, the meetings at this level take 
place ‘once a week’ or ‘at least every two weeks’, both at the KFOR and the EULEX 
HQs (Interview 55, 2011, Interview 56, 2011, Interview 58, 2011). Furthermore, ‘they 
started this structure of weekly meetings at the HoM and COMKFOR level, but of 
course there is always a direct channel of communication open’ (Interview 58, 2011). 
Often, these meetings also take place with their deputies, including chiefs of staff and 
political advisors. It is also noteworthy that there is ‘surprisingly little interference from 
the Brussels level’ and both the leaders of their respective missions attempt to 
support each other ‘with good complementarity’ (Interview 56, 2011). 
There are also regular points of contact at the Chief of Staff (CoS) and POLAD 
level. For example, the CoSs and POLADs often meet within the context of a 
COMKFOR-HoM EULEX consultation, while at other times they ‘just pick up the 
phone’ (Interview 55, 2011, Interview 56, 2011, Interview 58, 2011). Below this, there 
has also been increasing coordination/cooperation at the branch head level (J1-J7), 
working group level, and with liaison officers. In the first two instances, these 
meetings take place with both the various EULEX and KFOR branch heads or in 
working groups, depending on what topic is under discussion: intelligence, policy 
formation, operations, etc. (Interview 55, 2011, Interview 56, 2011, Interview 58, 
2011). These meetings are not static and staff officials also attend other meetings 
and, overall, they ‘contributed to the development of the JSC’ mentioned above 
(Interview 56, 2011). Furthermore, there is very good cooperation between the J2 
intelligence units and this is deemed ‘crucial’ (Interview 56, 2011). Finally, there are 
both EULEX and KFOR liaison officers with regular contacts. For quite some time, 
there were no ‘permanent structures’, although they did have desks at each of the 
HQs. However, on 22 July 2013, a JOP was ultimately signed by both EULEX (HoM) 
187 
 
and KFOR (ComKFOR) to improve cooperation and permit the ‘appointment of full-
time Liaison Officers’.73 One KFOR official noted that, ‘we meet in working groups; 
we inform each other about each other’s work. These meetings are monthly (revolve 
between EULEX and KFOR HQs when they can or is appropriate). Also we have the 
Branch Heads (J1 J2 J3 J4 J5), depending on the topic and EULEX equivalent. 
There are usually about 12 people from each organisation’ (Interview 55, 2011). 
Beyond these cross-level contacts, there are also other examples of general 
socialisation. Examples of these range from the Multinationalised Specialised Unit 
(MSU) camp in Pristina - whereby both the Italian and Austrian Military Police 
(KFOR) and Italian Carbanieri and Polish Gendarmerie (EULEX) are co-located - to 
the more mundane fact that EULEX personnel do quite a lot of their relaxing and 
shopping at the KFOR HQ and the various member state-operated base exchanges 
(PXs) (Interview 55, 2011). 
One other consequence of both KFOR (military) and EULEX (civilian) operating in 
such close proximity is the civilian/military culture dynamic. The EU and NATO are by 
no means the only two organisations that experience this phenomenon. In fact, the 
EU itself is known to have had uncomfortable experiences with both military and 
civilian personnel working within the same institutions since the creation of 
ESDP/CSDP (Korski, 2009, p. 60; Manners and Whitman, 2003). Moreover, because 
there is close coordination between KFOR and EULEX, this dynamic is most acute 
when it comes to military and civilians attempts to coordinate/cooperate in the field of 
policing, where often ‘issues can arise’ and because EULEX is a very ‘complicated 
organisation’ (Interview 55, 2011, Interview 56, 2011). One problem for KFOR-
EULEX cooperation is with EULEX and their internal ‘mechanics and lines of 
communication’. KFOR is all military, so it is easier for them to act. But EULEX is 
police/judges/civilian, so it is ‘not always easy to communicate inside their structures 
as they are not homogenous’. This is also the civilian to military and military police to 
civilian police issue (Interview 55, 2011). 
Finally, the two different institutional cultures mean that coordination/cooperating is 
hampered by a high rotation of staff on the side of KFOR. On average, EULEX 
personnel stay longer, two to three years, whereas KFOR personnel stay in-theatre 
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from two months to a year. However, there seems to be an impression, at least on 
the KFOR side, that this is balanced by the fact that KFOR is military and therefore 
has a stricter structure. This rotation difference was commented on by a EULEX 
official when he noted that ‘the other thing that makes things a bit complicated is that 
two different institutional cultures means that they do rotate like hell. I mean, I have 
been here since 2008, I have seen six or seven J5 counterparts’ (Interview 58, 2011). 
KFOR officials did corroborate this problem, but also added that new HoMs can be 
‘cocky’ but, by their third ‘fuck up’, they forget protocol and ‘talk to people’ (Interview 
56, 2011, Interview 57, 2011). And, of course, there is also evidence of basic 
institutional and organisational tribalism. KFOR staff pointed out that, initially, [they] 
felt EULEX, being new in town, were ‘subpar’ but that they ‘underestimated the 
complexity of the EULEX mission’ (Interview 56, 2011). EULEX officials also noted 
these cultural and tribal differences but stated that ‘the divide between the two 
institutional cultures was not particularly acute here in Kosovo’ (Interview 58, 2011). 
 
Conclusion 
 
After investigating EU-NATO cooperation with regard to both CP and Kosovo, it is 
becoming clear that both organisations cooperate extensively beyond just the Berlin 
Plus operation of ALTHEA. Furthermore, many of the docking mechanisms created 
as part of the BP/AF are utilised to facilitate informal cooperation, while others have 
been created in-theatre but with the acquiescence of actors at the political level. In 
the case of Kosovo, it has become obvious that a great deal of cooperation is, in 
fact, necessary in order for both the KFOR and EULEX missions to accomplish their 
mandated tasks. In this case, where formal cooperation has been ruled out, informal 
cooperation is not only evident but it has been increasingly institutionalised and 
systematised on the ground. Again, this development of ‘shared standards of 
behaviour’ have overwhelmingly been aimed towards finding creative solutions and 
alternative strategies in order to circumvent the BP/AF at the micro and operational 
level and not aimed at replacing the BP/AF at the political level. This has further led 
to processes of incremental change, facilitated by learning and socialisation, while 
not replacing the macro level framework between the two organisations. 
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Clear patterns of the institutionalisation of informal cooperation are also present 
with regard to EU-NATO cooperation in Kosovo (see Table 5.6 below). Although this 
was less evident at the political level, clear patterns of systematising cooperation at 
the staff and operational levels were revealed. However, there is evidence of some 
informal cooperation at the political level as well. The most obvious examples of this 
are the Transatlantic Dinners, the informal NAC-PSC meeting to discuss Kosovo 
(with all actors present, including Cyprus), and the PSC+7 meetings. This case study 
also revealed evidence of the member states pushing both the Sec/Gen and the HR 
to establish more staff-to-staff meetings, joint contribution meetings and an overall 
more organisation-to-organisation approach towards cooperation existing beyond the 
formal BP/AF operational context.  
However, as noted, the majority of the institutionalisation of informal cooperation 
takes place at the international staff level, and most prominently in-theatre. 
Examples of the former are semi-regular contacts between the Sec/Gen and the HR, 
EU and NATO international staffs, and meetings between the DSACEUR and actors 
from CMPD/EUMC/CPCC/DGEUMS. With regard to in-theatre institutionalisation of 
informal cooperation, this was demonstrated to be much less ad hoc and 
increasingly institutionalised from 2010 onwards. Examples of these developments 
are regular meetings between ComKFOR and HoM EULEX, as well as their 
deputies, KFOR CoS and EULEX CoS, between POLADs, between the various 
branch levels (J1-J7), working groups, liaison officers, and a particularly active 
relationship between the J2 intelligence actors. Interestingly, many of these 
developments proceeded with surprisingly little interference from the political actors 
in Brussels. Similar to CP, these processes in norm development, or ‘shared 
standards in behaviour’ (Smith, 2004, p. 26), have also clearly been more prolific and 
fertile the more they are practised spatially away from Brussels and the more 
hierarchically downwards and away from the political level actors. This constant level 
of interaction between EU and NATO actors has also led to real opportunities for 
learning and socialisation. 
Actors in both organisations have learned to use the institutions and docking 
mechanism established through the BP/AF in ways that do not strictly fit the AF, as 
outlined in Chapter Two. Actors have also learned that, if they must cooperate out of 
operational necessity, it is best to do this as far removed from the political level as 
possible. In doing so, they have further learned to share intelligence as well as their 
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respective strategic aspects and goals, at least as they pertain to the operational 
level. Furthermore, through extensive interaction and meetings that have become 
institutionalised over time, they have learned to compensate for elements of tribalism 
between the two sets of actors. Therefore, the hierarchical/spatial element is 
ultimately bound up with the developments of learning and interaction. This is 
evident through the technical arrangements and the MOUs being consistently drawn 
up and coordinated in the field. 
 The notion of ‘lessons learned’ in the EU denotes a specific, formal procedure 
that actually involves identifying the lessons and then discussing them. According to 
its Lessons Learned Concept, the EU can take into consideration LL from other 
organisations, including through those acquired by member states in non-CSDP 
activities; for example, their involvement in KFOR as well as from studies contracted 
to the European Defence Agency (EDA) (Interview 65, 2012). In this last case, the 
EDA can have staff-to-staff exchanges with the NATO IS and take into consideration 
related LL; so, even within this formal Concept, there is a way towards cooperation 
beyond the BP/AF context. 
When it comes to the informal staff-to-staff level, there are possibilities to 
exchange ideas and best practices, but it is up to the staffs and often individuals to 
carry this out. An example of this is when the ‘EUMS and NATOs IMS Directors met 
on 23 November 2012 to share views on common military issues with a particular 
emphasis on elaborating best practices and lessons learned from their respective 
ongoing actions’.74 Or when ‘representatives from the EUMS and SHAPE met within 
the Agreed Framework for informal talks on 10 December 2012 to share views on 
common operational issues with a particular emphasis on logistics, exercises and 
CIS fields, as well as related lessons learned from their respective ongoing 
activities’.75 Interestingly, these two examples are meetings that attempt to learn not 
only within a specific operational context such as Kosovo, but across multiple 
contexts or ‘ongoing activities’. 
 
                                            
74
 Find a record of this meeting at http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/structures-instruments-agencies/eu-
military-staff/news/archives/2013/20121123_en.htm (last accessed December 2013). 
75
 Find a record of this meeting at http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/structures-instruments-agencies/eu-
military-staff/news/archives/2013/20121210_en.htm (last accessed December 2013). 
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Table 5.6: 
Observed Institutionalisation for Kosovo (Systematised or 
Informal) 
Transatlantic Dinners Semi-systematised 
Informal NAC-PSC Meetings 
PSC+7 
Less Operational Interference from PSC 
Member State Pressure on Sec/Gen & HR pushing 
- More staff-to-staff meetings 
- More joint contribution meetings 
- Adopting an organisation to organisation approach 
DSACEUR-CMPD/CPCC/EUMS/DG-EUMS Meetings 
Informal 
Informal 
Semi-systematised 
Semi-Systematised 
Semi-Systematised 
Semi-Systematised 
Semi-Systematised 
Semi-Systematised 
Kosovo in-theatre  
- Enhanced MOUs + JOPs 
- Enhanced Joint Security Concept 
- Joint COM-KFOR & HoM-EULEX meetings 
- Deputies of COM-KFOR & HoM-EULEX meetings 
- CoS & CoS meetings 
- POLAD to POLAD meetings 
- Branch Level (J1-J7) meetings 
- J2 to J2 (Intelligence) meetings 
- Working Group Meetings 
- Liaison Officers Meetings 
Systematised 
Systematised 
Systematised 
Systematised 
Systematised 
Systematised 
Systematised 
Systematised 
Systematised 
Systematised 
Table 5.7: 
Key Findings for Kosovo  
Blocking States turning ‘Blind eye’  
Informal NAC-PSC (including Turkey and Cyprus)   
Transatlantic Dinners 
Sec/Gen and HR Discussing Kosovo 
Using the BP/AF as a normative reference point 
Sharing Intelligence 
 
Focus on organisation to organisation approach  
PSC and NAC Boundary testing by operational level  
EULEX and KFOR Commanders Coordinating  
DSACEUR as Strategic Coordinator Driving Cooperation 
Mirrored MOUs and JOPs 
Joint Security Concept 
 
Increased institutionalisation of informal cooperation  
EU-NATO personnel socialising out of working hours  
Socialisation of new HOMs   
  
 
This case study investigated the EU-NATO relationship, both at the macro and the 
micro level, and within the context of civilian (EU) to military (NATO) operations in 
192 
 
Kosovo. The primary aim of this chapter was to investigate for evidence of EU-NATO 
cooperation, despite the political blockage that should exclude any cooperation. 
Second, it investigated how such cooperation has evolved, as well as the nature and 
form of any such cooperation. Finally, it investigated to what extent the BP/AF 
remains the normative and institutional context for cooperation since 2004.  
Remembering that formal cooperation between the EU and NATO is path-
dependent on the sequencing of events and the initial institutional creation that was 
determined in the early years of cooperation, when it comes to Kosovo, the Agreed 
Framework remains locked-in and problematic in terms of limiting the ability of the 
EU and NATO to carry out broader functions of cooperation and to partake in formal 
strategic dialogue. Berlin Plus has not been re-established or re-negotiated to 
account for cooperation in Kosovo in general, or for civilian-military scenarios in 
particular. The empirical evidence suggests that, in the case of Kosovo, this is 
because the local situation is not bellicose enough, thus necessitating greater levels 
of formal cooperation. Those states that have a vested interest in the status quo do 
not need, therefore, to rethink their position. As long as lower-level agreements and 
technical arrangements can be agreed spatially away from the politically sensitive 
centre (Brussels) to the local level (in-theatre), the Agreed Framework will not be 
renegotiated at the macro-level.  
The thesis will now turn to investigating the EU-NATO relationship in the case of 
Afghanistan. As with the previous case in Kosovo, the background to the cases and 
the initial stand up periods of the missions will be contextualised and the relationship 
will be analysed through the same three levels of cooperation. 
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Chapter Six  
Beyond Berlin Plus  
Informal Civilian-Military/Civilian Cooperation in 
Afghanistan 
 
Equally in Afghanistan, the cooperation goes quite well in the 
field with EUPOL, which is a limited and very modest police 
mission. We don’t have an official deal there but, at the day-to-
day business level and at the staff level, there is a lot of 
interaction with the EUPOL offices in Afghanistan and with 
ISAF. Furthermore, if you compare that with the UN, there is 
much more interaction between NATO and the EU (Interview 
20, 2010). 
 
Introduction 
 
Similar to both the cases of counter-piracy and Kosovo, there is a good deal of 
rhetoric in the public record for EU-NATO cooperation concerning Afghanistan. This 
rhetoric is present, once again, in the legal/strategic documents that are supposed to 
underpin the ‘Strategic Partnership’ between NATO/ISAF and the EU in general and 
between ISAF/NTM-A and EUPOL specifically. This rhetoric is also present in 
primary source documentation, as well as from the interviews conducted for this 
case study. Much of the language used to describe the EU-NATO relationship in this 
case is very similar to that of Kosovo. Like the Kosovo case study, this chapter will 
show that the relationship could only be agreed by ‘local technical arrangements’ 
drawn up in the field. However, in the case of Afghanistan, this did not consist of two 
mirror documents (as with Kosovo), but 14 separate MOUs between EUPOL and the 
individual provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) and not NATO/ISAF specifically. 
As this chapter will show, this has incrementally progressed over the last few years 
leading to modest incremental change in the relationship, even if a formal 
relationship is, as yet, still lacking. 
This rhetoric is also present at the international staff level. Again, like Kosovo, 
there are the references to the lack of cooperation by both the offices of the EU’s HR 
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and the NATO Sec/Gen and quotes emanating from these offices, such as the two 
organisations need to ‘talk more together’, ‘do more together’ and that coordination 
concerning Afghanistan ‘needs to be stepped up’. This will also be demonstrated in 
this chapter by the increased institutionalisation of staff-to-staff meetings concerning 
Afghanistan.  
Finally, the different operational priorities of both the EU and NATO effect the 
relationship in Afghanistan. With regard to Afghanistan, it is NATO that is running the 
flagship mission and the EU’s EUPOL mission is, in fact, relatively small. Due to this 
dynamic, a formal agreement has not really been necessary in order to cooperate 
and/or deconflict (to a degree) in-theatre. Informal cooperation works well enough 
spatially away from the strategic linkages so as not to force a dramatic change in the 
BP/AF; and the status quo remains, albeit with minor incremental changes, in the 
day-to-day workings of the relationship at the meso and micro levels. In other words, 
this case study will demonstrate that events and operational necessity are driving 
incremental change far more than any theoretical debates about where the EU ends 
and NATO begins and, until such events force a situation whereby both 
organisations must revisit the formal structures of cooperation, the static relationship 
will continue to exist, but reinforced by sporadically releasing the political pressure 
valve, which is expedited through the processes of informal cooperation. 
The Afghanistan case study also demonstrates, once again, what I have already 
referred to as the essence of Berlin Plus issue in the previous chapters. In the case 
of CP, we saw that NATO provided a Standing Naval Maritime Group, while the EU 
worked out the political and operational obstacles to launching ATALANTA; plus, it 
operates a concurrent mission (Ocean Shield), which allows additional non-EU Allies 
to contribute and who might not do so in an EU context. In Kosovo, NATO lends 
assets and capabilities as well as provides general 3rd responder security in Kosovo 
which, in turn, enables the EU to function and carry out its mission in-theatre. 
However, there is a certain amount of parity between the two missions when it 
comes to providing security and capacity-building in Kosovo. In Afghanistan, 
however, not only is NATO/ISAF the provider of security bar none, but there is also a 
very large difference in the relative mission sizes. Most importantly, though, without 
ISAF providing security in Afghanistan generally and for EUPOL specifically, EUPOL 
could not perform its mission nor fulfil its mandate in the country. 
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The formal channels are not officially utilised (NAC-PSC & SHAPE as an EU 
OHQ) to enable EU-NATO cooperation in Afghanistan, nor is this a case whereby 
the EU assumes or replaces the military functions of NATO (as with CONCORDIA & 
ALTHEA). However, Berlin Plus is by definition ‘an EU-led operation making use of 
NATO assets and capabilities’ (European Union External Action Service, 2011a). 
This is clearly the case in Afghanistan. What will be demonstrated in this chapter is 
that NATO/ISAF provides ‘in extremis’ support to EUPOL, provides for the general 
security and stability in Afghanistan, as well as a degree of intelligence sharing. 
Furthermore, these functions and provisions are clearly written into the MOUs and 
JOPs. However, this chapter will also show that, when informal mechanisms were 
used to carry out strategic discussions and planning, no informal NAC-PSC format 
was adopted, as was the case with Kosovo. Therefore, one claim this case study 
cannot make is that the Berlin Plus template/institutional processes for cooperation 
were used in this particular way. 
Again, it would seem informal cooperation between the EU and NATO is path-
dependent on the sequencing of events and the initial institutional creation that was 
determined in the early years of cooperation. Although the BP/AF seems locked-in 
and problematic in terms of the ability of the EU and NATO to carry out the broader 
formal functions of cooperation and strategic dialogue, there still have been 
incremental and evolutionary processes of change. But, as with CP and Kosovo, the 
case of Afghanistan will clearly show that there has not been enough political will or 
some specific crisis that has forced a change to the relationship at the macro level. 
In other words, Berlin Plus has not been re-established to account for these areas of 
cooperation or for civilian-military cooperation. In the case of Afghanistan, although it 
is a much more hostile environment where one would expect a formal relationship to 
be fundamental to allowing the missions to operate in the same space, the fact that 
EUPOL is such a small operation has meant that no real need to renegotiate the 
BP/AF has been required. The technical arrangements drawn up in-theatre have 
been enough to allow cooperation to transpire in the field. Once again, this 
demonstrates that the static formal relationship will continue to exist, reinforced by 
the political actors sporadically releasing the pressure valve through the processes 
of informal cooperation. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section frames the chapter as a further 
investigation of EU-NATO cooperation beyond the BP/AF and establishes the 
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specific research questions for this case study. Second, the chapter will 
contextualise and detail the various EU and NATO missions in Afghanistan. The 
main section of the chapter is an in-depth empirical analysis of the EU-NATO 
relationship with regard to these respective missions. As with the two previous case 
studies, it investigates cooperation at three levels of analysis: the political/strategic 
level, the international staff level, and the operational level. The chapter ends by 
offering a set of conclusions that are based on the research questions established in 
the next section. This chapter will ultimately demonstrate that both static and path-
dependent features to the macro relationship (BP/AF) are present, while 
simultaneously evidence of incremental processes of change are also present at the 
micro level of the EU-NATO relationship. 
 
Framing Propositions:  
 
Before the central findings of the EU-NATO relationship on Afghanistan can be 
addressed, some assumptions are first required for the EU-NATO relationship as it 
pertains to operations in Afghanistan specifically, and in line with the general 
research framework, especially those related to incremental change, learning and 
socialisation. The specific research questions can then be set for this case study. As 
with the CP and Kosovo cases, there are some assumptions that should be outlined 
before proceeding. 
Due to the limitations of BP/AF, it is expected that no formal EU-NATO strategic 
dialogue, joint EU-NATO planning, official EU-NATO task-sharing or any kind of EU-
NATO formal functional or strategic action will be evident in relation to either 
NATO/ISAF and EU/EUPOL, ISAF/NTM-A and EU/EUPOL, or any military-civilian 
cooperation vis-à-vis operations in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the NAC and the PSC 
will not be permitted to formally discuss operations or strategic direction relating to 
Afghanistan, or have it as part of any official NAC-PSC agenda. In other words, there 
will be no formal political/strategic institutional framework for cooperation concerning 
activities in Afghanistan. 
It is taken as a given that there will be certain functional and operational 
requirements. These are conditioned on the fact that both the EU and NATO are 
operating in the same geographical space while conducting different missions in 
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pursuit of their respective mandates (of which the specific dynamics and operational 
complexities are explained below). Therefore, agents at all three levels 
(political/strategic, international staffs and operational) will seek alternative avenues 
for cooperation in the face of the limits to cooperation. Agents adapt the rules and 
institutions created by the BP/AF arrangements as a normative and institutional 
reference point, not only for limiting formal cooperation, but also for facilitating 
informal cooperation. 
As with the case of CP and Kosovo, the core assumptions of HI explain the 
limitations of BP/AF as a formal vehicle of EU-NATO cooperation in Afghanistan 
(while still persisting as the only formal EU-NATO institutional framework in general). 
However, these core assumptions are much less useful in explaining other forms of 
EU-NATO cooperation beyond the strict interpretation and operationalising of BP/AF. 
This case study, similar to the other two, problematises why cooperation exists 
despite the political blockage that should limit its use and how EU-NATO cooperation 
in Afghanistan proceeds, despite a formal framework for cooperation. Consequently, 
this case study is an investigation of how EU-NATO cooperation takes place despite 
this political blockage and examines how much incremental change, socialisation 
and learning play a role in an agent’s ability to find alternatives or adaptations to the 
BP/AF. 
Finally, given the political sensitivities of BP/AF, there is an expectation that some 
degree of institutionalisation of cooperation will take place, but it will be most 
prominent hierarchically downwards towards the international and especially the 
operational agents. This institutionalisation will also be more prominent spatially 
away from the central tools of Brussels, towards operational HQs and the areas of 
operation. As well as the general guiding research questions and assumptions 
established in Chapter Three, the following research questions are also generated to 
investigate the EU-NATO relationship in the context of Afghanistan:  
 
(1) Is there any observable evidence of learning facilitating informal EU-NATO 
cooperation in the case of Afghanistan?  
(2) Is there any observable evidence of socialisation facilitating informal EU-
NATO cooperation in the case of Afghanistan?  
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(3) Is there any observable evidence of institutionalisation impacting on changes 
in behaviour, or at least facilitating changes in behaviour (be they rational or 
sociological in nature) in the case of Afghanistan? 
 
The chapter will now contextualise both NATO’s and the EU’s different operations 
in Afghanistan, before turning to an in-depth empirical analysis of the EU-NATO 
relationship with regard to their respective missions.  
 
Afghanistan 
 
Background and Context 
 
After the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, the United States launched and led 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) into Afghanistan. This operation was targeted 
‘against al Qaeda terrorist training camps and military installations of the Taliban 
regime in Afghanistan’. OEF was designed to ‘disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a 
terrorist base of operations, and to attack the military capability of the Taliban 
regime’.76  
United Nation’s Security Council consent was given in the form of UNSCR 1373 
(28 September 2001), which expressed the ‘determination to take all necessary 
steps in order to ensure the full implementation of this resolution’ (UNSCR 1373). On 
7 October 2001, OEF was launched with the large support of the international 
community to take those ‘necessary steps’. It should also be noted that the UN 
created (March 2002) the UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan UNAMA77 ‘at the 
                                            
76
 George W. Bush talking on 7 October 2001. See 
http://middleeast.about.com/od/afghanistan/qt/me081007b.htm (last accessed December 2013). 
77
 Both UNAMA and ISAF (the International Security Assistance Force) are mandated by the United 
Nations Security Council to operate in Afghanistan, and are here at the request of the Government of 
Afghanistan. Agreements with the Government of Afghanistan define the distinct missions of the two 
organisations. 
UNAMA is a political Mission directed and supported by the United Nations Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations. As an ‘integrated’ Mission’, UNAMA has two main areas of operation, 
development and humanitarian issues, and political affairs. As such, neither UNAMA nor ISAF are 
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request of the [Afghan] Government to assist it and the people of Afghanistan in 
laying the foundations for sustainable peace and development’.78 ‘These agreements 
paved the way for the creation of a three-way partnership between the Afghan 
Transitional Authority, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 
(UNAMA) and ISAF’.79 
The capitulation of the Taliban and Al Qaeda (in Afghanistan only) was achieved 
relatively quickly. However, since this initial advancement on the military front, the 
reconstruction of Afghanistan has proved to be a considerably more complicated and 
difficult task to fulfil. Since 2003, the Taliban have returned (mainly from Pakistan) 
and have been operating an insurgency against the Afghan government and the 
international forces present in the country. Under the framework of UNSCR 1378 
and the Bonn Agreement (December 2001), the International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) was established to ‘assist the newly established Afghan Transitional 
Authority’ and to ‘create a secure environment in and around Kabul and support the 
reconstruction of Afghanistan’.80 Beginning with OEF and continuing under the full 
command of ISAF, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) were established so 
that ‘lead nations’ could begin work in the area of Afghan reconstruction. However, 
these PRTs have been largely populated with military and not civilian personnel. On 
11 August 2003, NATO took full command of ISAF and, since 2006, all PRTs in 
Afghanistan have fallen under the ISAF/NATO ‘umbrella’. Luis Peral notes that these 
PRTs have been largely acting ‘autonomously’ from each other with ‘strong links’ to 
their individual national capitals. As a result, there has been ‘little coordination’ 
between these teams on the ground (Peral in Grevi et al., 2009, p. 326). 
With this in mind, the London Conference (31 January-1 February 2006) 
attempted to form an international consensus and a ‘common strategy’ (ibid, p.327) 
between the international actors and the Afghan government. Moreover, ‘the Afghan 
                                                                                                                                       
seen as traditional ‘peacekeeping’ Missions with blue berets or helmets on the ground. Both 
organisations have adopted an integrated approach coordinating governance, development and 
security efforts in order to help the Government of Afghanistan promote peace and stability 
throughout the country (http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1748) (last accessed 
December 2013). 
78
 See http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1742. 
79
 See http://www.isaf.nato.int/history.html (last accessed December 2013). 
80
 See http://www.isaf.nato.int/history.html (last accessed November 2013). 
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Compact’ that was produced from this Conference outlined (1) Security, (2) 
Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights, and (3) Economic and Social 
Development as three ‘critical and interdependent pillars of activity’.81 NATO/ISAF 
has overwhelmingly prioritised ‘security’ as its primary objective in order to create an 
environment for reconstruction and nation building. The European Union’s Police 
Mission (EUPOL) in Afghanistan is firmly entrenched within the second objective. 
However, NATO/ISAF also performs a function in this second ‘pillar’ with its NATO 
Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) and, although EUPOL carries out a non-
executive police mission, it is in many ways fundamentally connected to the concept 
of security. A broader explanation of both NATO/ISAF and EUPOL follow and are 
necessary before the main part of this section looks, once again, at cooperation 
between these two organisations. Finally, as with KFOR and EULEX, the area of 
investigation is the EU-NATO relationship, instances of informal cooperation and the 
form of that cooperation between NATO/ISAF and EUPOL beyond BP/AF. It is not 
the effectiveness and overall success of these missions per se. 
 
                                            
81
 See the Afghan Compact http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/afghanistan_compact.pdf (last 
accessed November 2013). 
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NATO/ISAF 
 
Figure 6.1: ISAF Regional Commands and Major Units 
 
(Taken from NATO/ISAF Website) 
 
 
According to the NATO website, the NATO/ISAF ‘mission’ is to fulfil the following: 
 
In support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan, ISAF conducts operations in Afghanistan to 
reduce the capability and will of the insurgency, support the 
growth in capacity and capability of the Afghan National 
Security Forces (ANSF), and facilitate improvements in 
governance and socio-economic development in order to 
provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is 
observable to the population. 
 
NATO/ISAF has been steadily building its troop strength in Afghanistan since it took 
over command in 2003. Although they have fluctuated over the time of research, at 
the time of writing there are 49 troop-contributing nations, a combined total of around 
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86,834 troops and 26 PRTs.82 In order to carry out the mission as stated above, 
ISAF conducts population-centric counterinsurgency operations in partnership with 
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and provides support to the Government 
and international community in Security Sector Reform. Its key priorities are: protect 
the population; neutralise insurgent networks; develop the Afghan National Security 
forces (ANSF), including the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National 
Police (ANP); and to promote effective governance and support socio-economic 
development.83   
The Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A), a sub-component of NATO/ISAF and 
announced at the Strasbourg/Kehl NATO Summit (2009), is specifically geared 
towards ‘higher-level training’ and mentoring’. It is tasked ‘to oversee higher level 
training for the Afghan National Army, and training and mentoring for the Afghan 
National Police, capitalising on existing structures and synergies in close 
coordination with the International Police Coordination Board’.84 When it comes to 
the objective of delivering ‘stronger governance and development’ throughout 
Afghanistan, NATO/ISAF turns to its PRTs in order to develop the capacities of 
‘Afghan sub-national institutions and businesses’.85 These PRTs are operated and 
managed by a ‘lead nation’, but their staff can include personnel from various 
contributing nations. These personnel mainly consist of military staff; however, they 
usually include ‘diplomatic staff from ISAF contributing nations, police trainers, as 
well as civilian experts for development and governance’. 
 After UNSCR 1510 (October 2003) expanded NATO/ISAF’s mission to include all 
of Afghanistan (before ISAF provided security in and around Kabul only), it 
eventually began to include all the PRTs working throughout Afghanistan. The fourth 
and final expansion of NATO/ISAF brought all 27 PRTs under its control and, 
therefore, assumed responsibility for Afghanistan in its entirety. As explained below, 
                                            
82
 See http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2013_10/20131003_131001-ISAF-Placemat.pdf 
(Last accessed on 09-10-13). 
83
 See http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-44BB9141-569C3523/natolive/topics_69366.htm (Last 
accessed on 09-10-13). 
84
 See http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52836.htm (Last accessed on 09-10-13). 
85
 See http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-44BB9141-569C3523/natolive/topics_69366.htm (Last 
accessed on 09-10-13). 
203 
 
the majority of EU-NATO cooperation in Afghanistan has been between EUPOL and 
the PRT/lead nations. However, before this can be accomplished, it is necessary to 
highlight some of the key background information for EUPOL and its operations in 
Afghanistan. 
 
EUPOL AFGHANISTAN 
 
Figure 6.2: EUPOL in Afghanistan 
 
 
The first EU ‘exploratory mission’ in Afghanistan was conducted in July 2006 at 
the request of the Council Secretariat. This was later followed by the ‘Joint 
Council/Commission EU Assessment Mission (JEUAM)’ in September of the same 
year. There was another mission sent at the request of the PSC in late 2007, 
followed by the approval (12 February 2007) of the Crisis Management Concept 
(CMC) and then the approval (April 2007) of the Concept of Operations (CONOPS). 
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EUPOL Afghanistan was eventually established (30 May 2007) as a ‘non-executive 
mission’ with Council Joint Action 2007/369/CFSP. 
According to the EUPOL website, the mandate and objective of EUPOL ‘is to 
contribute to the establishment of sustainable and effective civil policing 
arrangements’.86 It was launched on 15 June 2007 and has a potential end date of 
31 December 2014. CJA 2007/369/CFSP established the EUPOL Mission with the 
following criteria: 
 
The EU police mission will be set in the wider context of the 
international community's effort to support the Government of 
Afghanistan in taking responsibility for strengthening the rule of 
law, and in particular, in improving its civil police and law 
enforcement capacity. Close coordination between the EU 
police mission and other international actors involved in security 
assistance, including the International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF), as well as those providing support to police and 
rule of law reform in Afghanistan, will be ensured. (CJA/369/ #9) 
 
EUPOL is designed as a ‘coordinated EU approach that includes local political 
guidance provided by the EU Special Representative and a reconstruction effort 
managed notably through the European Union Delegation in Kabul’ (EUPOL 
Factsheet). The current mission (at the time of writing) is 350 international staff 
consisting of 24 EU member states and a contribution from Canada.87 There are also 
200 local staff contributors (as of May 2013 Factsheet). 
EUPOL operates a central OHQ in Kabul, but also maintains regional and 
provincial components, which are attached to NATO/ISAF PRTs. Under the heading 
‘mission achievements’, EUPOL has developed ‘six strategic objectives’ (EUPOL 
Fact Sheet).88 These are: (1) police command, control and communications; (2) 
intelligence-led policing; (3) criminal investigation department capacity building; (4) 
implementation of the anti-corruption strategy; (5) police-justice cooperation; and (6) 
                                            
86
 See: http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eupol-
afghanistan/pdf/03052013_factsheet_eupol-afghanistan_en.pdf (last accessed on 09-10-2013) 
87
 Other non-EU nations have contributed in the past. For example Croatia, New Zealand and 
Norway. 
88
 See: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/eupol-
afghanistan/factsheets?lang=en (Last accessed on 09-10-13). 
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strengthening gender and human rights aspects within the Afghan National Police 
(ANP) (ibid).  
Why would an organisation like the EU agree to operate in such a hostile 
environment, when a formal mechanism for strategic dialogue and cooperation is 
ruled out with the very organisation that provides for the general security in the area 
of operations? This alone makes this case study remarkably intriguing. The chapter 
now turns to an in-depth empirical analysis of the EU-NATO relationship with regard 
to these respective missions. As with the two previous case studies, it investigates 
cooperation at three levels of analysis: the political/strategic level, the international 
staff level, and the operational level. 
 
Discovering EU-NATO Informal Institutionalisation in Afghanistan 
 
The Political/Strategic Level 
 
As we found with the Kosovo case, the overriding trait of EU-NATO cooperation in 
Afghanistan is that it is not based on any formal political framework, i.e. the PSC and 
the NAC cannot engage in strategic dialogue or discuss (as part of any official 
agenda) common concerns or operations in Afghanistan. However, as we will see, 
there is clear evidence of incremental change with regard to the relationship, most 
notably at the operational level, but at the political level as well. However, when the 
research was commenced, the general texture of the EU-NATO relationship vis-à-vis 
Afghanistan was described as follows: ‘in ISAF there is no Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) between ISAF and EUPOL. EUPOL has had to enter into 14 
bilateral arrangements with individual nations running PRTs on a bilateral EU to 
nation basis. This process has taken more than two years and two MOUs still remain 
outstanding’ (EU-NATO Friction Document 2010).  
As with cooperation in Kosovo, it is first necessary to outline the arrangements as 
they stand for both EUPOL and NATO/ISAF individually before the modalities and 
procedures of these ‘informal’ and ‘ad hoc’ arrangements can be investigated further. 
Both NATO/ISAF and EUPOL work in relation with UNAMA and both understand the 
Bonn Agreement, plus the various UNSC Resolutions to be their legitimating 
documents. In the case of the EU, UNSCR 1746 (23 March 2007), this document 
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‘welcomes the decision by the European Union to establish a mission in the field of 
policing with linkages to the wider rule of law and counter narcotics, to assist and 
enhance current efforts in the area of police reform at central and provincial levels, 
and looks forward to the early launch of the mission’. The key legal documents 
generated from within the EU Council that establish, outline and structure EUPOL in 
Afghanistan are primarily (but not limited to) CJA 2007/369/CFSP, CJA 
2007/733/CFSP, Political and Security Committee Decision EUPOL AFGH/2/2007, 
CJA 2008/612/CFSP, Council Decision 2010/279/CFSP, and Council Decision 
2010/686/CFSP. 
As mentioned above, CJA 2007/369/CFSP (30 May 2007) is the establishing 
document for EUPOL Afghanistan. Space does not permit, nor is it particularly 
relevant, to outline this document in full. However, a few sections are of interest to 
this case study as they refer to coordination with other actors and the release of 
classified documents. This document refers to NATO/ISAF a total of five times. The 
relevant sections of this document are: 
 
(9) Close coordination between the EU police mission and other 
international actors involved in security assistance, including the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), as well as those 
providing support to police and rule of law reform in 
Afghanistan, will be ensured.  
Article 2, # 5 (Planning Phase): The Head of Mission shall 
work closely and coordinate with the Government of 
Afghanistan and relevant international actors, as appropriate, 
including NATO/ISAF, Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) 
Lead Nations, the UN (United Nations Assistance Mission 
Afghanistan (UNAMA)), and third states currently involved in 
police reform in Afghanistan.  
Article 5, #2 (Structure of the Mission): Technical 
arrangements will be sought with ISAF and Regional 
Command/PRT Lead Nations for information exchange, 
medical, security and logistical support including 
accommodation by Regional Commands and PRTs.  
Article 6, #7 (Head of Mission): The Head of Mission shall 
ensure that EUPOL AFGHANISTAN works closely and 
coordinates with the Government of Afghanistan and relevant 
international actors, as appropriate, including NATO/ISAF, 
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Lead Nations, the UN 
(United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan (UNAMA)), and 
third states currently involved in police reform in Afghanistan.  
Article 15 (Release of classified Information), #1 The SG/HR 
shall be authorised to release to NATO/ISAF EU classified 
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information and documents generated for the purposes of the 
Mission, in accordance with the Council's security regulations. 
[Local technical arrangements shall be drawn up to 
facilitate this] (Author’s emphasis). 
#2: The SG/HR shall be authorised to release to third states 
associated with this Joint Action, as appropriate and in 
accordance with the needs of the Mission, EU classified 
information and documents up to the level ‘CONFIDENTIEL UE’ 
generated for the purposes of the Mission, in accordance with 
the Council's security regulations. 
 
Some key lines are of note in this document. First, although NATO (including ISAF) is 
mentioned more often than in the document that establishes EULEX in Kosovo, the 
wording is still rather vague and the reference to ‘coordination’ is not supported by 
any formal strategic institutional relationship or and TORs/MOUs at the political 
macro level. This being the case, it is difficult to see how ‘close coordination’ can be 
‘ensured’ without formal agreements. Second, it is important to note the references to 
the PRTs. It is with these constructs, and not NATO/ISAF as a whole, that the 
individual contributing EUPOL member states had to establish their MOUs. This point 
connects to a third. The line ‘[L]ocal technical arrangements shall be drawn up to 
facilitate this’ is quite significant because, as with Kosovo, clearly these 
arrangements were not possible to agree at the political level in Brussels. This 
demonstrates that hierarchical and spatial processes are clearly at work concerning 
EU-NATO cooperation outside the BP/AF with regard to Afghanistan.  
Some of the other EU Council documents mentioned above also refer to 
‘coordination’ with NATO/ISAF through the ‘Head of Mission’ (CJA 2007/733/CFSP & 
Council Decision 2010/279/CFSP, in relation to the ‘Release of classified information’ 
Council Decision (and replacing SG/HR with HR) Council Decision 2010/279/CFSP. 
This last document also referrers to the NTM-A element of NATO/ISAF whereby 
EUPOL will ‘enhance cooperation with key partners in police reform and training, 
including with NATO-led mission ISAF and the NATO Training Mission and other 
contributors’. 
As for the NATO arrangements, it is much more difficult to access the MOUs and 
the ToR for cooperation as these documents are classified. Therefore, the only 
alternative is to use what official documents there are in the public record. A short 
detailing of those documents and how they pertain to EU-NATO cooperation in 
Afghanistan now follows. 
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An examination of NATO documents reveals that there is occasional mention of 
EUPOL in some of these documents, but that the specifics of how these two 
organisations will cooperate is couched in language that is vague at best. The first 
document to mention EUPOL is the NATO Defence Ministerial Final Communiqué 
released (14 June 2007) shortly after CJA/369/CFSP established EUPOL and just 
prior to the launching of the mission in-theatre. One line is offered mentioning the 
nascent mission by welcoming ‘the EU’s decision to launch an ESDP police 
mission’.89 Both the December 2007 NATO Ministerial and the NATO Bucharest 
Summit Declaration fail to mention the EU’s operation at all. Even more interesting is 
that the document entitled ‘ISAFS’s Strategic Vision’ (3 April 2008), released almost 
a year after the launching of EUPOL, also fails to give any recognition to EUPOL. 
This is puzzling given the document mentions as a ‘guiding principle’ the 
commitment to ‘a comprehensive approach by the international community, bringing 
together civilian and military efforts’. This document goes on to declare under the title 
‘Enhanced Coordination’ that, ‘success requires a comprehensive approach across 
security, governance and development efforts and between all local and international 
partners in support of the Afghan Government’. This section of the document 
mentions the UN in this regard as well as the ongoing effort of the PRTs and the 
‘pledge’ to ‘strengthen their civilian component’, but neglects to mention the role of 
EUPOL as part of this ‘comprehensive approach’.90 
Although the NATO Foreign Ministerial Final Communiqué (3 December 2008) 
does not mention EUPOL directly, it states that NATO does ‘support greater efforts 
by Allied nations and partners, in coordination with United States and European 
Union programmes and missions, to accelerate development of the Afghan National 
Police’.91 The Strasbourg/Kehl NATO Summit Declaration on Afghanistan (4 April 
2009) does refer to the NATO decision to establish NTM-A and underlines ‘the 
importance of other efforts in this field such as the training activities conducted by 
the European Union police mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL)’.92 However, there is no 
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 See http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_47011.htm (last accessed December 2013). 
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 See http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8444.htm (last accessed December 2013). 
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 See http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_46247.htm (last accessed December 2013). 
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 See http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52836.htm (last accessed December 2013). 
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mention of how cooperation between the two organisations will be worked out 
through formal institutional links. 
It is also worth mentioning the NATO Strategic Concept (19 November 2010), as 
two sections are particularly relevant. First, this document sets out NATO’s clear 
intention to move more intently into competencies that are putatively deemed to be 
civilian and not NATO’s traditional military role. In this regard, section 25/3 is of 
particular note as the Alliance states that ‘[T]o be effective across the crisis 
management spectrum, we will... form an appropriate but modest civilian crisis 
management capability to interface more effectively with civilian partners, building on 
the lessons learned from NATO-led operations. This capability may also be used to 
plan, employ and coordinate civilian activities until conditions allow for the transfer of 
those responsibilities and tasks to other actors’. Clearly - and with structures like the 
NTM-A in mind - NATO is demonstrating its desire, however modest, to develop 
competencies that could potentially compete with missions like EUPOL. However, as 
we will see, this focus on competition is very limited, especially at the operational 
level. 
The second relevant section of this document is section 32, which is clearly 
written to demonstrate the Alliance’s desire to further strengthen EU-NATO relations 
at the broad level.93 
 
An active and effective European Union contributes to the 
overall security of the Euro-Atlantic area. Therefore the EU is a 
unique and essential partner for NATO. The two organisations 
share a majority of members, and all members of both 
organisations share common values. NATO recognizes the 
importance of a stronger and more capable European defence. 
We welcome the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which 
provides a framework for strengthening the EU’s capacities to 
address common security challenges. Non-EU Allies make a 
significant contribution to these efforts. For the strategic 
partnership between NATO and the EU, their fullest 
involvement in these efforts is essential. NATO and the EU can 
and should play complementary and mutually reinforcing roles 
in supporting international peace and security. We are 
determined to make our contribution to create more favourable 
circumstances through which we will: 
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 See http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf (last accessed December 
2013). 
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- fully strengthen the strategic partnership with the EU, in the 
spirit of full mutual openness, transparency, complementarity 
and respect for the autonomy and institutional integrity of both 
organisations;  
- enhance our practical cooperation in operations throughout 
the crisis spectrum, from coordinated planning to mutual 
support in the field;  
- broaden our political consultations to include all issues of 
common concern, in order to share assessments and 
perspectives;  
- cooperate more fully in capability development, to minimise 
duplication and maximise cost-effectiveness. 
 
This latter section evidently shows a desire to enhance cooperation and examples 
of pragmatic steps in that direction are outlined below. Owing to the fact that the EU 
and NATO are cooperating to such an extent outside the BP/AF, the NATO Strategic 
Concept clearly demonstrates a desire to have improved coordination, at least at the 
organisation-to-organisation level, and definitely at the practical and operational 
level. There seems to be attempts to learn from the various operations where the EU 
and NATO are co-located, once again demonstrating path-dependence at the static 
macro level combined with incremental change with regard to practical cooperation 
in operations. 
The section above documented the strategic vision and rhetorical proclamation of 
EU-NATO cooperation in Afghanistan through a compilation of official primary source 
documentation. However, as the EU-NATO relationship in Afghanistan is clearly built 
on more informal linkages, it is also imperative to investigate the particulars of this 
relationship outside this public record. It is to this discussion, based on extensive and 
in-depth interviews, that this chapter now turns. The following sections investigate 
informal cooperation through four broad areas. These are (1) generalities for the 
political/strategic level, (2) informal technical agreements for cooperation, (3) the 
implications of informal cooperation, and (4) future implications for both the EU and 
NATO in Afghanistan. 
Some generalities can be extrapolated from the political/strategic level when it 
comes to EU-NATO cooperation in Afghanistan. The most obvious point is that both 
the EU and NATO focus the majority of their attention, capabilities, and 
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organisational commitment towards different operations and localities. For NATO, 
Afghanistan is currently its number one priority. In an environment that is highly 
bellicose and with a vast amount of human and material military capabilities as well 
as economic resources invested, Afghanistan has become somewhat of a ‘test of 
NATO's credibility’ (US President Barack Obama, December 2009).94 To paraphrase 
one interlocutor: for NATO, the operational priority is in Afghanistan and backsides 
are on the line (Interview 3, 2010). One only has to compare the numbers of 132,400 
NATO/ISAF and 317 EUPOL personnel (at the time of the interview) for the clarity of 
this point to resonate.  
The difference in size between EUPOL and ISAF does impact on what type of 
framework is permissible. Similar to how Kosovo, which is relatively non-hostile, 
permits an informal relationship through technical arrangements on the ground, so 
the rather modest size of EUPOL means that cooperation through informal channels 
in Afghanistan is also sustainable. If there were more EUPOL personnel on the 
ground in Afghanistan, a formal relationship would be required and the informal 
framework would just not be sustainable. In other words, informal cooperation and 
the set of technical arrangements that currently exist would not be enough to 
‘ensure’ ‘close coordination’ if EUPOL was a much larger mission operating in such a 
hostile environment. One interlocutor at NATO illustrated this by stating ‘I think in 
Afghanistan if EUPOL was 4-5000 experts, the situation would be very different 
because you would have a lot more pressure from the ground pushing or triggering 
different negotiations for finding solutions. Fortunately, there are no casualties in 
Afghanistan attributable to this deadlock’ (Interview 5, 2010).  
This leads us onto another issue. CSDP, both in concept and in terms of 
operations, is increasingly becoming more civilian focused. However, the EU’s focus 
through CSDP has been overwhelmingly civilian as it has progressed. This is 
currently evident by the fact that, of the 16 on-going CSDP operations, only four are 
military missions. Two points are worth making. First, formal agreements for EU-
NATO cooperation in a civilian/military capacity do not exist on paper. The principal 
development in terms of the CSDP presence on the international stage is more 
civilian than military, ‘so that puts a question over Berlin Plus in its present format. 
Now whether or not this will ever be expanded to include civ/mil arrangements, 
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 See http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_18291-544-2-30.pdf (last accessed December 2013). 
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because at present the political will is not even there to address the issues never 
mind come up with a reasonable approach to a solution’ (Interview 16, 2010). 
Second, because both organisations are working in areas related to policing/civilian 
competencies, the potential for competition, or at least confliction, does exist. This 
point was demonstrated by one EU member of staff at SHAPE when they articulated 
that ‘once people deploy into a mission area and they look and see what we term 
friendly forces, then they know that they have to work very closely together with 
friendly forces to make sure that, first of all, they are all safe and secure and, 
second, that they are not cutting across each other in terms of the work that they are 
doing (Interview 16, 2010). 
With regard to the political/strategic institutional links in Brussels, there are no 
formal links in Brussels at this level. As demonstrated in Chapter Two, as well as the 
previous case studies, the PSC/NAC and EUMC/NATO MC can only meet formally 
to discuss Berlin Plus operations. This means that there is no formal EU-NATO 
dialogue on key areas where there is mutual interests; Afghanistan is clearly of 
mutual interest and is therefore a casualty of the ‘participation problem’. As for the 
technical agreements between the EU and NATO that do allow cooperation to take 
place in Afghanistan, it was not possible to establish these at the political level owing 
to the political complications resulting from the ‘participation’ problem generated by 
the Turkish/Cyprus impasse. Once again, the line ‘Local technical arrangements 
shall be drawn up to facilitate this’ (CJA 2007/369/CFSP) is the key to understanding 
the framework of cooperation in Afghanistan. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, there were two sets of identical technical 
agreements drawn up for cooperation in Kosovo. However, not even this was 
achieved for Afghanistan because ‘in ISAF there is no Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) between ISAF and EUPOL. EUPOL has had to enter into 14 
bilateral arrangements with individual nations running PRTs on a bilateral EU to 
nation basis. This process has taken more than two years and two MOUs (when this 
interview was conducted) still remain outstanding’ (EU-NATO Friction Document 
2010). The type of ‘mirrored’ MOUs agreed in Kosovo, whereby each organisation 
signed one copy separately in the field, were not possible between NATO/ISAF and 
EUPOL. In Afghanistan, these papers were going to be drafted but ‘even this was 
too much for the Turks’ (Interview 11, 2010). In-theatre, it results to ‘gatherings on 
the ground’. All the staff who work in the same operational space attend gatherings 
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called donor meetings. So it is all done ‘more open and in public on the ground’, but 
all very ‘discreet and secretive in Brussels’ (Interview 11, 2010). In fact, the 
NATO/ISAF-EUPOL technical agreements ‘were not even drafted’ (Turkey blocked). 
There are only pragmatic arrangements/agreements in the field (Interview 7, 2010). 
The Turks could have accepted the technical arrangements in Afghanistan, but ‘they 
did not on point of principle. There was no military logic in that at all and quite clearly 
it was a political decision’ (Interview 8, 2010). This does raise the question as to why 
a state would be more inclined to be acquiescent to agreeing technical arrangements 
in one operation as opposed to another. However, that is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
One interlocutor called this arrangement ‘absurd’ because, for Afghanistan, the 
EU has had to negotiate 14 separate memoranda of understanding with individual 
Allies on protection of EU personnel; ‘this is EU to individual nation not to NATO’ 
(Interview 3, 2010). As with Kosovo, it is clear that all of this has implications for 
informal cooperation for those working on the ground, for the international staffs and 
for the political/strategic level personnel working within these conditions. Some of 
these implications are now outlined.  
At a general level, the nature of cooperation being analysed is of two types. 
Between military security (NATO/ISAF), both in terms of NATO/ISAF providing actual 
‘in extremis’ support to EUPOL through the PRTs as outlined above, but also 
cooperation on ‘delivering the output in terms of better policing’ (Interview 54, 2011). 
With regard to the latter, what has happened is ‘a pretty sensible division of labour’ 
between NTM-A - which does the more industrial training of police officers, 
particularly those that have to operate in particularly difficult areas - and the more 
paramilitary end of policing, mainly through the use of Gendarmerie and Carabinieri. 
EUPOL, on the other hand, is settled into training and advising on ‘more 
conventional policing’ and helping the Afghans with the ‘institutional framework for 
policing’, i.e. how they are directed and politically controlled (Interview 54, 2011). 
This further raises division of labour and competition issues. This has been very 
central to NATO discussions for some time and is often debated in terms of ‘burden 
sharing’ within ISAF. However, the argument that the EU is providing more civilian 
capabilities as reciprocity for European Allies not performing the ‘hard military duties’ 
in Afghanistan is not one that is altogether accepted by actors at the 
political/strategic level. Or, as one official put it, ‘look at Afghanistan, a few years ago 
214 
 
there were more Eastern European troops than American, but now it is about 70%+ 
American. And it is not like the EU is compensating by doing the civilian side of 
things, far from it, and you saw yesterday the French announcing a massive increase 
(interlocutor’s sarcastic emphasis) of 80 trainers. This provokes derision in 
Washington’ (Interview 3, 2010). 
Of course, it is much harder to provide civilian personnel to operations, especially 
in areas where general security is as lacking as in Afghanistan. Furthermore, many 
contributing states do not have enough civilian capabilities for their own domestic 
benefit, let alone to send abroad. Therefore, how do you deploy people abroad when 
‘you do not even have enough for internal domestic purposes’ (Interview 5, 2010)? 
This, combined with the fact that EUPOL is not the top priority for the EU, helps to 
explain the relatively light footprint of 300 plus personnel on the ground and why ‘it 
has never been properly resourced’ (Interview 54, 2011). It is also one of the reasons 
why there has been a certain amount of ‘mission creep inside NATO’ in the sense 
that, when the NTM-A was established in 2009, one of the key decisions was to 
actually include police training. This task would have been ‘inconceivable’ for NATO 
to operationalise three years ago, but ‘to be perfectly blunt, those are the parts of the 
international community that could have delivered but have failed to do so’. There 
has been evolutionary pressure because it is quite clear that this needed to be done 
and, in the end, NATO took it on, ‘realising that NATO might not necessarily be the 
ideal organisation to take it on’. NATO is now also thinking about whether it should 
provide some sort of support in Afghanistan ‘to deliver broader rule of law functions’. 
But this is being driven by ‘reality and not any kind of rational strategic discussion 
about where NATO stops and the EU begins’ (Interview 5, 2010). The organisations 
are actually learning how to perform these tasks because they are undertaking them 
in the field. 
Complications with the sharing of intelligence are also a central issue. As with 
Kosovo and CP, passing intelligence is highly restricted around the terms of 
reference regarding such matters as laid out when the Berlin Plus arrangements 
were negotiated. Material deemed classified cannot be shared at the 27-28 level as 
these operations do not come under Berlin Plus regulations. There is ‘no framework 
to build cooperation’ and this, in turn, means that ‘it really is affecting the work there, 
even to the extent of putting people’s lives at risk. An agreement would make the 
work a lot easier if it were institutionalised’ (Interview 1, 2009a). This also has 
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implications for cooperation in terms of deconfliction because potentially both 
organisations could be ‘cutting across each other in terms of the work they are doing’ 
(Interview 16, 2010). 
This raises the same question posed for the two previous case studies, namely 
why and how does cooperation exist if it is blocked at the political/strategic level? 
The answer is also the same as it is for Kosovo and CP. All of the EU and NATO 
member states (including Turkey and Cyprus), plus all the contributing nations to 
either EUPOL or NATO/ISAF, ‘are fully aware that both commanders of EUPOL and 
NATO/ISAF are working together in the field’ (Interview 5, 2010). They are aware 
that ‘EUPOL authorities meet ISAF authorities and that they are working as closely 
as possible without formal agreements’ (Interview 5, 2010).  
As with Kosovo, all the empirical evidence gathered suggests that member states 
(including Turkey and Cyprus) ‘turn a blind eye’ to that cooperation as long as it 
exists below the political radar screens. A senior NATO official outlined this situation. 
‘They (Turkey) are happy to make the point here (NATO HQ) at the strategic level, 
diplomatically, but then turn a blind eye in Afghanistan’ (Interview 3, 2010). Turkey ‘in 
particular is flexible enough to let commanders on the ground work practically and 
under the radar screen’ (Interview 5, 2010). Turkish interlocutors not only pointed out 
that they were aware of cooperation on the ground, but went on to state that EU-
NATO cooperation is on even better terms than that between NATO and the UN. For 
example, ‘cooperation goes quite well in the field with EUPOL, which is, of course, a 
limited and very modest police mission in Afghanistan. At the day-to-day business 
level and at the staff level there is a lot of interaction with the EUPOL offices in 
Afghanistan and with ISAF. In addition, if you compare that with the UN, there is 
much more interaction between NATO and the EU’ (Interview 20, 2010). 
This ‘blind eye’ approach was further espoused by Cypriot interlocutors. Because 
Afghanistan is much more hostile than Kosovo, for example, they are extremely 
aware of the tension that blocking cooperation on the ground could cause at the 
political level. ‘It is very difficult for the other member states because, when you have 
German soldiers being killed in Afghanistan, it is hard to then say to them, well 
because of the Cyprus/Turkey issue… because of this huge political issue your 
soldier dies’ (Interview 42, 2011). The following remark demonstrates the Cypriot 
approach in this area. ‘When it comes to cooperation in the theatre, when we have 
EU lives at risk, we are flexible. We kind of somehow turn a blind eye because we 
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don’t want to keep causing problems. So there is this understanding’ (Interview 42, 
2011). Again, this comment shows there is evidence of norms or shared standards of 
behaviour developing.  
It is also important to note the Committee of Contributors for both NATO/ISAF and 
EUPOL. One theme you repeatedly hear from NATO political/strategic staff is the 
lack of inclusiveness you get from the EU regarding decision making for non-EU 
contributors to their operations as compared to NATO’s practices and norms. This is 
especially true with NATO/ISAF and the 20 non-NATO contributors to that operation. 
Turkey, as a member of NATO, is the most keen to raise this point. Of course, for 
both the EU and NATO, if you are not a full member then you cannot be a formal 
part of the decision making, but what Turkey wants is to be part of the EU ‘decision 
shaping’. In the ISAF operation, there are some 48 contributing states ‘discussing all 
the critical and classified information’. But this is not the case with the EU. Turkey is 
the ‘largest third country contributor to CSDP operations’ and yet, even there, Turkey 
does not feel it is ‘part of the EU decision shaping’ (Interview 20, 2010). 
Other interlocutors also pointed to this difference in the CoC arrangements and 
the difference in approach taken by the individual organisations. A point Turkey will 
make is that NATO, in handling operations, has been ‘amazingly open to non-
member partners. We have 20 non-NATO partners. They are fully involved in all of 
our discussions as well as all of our negotiations’. Interviews showed that this, 
indeed, has become the norm. ‘When we meet to talk about Afghanistan we meet at 
48. But there is no equivalent treatment of the non-EU contributors by the EU and 
they have not grappled with this, this idea of equivalence in the treatment of 
contributors who are not members of your organisation’ (Interview 3, 2010). Given 
this, it is important to highlight that there have been demonstrable incremental 
changes and some key pragmatic steps negotiated at the political/strategic level in 
order to enhance cooperation and effectiveness on the ground. In order to 
demonstrate this, four examples are given. Two are seen as positive pragmatic 
steps, while two are still areas of on-going debate and negotiation. 
 The two examples of positive pragmatic steps, both facilitated by the increased 
institutionalisation of cooperation beyond BP/AF, relate to the direct ability of 
NATO/ISAF to provide ‘in extremis’ support to EUPOL. Both of these examples have 
been negotiated and agreed during the course of the data collection for this 
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research. The first example is that of NATO/ISAF’s Blue Force Tracker System.95 
Initially, ‘EUPOL could not be included in NATO’s Blue Force tracking system’ 
(Interview 3, 2010). However, inclusion of EUPOL vehicles on the system has been 
achieved ‘after more than a year’s negotiation’. NATO only agreed for EUPOL 
vehicles to appear on the ISAF system ‘and not for NATO vehicles to appear on the 
EU system’ as a result of NATO’s ‘inability to pass classified information to the EU’ 
(Interview 13, 2010). 
The second example is the change in the Operations Plan (Op/Plan) agreed 
through the NAC. The NATO/ISAF Op/Plan was altered in order to ‘allow ISAF to 
provide more support to EUPOL’ (Interview 54, 2011); in other words, ISAF to 
EUPOL, rather than EUPOL to a range of nations as was the case prior to the 
change. According to a senior level member of the Danish Foreign Ministry, ‘there 
has been a couple of incremental pragmatic steps that have been taken at a sort of 
non-political level to increase cooperation, one being the changing of the OP/PLAN 
in Afghanistan for ISAF. This allows them locally to negotiate security protection 
agreements with EUPOL to the reconstruction teams in ISAF’ (Interview 38, 
2011).The interlocutor also suggested that Turkey, in particular, sees this change in 
the Op/Plan as an example of a major concession. This was also noted by a Turkish 
senior member of their NATO delegation. ‘We are looking for ways where we can let 
ISAF provide security for EUPOL so that EUPOL can really institutionalise itself in 
some remote parts out of Kabul. We are always showing flexibility on the ground with 
the hopes of some reciprocity in Brussels, but we never receive it’ (Interview 20, 
2010). Clearly, both the logic of calculation and of appropriateness is underpinning 
these incremental changes. Furthermore, this is much more than just militaries or 
operational personnel working in-theatre and learning how to deconflict or interact. 
There is also real evidence of learning how to calibrate these incremental changes 
with the various political red lines.  
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 The Blue Force Tracking System is a ‘vehicle-mounted system which allows all of the vehicles in a 
unit to see themselves and each other, to navigate regardless of conditions, and to communicate by 
text-based instant messaging. The command post has the same information in real-time and troops in 
the field or commanders can mark hazards like IEDs as they are found. It creates tremendous 
situational awareness while preventing friendly-fire casualties, and can be quickly swapped in and out 
of vehicles as needed’. Please see http://www.globecommsystems.com/pdf/2009-01-Milsatcom-
Scardino.pdf (last accessed December 2013). 
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This is an example of an arduous negotiation which, in reality, ‘has not really 
helped very much’ (Interview 38, 2011). In interviews with Cypriot representatives, 
their argument was that ‘actually in 2008 we suggested here [at the PSC] that 
EUPOL and ISAF should have tactical and technical arrangements for cooperation’. 
The interlocutor suggested it was Turkey that actually ‘blocked’ this proposal in the 
NAC initially (this could not be confirmed). The change in the Op/Plan was eventually 
agreed in December 2010 and it was ‘hailed’ as a success by the UK primarily. The 
Cypriot interlocutor made it clear that they ‘had to remind everyone that actually their 
plan was a lot more aspiring but it was blocked’ (Interview 42, 2011). Although this 
change is ‘a small step forward’, it is clear that these, seemingly, very practical forms 
of cooperation ‘take ages’ and are for ‘human safety reasons only’ (Interview 50, 
2011).  
The two examples of negative negotiations relate to the areas of ‘Counter 
Improvised Explosive Devices’ (CIEDs) and ‘Medical Support’. With regard to both 
these issues, CIED information and intelligence has only been shared on an informal 
and local basis. Recent NATO non-papers (the product of joint work with the EUMS) 
on CIED and Medical Support were viewed by one nation with ‘astonishment and 
disappointment’ at the failure to ‘respect their sensitivities and the Agreed 
Framework for NATO-EU activities’ (EU-NATO Friction Document 2010). A French 
initiative to deploy a CIED ‘Theatre Exploitation Laboratory’ (a capability which, at 
the time of writing, is not currently available to ISAF) was objected to by one NATO 
Ally as it had ‘been procured and funded by the European Defence Agency (EDA)’ of 
which Cyprus is a member (EU-NATO Friction Document 'Interview 13', 2010). In 
other words, this objection was very closely related to the on-going Turkish failure to 
become a member of the EDA and their apprehension to recognise the state of 
Cyprus. 
It is of value to discuss the future of Afghanistan vis-à-vis EU-NATO cooperation, 
as seen by those officials working at the political/strategic level, and the potential for 
any formal relationship to develop. Based on all of the interviews conducted at this 
level, and even those at the staff and operational level, never once was the 
possibility ever mentioned of having a formal EU relationship established for 
cooperation in Afghanistan. There are a few reasons for this. First and foremost, a 
resolution to the divided island of Cyprus is not expected by anyone any time soon 
(confirmed by many EU and NATO interviews). Therefore, overcoming the basic 
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‘participation’ problems of EU-NATO cooperation at the macro level is also unlikely. 
There have been no discussions to bring cooperation in Afghanistan under the Berlin 
Plus Agreed Framework, or to establish a formal framework of any kind.  
Second, although a revamped civilian-military framework would be necessary for 
cooperation where the EU and NATO are operating in the same space, but 
performing different missions, clearly the current political situation means that 
developing a new agreed Framework that includes civ/mil modalities is being ‘driven 
by reality and not any kind of rational strategic discussion about where NATO stops 
and the EU begins’ (Interview 54, 2011). To date, EUPOL is having a hard time 
‘filling the civilian number for missions’. This means that an EUPOL with only 300 
plus personnel is not enough to overcome the current political deadlock to negotiate 
a new framework for civ/mil cooperation (Interview 5, 2010).  
 
International staff Level 
 
Like the previous case studies, there are three distinct areas that need to be 
examined at this level of analysis: The NATO Sec/Gen and EU/HR relationship, the 
international staffs working in both organisations, and the office of the DSACEUR. 
This section will look at all three of these relationships in turn.  
With regard to Javier Solana and the approach to cooperation over Afghanistan, 
his address to the ‘Afghanistan Conference’ (31 March 2009) is insightful. At this 
event, he noted the ‘strategic importance’ of a stable Afghanistan and that the EU 
had ‘contributed to this process since the beginning’. He went on to define the EU 
role and future engagement in Afghanistan. In terms of the civ/mil approach to 
tackling Afghan development, Solana noted that ‘solutions in Afghanistan will be 
political, not military’ and he spoke of an EU approach that is ‘comprehensive’ in 
nature. He noted that (at that time) EU Member States also had 27,000 soldiers ‘on 
the ground in the framework of Afghanistan’ (Javier Solana address to Afghan 
Conference 31 March 2009). In this address, Solana tried to position EUPOL 
Afghanistan as ‘[T]he European Union’s most visible engagement in the field of 
governance’ (ibid). However, no attempt was offered to address the difficulties of 
cooperation through informal means. In a second press release document, the 
‘importance’ of EUPOL is again outlined and Solana mentioned that ‘EU Member 
220 
 
States are also providing half of NATO’s ISAF troops’ (Summary of remarks after 
Solana’s visit to Afghanistan, 21 July 2009).96  
With regard to pragmatic steps for better EU-NATO cooperation, Javier Solana 
had pushed for a change to the ISAF Op/Plan ‘since EUPOL started in 2007’, a 
process that was only finalised under the tenure of both Rasmussen and Baroness 
Ashton (Interview 38, 2011). NATO Sec/Gen de Hoop Scheffer was also helpful in 
pushing small pragmatic steps. One example was his advocating informal PSC-NAC 
meetings; however, when this format was no longer permitted, due to sensitivities by 
certain member states, it was a source of ‘great frustration’ and was one ‘of the 
lowest points in [his] mandate’ (Interview 40, 2011). 
Both the Sec/Gen and the EUSR have stated on occasion that cooperation in 
Afghanistan ‘needs to be stepped up’.97 However, obvious differences in their 
approach to accomplishing this objective are noticeable. Over the last two years, 
there has been a ‘real determined effort’ on the part of the NATO SEC/Gen 
Rasmussen and the High Rep to increase cooperation between the two 
organisations (Interview 38, 2011). With regard to Baroness Ashton, one interlocutor 
spoke of her early experience with EU-NATO cooperation in Afghanistan in the 
following way: ‘We invite Baroness Ashton to our meetings on Afghanistan and 
sometimes she comes. We had one last week in Istanbul with Defence Ministers and 
she didn’t come, or she sends a representative but that representative doesn’t talk. 
So although the EU has a seat at the table, they are not exactly consulting with 
NATO’ (Interview 3, 2010). On 26 April 2010, the General Secretariat Press Office 
released a ‘Background’ document which contains a section on Afghanistan. It notes 
that: 
 
The Council, in a joint session of foreign and defence ministers, 
will be briefed by the High Representative on the six-monthly 
report on the implementation of the Action Plan for Enhanced 
Engagement in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Ministers will then be 
joined by the Secretary-General of NATO, Anders Fogh 
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 It should be noted that this percentage, although true at the time of the speech, is no longer 
accurate at the time of writing, whereby EU Member State contributions to NATO/ISAF are just under 
25%. 
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 See http://www.acus.org/natosource/rasmussen-and-ashton-discuss-bosnia-and-eu-nato-
cooperation (last accessed January 2014). 
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Rasmussen, for an informal discussion on military and civilian 
cooperation on policing, on EU-NATO cooperation in 
Afghanistan, including on training (Background, 26 April 2010 
with Defence Ministers).98 
 
Just a couple of months after this, as part of a press release congratulating the new 
Head of Mission for EUPOL, Ashton commented that EUPOL will ‘seek even closer 
cooperation with NATO and its training mission’.99 This remark was in obvious 
connection to the standing up of ISAF’s NTM-A in Afghanistan. 
A speech given by Ashton to the Commission on 15 December 2010 also 
demonstrates her awareness of the problems regarding EU-NATO cooperation and 
reveals her ‘concrete and pragmatic’ approach to the issue. In reporting back to the 
Commission on NATO’s Lisbon Summit, she notes that Afghanistan is an ‘important 
area of cooperation between the EU and NATO’ and how she ‘took the initiative of 
sending NATO a set of concrete measures to reinforce EU-NATO cooperation’. She 
goes on to discuss how both she and her NATO counterpart Rasmussen have 
received ‘mandates’ for ‘reinforcing EU-NATO relations’. Finally, she mentions that 
EU Defence ministers ‘warmly welcomed’ progress in this area and she further sited 
‘helicopter availability, Counter Improvised Explosive Devices’ and ‘Medical Support’ 
as examples of this cooperation, cooperation that has ‘real operational 
consequences’ for those serving in Afghanistan.100 
Obvious differences in the two approaches are evident, however. Interviews 
revealed that Rasmussen’s approach is ‘more active and a bit blunter’ (Interview 54, 
2011). The Sec/Gen’s answer to EU-NATO difficulties are centred on what is 
sometimes referred to as the ‘Palma Package’ (Interview 38, 2011).101 In this 
approach, Rasmussen has made three clear suggestions to the EU to improve the 
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 The full text of this document can be located here: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/113942.pdf (last 
accessed January 2014). 
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 Taken from the announcement by Ramussen at an informal meeting of EU Defence Ministers’ 
meeting in Palma de Mallorca, Spain on 24 and 25 February 2010. 
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situation. In order to have better relations, the EU must ‘make moves to 
accommodate some concerns of NATO Allies’. In order to do this, he suggests that 
(1) The EU should include non-EU military contributors to the CoC decision-making 
processes, like NATO does in ISAF for its contributors. (2) The EU should conclude 
a security agreement with Turkey, and (3) the EU should conclude an arrangement 
between Turkey and EDA. For NATO’s part, he suggests that ‘it should be accepted 
that Cyprus is actually a country that deserves a seat at the table’. He finished his 
remarks by stating ‘I am not a diplomat so I put it bluntly, the question is how we get 
from here to there’. Further comments by a senior NATO official also testify to this 
analysis:102 
 
Well, I am not sure that the Sec/Gen has done a naming and 
shaming approach. He just said he had a really clear vision 
about what should be done; which is about the security 
agreements and the association with the EDA. On the other 
hand, an acceptance by Turkey that occasionally NATO will 
meet with all 27 member states of the EU. That is basically the 
deal that he has been trying to strike for some time. So far we 
have not achieved that. I think there is a difference where the 
Sec/Gen maybe more active and maybe a bit blunter in his 
approach on this, but that is his style, it is not particularly a 
strategy (Interview 54, 2011). 
 
Clearly, he has also put pressure on Turkey; for example, his visit to Ankara on 7 
October 2010 in order to ‘persuade Turkey to lift its veto on Greek Cyprus’ possible 
role in European Union-NATO cooperation’.103 On this visit, Afghanistan was also the 
main topic of discussion in Ankara (ibid). Furthermore, at a daily press briefing (15 
September 2010), the Sec/Gen reiterated the basic goals of the ‘Pelma Package’, 
strengthening his basic belief that it is ‘absurd that the EU and NATO operate 
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 Thursday, October 7, 2010 ANKARA - Hürriyet Daily News: 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=nato-chief-seeks-turkey8217s-
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together in the same theatres but have not been able to conclude security 
agreements’ in order that both organisations can ‘assist each other’.104  
 The analysis outlined in the section with regard to staff-to-staff contacts is, in 
many ways, similar to the analysis of Kosovo. However, further details are relevant to 
this particular case study. As stated above, staff-to-staff contacts are another key 
area of synergy while still keeping in mind their propensity for ‘institutional fatigue’ 
when fighting political sensitivities. The disorder and reconfiguring of key EU 
institutions in light of the Lisbon Treaty have made staff-to-staff contacts somewhat 
more challenging in terms of cross-coordinating at the appropriate levels. As one 
NATO senior member of staff revealed: 
 
There is one area where, for me, things have gone backwards. I 
mean for my first two years here, we were able to meet up 
every six weeks or so at the staff-to-staff level with the EU and 
talk through how well things are going in Afghanistan. Or 
something on Kosovo or a residual issue on Bosnia. I mean, we 
were not able to do sort of formal strategic planning or reach 
decisions. But as a means of making sure, at least at the HQ 
level, that we knew what each other were doing it was really 
helpful. I have to say that, in the aftermath of the Lisbon Treaty, 
we have definitely gone backwards, and I think that what I 
perceive is continuing turmoil inside the EU as to who is doing 
what. I mean, it is very difficult for me to say now, who is it that I 
should talk to (Interview 54, 2011). 
 
Added to this confusion are the difficulties that cooperation between military and 
civilian staff sometimes brings. Formulas like the ‘Transatlantic Events’ and the 
informal PSC-NAC meetings, for example, are ‘still not done at the military level’ 
(Interview 38, 2011). Therefore, this political blocking also directly impacts on 
attempts at informal staff-to-staff contacts at the military level. For example, ’they still 
can’t even have joint trips between the MILREPS of the EU and NATO or away days 
together. Every time it is raised to a formal political level, even away days seem to be 
considered formal, then they are stopped’ (Interview 38, 2011). However, one 
interlocutor was of the opinion that cooperation between military and civilian staff was 
good, but this was mainly ‘on the ground’ (Interview 23, 2010). Often, a certain 
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amount of tribalism also seems to be evident with staff-to-staff contacts. For example, 
‘alongside all the productive informal cooperation, a corresponding number of people 
think they are doing the right thing by resisting NATO-EU cooperation. I suspect a 
natural tribalism instinct makes some people genuinely mistrust the other side’ 
(Interview 14, 2010). 
Again, it is clear that ‘operational experience and reality’, not the ‘theoretical 
debates’ at the staff level, are driving ‘movement’ between the two organisations; and 
‘in particular, by operational necessities on the ground in Afghanistan’ (Interview 54, 
2011). When asked how international staffs (working in Brussels) facilitate EUPOL’s 
connection to the PRTs out in the Afghan provinces - as well as the technical 
arrangements that need to be implemented to permit this kind of cooperation - one 
answer was especially revealing: ‘We would enable that cooperation, and if need be, 
provide protection. But it is done mainly by local command. I don’t regard it as a 
majorly strategic issue’ (Interview 54, 2011). So, while there is an attempt to 
institutionalise cooperation in-theatre, driven by those at the staff level in Brussels 
(precisely because they are aware of the problems that may arise if they try to 
resolve these issues in Brussels and closer to the political sensitivities), there are 
also examples of trying to institutionalise cooperation through other mechanisms. 
The best example of this is the attempts to ‘codify’ NATO/ISAF CoC meetings. 
However, it must be said the same has not been reciprocated at the EU level to the 
same degree as it has been in ISAF (Interview 54, 2011). The change in the Op/Plan 
for NATO/ISAF has also been agreed with the intended output of enhanced staff-to-
staff level contacts and should ‘certainly provide the opportunity for better liaison and 
dialogue’. Moreover, ‘it has catalysed a fresh series of informal meetings between the 
CMPD/CPCC and SHAPE’ (EU-NATO Friction document 2011). 
A further sign of institutionalised informal cooperation can be observed through 
institutions where a strict interpretation of the BP/AF should exclude operations, such 
as Afghanistan (and Kosovo for that matter). The EU cell at SHAPE was ‘established 
to assist in future Berlin Plus operations’ (Interview 46, 2011); yet, interviews 
conducted show that when EU personnel ‘get approached by SHAPE for 
involvement or connectivity’ in Afghanistan, they do try to ‘facilitate’ cooperation, 
even if that is ‘beyond their remit’ (Interview 16, 2010). The involvement of the EU 
Cell in terms of facilitating cooperation in Afghanistan is further evidence of how the 
BP/AF is used as a reference point in operations that fall outside the formal 
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framework. A direct example of this can be seen in relation to the arduous 
negotiations over EUPOL’s inclusion on the Blue Force Tracker system. Again, the 
EU Cell at SHAPE was instrumental and ‘an awful lot of traffic was being facilitated 
and a lot of advances were made by virtue of the facilitation of the EU Cell’ (Interview 
16, 2010). Although both the EU Cell at SHAPE and the NATO liaison arrangements 
at EUMS were set up in ‘preparation of EU operations having recourse to NATO 
assets and capabilities under Berlin Plus arrangements’,105 in reality both have 
become institutions that facilitate learning and informal cooperation between both the 
EU and NATO outside of the formal BP/AF context. In short, they are both learning 
how to facilitate informal cooperation in operations that collectively affect both 
organisations. 
Finally, the role of the DSACEUR is fundamental to the facilitation of informal 
cooperation regarding Afghanistan, most notably through the role of ‘Strategic 
Coordinator’ detailed above. Again, much of what was outlined in the section with 
regard to Kosovo is also true for Afghanistan. However, there are specific examples 
of this facilitation in the context of EUPOL and NATO/ISAF cooperation. The 
research clearly shows that there are ‘lots of practical examples of people in the front 
lines making things work’. However, it is the DSACEUR that has really ‘pushed for 
practical cooperation’. As a member of the EU Cell at SHAPE put it, ‘if the 
DSACEUR was not involved, it is very difficult to see where the impetus would have 
come from.’ In other words, if you are waiting for the political pressure or political 
declarations to make things go ahead, ‘well, they would not have gone ahead’ 
(Interview 9, 2010). DSACEUR General McColl, in particular, was very ‘frustrated’ 
with the lack of agreements in Afghanistan. Cooperation is being driven by 
operational necessity on the ground and, therefore, incremental changes in the EU-
NATO relationship are less affected by theoretical ideas and debates regarding EU-
NATO divisions of labour. 
However, a number of key ‘friction points’ still remain regarding cooperation in 
Afghanistan, all of which DSACEUR ‘takes up’ when he goes into theatre (Interview 
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13, 2010). Some of these issues have been mentioned above: Blue Tracker, CIED, 
Medical. However, there is also the issue of transport into Afghanistan. If an EU 
Police Head of Mission needs to go to Afghanistan, they have to fly on NATO flights; 
however, due to chain of command issues, the EU Head of Mission is ‘very low 
priority’ and he may spend the day in the airport and not flying (Interview 4, 2010). 
According to interviews with the office of the DSACEUR: 
 
DSACEUR goes to theatre, because he is the NATO strategic 
coordinator for the EU, he make a point of going to see EUPOL, 
to call on them and say what are your issues with Afghanistan, 
then he’ll go see the Dept. Commander out there and say, right 
these are the issues with EUPOL and we need to try and work 
them out. DSACEUR will keep that dialogue going in a way that 
they probably can’t because it’s quite difficult for them. 
And when EUPOL wanted to review their mission, CPCC (Mr 
Kees KLOMPENHOUWER) came here with his plan of 
instructions. DSACEUR then facilitated him getting into theatre 
and talking to the key personalities in-theatre, namely the NATO 
Training Mission (NTM-A). This way he could recast his method 
and review it and make sure there was proper complementarity 
between the NTM-A police mission and the EUPOL mission 
(Interview 13, 2010). 
 
More than one official testified to the value the office of DSACEUR plays in mitigating 
the problems that occur while operating under an informal framework. From a NATO 
point of view, interlocutors observed problems within the EU with regard to getting 
their own departments to talk to each other, never mind to NATO. For example, a 
member of the DSACEUR’s office noted that the ‘CMPD came to talk to us about 
Afghanistan. It was us that suggested and insisted that they get the CPCC along as 
well, with the HQs that actually run the operation, because we suspected that the 
CMPD would not have invited them along. So it’s really anything we can to get them 
to try and talk to each other and try to move things forward’ (Interview 14, 2010).  
 
Operational Level 
 
It is important to start this section with a clarification of the institutional complexity at 
the operational level within which the EU and NATO operate in Afghanistan. 
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Although, broadly speaking, Afghanistan is a case where both organisations are in 
the same mission space doing different types of operations - i.e. the EU is running a 
civilian operation and NATO is performing a military function - when one looks 
closer, the situation on the ground it is more complex. This dynamic makes this case 
study particularly interesting because, in many ways, it is a hybrid of both the 
counter-piracy case study and that of Kosovo.  
The EU/EUPOL operation is easier to outline. Unlike EULEX, EUPOL is a rather 
small, non-executive civilian mission consisting of only 350 international staff and 
200 local staff. The current EUPOL Head of Mission is Karl Ake Roghe (since August 
2012) and previously Jukka Savolainen (from 15 July 2010). Yet, there are some 
similarities to EULEX. It is overwhelmingly focused on civilian policing but it also has 
‘arrangements that will ensure appropriate interaction with the wider criminal justice 
system under Afghan ownership’. It also takes the MMA approach whereby the 
mission ‘monitors, mentors, advises and trains at the level of the Afghan Ministry of 
Interior’ (EUPOL Afghanistan, 2012). The overall tasks and strategic objectives are 
outlined above and there is no need to restate them. However, NATO’s presence in 
Afghanistan is somewhat more complex than that of KFOR in Kosovo and therefore 
needs some clarification. 
NATO, in fact, operates under different configurations in Afghanistan. Firstly, there 
is ISAF, which provides the overall security in the theatre. This is NATO plus: the 
number of ISAF troops has grown from the initial 5,000 to more than 130,000 troops 
from 48 countries (at its peak), including all 28 NATO member nations (NATO/ISAF, 
2012). There is the NATO Senior Civilian Representative (NATO SCR: currently 
Ambassador Maurits R. Jochems), who is the formal representative of NATO in 
Afghanistan. The role of the NATO SR is to work closely with ISAF and to provide a 
direct channel of communication between ‘the theatre, NATO HQ in Brussels, and 
the North Atlantic Council, the Alliance's principal decision-making body’ (NATO 
Website, 2012). 
Then there is also COM-ISAF (currently General Joseph F. Dunford (USA)), who 
is also COM-US Forces.106 Finally, there is the training mission (NTM-A), which is a 
large mission of more than 2000 people providing the recruitment, training and 
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equipment for the security forces. Lieutenant General Daniel P. Bolger (USA) 
assumed command of NTM-A in November 2011. Prior to Bolger assuming 
command, this post was held by Lieutenant. General William B. Caldwell.107 108  
Therefore, there are three layers of NATO representatives in Afghanistan 
operating within a more complex and hostile environment to that of Kosovo, while at 
the same time a mixture of both civilian and military personnel. There are civilian, 
military (NATO Plus), and the training mission (which has a specific mandate). 
EUPOL has a relationship with all three of them. With NTM-A, the relationship is 
‘very formalised’ through the institutional set-up that ‘together’ has been put in place 
(Interview 61, 2011). With ISAF, the relationship is based on a number of MOUs, the 
aspect of which will be explained in detail below. To sum up this institutional 
complexity in-theatre, there is a dynamic whereby the EU and NATO/ISAF are doing 
very different tasks, while cohabitating in the same area of operations. At the same 
time, we have EUPOL and NTM-A both in the specific area of police training. With 
respect to the latter, there exists a situation where both organisations are performing 
a similar function in the same mission space. This raises obvious questions of 
competition, overlap and redundancies with regard to the specific role of police 
training, as already noted.  
What this case study demonstrates is that, although both organisations were 
aware of this potential for competition or duplicative efforts from the outset - and 
concerns were raised both within the individual organisations as well as between 
them – when the NTM-A operation stood up it became ‘much clearer’ with regard to 
which roles ‘each mission should take and the coordination both at Brussels level, 
HQ level, and in-theatre was amazingly fruitful’ (Interview 60, 2011). This could not 
have happened without a degree of learning and socialisation in-theatre between 
EUPOL and NTM-A/ISAF underpinning this incremental process. Therefore, this 
section of the case study mainly looks at cooperation between EUPOL and NTM-A, 
but this coordination/cooperation is placed within the much larger context of 
EU/EUPOL-NATO/ISAF relations with the latter providing general security within 
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Afghanistan, which fundamentally allows EUPOL to perform its own tasks in 
fulfilment of its mandate.  
 At the theatre level, in the first couple of months after NTM-A was established, 
there was a lot of ‘dissonance’ between the missions. It was not clear where EUPOL 
started and where it ended. This was also the case for NTM-A and, therefore, the 
division of labour between EUPOL and NTM-A was originally problematic, i.e. there 
was uncertainty for both organisations. After six months in-theatre (summer 2010), 
however, a ‘number of discussions started taking place’ with SHAPE being involved 
as well as NATO SCR, CPCC, and the PSC. This allowed for communication to take 
place between the EUPOL HoM and Com-NTM-A and quite a clear common 
understanding developed. Not only for the HoM and COM-NTM-A, but also from the 
‘institutional side’. It became clear that EUPOL had to be complementary to the other 
players and that EUPOL ‘cannot be seen as a competitor’ (Interview 61, 2011). 
Cooperation/coordination started with feelings of reluctance on both sides - ‘NTM-A 
arriving with the idea that EUPOL was totally useless and not able to do anything’ 
and on the EUPOL side the fear that ‘a military organisation is coming in-theatre with 
huge means and potentially making us [EUPOL] irrelevant’. However, through 
different ‘official and informal means’, both organisations turned this around and 
were able to ‘define much better the roles of each mission and organisation’ 
(Interview 60, 2011). In other words, a substantial amount of norm development and 
shared standards in behaviour began to emerge and both EUPOL and NTM-A 
learned how to complement each other.  
One key example of this was the Strategic International Afghan National Police 
(ANP) Development Symposium at the NATO Allied Joint Force Command 
Headquarters (JFC HQ) in Brunssum on 26-27 January 2011. This event led directly 
to the EU and NATO’s ability to better define their respective roles. Representatives 
from NATO and non-NATO ISAF Troop Contributing Nations, United Nations, 
European Union, Afghanistan Government, ISAF Command Structure and other 
International key organisations all attended this symposium. A statement by the 
participants released at the end of this symposium stated that ‘[we] are promoting a 
continually improving unity of effort and a commitment to coordinate, collaborate and 
cooperate across all stakeholders’ (the participants of the Strategic International 
ANP Development Symposium, 2011). This was a ‘significant event’, where the roles 
of each organisation were ‘officially’ announced and then internalised by the Afghans 
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and the internationals present. They were, therefore, ‘really helpful’ (Interview 60, 
2011): ‘it was a joint declaration at Brunssum, by JFC Brunssum together with 
EUPOL and NTM-A. It was not so much the EU or NATO announcing, but the 
missions [EUPOL & NTM-A] announcing this. What led to Brunssum was a lot of 
informal meetings and the desire to speak the same language’ (Interview 60, 2011). 
The Senior Police Advisor to the Deputy Commander Police to NTM-A also 
commented that he believed Brunssum was a ‘very positive step towards highlighting 
to the international community a new spirit of cooperation’ and that it was essential in 
pushing towards ‘improving unity of effort and a commitment of all stakeholders to 
collaborate and coordinate’ (Shourie, 2011, p. 2). 
Before turning to the framework and technical arrangements for how the two 
organisations coordinate/cooperate in-theatre and the various points of contact 
between the two missions, a few words regarding the geography and space in which 
both these organisations perform their tasks is appropriate. In the provinces, EUPOL 
is ‘completely dependent’ on PRTs for its compounds. Not financially dependent, but 
for ‘supply and over all security’. In Kabul, things are slightly different; EUPOL has a 
separate standalone and quite large accommodation, office space and recreation 
space compound. It is ‘independent’ and has its own security company. It is not 
‘dependent on the military in any way shape or form other than any organisation 
would be dependent on the military if things went horribly wrong’ (Interview 59, 
2011). 
Day-to-day compound security and movement security is carried out by EUPOL 
itself and, unlike EULEX in Kosovo, EUPOL does not occupy positions in the Afghan 
national police, nor does it have any authority in that position, i.e. it does not have an 
executive mandate. It is mentoring and training as well as the rule-of-law pillar that 
looks at human rights and gender. Alternatively, the NTM-A HQ is inside the ISAF 
HQ compound and, therefore, NTM-A ‘are an aspect of ISAF’ (Interview 59, 2011). In 
Kabul, EUPOL has its own private security company and its staff travel by their own 
means whereas, in the provinces, ‘this is not the case’ (Interview 60, 2011). Once 
again, this shows that EUPOL is clearly dependent on NATO/ISAF assets and 
capabilities in order to achieve its objectives. 
The overriding feature of EU-NATO coordination/cooperation in Afghanistan is the 
fact that it is based on informal arrangements. The same document compiled and 
sent from the office of the DSACEUR helps to illustrate NATO/ISAF and EUPOL 
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cooperation; remembering that ‘in ISAF there is no Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) between ISAF and EUPOL’ and that ‘EUPOL has had to enter into 14 bilateral 
arrangements with individual nations running PRTs on a bilateral EU to nation basis’ 
(Interview 13, 2010). With this context in place, it is possible to outline the technical 
arrangements and the evolution of these arrangements negotiated at the operational 
level. The change in the Op/Plan outlined above further allowed for 
coordination/cooperation to progress in-theatre. The NATO/ISAF Op/Plan was 
altered in order to ‘allow ISAF to provide more support to EUPOL’ (Interview 54, 
2011). In other words, ISAF to EUPOL rather than EUPOL to a range of nations, as 
was the case prior to the change.  
There are now technical agreements, somewhat based on the model of Kosovo, 
between KFOR and EULEX. These refer to ‘mutual support’ - although, in reality, 
support would only come from ISAF, but it is still called ‘mutual support’. This covers 
technical issues like C-IED, exchange of classified information, in extremis support; 
‘procedures to ensure that it is working when we need the support and also medevac 
and access to ISAF medical facilities. But yes, in extremis support for us [EUPOL] is 
the most important’. This is a ‘significant improvement and a significant shift’ 
(Interview 60, 2011). One official noted that ‘until the ISAF Op-Plan was changed, we 
only had one general agreement, one MoU. But we are about to finalise a MoU 
specifically between ISAF-EUPOL with several annexes and it will be signed by the 
EUPOL HoM and the ISAF Chief of Staff (COS). What we are doing now is with 
ISAF and not with the PRT’s/Lead Nations’ (Interview 60, 2011). When the 
interlocutor was pressed on whether this new MoU was likely to be received with 
resistance or even blockage from the Brussels level, they reply was, ‘now it is with 
the legal advisors who are checking the technicalities and so far there have not been 
any problems, we have not received any indication that they will block it because we 
have done everything we can to keep it at the theatre level and not the 
political/strategic level’ (Interview 60, 2011). 
A senior official supporting the HoM EUPOL also corroborated this point of view. 
When asked if there was pressure coming from Brussels for the mission to keep 
cooperation as quiet as possible, the response was, ‘actually the opposite! Here in 
Afghanistan nothing works without ISAF/NATO. The EU would not be able to 
function or deliver without the support and the cooperation of NATO’ (Interview 61, 
2011). However, the official also pointed out that the change in the Op/Plan had not 
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really changed much at the local level dramatically and mentioned that NATO/ISAF 
‘are not here to be a supporter and enabler for EUPOL; they are here for their own 
mandate. Obviously, if EUPOL should not be able to fight off any would-be attackers 
on the compound, the Afghans would be called in, but obviously in parallel with 
ISAF/NATO’ (Interview 61, 2011). Given this increasingly routine and institutionalised 
coordination at the operational level, it is also germane to outline the various levels 
of contact between the missions which facilitate this coordination/cooperation. The 
following section outlines some of these points of contact. As we saw in the Kosovo 
case, these institutional contacts have been increasingly systematised over time. 
First, HoM-EUPOL (Jukka Savolainen) has ‘eventually built up a relationship’ with 
the COM NTM-A Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell from 2010 onwards. 
Contacts at this senior level are ‘at least weekly’, ‘face-to-face’ and/or ‘a telephone 
meeting’. They attend ‘jointly’ many of the donor meetings or coordination events 
hosted by the Afghan Ministry of Interior (Interview 59, 2011). Contacts are also 
‘really frequent’ between HoM-EUPOL and Deputy NTM-A Commander, probably 
every week or two weeks. At the level below this, it is every week or several times a 
week. There are also NTM-A Liaison Officers and ISAF Liaison Officers with some 
personnel claiming to have ‘almost daily contact’ (Interview 60, 2011).  
Caldwell and Jukka Savolainen clearly understand where each other are coming 
from. This goes back to the Brunssum conferences, where they ‘began to sing from 
the same hymn sheet and things visibly seemed to get better from there on’ 
(Interview 59, 2011). When it comes to in-theatre contacts, there are a lot of lines 
between the key players and the different institutions. There are many lines you can 
connect between institutions and personalities, but it is not done with the formal AF 
and that is what is really missing (Interview 61, 2011). The official added, ‘our 
colleagues at the Brussels staff level are less informed and less coordinated than we 
are at the theatre level’ (Interview 61, 2011). An official at the EU’s CPCC in 
Brussels also confirmed there were two ‘informal PSC meetings’ where the Com-
NTMA was invited to ‘give a briefing and to have a discussion’. One of these 
meetings was as recent as ‘the end of October 2011’. When asked if the reciprocal 
meeting had ever taken place, i.e. an informal NAC meeting whereby HoM EUPOL 
attended, the answer was ‘no, not that I know of’ (Interview 60, 2011). 
Similar to the case of counter-piracy (for example, SHADE), much of EU-NATO 
coordination and cooperation in Afghanistan is embedded within the context of large 
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donor meetings that include many of the key international actors involved in 
conjunction with the Afghan Ministry of the Interior. Therefore, besides the regular 
contacts between HoM EUPOL and COM-NTM-A, some of these regular donor 
meetings include: the Ministerial Development Board (MDB), the International Police 
Coordination Board (IPCB), the Senior Police Advisory Group (SPAG), the 
Institutional and Police Policy Development Board (IPPD), the International Advisory 
Council (IAC), and the Ministry of the Interior International Coordination Cell (MIIC). 
There are also NTM-A led meetings referred to as ‘deep dives… where they really 
look into the details and the blockages and everything, and generally EUPOL would 
be involved in those at quite a high level’ (Interview 59, 2011).  
However, this embedding of EU-NATO personnel within these donor structures 
has led to a more ‘formal type’ of cooperation and coordination (although, obviously, 
without any agreed political framework) with a very ‘sophisticated and complex’ set of 
institutional steps put in place in-theatre, which ensures that coordination and 
planning is ‘as efficient as it can be’: 
 
Ok, there is no unity of command on the macro level, but on the 
micro level we are doing all of this in a formal way. All of these 
bodies have been set up in a formal way with the agreement of 
the Afghan authorities, all the missions have signed up to this 
and we have full membership of these bodies, all of these 
bodies are formal bodies with formal decision taking powers. So 
all of the decisions that they take are later on implemented and 
have huge financial and political consequences. So we are 
talking about very formal settings in-theatre, we are not talking 
about informal cooperation here (Interview 61, 2011). 
 
The IPPD is one good example of how a donor meeting contributes to this less 
‘politically visible’ sort of coordination/cooperation. The process itself is led by the 
Afghans and, because it is Afghan-led, that allows ‘both NTM-A and EUPOL to support 
it without it looking like one is sitting in the pocket of the other’. One has a level of 
consensus because one is operating on ‘neutral ground’ and, therefore, within that 
construct ‘we are developing policies that allow us to divide up what we are doing’ 
(Interview 62, 2011). 
Of course, because coordination and cooperation is informal, at least at the macro 
level, processes are still very dependent on relationships and personalities. 
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Furthermore, because this refers to both civilian and military personnel trying to 
coordinate and cooperate, performing both related and dissimilar tasks in a shared 
area of operations, different cultures, tribalism and operating procedures can come 
into sharp relief; or, as one official put it, ‘I mean it was perfectly pleasant at the 
individual relationship level, but you would always know that, as a member of 
EUPOL, you were sort of viewed as not delivering and a bit haphazard; you were not 
military so you had holidays and that sort of things that soldiers don’t have’ (Interview 
59, 2011). 
These misunderstandings or fractures due to different operating procedures or 
personalities are often felt the most during periods of rotation, especially at the HoM or 
COM level. Often, when there is a changeover in staff, there are people who come in 
and say, ‘this is a new regime, it will be this way and we are going to do things right 
now’; but it is only after the new member of staff makes two or three mistakes do they 
realise they have to start talking to people that have been there for some time 
(Interview 59, 2011, Interview 61, 2011). However, it was also suggested that this 
dynamic ‘was not a symptom of NTM-A-EUPOL difficulty’ per se, but rather ‘a 
symptom of anywhere that it is difficult to operate with different procedures and terms 
and conditions’ (Interview 59, 2011). 
After comprehensively outlining the EU-NATO relationship within the context of 
Afghanistan, the final section of this chapter can now turn to summarising the empirical 
conclusions. 
 
Conclusion 
 
After investigating the EU-NATO relationship in three different case studies, there 
can be no doubt that these two organisations cooperate extensively beyond the 
formal BP/AF context and in operations where cooperation should be ruled out due 
to the limitations imposed by political obstructionism. In fact, it is now obvious that 
the EU and NATO cooperate and interact more outside of the BP/AF than they do 
within the context of ALTHEA. This begs the question of exactly where would the 
EU-NATO relationship be today, especially at the operational level, if there were no 
missions in CP, Kosovo or Afghanistan. The relationship remains problematic, of this 
there is little doubt; but, if there were no operations to drive this incremental change 
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at the micro level, the relationship would almost certainly be even worse. At the 
same time, the more these informal processes at the micro level lead to sufficient 
workarounds of the BP/AF to allow cooperation to progress in-theatre, the less the 
need to reform the broad strategic relationship. Clearly, the political will is still not 
there to find a grand bargain that would result in a true EU-NATO strategic 
partnership. Paradoxically, although the EU-NATO relationship has become 
increasingly systematised at the international staff level, and especially the 
operational level, this has only reinforced the stasis at the macro/political level. 
The case of EU-NATO cooperation in Afghanistan has provided clear evidence of 
incremental change in the relationship. Interestingly, however, resistance at the 
political level to these processes has been more pronounced with regard to 
Afghanistan than was observed in the other two cases. Understanding exactly why 
this is the case was beyond the objectives of this thesis; but the fact that the NATO 
mission dwarfed the EUPOL mission in size and publicity, as compared to the 
relative parity between the missions in the other two case studies, seems to have 
played a part. In other words, when it comes to Afghanistan, NATO is clearly in the 
driver’s seat and this gives those Alliance member states, which have obstructionist 
tendencies vis-à-vis EU-NATO relations, more leverage. That being said, this case 
study provided evidence of flexibility as well. Even the most obstructionist political 
actors understand that the general public would not accept lives to be at risk or 
casualties directly perceived as attributable to EU-NATO friction over matters 
exogenous to the mission in Afghanistan. Therefore, the answer was to turn a blind 
eye to much of the increasingly systematised cooperation on the ground; this 
occurred to such an extent that many of the interlocutors interviewed went as far as 
to call this in-theatre cooperation ‘formal’. What the Afghanistan case study has 
demonstrated, as well as the prior two cases, is that an understanding has 
developed between the political level and the international/operational levels as to 
what the former will condone in the way of cooperation beyond a strict interpretation 
of the BP/AF and what it will not. 
The incremental changes in the relationship have been uneven and this case 
study was the best example of that irregularity. Although there were positive steps 
towards cooperation in order to allow NATO/ISAF to provide in extremis support to 
EUPOL - most notably with the Blue Tracker System and the change to the 
Operations Plan - there were also problematic negotiations over cooperation. 
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Examples of the latter were the protracted struggles over CIED and providing 
medical support. In the case of Afghanistan, once again technical arrangements had 
to be drawn up in the field. However, 14 separate MoUs were needed and even 
these were EUPOL to PRTs and not between EUPOL and NATO specifically. 
Furthermore, there were no informal NAC-PSC meetings or informal MILREP 
meetings by which to engage in strategic dialogue, although cooperation at the 
international staff level was demonstrated; for example, informal meetings between 
EUMS and SHAPE staff as well EUMS staff and NATO International Military staff. 
This case study also offered evidence of sui generis EU-NATO cooperation. This 
chapter documented relationships between EUPOL and the PRTs (and eventually a 
MoU between EUPOL and ISAF providing ‘mutual support’), civilian and military 
relationships in the guise of NATO/ISAF and EUPOL, and between military policing 
functions and civilian policing elements (NTM-A and EUPOL). The complexity these 
different components offered made this case study a unique insight into the 
relationship beyond the BP/AF and clearly the EU would not be able to function in 
Afghanistan without NATO/ISAF. Some interlocutors even suggested that the 
creation of NTM-A was only necessary because the EU was not really living up to its 
international duties in Afghanistan. Therefore, NATO had to provide a police mission, 
even if it is not really the best organisation for this type of civilian function. 
Beyond the mere fact that the EU is dependent on NATO assets and capabilities 
to perform its EUPOL duties, this case study also demonstrated that the formal 
BP/AF institutional linkages are utilised to facilitate informal EU-NATO cooperation, 
most notably, through the DACAEUR, EU Cell and NATO Liaisons to the EUMS. For 
example, the EU Cell, a body that was created for future Berlin Plus scenarios, has 
been heavily involved in facilitating EU-NATO cooperation regarding Afghanistan. 
Most significant of all is the position of the DSACEUR as ‘strategic Coordinator’ 
(created under the BP/AF) when it comes to driving cooperation in this regard.  
Many of the docking mechanisms created as part of the BP/AF are utilised to 
facilitate informal cooperation, while others have been created in-theatre but with the 
acquiescence of actors at the political level. As with CP and Kosovo, when it comes 
to Afghanistan a great deal of cooperation is necessary to allow both organisations 
to perform their tasks - although, in this case, the EU is much more dependent on 
NATO than it was in the other two case studies. The Afghanistan case has 
demonstrated once again that, where formal cooperation has been ruled out, 
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informal cooperation is not only evident but it has been increasingly institutionalised 
and systematised on the ground. Again, this development of ‘shared standards of 
behaviour’ have overwhelmingly been aimed towards finding creative solutions and 
alternative strategies in order to circumvent the BP/AF at the micro and operational 
level and not aimed at replacing the BP/AF at the political level. This has further led 
to processes of incremental change, facilitated by learning and socialisation, while 
not replacing the macro level framework between the two organisations.  
As with the two prior case studies, clear patterns of the institutionalisation of 
informal cooperation have been demonstrated. The most obvious examples of this 
with regard to all three levels of analysis are listed in the table below (see Table 6.1 
below). As with the prior two case studies, the most systematised cooperation takes 
part in-theatre, once again confirming that the hierarchical/spatial element is 
ultimately bound up with the developments of learning and interaction. Therefore, 
this case study provides evidence that actors working in both organisations have had 
to learn, over time, ways to overcome the restrictions of the BP/AF and, in order to 
do that, a degree of interaction was essential. This case study has confirmed (as 
have the prior two) that simple learning is more pervasive as information is utilised to 
alter strategies (circumventing the BP/AF at the micro level), but not preferences 
(retaining the BP/AF at the macro level). The same is true with socialisation. Social 
interaction between EU and NATO actors at all three levels of analysis 
(political/strategic, international staff and operational) impacted on common attitudes 
towards cooperation outside the BP/AF context with regard to Afghanistan. However, 
interaction was clearly more associated with ‘strategic calculation’ rather than ‘role 
playing’ or normative suasion, as behaviour was aimed at altering strategies 
(circumventing the BP/AF at the micro level) but not preferences (retaining the 
BP/AF at the macro level). 
 
Table 6.1: 
Observed Institutionalisation for Afghanistan (Systematised or Informal) 
Enhanced Operations Plan 
PSC & Com-NTM-A Meetings 
Bi-lateral Sec/Gen & HR Meetings 
HR & NATO Defence Ministers Meetings 
Sec/Gen Invited to the Council 
Systematised 
Semi-Systematised 
Semi-Systematised 
Semi-Systematised 
Semi-Systematised 
DSACEUR-CMPD/CPCC/EUMS/DG-EUMS Meetings Semi-Systematised 
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NATO HQ or SHAPE & CMPD or CPCC Meetings Semi-Systematised 
EU Cell Facilitating Cooperation 
SIANP Development Symposium (at JFC Brunssum) 
Afghanistan in-theatre 
Semi-Systematised 
One Occurrence 
- HoM EUPOL & COM NTM-A meetings 
- Liaison Officer meetings 
Donor Meetings 
- MDB meetings 
- IPCB meetings 
- IPPD meetings 
- IAC Meetings 
- MIIC Meetings 
- Deep Dives 
  
Systematised 
Systematised 
Systematised 
Systematised 
Systematised 
Systematised 
Systematised 
Systematised 
Systematised 
 
Table 6.2: 
Key Findings for Afghanistan  
EU dependent on NATO assets and capabilities  
Technical Arrangements Drawn up in-theater  
14 Separate MOUs (originally no ISAF-EUPOL Agreement)   
Multiple Layers of organizational cooperation  
(NATO/ISAF/NTM-A & EUPOL EU) 
 
More flexible rules on sharing information  
Change to Blue Tracker 
Change to Operations Plan 
 
HR Invited to NATO Defence Ministers Meetings 
No inclusive MilRep Meetings 
No Informal NAC-PSC meetings to Discuss Afghanistan 
Com NTM-A Briefs Informal PSC meetings  
Transatlantic Dinners 
 
Helicopters/CEID/Medical Support  
DSACEUR as Strategic Coordinator 
MOU Agreed EUPOL to ISAF (not PRTs) 
Document of Mutual Support 
 
Increased institutionalisation cooperation 
at operational level  
(even referred to as formal on the ground) 
 
Common military cultures and levels of professionalism   
 
This case study investigated the EU-NATO relationship in Afghanistan, both at the 
macro and the micro level. The primary aim of this chapter was to investigate for 
evidence of EU-NATO cooperation despite the political blockage that should exclude 
any cooperation. Second, it investigated how such cooperation has evolved as well 
as the nature and form of any such cooperation. Finally, it investigated to what extent 
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the BP/AF remains the normative and institutional context for cooperation since 
2004. 
Once again, the BP/F remains locked-in and path dependent on the sequencing of 
events and the initial formal structures, rules and operating procedures that 
practitioners at all three levels of cooperation should comply with since 2003. With 
regard to Afghanistan, the static BP/AF limits the ability of the EU and NATO to carry 
out broader functions of cooperation and to engage in strategic dialogue at the 
formal political level. However, the empirical evidence suggests that cooperation at 
the operational level has progressed incrementally, albeit unevenly. The fact that the 
EUPOL mission is relatively small compared to NATO’ presence means that 
increasingly institutionalised informal and operational cooperation has been 
achievable. This has meant that the status quo at the political/strategic level has 
remained unaltered. As with the previous case studies, as long as lower-level 
agreements and technical arrangements can be agreed spatially away from the 
politically sensitive centre (Brussels) to the local level (in-theatre), the Agreed 
Framework will not be renegotiated at the macro-level. 
The empirical case studies have now all been completed. It is therefore time to 
turn to the final chapter which will address the key empirical and theoretical findings 
of the thesis as a whole. This final chapter will also offer some thoughts on a way 
forward for the EU-NATO relationship and offer some views on how to diminish the 
current impediments to cooperation. 
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Chapter Seven  
The Institutionalisation of Informal Cooperation  
Empirical and Theoretical Conclusions 
 
We see ambiguity as a more permanent feature, even where 
rules are formalised. Actors with divergent interests will contest 
the openings this ambiguity provides because matters of 
interpretation and implementation can have profound 
consequences for resource allocations and substantive 
outcomes. (Mahoney and Thelen, 2009) 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter will illustrate the findings of the analysis, with specific attention given to 
how the empirical research of the three case studies impacts on the theoretical 
approach underpinning the work. The key empirical findings from the case studies 
will be extrapolated in order to illuminate a more complete picture of EU-NATO 
cooperation. The overall conclusions demonstrate that a focus on incremental 
change, as well as the path-dependent nature of the formal Agreed Framework, 
leads to a more complete understanding of how these two organisations cooperate. 
Furthermore, the traditional HI assumptions of institutional persistence were not 
enough to fully explain the EU-NATO relationship in its entirety. 
Once the empirical conclusions are reiterated and fully considered for all three of 
the case studies, the chapter will then comment on the broad theoretical 
conclusions, especially those relating to the evolutionary aspects of the EU-NATO 
relationship. This is necessary to establish that the traditional assumptions of HI are 
indeed insufficient to explain the persistence of EU-NATO cooperation at the macro 
level, as well as the evolutionary change that has transpired at the micro level. Once 
this is completed, the chapter ends by offering some thoughts on the future of EU-
NATO relations. 
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The fundamental objective of this thesis was to elucidate the EU-NATO 
relationship comprehensively and to unpack the discrepancies between the rhetoric 
and reality of this relationship, both in terms of its historical institutional development 
and the practical cooperation between these two organisations on the ground and in 
common operational areas. To be clear, the relationship was the focus of the thesis 
in order to more fully comprehend how the EU-NATO relationship really works, both 
in formal/informal apparatus and formal/informal practice.  
The first chapter of this thesis made clear that the investigation would be 
concerned with the EU-NATO relationship in a holistic sense; that this investigation 
would consider the EU-NATO relationship to be itself an institution as well as a sub-
set of separate EU and NATO institutions and collections of bureaucracies. The 
chapter established the significance of the subject matter under investigation and 
presented the general research puzzle and research questions. Chapter One also 
presented both the analytical and empirical focus, the methodology and case 
selection criteria before finally outlining the structure of the thesis.  
Chapter Two established that there is rhetoric calling for a ‘strategic partnership’ 
on the one hand, and a problematic and inefficient set of formal mechanisms 
(BP/AF) that should be facilitating this partnership but are, in fact, limiting 
cooperation between the two organisations. Chapter Two set the baseline of the 
BP/AF to be carried forward into the case studies. It showed that Berlin Plus was 
deemed by practitioners at all three levels to be the appropriate form of cooperation. 
It also demonstrated that Berlin Plus, as an instrument of EU-NATO cooperation, 
was a success in two operations; that it is still active with regard to ALTHEA, albeit 
with some pronounced friction points. 
The other main contribution of this chapter was to demonstrate the process that 
established Berlin Plus and the Agreed Framework for cooperation. Berlin Plus was 
directly modelled on the Berlin NAC decisions of 1994 and, most obviously, 1996 
which called for ‘the use of separable but not separate military capabilities in 
operations led by the WEU’ (The North Atlantic Council, 1996c).   
Most significant to note, in terms of sequencing, is that these institutional 
arrangements were worked out before Cyprus (still as a divided island) joined the EU 
after the Greek Cypriots rejected the referendum concerning the northern Turkish 
part of the Island. Chapter Two demonstrated that, since the EU enlargement of 
2004, formal EU-NATO meetings have been discontinued outside of Operation 
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ALTHEA. With regard to the NAC-PSC, since 2004, ALTHEA is the only agreed 
agenda subject that can be discussed without the presence of Cyprus (Yost, 2007, p. 
93). In this way, the acceptance of Cyprus into the EU as a divided island can be 
seen as an unintended consequences for the EU-NATO relationship.  
This chapter also outlined the development of a series of central tools that 
facilitate EU-NATO cooperation. These central tools, which were developed in the 
formal phases of EU-NATO cooperation, have been demonstrated in the subsequent 
case studies to be relevant to cooperation when Berlin Plus has not been agreed for 
a particular operation but when the EU and NATO may want to communicate and 
cooperate. 
To sum up, Chapter Two set the following criteria as the baseline of this 
investigation: (1) there is established rhetoric for positive EU-NATO cooperation, (2) 
that institutions were created to formally operationalise and facilitate cooperation, 
and (3) the Berlin Plus, specifically, is the mechanism that uses these institutions 
together with the offer of EU access to NATO’s assets and capabilities to establish 
what is commonly known as the Agreed Framework (with the caveats built into the 
security of information agreement). These, in other words, are the (4) formal 
structures, rules and operating procedures that practitioners at all three levels of 
cooperation should comply with. Finally, (5) this chapter demonstrated a Berlin Plus, 
both of a last resort but also with a deeply symbolic value internalised by actors at all 
three levels of EU-NATO cooperation. However, the combination of the established 
rhetoric and the Agreed Framework means that all of the above should only be used 
to discuss and conduct ALTHEA and no more. The subsequent chapters 
investigated for EU-NATO cooperation in areas where cooperation should be ruled 
out. But before the empirical investigation could be pursued, the analytical 
framework had to be established. 
As demonstrated in Chapter Three, the approach allowed for an investigation 
utilising the traditional assumptions of historical institutionalism (path dependency, 
punctuated equilibrium and critical junctures) to show that the BP/AF baseline for 
cooperation is indeed static, path dependent and constrained by a sequence of 
decisions taken during the early years of EU-NATO cooperation. These decisions 
and sequences locked in certain processes from the outset while, at the same time, 
they reduced the likely options for switching paths. Yet, while equilibrium has 
transpired with regard to the relationship at the macro level, the approach of the 
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thesis has also allowed for a deeper understanding of the incremental changes that 
have emerged within the equilibrium or general stasis of the relationship. In this 
regard, it has investigated and demonstrated the incremental changes that have, in 
fact, reinforced the current static formal political and strategic relationship.  
This is not to say that other ways of framing the study were not possible. 
However, it has been argued that, by combining a temporal/historical approach (HI) 
with a hierarchical/spatial investigation (three levels of investigation), not only has a 
deeper understanding of the EU-NATO relationship been uncovered than currently 
exists in the literature, but it has also allowed for a narrative to emerge based on 
incremental change, facilitated by both learning and socialisation, which accounts for 
both stasis and change.  
Clearly, Berlin Plus is the central mechanism of the Agreed Framework. However, 
this study has endeavoured to go well beyond the limitations of an analysis solely 
focusing on this set of arrangements. In order to more fully understand the 
relationship in its entirety (and not only at the broadest political levels that make up 
so much of the research in this area to date), this thesis has shed light on 
cooperation at the micro level. This lacuna in the literature has been reduced by 
looking at the relationship in action through three case studies, each demonstrating a 
unique component of EU-NATO cooperation. 
However, before summarising the key findings of the case studies, first let us 
remind ourselves of the central empirical puzzles that this thesis set out to 
investigate. Why are the formal mechanisms of EU-NATO cooperation (BP/AF) 
becoming static, but cooperation is continuing? Within a context where formal 
cooperation is ruled out, what kind of cooperation is emerging? Is the static BP/AF 
indeed the entire picture, or could there be elements of incremental change taking 
place within a broader understanding of EU-NATO relations. In other words, is there 
an adaptive, interactive, and interdependent evolutionary process between 
individuals, micro-level institutions, and the organisations as a whole going on below 
the surface of the seemingly stagnant formal and Agreed Framework. If so, what are 
the conditions for the growth of cooperation outside the BP/AF? Finally, if there are 
processes of evolutionary change in EU-NATO relations at the operational level, 
then what impact does this have on the EU-NATO strategic relationship and the 
static BP/AF? 
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The central research questions generated to investigate this general puzzle were 
then following: 
 
1. Is there any evidence of EU-NATO cooperation outside the BP/AF context, 
despite the political blockage that prima facie should exclude such 
cooperation? 
2. If such cooperation can be established, how has cooperation evolved since 
the BP/AF macro level stasis established in 2004? 
3. To what extent is BP/AF the normative and institutional context for any 
cooperation since stasis was established?  
 
Empirical Conclusions  
 
The Case Studies 
 
Chapters Four to Six contained the three case studies under investigation. The CP 
case study demonstrated that, although the EU-NATO relationship and cooperation 
towards countering piracy is not formally agreed or operationalised through Berlin 
Plus, rhetoric for a positive relationship does exist. Importantly, and as Javier Solana 
stated in 2009, it has to be a more ‘flexible framework’ without the formal structures 
to support it. Both organisations have publicly stated their intention to work as closely 
as possible ‘with all actors involved’, and with specific reference to ‘exchange of 
information’. This contradictory force of failing to agree a formal relationship, 
combined with the rhetoric to promote a ‘strategic partnership’, has resulted in 
increased informality of relations and a pushing of cooperation spatially towards 
relationships between the two sets of international staffs working in Brussels, 
especially at the operational level.  
This case study demonstrated that, although Berlin Plus is not the formal structure 
for EU-NATO cooperation in counter-piracy (in terms of formal institutional structures 
and the EU officially having access to NATO assets and capabilities), what does 
apply is the essence of Berlin Plus, i.e. the EU borrowed NATO assets and 
capabilities unofficially when the EU was initially trying to stand up ATALANTA. The 
EU did not possess a Standing Naval Maritime Group and, therefore, essentially 
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borrowed NATO’s assets and capabilities until such time as it was ready to launch 
ATALANTA.  
The CP case study showed that Berlin Plus was never really even considered as 
an option for conducting an EU-led operation with formal recourse to NATO assets 
and capabilities due to the political deadlock surrounding the Agreed Framework. 
However, no enhanced mechanism to replace Berlin Plus was negotiated or 
adopted, which suggests that ‘expected ways of thinking, feeling and acting’ 
(Johnstone 2001, p. 494) have been internalised across all three levels of analysis. 
Berlin Plus is no longer deemed a possibility for conducting new operations and this 
reality has been internalised by actors working at all three levels of analysis. This 
has further increased informality of relations and pushed cooperation spatially away 
from the political/strategic level; instead, it has pushed it towards increasingly 
institutionalised relationships between the two sets of international staffs working in 
Brussels and at the operational level, again both in Northwood and at sea. The most 
striking example of ‘flexibility’ towards informality was the decision to establish both 
the NATO Ocean Shield and EU ATALANTA OHQs within the UK’s Northwood 
Permanent Joint Headquarters. This would also seem to suggest that at least a 
modicum of institutional learning transpired. 
The case of CP demonstrated that learning to cooperate outside the BP/AF 
context is clearly developing, but it is overwhelmingly simple in nature. In other 
words, it is not learning that is ultimately aimed at renegotiating the EU-NATO 
relationship at the macro level or replacing the BP/AF as the formal framework of the 
EU-NATO relationship. Furthermore, much of these learning processes are only 
experienced by individuals. However, occasionally there has been evidence of 
simple organisational learning as well. For example, when the political actors 
collectively overlook some of these transgressions, or even agree minor changes to 
the rules, as was the case when the PSC decided to slightly change the sharing of 
information agreement. 
The informal relationship is based on distinct processes of incremental change in 
the EU-NATO relationship. First, it is obvious that the more cooperation is hidden or 
subsumed within an international effort, the easier it is for the more obstructionist 
political actors to allow informal cooperation at the two other lower levels of analysis, 
the use of SHADE being the most striking example of this. Second, the unique role 
that Northwood has to play as a ‘fusion centre’ for the informal cooperation of EU 
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and NATO staff has given a tremendous advantage in the face of political 
obstruction. This case study has demonstrated that there have been very deliberate 
attempts to institutionalise informal cooperation, most obviously at Northwood, driven 
by operational staff testing the boundaries of the political ‘red lines’ when it comes to 
the sharing of sensitive information.  
The findings did not show that this led to the systemisation of intelligence sharing. 
However, a ‘unity of effort’ is discernible from the data and this effort is intended to 
supplement the obvious lack of a formal ‘unity of command’. This suggests that a 
shift from a logic of consequence to a logic of appropriateness has taken place. 
What is less clear is whether a level of normative suasion, i.e. a ‘reflective 
internalisation’ on the ‘intrinsic value’ of these norms, was reached. Finally, none of 
this would have been possible had the actors involved not been interacting 
constantly and working within common military and operating cultures; this is even 
more evident in this case study due to a long history of maritime cooperation at sea 
between the 21 coinciding members of the EU and NATO, as well as those who are 
only members of one of the organisations. Not only is this a case of different 
organisations using the same set of forces due to a high degree of membership 
overlap, but it has also shown that Operational Commanders have even been 
rotated from NATO into ATALANTA and back to NATO, demonstrating high levels of 
socialisation. 
Clearly, many of the institutions and established links of operational contact 
established in the formal operations and through the Agreed Framework are used, 
albeit informally, for EU-NATO cooperation with regard to counter-piracy. There have 
been informal attempts at the NAC and PSC levels (although with much less 
success) to discuss on-going counter-piracy operations. With regard to the 
increasing institutionalisation of informal cooperation at the two lower levels of 
analysis, the usual obstructionist political actors have used, to a certain extent, a 
‘blind eye’ approach to allow this informal relationship to develop, further indicating 
that a logic of appropriateness is present.  
This chapter has also established the existence of contact at the S/G and H/R 
levels (regardless of the personality in the post), as well as other senior level staff at 
both the EU and at NATO, having informal meetings to discuss operations in this 
area. It has also shown that the creation of the DSACEUR as the EU-NATO 
‘strategic coordinator’ developed under Berlin Plus has led to an informal relationship 
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between that office and various institutions within the EU, one where the ‘real 
business’ is being done, for both formal Berlin Plus and informal non-Berlin Plus 
operations. As noted above, some have even gone as far as to say that the 
relationship between the office of the DASACEUR and that of CMPD, as well as 
other CSDP institutions, is vital to overcoming the EU-NATO stasis at the 
political/strategic level. It is, therefore, argued that there is both evidence of the logic 
of consequence and appropriateness present when it comes to the incremental 
changes in the relationship, as well as a lack of compliance to a strict interpretation 
of the AF within this case study.  
Both the cases of Kosovo and Afghanistan further demonstrated that there is 
rhetoric for EU-NATO cooperation and a strategic partnership. With regard to 
Kosovo, this rhetoric is present in the legal/strategic documents that underpin both 
KFOR and EULEX; it is also present in other primary source documentation, as well 
as from the interviews conducted for these two case studies. These documents 
speak of ‘close coordination’, ‘close’ working relationships and even the release of 
‘classified information and documents up to the level of confidential’. However, due 
to the political impasse and the resulting deadlock that has been institutionalised and 
internalised at all three levels of cooperation, the only way to achieve any structured 
cooperation was to have ‘local technical arrangements’ drawn up in the field as no 
formal institutional links were achieved in Brussels, or anywhere at the 
political/strategic level for that matter. Once again, a precedence was found in the 
formal operation of ALTHEA.  
However, having Kosovo (and now Serbia, at least with regard to the EU) as part 
of a common ‘Concerted Approach for the Western Balkans’, as well as prior 
experience of EU-NATO formal cooperation in the region (CONCORDIA/ALTHEA) 
has meant that a modest degree of informal strategic institutional links was also 
established, however briefly. This is demonstrated mostly by the holding of an 
informal NAC-PSC meeting in February 2007 which had all EU and NATO (Turkey 
and Cyprus included) members discussing the topic of Kosovo informally. This has 
still not been achieved for Afghanistan, although the Transatlantic Events have 
facilitated discussion on this issue to some degree. This clearly shows that a logic of 
consequence is still the overriding logic at the macro level as these informal 
meetings have not been systematised. However, the fact that these informal political 
linkages were attempted does suggest that, at least to some degree, a logic of 
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appropriateness is also present in the relationship. At all three levels, there was 
evidence of norms and shared standards of behaviour being developed. 
In the public record, there is also rhetoric for cooperation concerning Afghanistan. 
Much of the language used to describe the EU-NATO relationship in this case is very 
similar to that of Kosovo. Yet, like Kosovo, the relationship was again only 
underpinned by ‘local technical arrangements’ that had to be drawn up in the field. In 
the case of Afghanistan, this comprised not even two mirror documents but 14 
separate MOUs between EUPOL and the individual PRTs, and not NATO/ISAF as a 
whole. As this case study has shown, this has incrementally progressed over the last 
few years leading to modest incremental change in the relationship, even if a 
substantial change to the formal relationship is still lacking. 
This rhetoric was also present in both case studies at the international staff level. 
Most discernible are the increased references to the lack of cooperation by both the 
offices of the EU’s HR and the NATO Sec/Gen, as well as quotes emanating from 
these offices such as the two organisations need to ‘talk more together’, ‘do more 
together’ and that coordination concerning Kosovo and Afghanistan ‘needs to be 
stepped up’. This was also demonstrated by the increased institutionalisation of staff-
to-staff meetings concerning Kosovo and Afghanistan.  
Finally, it cannot be denied that the different operational priorities of both the EU 
and NATO effect the relationship in both Kosovo and Afghanistan. As it happens, 
Kosovo and the EULEX mission is the EU’s first priority CSDP mission currently on-
going (although ATALANTA is also highly prioritised) and the same is true for 
Afghanistan and NATO. Furthermore, the fact that Kosovo is relatively calm (as 
compared to Afghanistan) and that the EU’s EUPOL mission is relatively small (as 
compared to EULEX), means that a formal agreement was not necessary to 
cooperate and/or deconflict (to a degree) in-theatre. In other words, informal 
cooperation works well enough spatially away from the strategic linkages not to force 
a dramatic change in the Agreed Framework at this level; thus, the status quo 
remains, albeit with minor incremental changes, in the day-to-day workings of the 
relationship at the meso and micro levels.  
Once again, in both of these case studies, neither were formal Berlin Plus 
operations, nor was cooperation formally structured through some re-writing of the 
Berlin Plus mechanism to fit civilian/military cooperation. This, in turn, led to 
limitations in the EU-NATO relationship concerning cooperation in both the Kosovo 
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and Afghanistan case studies. First and foremost, formal institutional settings were 
not clearly established to facilitate strategic dialogue on cooperation or strategy 
between the two organisations that could lead to substantial formal changes at the 
macro level. This was somewhat mitigated by one informal NAC-PSC meeting in 
February 2007 set up to discuss matters relating to Kosovo, again suggesting a 
modest turn towards a logic of appropriateness. However, this was far from 
institutionalised as it was a one-off event with regard to Kosovo and, therefore, a 
logic of consequence seems to prevail. In this way, formal NAC-PSC meetings to 
discuss any matters outside of ALTHEA are rare and path-dependent/locked-in to 
the Agreed Framework, as previously discussed. However, moves to have at least a 
modest amount of informal cooperation through these formal NAC-PSC institutions, 
‘below the radar’ and ‘off the record’, do establish a degree of evolutionary change 
within the confines of the path-dependant and post-2004 static/locked-in EU-NATO 
relationship as determined by the Agreed Framework. 
Besides the limitations to cooperation concerning the formal channels of strategic 
planning and decision making at all three levels of analysis, the other major limitation 
concerns the passing of intelligence and sensitive information. Again, the 
relationship is path-dependent and locked into the Agreed Framework due to the 
limited interpretation of Berlin Plus that some nations have taken. Yet, the increased 
institutionalisation of informal cooperation, based on both learning and socialisation 
over time, and at both the international staff and operational levels, has allowed 
cooperation to transpire in the field. As with counter-piracy, this has been especially 
facilitated through the office of the DSACEUR based on his TORs as the ‘Strategic 
Coordinator’ between the EU and NATO. This also demonstrates a level of 
organisational learning with specific regard to the office of the DSACEUR, as this 
behaviour has been demonstrated over multiple holders of the office. 
Again, both of these case studies further demonstrate the essence of the Berlin 
Plus issue raised in the other cases. Both in Kosovo and Afghanistan, NATO lends 
assets and capabilities as well as provides security to the EU in order for it to 
function and carry out its mission in-theatre. Although the formal channels are not 
officially utilised, as with CONCORDIA or ALTHEA (NAC-PSC & SHAPE), nor are 
these cases whereby the EU assumes or replaces the military functions of NATO, in 
‘simple terms’ Berlin Plus is by definition ‘an EU-led operation making use of NATO 
assets and capabilities’ (European Union External Action Service, 2011a). This is 
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clearly the case in both Kosovo and Afghanistan. It should also be reiterated that, 
when informal mechanisms were used to carry out strategic discussions and 
planning, it was the NAC-PSC format that was adopted in the case of Kosovo and, 
therefore, utilising the Berlin Plus template/processes for cooperation through the 
Agreed Framework. 
As noted in Chapter Two, in order to help establish that the formal EU-NATO 
relationship (BP/AF) had become static (outside of ALTHEA), an EU-NATO 
questionnaire was sent via email to all of the interview participants (and at all three 
levels of analysis) involved in this study. However, questions were also asked with 
regard to the informal EU-NATO cooperation being problematised in the case 
studies. Although this questionnaire is limited in its ambition and methodological 
rigour, the results do support the finding that, not only is a large amount of informal 
EU-NATO cooperation occurring beyond the BP/AF, but it seems to work well in 
practice. When asked how well informal cooperation works in practice, the answer 
was an average of 3.56 (based on a scale of 1-5), with 94.4% agreeing that informal 
cooperation works average or better in practice. For comparison, when asked the 
same of formal cooperation, an average of 2.83 was the response with 66.7% 
believing that formal cooperation worked average or below in practice.  
Another set of questions were specifically aimed at quantifying the perceived 
levels of institutionalisation of informal cooperation at the political/strategic, 
international staff and the operational levels. The responses given clearly support the 
hierarchical/spatial approach as operationalised in this thesis. Furthermore, the 
responses seem to corroborate the finding – as illustrated in the CP, Kosovo and 
Afghanistan case studies - that the contradictory force of failing to agree a formal 
relationship, combined with the rhetoric to promote a ‘strategic partnership’, has 
resulted in increased informality of relations and a pushing of cooperation spatially 
towards the two sets of international staffs working in Brussels, especially at the 
operational level. Most importantly, the responses seem to confirm the general 
argument of this thesis in that there is an increasing institutionalisation of informal 
cooperation, especially with regard to the international staff and operational levels of 
analysis. The results further support the argument that informal cooperation is 
becoming increasingly institutionalised the further away from the political level it is 
located. When asked how institutionalised/systematised informal EU-NATO 
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cooperation was at the three levels under investigation, the responses averaged 
2.39 at the political level, 3.22 at the international staff level, and 3.78 at the 
operational level (see the appendices for the full questionnaire). This begs the 
question: where would EU-NATO relations be in 2014 without the vast amount of 
informal cooperation taking place? 
 
Theoretical Conclusions 
 
Path Dependency and Causal Sequencing 
 
The statement that ‘what happened at an earlier point in time will affect the possible 
outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in time’ (Sewell, 1996 
quoted in Pierson, 2004, p. 20) certainly applies to the EU-NATO relationship. A 
certain number of decisions, those that were taken when the modalities of EU-NATO 
framework for cooperation were being initially negotiated, have resulted in a 
sequence of events that have severely limited alternative options for cooperation. 
This has, therefore, led to equilibrium in the relationship that has seen the BP/AF 
persist while, at the same time, severely limiting the options for a true EU-NATO 
strategic partnership. A few of these events are now highlighted. 
First, it is clear that there was a decision to frame the Berlin Plus mechanism on 
the 1996 NATO-WEU agreements and a consistency on staying that course right up 
until Berlin Plus was agreed in March 2003. Furthermore, Berlin Plus was such a 
template of Berlin 1996 that ‘no other options were even considered’ (Interview 39, 
2011). This has resulted in a relationship based strictly on a military approach to the 
access of NATO assets and capabilities. Therefore, regardless of the subsequent 
‘participation problem’, EU-NATO cooperation and the relationship itself was framed 
in a limited capacity that did not include civilian-oriented cooperation but only military 
options. This has led to cooperation insufficiencies in Kosovo and Afghanistan. 
Furthermore, the decision to create ESDP/CSDP at St. Malo - and the subsequent 
decision to terminate the WEU’s arrangements - instigated a process whereby 
Turkey began to feel marginalised and discriminated against, as it no longer retained 
a guaranteed security agreement with the EU as it did with the WEU. This early 
decision created a positive feedback element to the EU-NATO relationship, whereby 
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Turkey was increasingly more likely to take a rigid and inflexible approach to the 
relationship.  
Further decisions taken at the Cologne and Helsinki EU Councils in 1999 failed to 
clearly incorporate Turkey in any meaningful way into ESDP/CSDP decision-shaping 
and making structures. The fact that Turkey had to be invited by the EU Council to 
take part in autonomous EU operations further solidified a hard-line approach by 
Turkey as it became well aware that its cooperation within ESDP/CSDP structures 
could be blocked by only one EU member state (most likely Greece and, later, 
Cyprus). What resulted was Turkey’s blocking of guaranteed EU-assured access to 
NATO assets and capabilities, which forced the Alliance to opt for a case-by-case 
basis instead. It is clear that the EU’s decision, if not to fully integrate Turkey into the 
nascent ESDP/CSDP, then to at least design mechanisms whereby non-EU Allies 
could participate in autonomous EU operations based on a QMV process in the EU 
Council and not based on unanimity, was a critical juncture that restricted future 
options for the EU-NATO relationship. 
Decisions towards the end of the Berlin Plus negotiations also served to further 
amplify the relative attractiveness for Turkey, and then Cyprus (after 2004), of a rigid 
and inflexible approach towards the EU-NATO relationship. Clearly, the decision to 
limit EU-NATO cooperation only to those EU members who were also NATO 
members or PfP signatories meant that Berlin Plus would become a straightjacket 
while, at the same time, persisting in its sub-optimal form. Furthermore, in terms of 
sequencing, it was crucial that Cyprus was offered EU membership regardless of 
whether the referendum was passed in 2004. This gave the Greek Cypriots an 
overwhelming interest in rejecting the referendum, which it did (24/04/2004), 
resulting in a divided island gaining full EU membership (01/05/2004). Continuing in 
the positive feedback process, Cyprus then went on to accept Berlin Plus as a 
mechanism for operation ALTHEA, but then proceeded to block Turkish observer 
status in the European Defence Agency, a security agreement between Turkey and 
the EU, and EU-NATO formal deliberations and negotiations for anything other than 
ALTHEA and the Capability Group. Again, these positive feedback processes made 
the cost of switching paths from one of hard-line stances to one of increased 
flexibility more and more unlikely as time went on. The end result was that formal 
EU-NATO discussions were limited to BiH and, therefore, rather narrow and of 
reducing occurrence. This increased cost of switching paths has meant that Berlin 
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Plus persists in this restricted form and any other formal mechanism that could 
potentially increase cooperation in counter-piracy, Kosovo or Afghanistan has been 
eliminated from considerations or discussions in any meaningful way.  
Before turning to some theoretical implications regarding the persistence of the 
EU-NATO relationship, in terms of the Agreed Framework, it should be noted that 
the data collected overwhelmingly demonstrated that the assumption of actors 
(working at all levels and in both organisations) is that Berlin Plus will never be used 
again as an active mechanism for EU-NATO cooperation, notwithstanding its 
continued use for operation ALTHEA. This was particularly the case regarding 
Cypriot interlocutors, who stated that ‘we will never consent to another Berlin Plus 
operation’ (Interview 42, 2011). This assumption was not just held by the Cypriots, 
but was tangible across the spectrum of interviews conducted. Some caveat this by 
stating (for example), ‘there will never be another Berlin Plus operation unless we 
solve the issue of Cyprus and Turkey, which I see absolutely no indication that we 
will’ (Interview 38, 2011) or ‘not in the current political context’ (Interview 53, 2011). 
Critically, however, this does not mean that a formal EU-NATO relationship will 
cease to exist if the ALTHEA operation is terminated. If the EU-NATO relationship is 
understood to be the Agreed Framework and the rhetoric that implies the existence 
of a ‘strategic partnership’ and not merely Berlin Plus in an operational format, then 
the macro level arrangements will continue to persist in their current formation. This 
starts to touch on both the logic of consequence and the logic of appropriateness. 
Let us take each in turn. 
As Chapter Two demonstrated, and as did the subsequent case studies on 
informal cooperation, NAC-PSC meetings have become highly formulaic and have 
reduced greatly in number. This is due to the fact that they can only discuss ALTHEA 
and are, therefore, rather dull occasions. However, there is a certain rational and 
security-based logic to keeping Berlin Plus activated for this operation. The reason is 
as follows. Although the troop numbers have been greatly reduced in ALTHEA, there 
is still the chance that ethnic tensions could build again and the troop strength of 
around 1,400 EU troops is hardly enough to contain a conflagration of violence if it 
were to sweep the country. However, the so-called NATO ‘over-the-horizon’ forces 
that ‘are controlled by SHAPE’ offer a fairly ‘cheap option’ in terms of manpower and 
cash should such events transpire (Interview 48, 2011). At the time of writing, BiH is 
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still an active Berlin Plus operation and this rational logic does play a part in its 
persistence. 
There are also logics of appropriateness entrenched in the BP/AF persistence 
and, more specifically, the EU-NATO relationship as well. Significantly, although the 
Cypriots have stated their intention to block any future use of the Berlin Plus 
mechanism outside of BiH, they also admit that ‘so many European powers want to 
maintain ALTHEA with Berlin Plus, even if it meant just one soldier just to retain the 
formal link’. It is this idea of having a joined operation with NATO because ‘if that 
goes, there is nothing’ (Interview 42, 2011). 
This symbolic argument regarding Berlin Plus as the last formal link between the 
two organisations was reiterated across the spectrum of interviews, even by those 
interlocutors who represented member states with more interest in seeing a reduced 
relationship between the EU and NATO. Again, the Agreed Framework and a 
relationship would continue to exist even if the formal mechanism for operationalising 
that relationship becomes lifeless. In other words, Berlin Plus persists, but only in a 
‘break glass in case of an emergency’ capacity. 
With regard to Berlin Plus, it is also further understood by the vast majority of 
those interviewed that Berlin Plus, as a mechanism for cooperation, is ‘out-dated’. As 
mentioned above, Berlin Plus was created so that NATO could aid the EU in 
performing certain military functions. However, as crisis management has gone 
down the road of civilian/military instruments and the so-called ‘comprehensive 
approach’, Berlin Plus as a mechanism of the Agreed Framework ‘no longer 
addresses these processes’ (Interview 48, 2011). Again, the decisions and the 
template used in the design phase of EU-NATO cooperation have directly impacted 
on the macro-level options for carrying out cooperation. 
However, at the micro level, evolution in the relationship is tangible even if it is 
locked within these macro level limitations. One further example of this would be the 
continued existence of the EU Cell at SHAPE, even if the EU Staff Group (as an 
Operational HQ for BiH) were to be closed down in the event of ALTHEA being 
terminated. According to one representative at the Cell, ‘if Berlin Plus is not active in 
operational terms, Berlin Plus is still active here because the potential for a future 
operation is still relevant in theory. The EU Cell is a permanent relationship with 
NATO, the EU Staff Group is a temporary HQ based on the existence of an 
operation’ (Interview 46, 2011). Furthermore, as the remit of the EU Cell is to ‘be 
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prepared to assist the DSACEUR in the development of any Berlin Plus operations 
where it is agreed and the political considerations are worked out’, it then begs the 
question: if no Berlin Plus operation will, most likely, ever be operationalised again, 
what is the purpose of this Cell going forward?  
 What this amounts to are three strands of persistence. First, the relationship at 
the macro level will continue to persist in its static form into the foreseeable future. At 
the political/strategic level, there has only been increased rhetoric for more 
cooperation, not less. The NAC-PSC will continue to meet, even if these meetings 
are much less frequent and the dialogue formulaic. Furthermore, 21 coinciding 
member states have one Chief of Defence that meet in both an EU and NATO 
capacity. However, even at one level down, all but three of the 21 coinciding 
members of EU and NATO (Belgium, Greece, and Luxembourg) have the same 
Military Representatives double-hatted to both organisations. This in and of itself 
helps to maintain a good deal of coordination between the two organisations at the 
military strategic level, even if they can still only formally meet as 28 and 27 when 
discussing EU-NATO relations. 
Second, since 2010, the staffs have been given directions to increase contact 
across the divide, both from the respective organisations (Sec/Gen & H/R) and also 
from the national capitals. Of course, this cooperation has to be worked out, with 
special focus on the ‘sensitivities’ and not infringing on the security agreement. This 
informal dialogue is ‘instrumental and beneficial’, even if it is difficult and ‘the output 
of this informal dialogue is not in proportion with the effort’ (Interview 49, 2011). 
Finally, in this broad sense, NATO and the EU will be continuing to cooperate 
through the formal mechanisms of Berlin Plus as long as ALTHEA is operational.  
Third, the Agreed Framework and the ‘spirit of Berlin Plus’ will also continue to 
persist ‘symbolically’ and with a rational function, even if ALTHEA is terminated. 
There will be operational persistence because both organisations will continue to 
work in the same areas of operation, albeit informally, but with greater 
institutionalisation and systemisation of informal operational cooperation for some 
time to come. In counter-piracy until at least 2014, Afghanistan is the same and, 
probably beyond 2014, in Kosovo.  
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Incremental Change 
 
The conclusions of the case studies demonstrate that incremental change, as well as 
the path dependent nature of the formal Agreed Framework, has led to a much more 
complete understanding of how these two organisations cooperate in the totality of 
their relationship. The HI assumptions of institutional persistence based on path-
dependence and punctuated equilibrium alone were not enough to explain the EU-
NATO relationship in its entirety. However, it is fair to say that this approach [HI] is 
not ‘methodologically sophisticated’ in terms of quantifying the units of analysis, 
isolating variables and then holding them constant in order that their independent 
effects can be measured (Steinmo in Porta and Keating, 2008).  
What it has achieved is an analysis of the EU-NATO relationship in the ‘real world’ 
and how this relationship ‘really’ works. Human history is the ‘product of complex, 
dynamic and interdependent processes’ and this thesis as a whole - as well as the 
three particular case studies investigated – corroborate this. This does mean, 
however, that some will see the approach as having some built-in limitations. Some 
of these are: predictability, wider application to other cases, post-hoc constructions 
and falsification. However, this approach has consciously taken an in-depth overview 
of the subject matter. That being said, HI’s contribution to explaining equilibrium and 
evolutionary change does have theoretical utility for studying other cases. The EU-
NATO relationship cannot be fully understood if you remove that relationship from 
the ‘context of their own independent historical evolutions’ (Howorth, 2007). The 
traditional assumptions of HI, together with the additional and more recent 
assumptions based on evolutionary processes, does not presuppose constancy of 
variables. Therefore, similar variables have different effects in different contexts. 
This study has taken a path-analysis and process-tracing approach in order to 
explain how the early decisions taken during the formation of the EU-NATO 
relationship locked in certain paths. Process tracing allowed an investigation and 
interpretation of the steps and processes that led to EU-NATO informal cooperation 
outside the BP/AF context as well as the conditions for the growth of that 
cooperation. It also led to the observation that, not only does path dependency help 
us to understand the mechanisms of stasis in the EU-NATO relationship at the 
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macro level, but also how learning and socialisation have contributed to processes of 
incremental change in the relationship as well.  
Process tracing has also allowed for an analysis of the consequences of those 
paths, as well as the processes of adaptation to those consequences. For example, 
one of the central findings of this thesis has been that common political and military 
cultures, norms, and operating procedures were central to the facilitation of informal 
cooperation in those instances where a formal relationship was just not politically 
achievable. This was most evident in the counter-piracy case study, but also evident 
in the Kosovo and Afghanistan cases. In other words, it helped to demonstrate that 
the macro level relationship remained unchanged and path-dependent, while the 
micro level evolved to accommodate this reality in order to achieve some level of 
cooperation.  
By taking history ‘seriously’, this approach has shown that sequencing matters 
and when an event occurs, it fundamentally shapes later choices. The most obvious 
example of this, with regard to the stasis of the relationship at the macro level, is the 
accession of Cyprus into the EU with a failed referendum. However, at the 
incremental level, even the decision to locate SHAPE in a remote part of the Belgian 
countryside in 1966 - as opposed to Brussels, and in closer proximity to NATO HQ 
and the central institutions of the EEC/EC/EU and what would become CSDP - has 
affected the informal EU-NATO relationship many years on. This is due to the simple 
fact that EU officials are much less keen to make the trip there, which limits informal 
discussions and cooperation in all three of the relevant case studies. It is not even 
out of the realm of reality to suggest that the whole political struggle over the creation 
of an independent and autonomous CSDP OHQ would not have the same character 
if SHAPE was in Brussels itself. This may be a facetious example, but it makes the 
point nonetheless by demonstrating that seemingly random or minor events can 
have fundamentally important unintended consequences, i.e. a case of 
nonergodicity. 
EU-NATO cooperation has to be studied within its own context and environment 
due to the multiple causal variables that explain the totality of the relationship. There 
are no truly independent variables in this case. Although you can look at the impact 
of the existential political realities of the Turkey/Cyprus/Greece question, you cannot 
reasonably state that this is the sole independent variable determining the totality of 
the EU-NATO relationship. The same is true of the different organisational 
258 
 
trajectories of the EU and NATO, as well as the many other factors that this thesis 
has teased out. The EU-NATO relationship - in both its static guise and in terms of 
the incremental change to accommodate that stasis - is the summation of all of the 
interdependent variables and iterative relationships exposed in the course of this 
research. 
As Mahoney and Thelen have noted, ‘once created, institutions often change in 
subtle and gradual ways over time’ (Mahoney and Thelen, 2009, p. 1). This has 
clearly been the case with regard to the relationship under study in this thesis. HI as 
an approach still lacks some ‘useful tools for explaining the more gradual evolution of 
institutions once they have been established’ (ibid, p. 2). One of the most difficult 
methodological problems that this research had to contend with was the fact that the 
EU-NATO relationship is not that old in terms of institutional longevity, nor has there 
really been an exogenous critical juncture large enough to directly test the status quo 
of the macro level equilibrium. As some recent literature has suggested, ‘self-
reinforcing “lock-in” could be a rare phenomenon’; therefore, there is the possibility 
that institutions do evolve in more ‘incremental ways’ (ibid, p. 3). 
Future research on the EU-NATO relationship utilising the HI approach may want 
to ask of that institutional relationship: ‘exactly what properties of institutions permit 
change?’ This research has clearly demonstrated that the core of HI is under-
equipped to adequately explain the intuitional change in the EU-NATO relationship. 
Although the core assumptions of HI did have a lot to say about the macro level 
stasis of the relationship, it was much less able to explain the incremental change 
that the case studies clearly demonstrated. This is not altogether surprising 
considering ‘HI has grappled with the problems of institutional change (as have other 
variants in the institutionalist literature), [but] traditionally stressing continuity over 
change’ (ibid, p.6). 
EU-NATO cooperation seems to reflect both exogenous and endogenous 
interests. The exogenous given interests determine the macro level stasis of the EU-
NATO relationship. This is true both for the Turkey/Cyprus question in general, but 
also with regard to other national interests that use that crisis as a convenient cover 
in order to reduce the likelihood of a closer and more formal institutional relationship 
developing. However, to some degree at least, both the formal and the informal 
institutions of EU-NATO cooperation have had some impact on shaping the 
outcomes of the incremental changes and the increasing institutionalisation of 
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informal cooperation. This would suggest that indicators of socialisation and learning 
have played some part in this incremental change to the institutional relationship. 
The case studies analysing the informal cooperation show that ‘in many cases there 
is simply a great deal of “play” in the interpreted meaning of particular rules or in the 
way the rules are instantiated in practice’ (Mahoney and Thelen, 2009, p. 11). Or, as 
Mahoney and Thelen have recently described this understanding: 
 
we see ambiguity as a more permanent feature, even where 
rules are formalized. Actors with divergent interests will contest 
the openings this ambiguity provides because matters of 
interpretation and implementation can have profound 
consequences for resource allocations and substantive 
outcomes (Ibid p. 11).  
 
Learning how to cooperate over time and beyond the BP/AF has been as much 
about political actors’ (within both the EU and NATO) understanding and internalising 
just how far they are willing to permit informal cooperation, as it has been about 
actors at the international staff or the operational level finding creative solutions to 
cooperate, given the limitations they work within. The constant interplay between 
these processes across the three case studies has been absolutely fascinating to 
investigate.  
The data provided demonstrate that simple learning is more pervasive as 
information is utilised to alter strategies (circumventing the BP/AF at the micro level) 
but not preferences (retaining the BP/AF at the macro level). The same is true with 
socialisation. Social interaction between EU and NATO actors at all three levels of 
analysis (political/strategic, international staff and operational) impacted on common 
attitudes towards cooperation outside the BP/AF context in all three case studies. 
However, interaction was clearly more associated with ‘strategic calculation’ rather 
than ‘role playing’ or normative suasion, as behaviour was aimed at altering 
strategies (circumventing the BP/AF at the micro level) but not preferences (retaining 
the BP/AF at the macro level). 
The research has shown that, to date, there are no systematic attempts to carry 
out a NATO-EU LL  exercise for NATO-EU relations. However, the case studies 
have also demonstrated that the more routine the contact in-theatre is becoming, the 
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more the opportunities arise to correct/adapt current arrangements and practices. 
Although not classed as NATO-EU LL, it is a short loop process to do just that. In 
parallel, the NATO LL process allows for commanders at all levels to input to the 
NATO LL and Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC).109 The real 
obstacles to cooperation are when attempts are made to make official or formal an 
unofficial or informal activity. Any process that is more of a top-down one runs into 
the traditional problems of, ‘there is no mandate for that. Stop it!’ (Interview 48, 
2011). There is, however, the bottom-up approach with input from the nations. For 
example, the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) is working on a 
Stability Policy. The UK is the lead nation for associated doctrinal publications with 
inputs from the other nations. National LL processes/databanks can, therefore feed 
into a new policy and doctrine that will be adopted by NATO. 
The BP/AF does refer to those documents-agreements that constitute the 
framework of EU-NATO relations. Provisions for staff level meetings are included in 
such documents (as well as in EU documents) and these provisions do not explicitly 
exclude any state (e.g. Cyprus). For example, if there is a Cypriot army official 
seconded to the EUMS, he or she would not be legally excluded from participating in 
staff-to-staff meetings just because Cyprus does not have a Security of Information 
agreement with NATO. EUMS officials do not attend meetings in their national 
capacity, but rather in their EU capacity. However, in practical terms, this is not so 
simple because, on the one hand, Cyprus does not have any seconded staff to the 
EUMS or the EDA and, on the other hand, it is most probable that their Turkish 
counterparts would have an issue if such a case arose (Interview 65, 2012). 
When these informal meetings do take place, such meetings are informal due to 
their non-decision-making nature and that no formal minutes are recorded or agreed. 
In essence, staffs can cooperate and exchange ideas but they cannot commit their 
respective organisations to any joint work or project. It is only the member states of 
both the EU and NATO that have such an authority. 
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 The JALLC website can be found at: http://www.jallc.nato.int/ 
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EU-NATO Relations: Thoughts on the Way Forward 
 
Although it is becoming a somewhat hackneyed proposition, we are living in an age 
where civilian and military instruments and capabilities go ‘hand in hand’ (Luciolli, 
2009, p. 98). However, this does not make the statement any less true. Most 
commentators and actors (even those actors not yet willing to see it go) agree that 
Berlin Plus is out-dated. In this sense, EU-NATO relations really are ‘stuck in the 
1990s’. This final section comments on some recent proposals that have been put 
forward to reconcile EU-NATO differences and makes a number of 
recommendations of its own. 
First, some have put forward the notion of a ‘Berlin Plus in Reverse’. This concept 
is based on the premise that NATO would be willing to lead a civil crisis mission 
utilising EU collective assets and capabilities. There are at least three problems with 
this idea. First, a Berlin Plus in reverse would be hostage to the exact same political 
setbacks as its military twin. Second, what this would really entail would be a much 
more developed relationship between the Commission (who have the money) and 
NATO, which would be leading the operation. This is bound to aggravate an already 
troublesome internal turf battle between the Commission and the Council, post-
Lisbon modifications aside. Furthermore, there are those on both sides of the EU-
NATO divide that do not want NATO participating in this type of mission as they see 
it as the sole competence of the EU. Finally, and leading on from this, there is still, 
as yet, no consensus within NATO to lead a civilian operation outside of the police 
training and security sector reform missions that it currently performs. 
This has not stopped NATO from broaching new ground in this area on its own, 
however. At their Summit meeting in Lisbon, NATO members published their new 
Strategic Concept calling for ‘an appropriate but modest crisis management 
capability’ (The North Atlantic Council, 2010). Although some observers may claim 
that this is duplication of EU capabilities, or that it smacks of organisational 
competition, this nascent capability is really only geared towards deploying in areas 
that are so bellicose that the UN or the EU would have a hard time launching 
operations of their own. Furthermore, and as Sven Biscop rightly points out, ‘NATO 
is a political-military organisation, which deals with one dimension of foreign policy 
only, i.e. security and defence’ (Biscop, 2011, p. 2).   
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Others have suggested that, instead of only fixating on a top-down grand bargain 
solution to EU-NATO co-operational problems, the focus should be much more 
bottom-up with an approach that envisions more practical cooperation in the field. 
The main drawback to this argument is that it is no different from the current 
situation; it is the status quo. Although this is, in all likelihood, going to be the reality 
for some time to come, it is susceptible to the problems of institutional fatigue 
outlined above, especially at the level of staff-to-staff contacts. Therefore, a 
concerted effort must be made to overcome potential lethargy in this area.  
As this thesis has illustrated, over the last two years (from 2010 onwards) there 
has been a real determined effort on the part of the NATO Sec/Gen Rasmussen and 
the High/Rep Ashton to increase cooperation between the two organisations. As one 
official put it, ‘they are meeting much more often now’ (Interview 38, 2011). What has 
become apparent is that there has been a push, mandated by their respective 
organisational memberships, to bring both the EU and NATO closer together. 
However, neither strategies have been equal in approach. It is fair to say that 
Rasmussen on the NATO side has attempted a much broader grand bargain 
approach to solving some of the obstacles, thus preventing closer cooperation. 
Some have even referred to this as a ‘name and shame tactic’. At the same time, 
Baroness Ashton has taken a more pragmatic approach, with the stated intention 
that there should be a ‘true organisation-to-organisation relationship’ (Ashton, 
2010a). Let us look at the two approaches in turn. 
In early 2010, Rasmussen protested that it was ‘absurd’ that both organisations 
‘could not operate together in the same theatres’ without security agreements that 
allow both organisations to ‘assist each other’ (Ames, 2010).110 In Palma de 
Mallorca, Rasmussen laid out three suggestions in what has been since termed his 
‘Palma Package’. There, he stated that the EU should make three overtures towards 
Turkey in order to persuade Ankara to ‘lift its objections to closer cooperation’. These 
are: (1) the EU should conclude an agreement between the European Defence 
Agency and Turkey; (2) the EU should also commit to a security agreement with 
Turkey; (3) the EU should be more open and transparent in the decision shaping 
processes for the running of its security operations regarding ‘non-member troop 
                                            
110
 For access to the full article, please see http://192.254.129.212/natosource/rasmussen-seeks-
break-deadlock (last accessed on 16/12/2013). 
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contributors, such as Turkey’ (Ames, 2010). At the time of writing, little progress, 
however, has been made in finding a compromise. One interlocutor described this 
latest attempt at a compromise: 
 
Rasmussen has been here (the EU) three times now with the 
same message, ‘you should give Turkey a break’, because they 
were squeezed out of the WEU where they had access to what 
later became the CSDP missions, agreed in the Nice Treaty... 
and they have gotten the wrong end of the stick and therefore 
you should open up to them with more inclusion to CSDP and 
more inclusion in the EDA... He has come with that message 
three times and it does not resonate so well here because, first 
of all, it is Turkey that has ditched his Palma Package. It is 
Turkey that has said that we are not going to sit in the same 
room as Cyprus, so they will not agree to a PSC NAC meeting 
(Interview 38, 2011). 
 
As for Ashton’s approach, as stated above, it has been a much smaller ‘pragmatic’ 
steps approach. In 2010, Ashton stated that she attaches ‘great importance to 
moving EU-NATO relations forward. Our goal should be to find practical solutions to 
wider structural problems that have hindered the development of a true organization-
to-organization relationship’ (Ashton, 2010b). Most of these ‘pragmatic steps’ have 
been concerned with EU-NATO cooperation on capabilities, e.g. counter-IED, 
medical support, CBRN and cyber security. A confidential letter (dated 05/05/2011) 
written by 15 EU Foreign Ministers to Baroness Ashton (provided to the researcher 
in confidence) further reinvigorated her approach to this matter. Not only did the 
letter state a conviction for her to move forward on the above-mentioned capabilities, 
but it also stated that the EU should conclude a security agreement with Turkey in 
the first half of 2011. However, at the time of writing, this security agreement has yet 
to be agreed. 
There should be a concerted effort to hold more informal ‘transatlantic events’ and 
especially to design a similar format for MODs and MILREPS. They should be held 
with the understanding that EU-NATO issues will be a key part of the informal 
discussions. Second, Turkey must be invited to take part in individual projects of the 
European Defence Agency (EDA) initially, but with a view to giving them a full 
administrative arrangement in the near future. Furthermore, all non-EU contributors 
to ESDP missions should be given full participation rights within the Committees of 
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Contributors for those operations in which they are engaged. Finally, there should be 
a standard framework arrangement that underpins all cooperation in the field 
between EU civil missions and NATO military missions, and these issues should be 
addressed in NATO’s new strategic concept to be finalised later this year. 
These proposals are intermediary at best and are intended to help take the small 
steps towards a medium bargain. David Yost (Yost, 2007, pp. 93–94) has correctly 
suggested that there are really only three solutions for obtaining a ‘grand bargain’: 
(1) Turkish membership in the EU, (2) the reunification of Cyprus, or (3) Cyprus 
becoming a member of PfP and signing a security agreement with NATO. It is the 
final option that is the most likely in the short to medium term. However, to achieve 
this, a medium bargain should be negotiated that encompasses Cyprus becoming a 
member of the PfP, but balanced with Turkey’s administrative arrangements in the 
EDA, and full participation rights (along with Canada) in the Committee of 
Contributors for any mission in which they are currently engaged or plan to be in the 
future. If need be, much of this could be worked out and agreed upon behind the 
scenes if it were to help facilitate progress. Not only would this help ease the 
deadlock of EU-NATO cooperation, but it would likely go a long way towards the 
Turkish recognition of Nicosia, which will have to necessitate any resolution of 
Cyprus or future membership of Turkey in the EU. 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is the fixed positions of nation states more than the design of the BP/AF that 
prevent real cooperation; that military actors, either in the field or in the centre, get 
the real business of EU-NATO cooperation done, especially when there are no fixed 
agreements for cooperation; and contacts between staff as well as experts have 
increased to try and ‘compensate but not substitute’ for the political deadlock. 
However, there is a real concern that the lack of improvement in EU-NATO 
cooperation over such a sustained period of time will lead to institutional fatigue. 
Although no level of actor - state, international staff, or operational - is immune to this 
difficulty, it has been argued here that the international staff are the most vulnerable. 
There seem to be increasing calls from all sectors to address this issue and to 
look for various solutions to the problem. Both frustration and the solutions exist 
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within EU-NATO institutions and the policy think tanks that surround them. Even 
those actors who have been the most obstructionist since 2003 have put forward 
non-paper policy solutions. Nevertheless, the frustration does not yet seem sufficient 
to substitute the informal arrangements for more formal ones and to institutionalise 
those solutions that have been put forward to date. In other words, a big enough 
external shock (the resolution of the Cyprus issue or, potentially, deaths tragically 
occurring in the field, which are attributable in some way to EU-NATO disconnection, 
for example) has not yet transpired in order to change the current arrangements. 
Therefore, this thesis makes the fundamental claim that the processes of 
incremental change through informal cooperation, in fact, reinforce the current static 
formal political and strategic relationship. Events and operational necessity are 
driving incremental change far more than any theoretical debates about where the 
EU ends and NATO begins. Until events force a situation whereby both 
organisations must revisit the formal structures of cooperation, the static relationship 
will continue to exist, reinforced by sporadically releasing the political pressure valve 
expedited through the processes of informal cooperation. If the EU and NATO are to 
ever truly achieve a ‘Strategic Partnership’, it will stem from an existential security 
critical juncture and not from internal evolutionary processes. 
One real worry is that no grand bargain will be reached until there is a resolution 
regarding Cyprus; one that encompasses all these issues in one package. For some, 
it would seem that nothing is negotiated until everything is negotiated. However, for 
those in the field who are depending on EU-NATO cooperation for their personal 
security, this may be too long to wait. What is needed is a medium bargain that 
would allow for cooperation to advance without giving away the negotiation chips 
that certain actors feel they must retain for future talks. What is clear, however, is 
that this will not happen if too much attention and fanfare is a part of the process. 
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Appendices 
Full List of Confidential Interviews (access for Internal and External 
Examiner Only) 
 
List of Member States by Organisation 
Membership 
 
NATO ONLY 
 
USA 
Turkey 
Canada 
Norway 
Iceland 
Croatia 
Albania 
 
Both NATO and EU 
 
France * 
Slovenia 
Slovakia 
Bulgaria 
Greece 
Germany 
Denmark** 
Belgium 
Poland 
Italy 
Portugal 
Spain 
Netherlands 
UK 
Czech republic 
Hungary 
Romania 
Estonia 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
 
EU ONLY 
 
Finland 
Sweden 
Austria 
Malta 
Cyprus 
 
 
*France rejoined the integrated command structure of NATO in 2009. 
** Denmark has an opt-out clause from CSDP. 
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NATO-EU: chronology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 27 April 2006: Informal ministerial NATO-EU dinner (Sofia).  
 1 March 2006: EU Cell set up at SHAPE.  
 7 December 2005: Informal ministerial NATO-EU dinner (Brussels)  
 3 November 2005: NATO Permanent Liaison Team set up at the EU Military Staff (EUMS)  
 3 October 2005: Agreement on Military Permanent Arrangements establishing a NATO Liaison Team at EUMS and an 
EU cell at SHAPE  
 20 September 2005: Informal ministerial transatlantic/ NATO-EU lunch (New York)  
 2 December 2004: beginning of the EU-led Operation Althea.  
 18 February 2004: France, Germany and the United Kingdom launch the idea of EU rapid reaction units composed of 
joint battle groups  
 December 2003: NATO and the EU start to assess options for the possible termination of NATO's stabilisation force in 
Bosnia (SFOR) by the end of 2004 and its transition to a new EU mission; Adoption by the European Council of a 
'European Security Strategy'  
 19-25 November 2003: First joint NATO-EU crisis management exercise (CME/CMX 03) based on the standing 
'Berlin-Plus' arrangements  
 29 July 2003: Development of a common strategy for the Western Balkans  
 19 May 2003: First meeting of the NATO-EU capability group  
 31 March 2003: Transition from the NATO-led operation 'Allied Harmony' to the EU-led Operation 'Concordia' in the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia1  
 17 March 2003: Agreement on a set of key cooperation documents, known as the 'Berlin-Plus' package  
 14 March 2003: Entry into force of a NATO-EU security of information agreement  
 16 December 2002: EU-NATO Declaration on European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)  
 21-22 November 2002: At the Prague Summit, NATO members declare their readiness to give the EU access to NATO 
assets and capabilities for operations in which the Alliance is not engaged militarily  
 19 November 2001: Creation of the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP)  
 30 May 2001: First formal NATO-EU meeting at the level of foreign ministers in Budapest. The NATO Secretary 
General and the EU Presidency issue a joint statement on the Western Balkans  
 24 January 2001: Beginning of institutionalised relations between NATO and the EU with the establishment of joint 
meetings, including at the level of foreign ministers and Ambassadors. Exchange of letters between the NATO 
Secretary General and the EU Presidency on the scope of cooperation and modalities for consultation  
 7 December 2000: Signature of the EU's Treaty of Nice containing amendments reflecting the operative developments 
of the ESDP as an independent EU policy (entry into force February 2003)  
 19 September 2000: The North Atlantic Council and the interim Political and Security Committee of the European 
Union meet for the first time to take stock of the progress in NATO-EU relations  
 10 December 1999: At the Helsinki Council meeting, EU members establish military "headline goals" to allow the EU, 
by 2003, to deploy up to 15 brigades (50 000 – 60 000 troops) for 'Petersberg tasks' (these consist of humanitarian and 
rescue tasks, peacekeeping and peacemaking). EU members also create political and military structures including a 
Political and Security Committee, a Military Committee and a Military Staff. The crisis management role of the WEU 
is transferred to the EU. The WEU retains residual tasks.  
 3-4 June 1999: European Council meeting in Cologne decides "to give the European Union the necessary means and 
capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defence"  
 23-25 April 1999: At the Washington Summit, Heads of State and Government decide to develop the 'Berlin-Plus' 
arrangements  
 3-4 December 1998: At a summit in St Malo, France and the United Kingdom make a joint statement affirming the 
EU's determination to establish a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)  
 2 October 1997: Signature of the EU's Treaty of Amsterdam incorporating the WEU's 'Petersberg tasks'. The EU 
affirms the role of the WEU as an integral part of its development and envisages the possible integration of the WEU 
into the European Union  
 3 June 1996: in Berlin, NATO foreign ministers agree for the first time to build up an ESDI within NATO, with the 
aim of rebalancing roles and responsibilities between Europe and North America. An essential part of this initiative 
was to improve European capabilities. They also decide to make Alliance assets available for WEU-led crisis 
management operations. These decisions lead to the introduction of the term "Berlin-Plus"  
 January 1994: At the Brussels Summit, NATO endorses the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces, which provides 
for separable but not separate deployable headquarters that could be used for European-led operations and is the 
conceptual basis for future operations involving NATO and other non-NATO countries  
 11 January 1994: NATO Heads of State and Government agree to make collective assets of the Alliance available on 
the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations undertaken by the European allies in 
pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy  
 19 June 1992: In Oslo, NATO foreign ministers support the objective of developing the WEU as a means of 
strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance and as the defence component of the EU, that would also cover the 
'Petersberg tasks'  
 February 1992: the EU adopts the Maastricht Treaty, which envisages an intergovernmental Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) and "the eventual framing of a common defence policy (ESDP). The WEU is considered as the 
EU's defence component; close cooperation between NATO and the WEU.  
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British-French Summit St-Malo, 3-4 December 1998 Joint Declaration 
 
The Heads of State and Government of France and the United Kingdom are agreed that:  
 
1. The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international 
stage. This means making a reality of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which will provide the 
essential basis for action by the Union. It will be important to achieve full and rapid 
implementation of the Amsterdam provisions on CFSP. This includes the responsibility of the 
European Council to decide on the progressive framing of a common defence policy in the 
framework of CFSP. The Council must be able to take decisions on an intergovernmental 
basis, covering the whole range of activity set out in Title V of the Treaty of European Union.  
 
2. To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by 
credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order 
to respond to international crises.  
 
In pursuing our objective, the collective defence commitments to which member states 
subscribe (set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, Article V of the Brussels Treaty) 
must be maintained. In strengthening the solidarity between the member states of the 
European Union, in order that Europe can make its voice heard in world affairs, while acting 
in conformity with our respective obligations in NATO, we are contributing to the vitality of a 
modernised Atlantic Alliance which is the foundation of the collective defence of its 
members.  
 
Europeans will operate within the institutional framework of the European Union (European 
Council, General Affairs Council and meetings of Defence Ministers).  
 
The reinforcement of European solidarity must take into account the various positions of 
European states.  
 
The different situations of countries in relation to NATO must be respected.  
 
3. In order for the European Union to take decisions and approve military action where the 
Alliance as a whole is not engaged, the Union must be given appropriate structures and a 
capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence and a capability for relevant 
strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication, taking account of the existing assets of 
the WEU and the evolution of its relations with the EU. In this regard, the European Union 
will also need to have recourse to suitable military means (European capabilities pre-
designated within NATO's European pillar or national or multinational European means 
outside the NATO framework).  
 
4. Europe needs strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to the new risks, and 
which are supported by a strong and competitive European defence industry and 
technology.  
 
5. We are determined to unite in our efforts to enable the European Union to give concrete 
expression to these objectives 
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Berlin Plus Arrangements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities able to contribute to military 
 planning for EU-led operations; 
 
• The presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO capabilities 
and 
 common assets for use in EU-led operations; 
 
• Identification of a range of European command options for EU-led missions; 
 
• The further adaptation of NATO’s defence planning system to incorporate more 
 comprehensively the availability of forces for EU-led operations; 
 
• A NATO-EU agreement covering the exchange of classified information; 
 
• Procedures for the release, monitoring, return and recall of NATO assets and 
 capabilities; and 
 
• NATO-EU consultation arrangements in the context of an EU-led crisis 
 management operation making use of NATO assets and capabilities. 
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EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION 
 Welcome the strategic partnership established between the European Union 
and NATO in crisis management, founded on our shared values, the 
indivisibility of our security and our determination to tackle the challenges 
of the new Century;  
 Welcome the continued important role of NATO in crisis management and 
conflict prevention, and reaffirm that NATO remains the foundation of the 
collective defence of its members;  
 Welcome the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), whose purpose 
is to add to the range of instruments already at the European Union’s 
disposal for crisis management and conflict prevention in support of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, the capacity to conduct EU-led crisis 
management operations, including military operations where NATO as a 
whole is not engaged;  
 Reaffirm that a stronger European role will help contribute to the vitality of 
the Alliance, specifically in the field of crisis management;  
 Reaffirm their determination to strengthen their capabilities;  
 Declare that the relationship between the European Union and NATO will be 
founded on the following principles: 
 Partnership: ensuring that the crisis management activities of the two 
organisations are mutually reinforcing, while recognising that the European 
Union and NATO are organisations of a different nature;  
 Effective mutual consultation, dialogue, cooperation and transparency;  
 Equality and due regard for the decision-making autonomy and interests of 
the European Union and NATO;  
 Respect for the interests of the Member States of the European Union and 
NATO;  
 Respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, which 
underlie the Treaty on European Union and the Washington Treaty, in order 
to provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable Euro-Atlantic 
security environment, based on the commitment to the peaceful resolution 
of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any 
other through the threat or use of force, and also based on respect for 
treaty rights and obligations as well as refraining from unilateral actions;  
 Coherent, transparent and mutually reinforcing development of the military 
capability requirements common to the two organisations;  
 
To this end: 
 The European Union is ensuring the fullest possible involvement of non-EU 
European members of NATO within ESDP, implementing the relevant Nice 
arrangements, as set out in the letter from the EU High Representative on 
13 December 2002;  
 NATO is supporting ESDP in accordance with the relevant Washington 
Summit decisions, and is giving the European Union, inter alia and in 
particular, assured access to NATO’s planning capabilities, as set out in the 
NAC decisions on 13 December 2002;  
 Both organisations have recognised the need for arrangements to ensure 
the coherent, transparent and mutually reinforcing development of the 
capability requirements common to the two organisations, with a spirit of 
openness.  
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EU-NATO Questionnaire 
 
1. Do you believe the EU-NATO relationship is sub-optimal? 
  answered question 18 
  skipped question 0 
  
Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
YES  94.4% 17 
NO  5.6% 1 
Other (please specify) 0 
 
2. If you answered YES to question number one, what is the primary cause of 
the sub-optimal EU-NATO relationship? 
  answered question 17 
  skipped question 1 
  
Response 
Count 
3. Besides the answer you gave for question number two, can you list any 
other causes for the sub-optimal EU-NATO relationship? 
  answered question 18 
  skipped question 0 
  
Response 
Count 
4. Please rank in order of impact on EU-NATO relations from 1-6. Turkey-
Cyprus relations Europeanist vs. Atlanticist tendencies Discrimination towards 
non-members Organisational design Competition Desire for autonomy other 
(write in) 
  answered question 18 
  skipped question 0 
  
Response 
Count 
5. How well does FORMAL EU-NATO cooperation work in practice 
(Concordia/Althea) on a scale of 1 to 5? (1=the lowest & 5= the highest) 
  answered question 18 
  skipped question 0 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Rating 
Average 
Rating 
Count 
tick 
appropriate 
5.6% (1) 38.9% (7) 22.2% (4) 33.3% (6) 0.0% (0) 2.83 18 
 
6. How well does INFORMAL cooperation work in practice (Kosovo, Piracy, 
Afghanistan) on a scale from 1 to 5?  
  answered question 18 
  skipped question 0 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Rating 
Average 
Rating 
Count 
tick 0.0% (0) 5.6% (1) 33.3% (6) 61.1% (11) 0.0% (0) 3.56 18 
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5. How well does FORMAL EU-NATO cooperation work in practice 
(Concordia/Althea) on a scale of 1 to 5? (1=the lowest & 5= the highest) 
appropriate 
 
 
7. Please list any factors that help to drive INFORMAL EU-NATO cooperation 
despite the political/organisational blockages. 
  answered question 18 
  skipped question 0 
  
Response 
Count 
8. How institutionalised/systematised is INFORMAL EU-NATO cooperation at 
the political level on a scale from 1 to 5? 
  answered question 18 
  skipped question 0 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Rating 
Average 
Rating 
Count 
tick 
appropriate 
16.7% (3) 33.3% (6) 44.4% (8) 5.6% (1) 0.0% (0) 2.39 18 
 
9. How institutionalised/systematised is INFORMAL EU-NATO cooperation at 
the international Staff level on a scale from 1 to 5? 
  answered question 18 
  skipped question 0 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Rating 
Average 
Rating 
Count 
tick 
appropriate 
0.0% (0) 16.7% (3) 44.4% (8) 38.9% (7) 0.0% (0) 3.22 18 
 
10. How institutionalised/systematised is INFORMAL EU-NATO cooperation at 
the theatre level on a scale from 1 to 5? 
  answered question 18 
  skipped question 0 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Rating 
Average 
Rating 
Count 
tick 
appropriate 
5.6% (1) 0.0% (0) 27.8% (5) 44.4% (8) 22.2% (4) 3.78 18 
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EU-NATO Questionnaire (Written Responses) 
 
2. If you answered YES to question number one, what is 
the primary cause of the sub-optimal EU-NATO 
relationship? 
‘The political blockage caused by uneven membership, ie Turkey and Cyprus’ 
‘The problem Turkey-Cyprus’ 
‘The Turkey-Cyprus dispute’ 
‘Turkey-Greece – Cyprus’ 
‘The Greece/Turkey/Cyprus nexus’ 
‘Lack of trust between the two organisations’ 
‘Turkey-Cyprus’ 
‘Turkey-Cyprus/Greece relations’ 
‘Intra-European politics’ 
‘Greek/Cyprus-Turkey issue’ 
‘Turkish relationship with EU and Cyprus issue, but also NATO/EU limited to 
operations’ 
‘I answered this question extensively in our conversation’ 
‘Turkey-Cyprus problems’ 
‘Imbalance; asymmetry’ 
‘Different objectives/different agendas of each organisation’ 
‘Greece/Cyprus/Turkey mess’ 
‘Lack of coordination on strategic level’ 
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3. Besides the answer you gave for question number two, 
can you list any other causes for the sub-optimal EU-NATO 
relationship? 
‘Different organisational cultures and working procedures’ 
‘Reluctance EU and some of its Member States (France)’ 
‘Some policymakers in France and some other EU (particularly non-NATO) member 
states' suspicion of closer EU cooperation with NATO, wanting to retain military 
independence from US, some US policymakers' suspicion that EU attempts to 
develop military capabilities are driven by rivalry with/wish to distance from US’ 
‘US agenda’ 
‘Fear among proponents of European integration that NATO/US will dominate 
NATO/EU relationship’ 
‘Ineffective intelligence exchange. Lack of European commitment (a) to a 
transatlantic security/defence relationship and (b) to defence spending.’ 
‘Competition’ 
‘Economic austerity which is paradoxically impeding any cooperation and capability 
building’ 
‘Inter-institutional bureaucratic rivalry’ 
‘Difference of nature and members of the two organisation’ 
‘Lack of regular political engagement. Relations too much at working level’ 
‘See previous answer’ 
‘Lack of political investment by EU Members in NATO; Ignorance of EU Staff 
members as much as with NATO Staff; Lack of Unity in EU towards a new 
transatlantic vision/bargain’ 
‘EU incompetence or lack of political will to play the appropriate role’ 
‘Politics, national interests’ 
‘Heavy reliance on EU NATO ms on the USA "to do the job" - major EU NATO ms 
(France, Germany) do want to maintain the EU autonomy of capability development 
(issues of market access, etc) - Greece/Turkey relations’ 
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‘Attitudes inside EU: some anti-US; some protective of EU aspirations against 
NATO/’ 
‘No’ 
 
4. Rank in order of impact on EU-NATO relations from 1 to 
6. Turkey-Cyprus relations, Europeanist vs. Atlanticist 
tendencies, Discrimination towards non-members, 
Organisational design, Competition, Desire for autonomy, 
other (write in). 
‘Existing ranking looks sensible’ 
‘1. Turkey-Cyprus. 2. Discrimination. 3. Desire for autonomy. 4. Organisational 
design. 5. Europeanist... 6. Competition.’ 
‘1 Turkey-Cyprus relations. 2 Europeanist vs. Atlanticist tendencies. 3 Discrimination 
towards non-members. 4 Competition. 5 Desire for autonomy. 4 Organisational 
design.’ 
‘Turkey-Cyprus Organisational Design Europe vs Atlantic Autonomy competition 
Discrimination’ 
‘Turkey-Cyprus; Europeanist vs. desire for autonomy; discrimination; organisational 
design; competition’ 
‘From the top: 5, 6, 3, 4, 2, 1’ 
‘1. Turkey-Cyprus relations. 2. Competition. 3. Europeanist vs. Atlanticist tendencies. 
4. FR vs UK.’ 
‘Turkey-Cyprus relations Organisational design Europeanist vs. Atlanticist 
tendencies. Discrimination towards non-members. Desire for autonomy. 
Competition. Economic austerity which is paradoxically impeding any cooperation 
and capability building.’ 
‘1. Greece-Turkey- Cyprus =2. Competition/desire for autonomy =4. Organisational 
design/discrimination 6. Europeanist v Atlanticist’ 
‘1 Turkey-Cyprus relations. 2 Discrimination towards non-members. 3 Desire for 
autonomy. 4 Organisational design. 5 Europeanist vs. Atlanticist tendencies. 6 
Competition.’ 
‘Turkey-Cyprus relations. Discrimination towards non-members. Organisational 
design. Desire for autonomy. Competition. Europeanist vs Atlanticist tendencies.’ 
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‘The EU/Turkey relationship or non-relationship is key, the rest is of a second order’ 
‘1) Turkey-Cyprus relations. 2) Desire for autonomy (of EU Nations) both in NATO 
and EU. 3) Discrimination towards (EU) non-members. 4) (Staff) Competition. 5) 
ideology (anti-militarism in EU Staff).’ 
‘The #1 problem is that the EU appears to be unable or unwilling (or both) to play the 
role it needs to play (and the US would like it to play) as a global actor. Thereafter, 
referring to list above, 5, 2, 4, 1 & 3 (equal). #6 (desire for autonomy) should not be 
an issue.’ 
‘1. Turkey-Cyprus rel. 2. Discrimination towards non-members 3. Organisational 
design. 4. Competition. 5. Desire for autonomy. 6. Eur vs. Atl.’ 
‘In terms of most important to least important 6. Desire for Autonomy 5. Europeanist 
Vs Atlanticist tendencies 4. Turkey-Cyprus relations 3. Organisational design 2. 
Competition 1. Discrimination towards non-members’ 
‘1,2,6,5,3,4 (ranking from top to bottom for above)’ 
‘Turkey-Cyprus relations Organisational design Europeanist vs. Atlanticist 
tendencies. Discrimination towards non-members. Competition. Desire for autonomy’ 
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7. List any factors that help to drive INFORMAL EU-NATO 
cooperation despite the political/organisational blockages. 
‘Working around and personal relationships.’ 
‘Reality on the ground. Personality of leaders.’ 
‘Professional commitment and relationships of the individual commanders and staff 
on the ground/running the operations.’ 
‘Quality of individual staff. Operational necessity.’ 
‘Experience of military in cooperative settings; dominance of practical over political 
considerations.’ 
‘Local/environmental pressure for efficiency. Financial pressures. Media and public 
opinion.’ 
‘No need for explicit approval by nations.’ 
‘Practical need for cooperation and overlap of members of the both organisations.’ 
‘Practitioners needing things to work efficiently.’ 
‘Same military culture - personnel coming almost from the same nations - need to 
succeed in the mission – pragmatism.’ 
‘People in-theatre who know each other/role of DSACEUR.’ 
‘See comments under question 2.’ 
‘Staff-to-Staff coordination from High-Level to field Commanders Military 
pragmatism.’ 
‘Real needs on the ground plus the fact that military personnel are not hung up by 
political considerations.’ 
‘Common objectives desire for success habit.’ 
‘Good work at the level of staffs - people "on the ground" speak the "same language" 
so they cooperate - Cyprus' willingness to accommodate such cooperation, from the 
EU side - HR Ashton's package of proposals, as presented to the PSC in April 2011.’ 
‘Everything is an exception and no informal cooperation establishes new rules.’ 
‘Joint NAC-PSC sessions would help but do not take place due to political 
constraints.’ 
